



8  
4836

---











COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

*Studies in Administration:* Volume IX

CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT  
IN SEVEN CITIES

## *Publications of the Committee on Public Administration*

### STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION

- The Administration of Federal Grants to States, by V. O. Key, Jr., 1937  
The Works Progress Administration in New York City, by John D. Millett  
The Administration of Canadian Conditional Grants: A Study in Dominion-Provincial Relationships, by Luella Gettys, 1938  
The Administration of an N. R. A. Code: A Case Study of the Men's Clothing Industry, by Robert H. Connery, with a Foreword by Lindsay Rogers  
Public Employment Service in the United States, by Raymond C. Atkinson, Ben Deming, and Louise C. Odencrantz  
The Administration of Old Age Assistance, by Robert T. Lansdale, Elizabeth Long, Agnes Leisy, and Byron T. Hipple, 1939  
City Manager Government in the United States: A Review, by Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, 1940  
City Manager Government in Nine Cities: Case Studies, by Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone  
City Manager Government in Seven Cities: Case Studies, by Frederick C. Mosher, Arthur Harris, Howard White, John A. Vieg, and others  
Public Administration and the U. S. Department of Agriculture, by John M. Gaus and Leon Wolcott, with a chapter by Verne Lewis [In Preparation]

### MONOGRAPHS

- Unemployment Compensation Administration in Wisconsin and New Hampshire, by Walter Matscheck, 1936 [Public Administration Service No. 52]  
The Administration of Old Age Assistance in Three States, by Robert T. Lansdale and others, 1936 [Public Administration Service No. 53]  
The Administration of Unemployment Compensation Benefits in Wisconsin, July 1, 1936, to June 30, 1937, by Walter Matscheck and R. C. Atkinson, 1937 [Public Administration Service No. 58]  
Films as an Aid in Training Public Employees, by John E. Devine, 1937  
Research in Administrative Law—Scope and Method, by Oliver P. Field  
Research in Public Personnel Administration—Scope and Method, by Leonard D. White, 1939  
The Administration of Public Tort Liability in Los Angeles, 1934-38, by Leon T. David and John F. Feldmeier  
Monographs on City Manager Government, by Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, 1939 [Public Administration Service]:  
San Diego, Cal., [Sp. 7]; Janesville, Wis., [Sp. 8]; Charlotte, N. C., [Sp. 9]; Fredericksburg, Va., [Sp. 10]; Lynchburg, Va., [Sp. 11]; Jackson, Mich., [Sp. 13]; Austin, Tex., [Sp. 14]; Dallas, Tex., [Sp. 15]; Kingsport, Tenn., 1940, [Sp. 17]  
Monographs on City Manager Government [Public Administration Service]:  
Berkeley, Cal., by Arthur Harris, [Sp. 18]; Hamilton, Ohio, by Howard White, [Sp. 19]; Rochester, N. Y., by Frederick C. Mosher, [Sp. 20]; Ames, Iowa, by John A. Vieg, [Sp. 21]; Long Beach, Cal., by A. George Miller, [Sp. 22]; Winnetka, Ill., by David Monroe and Harry Wilson, [Sp. 23]

# CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN SEVEN CITIES

by

FREDERICK C. MOSHER

ARTHUR HARRIS

HOWARD WHITE

JOHN A. VIEG

LANDRUM R. BOLLING

A. GEORGE MILLER

DAVID G. MONROE

HARRY O'NEAL WILSON

*Published for the  
Committee on Public Administration of the  
Social Science Research Council by*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE

CHICAGO: 1940

COPYRIGHT, 1940, BY  
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE

[FARRELL G. H. SYMONS, CHIEF OF PUBLICATIONS]

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, AND CRAWFORDSVILLE, INDIANA



## FOREWORD

THE COMMITTEE on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council in 1937 undertook a nation-wide study of the results and practical operation of the city manager plan of government. A few cities had operated under the plan for over a quarter of a century, many for more than twenty years, and there were 472 cities in the United States with this form of government in December, 1939. The time seemed ripe to appraise the results of what has sometimes been called one of the most important social inventions in government in the twentieth century.

Under the committee's auspices Mr. and Mrs. Harold A. Stone and Mr. Don K. Price visited eighteen carefully chosen cities to observe city manager government in action under varying local conditions and to learn from local sources the political traditions of each community, the kind of government which it had previously had, and the forces which had led to the adoption of the city manager plan.

In addition to those surveyed by the committee's staff, thirty-two cities were studied by forty-eight professors and graduate students of political science at universities throughout the country. Thirty of these studies were specifically undertaken to parallel those of the committee's staff and to furnish a broader base for possible generalizations. This voluntary pooling of the research efforts of many scholars to a common end has been most encouraging to the committee, which expresses its gratitude to its collaborators.

The results of these studies are presented in several forms. A volume of general analysis, based upon the experiences of the fifty cities studied, written by the committee's staff, is being published as *City Manager Government in the United States*. Mr. and Mrs. Stone and Mr. Price have written reports of the experiences of nine of the eighteen cities that they visited. These monographs, first published as separate pamphlets, are collected in a companion volume, *City Manager Government in Nine Cities*: it is believed that they give a realistic account and a sound analysis of city manager government in operation under varying circumstances.

Of the reports submitted to the committee's staff by the volunteer collaborators, seven have been similarly published under the committee's auspices as separate pamphlets. These are collected in the present volume, *City Manager Government in Seven Cities*, forming a second com-

panion volume to the over-all Review. Others have been published locally or have been summarized in a series of articles appearing in the *National Municipal Review* during 1939-40. The manuscripts of the unpublished reports submitted by volunteer collaborators have been deposited in the Joint Reference Library, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago, and are available on interlibrary loan.

The cities observed in the survey include nearly half the city manager cities with more than 50,000 population and nearly one-third of those with over 25,000. They include many of those with the most interesting and significant experiences under city manager government. There are some in every part of the United States and in every state that has been important in the city manager movement; some with every kind of political history and government background; and some of the earliest and some of the more recent cities to adopt the plan.

There is no agreed measuring stick by which to judge the success or failure of a city government. It is to be admitted at once that the form of government is only one factor affecting the practical results—though an important factor. Each of the cities covered has been carefully examined, and the actual results under the manager plan have been compared with those under preceding forms of government within the same community.

The observations recorded in the seven reports in this volume could obviously not have been made without the hearty cooperation of officials and citizens in all walks of life in the cities visited. It is impossible to name all the mayors, councilmen, managers, officers and employees of government, civic leaders, journalists, civic organization secretaries, housewives, and workingmen, who contributed information, submitted to interviews, or read and criticized drafts of the reports: the authors and the committee thank them all. During most of the period of the study Dr. Joseph P. Harris was the committee's director of research; his planning, consultation, and review of the work in progress contributed greatly to its success.

The individual authors are solely responsible for all statements of fact and opinion which appear in their several reports. The Social Science Research Council has facilitated the studies; in accordance with its customary practice, the council has not reviewed or passed upon the findings, nor has its Committee on Public Administration, under whose auspices the study was made.

CHARLES S. ASCHER  
*Secretary*

May, 1940

## CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . .	v
ROCHESTER, NEW YORK . . . . .	3
<i>Frederick C. Mosher</i>	
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA . . . . .	101
<i>Arthur Harris</i>	
HAMILTON, OHIO . . . . .	173
<i>Howard White</i>	
AMES, IOWA . . . . .	235
<i>John A. Vieg</i>	
DAYTON, OHIO . . . . .	259
<i>Landrum R. Bolling</i>	
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA . . . . .	325
<i>A. George Miller</i>	
WINNETKA, ILLINOIS . . . . .	375
<i>David G. Monroe and Harry O'N. Wilson</i>	
INDEX . . . . .	439

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

---

*MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE*

WILLIAM ANDERSON, *Chairman*, University of Minnesota  
LOUIS BROWNLOW, Public Administration Clearing House  
ROWLAND EGGER, Director of the Budget, Virginia  
LUTHER H. GULICK, Institute of Public Administration  
LEWIS MERIAM, The Brookings Institution  
LINDSAY ROGERS, Columbia University  
LEONARD D. WHITE, University of Chicago  
GEORGE F. YANTIS, Northwest Regional Council

---

CHARLES S. ASCHER, *Secretary*  
JOHN D. MILLETT  
261 Broadway, New York

---

*CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL*

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION  
AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION  
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION  
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION  
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY  
AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION

---

ROBERT T. CRANE, *Executive Director of the Council*

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

*Frederick C. Mosher*

## CONTENTS

I. The Setting . . . . .	3
II. Governmental Background . . . . .	7
III. The City Manager Movement . . . . .	16
IV. Ten Years of City Management 1928-1938 . . . . .	30
V. Politics and Policy-Making . . . . .	54
VI. The City Manager and Administration . . . . .	69
VII. Conclusion . . . . .	94



### IMPORTANT DATES IN ROCHESTER'S GOVERNMENT

First Charter . . . . .	1834
White Charter . . . . .	1900
Council-Manager Plan Adopted . . . . .	1925
Council-Manager Plan Effective . . . . .	1928

---

Stephen B. Story, Manager . . . . .	1928
C. Arthur Poole, Manager . . . . .	1932
Theodore C. Briggs, Manager . . . . .	1933
Harold W. Baker, Manager . . . . .	1934



*Field Work: Summer, 1938*  
*Report Written: Fall, 1939*

# City Manager Government in Rochester, New York

## I. THE SETTING

**R**OCHESTER, New York, is a city of about 340,000 population, lying in the western part of New York State, just south of Lake Ontario. It is the home of a large number of industries of varied type and is the distributing center of a highly productive agricultural area. Since its incorporation a little over a century ago, it has had a rapid but not spectacular growth, based upon a steady expansion of manufacturing and commercial operations in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth. The postwar period has witnessed Rochester's gradual passage into the status of a mature and stable city, productive and important in the national economy, steady-going and conservative in its social and political life.

The area on which Rochester now stands was beyond the western colonial frontier at the time of the American Revolution, and, until the armistice of that war, was part of the wild domain of the six Iroquois Nations. Development was slow at first, hindered by the difficulty of transportation to and from the eastern cities, but the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 stimulated a mushroom growth. A number of flour mills were built at the falls of the Genesee River, which crossed the canal near the present site of the city's business center, and the place soon became the trading focus of the rich agricultural area which surrounded it. Access to lake boats on Lake Ontario was supplemented by the construction of roads east and west and by the Erie Canal, which ran directly through the village. By 1834 the population, composed principally of migrants from New England, had swelled to over ten thousand, and the value of the city's products was estimated at about \$2,000,000. In that year the city of Rochester was created by action of the state legislature.

Thus officially launched, the city of Rochester embarked upon a century of almost uninterrupted industrial expansion and population growth. Its situation was in many ways favorable for such a develop-

ment. Located on the coastal plain which parallels the southern shore of Lake Ontario, it became the trade center of an extensive area, now estimated to include about 650,000 people. Hills and rugged topography south of the city forced the most important transportation routes to pass through or near it, and its growth largely depended upon the Erie Canal and, later, the railroad lines. There are now five railways connecting Rochester in every direction but north.

Water has been a most important element in Rochester's development. Lake Ontario provides deep water navigation to other Great Lakes cities and to the Atlantic Ocean, and the proposed development of the St. Lawrence waterway would potentially establish its importance as a port for ocean-going vessels. The Erie Canal ran through the heart of the city until its abandonment thirty years ago in favor of the Barge Canal. The new canal runs along the southern border of the city and offers important shipping facilities to the east and west. The Genesee River, the major reason for first settlement at this site, flows through the center of the city in almost a due northerly direction and drops, in a series of falls and rapids, about 250 feet before it flows into Lake Ontario. These falls, once employed to turn the wheels of the early flour mills, now furnish the city with its electric power.

These natural advantages and the ready accessibility of eastern and national markets provided ample inducements for the establishment of many varieties of industrial plants. During the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, Rochester became a thriving producer of such goods as clothing, furniture, office equipment, electrical equipment, steel, and, most of all, cameras.

After 1920 the rate of industrial expansion declined. Relatively few new manufacturing plants were established during the succeeding fifteen years. The economic depression, of course, caused a general contraction of industrial activities, and a number of plants closed their doors or moved out of Rochester. The depression, however, was felt no more severely in Rochester than in other cities and less so than in many. A decline in the rate of industrial growth had already set in, and it appears probable that Rochester had reached a state of comparative economic stability by 1938.

Population growth kept pace, of course, with the industrial expansion. Starting as a trading and milling center of thrifty and hardy New England emigrants, the city soon became a haven for Irish and German tradesmen and factory workers. Later on, Poland and Italy became the chief sources of immigrants. All but the Italians were readily



assimilated into the city's economic and social life; they constitute the only important element of the city's relatively small foreign-born population.

With foreign immigration sharply curtailed and with a steadily declining birth rate, Rochester is reluctantly entering its middle life. At least it gives every evidence of this. Between 1910 and 1920, its population increased by what then seemed a normal rate, 35.6 per cent. But between 1920 and 1930, this rate dropped to 10.6 per cent. Part of this drop is explained by the increasing settlement in the peripheral towns outside the city limits, but the gradual approach of death and birth rates to a state of parity and the failure of industry to expand at its accustomed tempo are equal factors. As the city enters its middle age, so do the majority of its residents. Less than half the population was under thirty years of age in 1930, and the elementary school enrollments declined steadily after they reached their peak in 1927.

But Rochester, long accustomed to steady expansion, swallows the idea of stability only with difficulty. Variouslly termed the "Flower City," the "Power City," the "Kodak City," Rochester nurtures the ideal of continuous growth along approved capitalist lines. This is not hard to explain, for economic growth was sound and profitable in Rochester. Measured by most criteria, Rochester is one of the wealthiest cities in New York State. It has a large proportion of persons in the top income brackets. Many of its industries—such as photographic equipment, lenses and optical goods, electrical apparatus, office furnishings—require many skilled laborers, and the wage level is relatively high. From the standpoints of inventiveness, balance and variety of enterprise, steady and intelligent development, and sound management, Rochester probably represents capitalism at its best. The economic depression of recent years has, of course, been acutely felt, and the welfare burden has been a heavy one, but the variety and vitality of major industries probably insures the city against any major economic collapse.

The nature of the city's industries has discouraged any very potent labor movement. A number of trade unions, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and associated in the Central Trades and Labor Council, are well established in certain of the crafts and offer a rather conservative labor influence in the political life of the city. The only important affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1938 was the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, by far the largest, the most powerful, and the most left-wing union in the city.

The business ideology, however—as expressed in the Chamber of

Commerce, the Rotary Club, the Real Estate Board, the Citizens' Tax League, the Gannett papers—provides the prevailing tenor of the town. Rochester is conservative in economics and politics. It values wealth and business success highly.

As a counterpart of its economic conservatism and perhaps as an inheritance from its early New England ancestry, there is a distinct tone of religious and righteous morality in the culture of the community. Rochester was once the home of a potent prohibition movement, and its two Gannett newspapers, which dominate local journalism, have steadfastly refused to accept liquor advertisements. The churches are strong and their membership is large. The private charities are likewise strong and well backed, and the city is justifiably proud of its generous contributions to the poor—a generosity which is less spontaneous when the contributions are made compulsory by governmental action.

In 1928, when it was criticized in a popular magazine as "the smuggest city in the United States,"<sup>1</sup> Rochester arose in indignant protest and pointed to its industry, its charity, its beauty, and its culture as refuting evidence. The city's parks and flower displays, the beautiful residences along wealthy East Avenue, the symphony orchestra, the music institute, the university, the library—all attest to an unusual civic interest in cultural and aesthetic pursuits as well as to a wonderful good fortune in the philanthropy of George Eastman and other successful native sons. Nonetheless, some of Rochester's citizens, perhaps overconscious of the city's flaws, echo the feeling that the city is too complacent about its accomplishments, too blind to its failures. They cite the planlessness and unsightliness of parts of the downtown area, the failure to recognize a housing problem, and the difficulty of arousing popular interest in civic affairs.

In fields of government, however, the city has certainly demonstrated a disposition toward progressiveness and reform. Indeed, Rochesterians take some pride in the progress made in all three of the local governmental units that operate in the city. The city was one of the first large cities to adopt the city manager plan; in 1938 it was the third largest American city operating under this plan. Monroe County, of which Rochester is the political and population center, likewise adopted the manager plan in 1936 and became one of the six counties in the country with this form of government. Finally, the local school system, which is administered by an elected board of education under the general budget control of the city council, has been a source of civic

<sup>1</sup> In a quotation in *Forbes Magazine*, September 15, 1928.

pride for many decades by virtue of its nonpolitical administration.

Some of the more cynical residents tend to minimize these achievements, holding that they demonstrate an overemphasis on form and appearance too often accompanied by an apathy toward substance. Whether this feeling is justified, it is certainly true that Rochesterians have made sincere efforts to bring about improvements in their city. Rochester's reform spirit—and there is no doubt that such a spirit exists—emanates from a rather self-conscious progressivism, a desire to do the right thing. It is circumscribed by a feeling of caution lest it go too far and upset the long-established and proved institutions. In the words of Carl Carmer, "Rochester is a temperate city, satisfiedly walking the middle of the road, always circumspect, prudent, discreet. It has never had much of that quality which for want of a better name is called color."<sup>1</sup>

## II. GOVERNMENTAL BACKGROUND

ROCHESTER'S POLITICAL development provides a good picture, on the one hand, of a rapidly growing city's struggle to adjust its government to the ever increasing demands made upon it, and, on the other, of its effort to improve its system of government in accordance with current political ideologies.

### *The Charter*

The first Rochester charter created a Common Council composed of two aldermen from each of the five original wards. This body was virtually all-powerful, and it appointed all the few other city officials except the assessors, who were likewise elected. With this simple legislative type of government as a beginning, the charter launched on a sixty-year career of repeated amendment and frequent recodification in an effort to keep the structure abreast of the times. Two principal trends may be noted in the development during this period. First was the gradual emergence of the office of mayor and the reciprocal decline of the council from its original position of dominance. Suspicion of the legislative body, with increasing demands for administrative services, led to amendments which, in the course of sixty-five years, transformed a legislative government into a strong-mayor type of structure.

The same lack of public confidence in elected representatives was

<sup>1</sup> In *Listen for a Lonesome Drum* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936), p. 41.

probably a basic force behind the second major trend: the increasing use of citizen commissions and ex-officio boards to administer particular governmental functions. These boards were particularly evident during the latter part of the past century when, at one time or another, practically all the city's functions were entrusted to some variety of plural body.

The indiscriminate establishment of boards limited the development and power of both the mayor and the council. The large number of independent officials encouraged interofficial jealousy, duplication of effort, and sometimes open conflict. The most flagrant example was, perhaps, the elective executive board, established in 1876 to administer virtually all public works functions. It was said that this body operated in open hostility to the city council.

The trend toward a strong mayor was climaxed—and that toward boards and commissions was abruptly checked—by the passage of the so-called White Charter of 1900. This charter was an event, the governmental significance of which in Rochester's history is equaled only by the city manager charter of 1925. In the first place, it marked the beginning of the end of special state laws on city governments. Whereas all previous charters and amendments were the subject of the fancies (and politics) of the state legislature, the White Charter was a uniform act, applying to all second-class cities in the state—that is, those between 50,000 and 175,000 population—a group which then included Rochester.

Secondly, this act established a really strong executive for the city for the first time in its history. Most of the boards and commissions were replaced by single administrative department heads responsible to the mayor. Only two important ex-officio boards remained—one on purchasing and one on budgeting—and these were controlled by the mayor and his appointees. The major offices which remained outside his appointive control were the financial ones, assessors, treasurer, and comptroller, and the board of education, all of which were elective.

The city council likewise enjoyed an enhancement of power. Many of the legislative powers which had been usurped by the various commissions were returned to the central legislative body.

In striking contrast to the rapidly changing charters in the previous fifty-five years, the features of the White Charter remained substantially unaltered until the adoption of the city manager plan in 1925. The State Census of 1905 reported the city's population as over the 175,000 limit for second-class cities, and it was thus removed from the application of

the uniform charter. A new charter was drafted, embodying practically all the features of its predecessor, and it was adopted by the state legislature in 1907. This new draft was carefully and thoroughly written and provided Rochester with what then was probably an excellent basic law. It remained in force until 1928, and the amendments to it during that period were few in number and minor in character.

The fact that, after sixty-five years of amendment and experimentation in the city's basic law, the features of the White Charter exhibited such marked stability for a quarter of a century partially reflects the city's approach to the grown-up stage. Growth was less rapid, changes were less drastic, public attitude was less aggressive and less progressive.

This suddenly acquired governmental stability probably also speaks well for the charter of 1900, its progressive features, flexibility, and adaptability to new requirements. The charter was undoubtedly an exceptionally good one for its time, and the operations which were carried on upon its framework were, on the whole, well conducted. When in 1915 George Eastman contracted with the New York Bureau of Municipal Research to make a survey of the Rochester government, a remarkable testimonial to its excellence resulted. Following a thorough investigation into the municipal offices, the bureau stated:<sup>1</sup>

The New York Bureau of Municipal Research has made administrative studies in some fifty different local governments and comprehensive studies of twenty-five city governments, and, notwithstanding the fact that Rochester still retains the old type of organization, the results and conditions which were found there are superior to those which have been found in any other city: not that Rochester has a government which is beyond criticism, as there is obvious opportunity and need for improvement. But speaking comparatively, Rochester's government is better organized and better managed than any which has come to the Bureau's notice.

It is little wonder that such a statement, made by what was then perhaps the authoritative research organization in municipal government, might be conducive to self-content and conservatism in local affairs. Rochester remained the "best governed city" in the minds of many citizens for years thereafter, and the expression is still occasionally used. This single statement in the report became a major handicap to the reformers who, a decade later, strove to institute the manager plan; it gave the partisan opponents and the conservatives a potent talking point for maintaining the *status quo*.

<sup>1</sup> New York Bureau of Municipal Research, *Government of the City of Rochester, N. Y.*, 1915, p. 1.

*The Bureau of Municipal Research*

General belief perhaps to the contrary, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research report was far from a whitewash. It made a large number of recommendations, some of which involved changes in the basic law. A logical outgrowth of the study was the establishment of a permanent research organization in the city to carry out these suggestions and keep the government on its toes. In point of chronology, the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research was organized before the New York Bureau report was published. It was set up and financed entirely by Mr. Eastman and was supported solely by him until his death in 1932. He gathered about him ten other prominent men interested in civic affairs to form a board of trustees. The bureau was incorporated in 1915 and was accepted with full approval by the city government.

The Rochester Bureau was an offspring of the New York Bureau and inherited not alone its report but its ideals, purposes, and methods. Mr. Eastman's original idea of establishing a research bureau probably emanated from his acquaintance with Frederick Cleveland, then director of the New York group. The first director, LeRoy Snyder, came to Rochester from the New York Bureau.

The Rochester Bureau became a most important element in the governmental picture. It was at least partly responsible for perhaps the majority of important improvements that were made in the day-to-day operations of the government in the following twenty years. It was the chief source of factual information for individuals and groups who were interested in the government. Finally, it was especially important in bringing the city manager plan to Rochester. Its original establishment was, perhaps, the seed of the whole movement, for its original long-time program called for adoption of the plan. Its actual part in the campaign was great, as will appear later.

The policy of the bureau was one of cooperation with city officials, political leaders, and other civic elements. It steadfastly opposed the militant approach, rather seeking the confidence of those in power. Excepting only the city manager campaign, it never publicly sought a radical change in the government, and it avoided discrediting any official. Its publicity policy was conservative. It presented facts and figures and the arguments on both sides of any debated issue. For many years it made little systematic attempt to reach a large sector of the public, although its data were available to any and all. In 1936 it began publishing a monthly bulletin, the circulation of which came to be about four thousand.

In the period between 1915 and 1925, the existence and the work of the bureau offered some assurance of progress and efficiency in the city administration. Actually a number of major improvements were initiated by the bureau during this period. It seems safe to assert, therefore, that even in 1925 Rochester was still a fairly well administered city. It had a workable charter; its operations had been praised in 1915; it had an active and competent research bureau to help improve it after 1915.

Yet, to a large extent, the effectiveness of the bureau's work, indeed the possibility of progress, depended upon the political party in power. Its success rested upon the cooperation and the farsightedness of the city personnel, and the personnel depended entirely upon the party.

Such cooperation was not always received, and the bureau became convinced that the set-up should be changed if further progress was to be made. This opinion was stated in a later (unpublished) report of the bureau: "This stone wall was encountered so often that it led to the conviction that the real vital improvements in government could not be made as long as the organization remained as it was and politics were carried down to the actual administration of the municipal government."

### *Politics*

The city manager movement probably grew out of this reaction against politics more than out of any structural weaknesses in the city's charter. The administrative organization was workable, and the record of performance was probably above average. It is, therefore, pertinent to inquire into the political behaviors and events that led to the reaction and to the adoption of the charter of 1925.

Until 1925 Rochester was a strictly party-governed city, and, more specifically, a Republican-governed city. In fact, the modern history of politics in Rochester had been, for many years, a story of Republican domination. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the Republicans controlled almost every city and county office and returned substantial pluralities in state and national elections. This party controlled all local patronage, and the Democrats, the only important source of opposition, could rely only on such state and federal offices as fell their way.

The situation in Rochester was even more one-sided than in other typically Republican New York cities. Even when there were national swings to the Democrats, the local organization managed to hold its own. Even in the 1921 election Rochester clung to its Republicanism

while many other comparable cities shifted to the other party. In that year the Democratic party lost the mayoralty contest by a bare two thousand votes, but it had no more than usual success in the aldermanic election, electing only three out of the twenty-four councilmen.

The Democrats had last controlled the Common Council by virtue of the election of 1907 in which they won thirteen of the twenty-two seats. Prior to that, the council had been fairly evenly divided, and the contests were close. From then until the first council under the manager form, the Democrats never placed more than four candidates. The average number of Democrats on the council from 1910 through 1927 was two, and the last council under the aldermanic system contained twenty-four Republicans and no Democrats whatever. Furthermore, the Republican machine controlled the two main at-large offices, mayor and president of the Common Council, without interruption for more than two decades before the city manager plan was adopted. The last Democratic mayor had been elected in 1897.

Rochester's unyielding faith in the Republican party during this period may be explained partly by tradition, partly by antipathy toward New York City and its Tammany organization, and partly by the appeal of that party's program to the conservative temper of the population. These factors Rochester had in common with the rest of upstate New York.

In addition, Rochester had a local Republican organization of unusual strength and cohesiveness, an organization welded and ruled for more than a quarter of a century by one man, George W. Aldridge. To a large extent, the overwhelming power of the party in Rochester was a personal achievement of Mr. Aldridge. From the time he took over the reins in 1894, Mr. Aldridge organized, developed, nursed, and completely dominated his machine and the local governments it controlled. He practically eliminated any serious factionalism in his party, and in contest after contest it presented a strong, united front. He controlled all Republican patronage and guided city and county policies. Upon the basis of a normally Republican electorate, he built a machine that was unbeatable.

In view of the stamp Mr. Aldridge left upon the political face of Rochester, some of the reasons for his remarkable career should be explained. First were the personal characteristics of the man himself. He was intelligent and an astute politician. He was a systematic worker, a good organizer, and a fighter when challenged. He understood people and in his early years in politics gathered about him many able young



men, some of whom long remained important in political circles. Mr. Aldridge was a student not alone of politics but also of government, and it appears that he understood the implications of his actions in terms of both theory and practice of government.

Secondly, an element in Mr. Aldridge's success was that he gave relatively good government. It was said that he required that the major officers meet certain qualifications of ability as well as of political favor. He apparently felt that the best guarantee of his power was efficiency and progressiveness in the administration itself. The 1915 report of the New York Bureau, cited above, is good evidence that he practiced this belief.

Finally, Mr. Aldridge's strength may be attributed partly to the support he could muster personally from groups outside the organization itself, particularly the financial and business elements in the city. Mr. Aldridge was a good friend of George Eastman, the unquestioned business leader in town. The Republican campaign chests were always fuller than the Democratic ones, and though this result would no doubt have been true under any Republican leader, the Aldridge influence contributed to it.

Mr. Aldridge was brought up in the rough-and-tumble school of politics of the late nineteenth century, and his methods were of that school. Compared with other bosses at that time, he may have been a relatively enlightened leader. But he was still the hard-driving, power-thirsty politician. Politics with him came first; government, second. Three times he ventured to establish himself outside the Rochester vicinity, and on each of these occasions he received a sharp rebuff. In 1896 he sought the governorship of New York State but lost the nomination, owing to the opposition of Boss Platt. He was appointed state superintendent of public works at about that time and had charge of the Erie Canal reconstruction work. The manner in which this work was supervised gave rise to a major state scandal, and Mr. Aldridge resigned under pressure in 1898. A legislative investigation of his supervision of this work reported gross partisanship, favoritism, and misuse of funds, amounting to about one million dollars of irregularly expended moneys. Later, he was appointed to the State Railways Commission, and here again scandal followed, culminating in the abolishment of the commission and the establishment of the Public Service Commission. In 1910 Mr. Aldridge aspired to membership in Congress and ran on the Republican ticket. A violent newspaper campaign started against him, particularly among out-of-town papers, which termed his can-

didacy an insult to the American Congress. His sharp defeat by his less prominent Democratic opponent was a personal rebuff that finally quieted his national political ambitions.

In the days of power Mr. Aldridge's Rochester was governed entirely on the basis of party, and politics thoroughly pervaded the whole government, excluding only the schools. There were charges of graft and "gravy," but for the most part, it appears that the government was honestly run, certainly more so than other boss-ridden cities.

When Mr. Aldridge died in 1922, the structure which he had virtually frozen into local control began to thaw and crumble under the heat of internal dissension. The dictator had failed in one thing—to develop a competent successor. Disgruntled elements within the party, for years quieted under the Aldridge hand, arose to harass the organization men. And the lesser leaders in the ward organizations, formerly content as satellites, now wanted nothing less than full control.

Thus was the path paved for the split in the Republican party and for the antiparty, city manager campaign of 1925. James L. Hotchkiss, a loyal Aldridge lieutenant for years, faithful to his chief's principles but lacking in his qualities of leadership and political acumen, became the Republican leader in 1922 and served in that capacity until 1927, the last year of mayor-council government. That five-year period was the stormiest in the party's experience in this century. Torn from within by dissension culminating in an open insurgent revolt in 1925, the organization presented an indecisive, divided front with which to face the city manager problem. In 1927 the breach which had been temporarily healed opened afresh and brought about an overturn in the organization and the departure of Mr. Hotchkiss. It was many years before the split in the party was repaired and it regained its control of the city government.

The immediate occasion for the revolt occurred in the summer of 1925, when Mr. Hotchkiss named the party designations for the fall elections. Clarence D. Van Zandt was then completing his second term as mayor. Joseph C. Wilson was completing his second term as comptroller, likewise an elective office. These two men were both popular, Mr. Wilson being an especially effective vote-getter, and both had been choices of Mr. Aldridge. They had fallen out with Mr. Hotchkiss, who designated two others to replace them. The immediate reason for the conflict was the independence with which the mayor made his appointments. Many ward leaders were dissatisfied with the distribution of patronage. The major culminating factor had been the appointment of

Harold W. Baker as commissioner of public works. Mr. Baker, who became city manager in 1934, had been an employee of the Bureau of Municipal Research and had no political standing. Mr. Wilson, though not responsible for these appointments, worked closely with the mayor. He was not sympathetic with the party's leadership and probably had personal ambitions for the post himself.

At the same time, Mr. Hotchkiss refused to renominate William F. Love, the county district attorney. The effect of this move was to throw the three men together in a concerted effort to combat the organization in the September primaries. Two other prominent Republican leaders, Leo A. MacSweeney and Charles E. Bostwick, joined the insurgents. Mr. Bostwick, leader of the large tenth ward, had several times opposed Mr. Aldridge and had been defeated in every effort. He was eager to overthrow the leadership of the party and probably sought domination himself.

The condition of the Republican party at the time of the city manager campaign was thus most favorable for the development of a powerful nonpartisan movement. Indeed, a unified Republican opposition to the movement might have forestalled it entirely.

The experience of the Democratic organization had been the opposite of that of the Republicans. During the Republican heyday it was a minority party, poorly financed, poorly organized, and poorly led. For many years the Democratic organization was important only as occasional dispenser of state and federal jobs. It did not even offer effective opposition, its membership on the city and county legislative bodies being insignificant.

The Democrats developed no leader who was able to command the respect and obedience of the rank and file. Perhaps no man could have attained that position. The Democrats were a discordant group, containing many chronic malcontents. Held together principally, if not solely, by the desire for political power and patronage, the party failed to develop any program or objective. It is said that George Aldridge persuaded many of the more promising young Democrats to switch their allegiance to the other side. This was probably not difficult in the light of repeated Democratic failures to dent the Republican machine.

The principal sources of Democratic strength were among the poorer classes, the industrial workers, and the racial groups. The economic cleavage between the two parties in the early twenties was far less evident, of course, than after the advent of the New Deal and industrial

unionism, but the influence of Governor Alfred E. Smith and of Democratic national policies even then had some local influence in this direction. Although the racial groups in Rochester had never been unified within themselves, indications were that they tended toward the Democratic standard, particularly the Italians, who comprised a substantial voting element in some of the downtown wards. The Democrats were a reservoir for many minority groups in the absence of any important minority parties. There was a local Socialist party which, about 1910, elected one or two nominees to the council, but its influence since then had been small, its activities restricted largely to vociferous criticism.

The two major factions in the Democratic party in the early twenties were split principally upon the question of alliance with Tammany Hall in New York City. Divisions on this question and upon other questions involving state and national political allegiances prevented the emergence of any established policy or assured leadership until 1922 when Harlan W. Rippey became recognized as leader. Mr. Rippey, a lawyer and a favored friend of Governor Smith, was leader for twelve years until 1934, when he retired to serve on the bench.

The earlier split in the party was never completely healed. Yet Mr. Rippey's control became fairly firm, and, at the time of the charter fight in 1925, the Democrats were far better united than the Republicans. They approached the election of that year with real hopes of success.

### III. THE CITY MANAGER MOVEMENT

THE CONFUSED political situation of 1925 provided a strategic setting for an antipartisan citizen movement, and the advocates of the city manager plan were quick to grasp it. The rapidity of events during 1925, leading up to the successful manager charter referendum in November, appeared to be a sudden, spontaneous political upheaval. Actually, the movement itself was neither sudden nor spontaneous, although it blossomed forth in somewhat spectacular fashion.

#### *Origins*

For many years prior to the initiation of the movement proper there had been interest in and discussion of possible changes in the form of city government. Early in the century a Commission Government Association was organized to promote a commission form of government for

Rochester, and as early as 1910 the commission plan became a matter of public and political interest. In that year the candidate for mayor on the Democratic ticket advocated the commission plan. Though he was defeated by a substantial margin, his campaign is a significant indication that the interest in a reform charter was then sufficient to justify its inclusion in the platform of a major political party.

One of the early stimuli of the city manager idea in Rochester arose from the establishment of the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research in 1915. LeRoy Snyder, the first director of the bureau, actively developed in Mr. Eastman and the other bureau trustees and among citizen groups interest in city management and proportional representation. He addressed many forums and discussion clubs on the plan. Important among these were the Women's and the Men's City Clubs, both of which were later to become most influential in getting the movement under way.

In 1921 the question first received some political notice. In that year Julius Hoesterey, a prominent labor leader, who later became a leader in the movement and a city councilman, ran for mayor on a city manager plank. He ran, however, on a Farmer-Labor ticket which had little, if any, political importance.

From that time on, the movement gradually gathered momentum. Until late in 1924 it received little outward notice, but small interested groups were familiarizing themselves both with the proposed form of government and the techniques of campaigning for it. The two main initiators and backers of the manager plan were George Eastman, who was remembered in Rochester as father of the plan, and the Women's City Club.

Mr. Eastman was a self-made businessman who, in his later years, turned his attention entirely to philanthropy. When he died in 1932, it was said that virtually all his funds had been donated or willed to civic, educational, and social enterprises of various sorts. He rose from the ranks of obscurity and economic insecurity as an outstanding inventor and became a tremendously successful businessman, keen, purposeful and, perhaps, hardheaded. Following the established formula of American business success during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he turned to philanthropy. In this last activity, he perhaps differed from many other business leaders who turned philanthropist. He was careful and foresighted in his gifts and his interests were broad. He always sought competent advice from the recognized authorities in the fields in which his funds were invested. His philanthropy was ap-

parently as successful as his business, perhaps because it was handled according to the same well-considered standards. Mr. Eastman was the most esteemed citizen of Rochester. He was highly respected and his word was almost command among business and social circles.

Mr. Eastman's approach to the improvement of Rochester's government was like his approach to other ventures—systematic, practical, yet idealistic. First, he secured the best available counsel on the matter, and then he set up a permanent research agency which was to gather facts and make unbiased recommendations. Once decided upon the goal, that is, the manager plan, he looked for a practical means of achieving it. A staunch Republican for years and a friend of the Republican leader, he approached George Aldridge on the subject of the manager plan several years before the charter became an active issue. Thus, his original intention was to have the plan initiated and carried through by the dominant party organization without resorting to a strenuous civic campaign. It is reported that Mr. Frank Gannett, prominent newspaper publisher, planned to initiate a city manager campaign in his paper in 1922, and that Mr. Eastman persuaded him to wait in anticipation of winning Mr. Aldridge over to the plan. A later statement made by Mr. Eastman indicates that this effort would have been successful had not Mr. Aldridge died.<sup>1</sup> The successors to Mr. Aldridge were unsympathetic to the manager form, and Mr. Eastman turned his attention to a nonpartisan movement.

The Women's City Club was organized in 1918, largely through the initiative of Mrs. Helen Probst Abbott. Mrs. Abbott had been an ardent campaigner for women's suffrage and was, throughout these years, the leading feminine crusader in civic affairs. Although diminutive in stature, she was a dynamic, enthusiastic reformer whose ideas were positive and energies unlimited. Under her leadership, the Women's City Club soon became an important element in the makeup of the city. Its activities covered a wide scope: social, aesthetic, literary, charitable, and political. It was a nonpartisan body, composed largely of wives of business and professional people. It initiated and carried through many campaigns for community development and betterment.

At first the Women's City Club was a compact group of about two hundred women, closely organized and extremely active. In 1921 it was incorporated and entered upon a period of great expansion which

<sup>1</sup> "I have good reason to believe Mr. Aldridge recognized the inevitableness of this [city manager] plan, and I fully believe if he had lived he would have been ready before now to approve it." From a speech quoted in *Rochester Journal*, July 21, 1925.

culminated in a membership of several thousand women and a budget of over \$40,000 a year. The club later declined, and it was finally abandoned. When the manager movement started, however, it was near the peak of its career.

Mrs. Abbott, an early advocate of the manager plan, soon spread the gospel among the other members of the club, and it was largely through the activities of this group that public attention was attracted to the plan. A City Manager Committee of the club was organized to study the plan, and during 1922 and 1923 it brought a number of prominent advocates of the manager plan to Rochester to give educational and inspirational talks about it. Perhaps the most important of these was A. R. Hatton, professor at Western Reserve University and then prominent in the city manager government of Cleveland, Ohio. Mr. Hatton spoke about the plan in Rochester on several occasions, and he was influential with Mr. Eastman and other local leaders in the movement.

The Women's City Club was principally responsible for the formation in 1922 of a Citizens' Committee of 100 to sponsor a new city charter. The following March, this committee appointed a subcommittee to study the various plans of city government. The latter group, known as the City Government Plan Committee, had nine members, including representatives of the Men's and Women's City Clubs, the city corporation counsel, a Democratic party leader, a member of the board of education, and two labor leaders.

For almost two years following its formation, this committee apparently accomplished very little, and it was not until the fall of 1924 that activities were renewed. At that time the movement was revived, partly because of the adoption of a state home-rule amendment the previous year, but mostly as a result of the awakened interest of George Eastman. Mr. Eastman, now realizing that the Republican leadership was unalterably opposed to the plan, put his full weight behind a citizen campaign.

At the request of the City Government Plan Committee, Mr. Eastman's Bureau of Municipal Research undertook a series of studies of cities having different forms of governments. Following several months of intensive effort, the bureau, in February, 1925, began to submit brief reports on each city visited. By March 7 the final reports on twenty-four cities had been submitted, and the bureau wrote a short summary report which unequivocally recommended the manager plan. The bureau named three principal advantages of the manager plan in the

cities studied: better financial procedure and control; more general and more intelligent public interest in municipal affairs; centralized power and responsibility with resultant increase in efficiency. The bureau reports were reprinted in full in the papers and became the subject of much popular discussion.

On March 27 the City Government Plan Committee, by a five-to-two ballot, voted to recommend the manager plan for Rochester. One of the dissenting votes was cast by the city's corporation counsel, and neither of the labor leaders on the committee voted.

The movement got off to a fast start on many fronts as soon as the plan committee became active. The *Times-Union* launched a vigorous news and editorial campaign for the plan, and the morning paper, the *Democrat and Chronicle*, though less vigorous, came out in its support. The other papers remained passive. The Women's City Club sponsored a number of public lectures on the plan and organized an educational campaign for the movement. Before the plan committee had reached its decision, the club had hired Miss Emily Kneubuhl, an organizer of the Cincinnati charter movement, to conduct its campaign.

Some political alarm over the situation had already been registered by the organization Republicans. On December 30, 1924, Mr. Hotchkiss, the county boss, announced that the citizens would be given an opportunity to decide on the plan, and two weeks later the city council, by ordinance, instructed the law committee to study the various forms of city government. The rapidity of developments, however, prevented this committee from ever making a report.

### *The Charter Campaign*

The charter campaign officially got under way when the City Manager League was formed at a mass meeting and dinner on April 4, 1925. This meeting, attended by about two hundred leading citizens, elected officers and laid the groundwork for a permanent organization. Louis S. Foulkes, a prominent businessman, was named president of the League, and Miss Kneubuhl was transferred from the Women's City Club and made permanent secretary of the new organization. The women's organization which she had erected for the educational campaign was likewise transferred.

The League was governed by an executive committee composed of five officers, elected at the first dinner meeting, and eight persons subsequently appointed by them. Its membership was obviously intended to represent the major economic, political, and social groups in



the city. It included six Republicans, three Democrats, one Socialist, and two independents. There were five prominent businessmen; two labor leaders representing the Central Trades and Labor Council and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union; two active political leaders, Meyer Jacobstein of the Democrats and Ernest A. Pavioir of the Republicans; and two women from the Women's City Club. Five of this group had been members of the City Government Plan Committee.

Once organized and under way, the movement gathered momentum like a snowball. The financial stability of the League was early assured by the offer of George Eastman to underwrite the expense of the campaign. Businessmen generally backed the movement, and a drive for funds resulted in more than seven hundred different contributions.

Under Miss Kneubuhl's direction, the women's campaign organization conducted an ambitious membership drive. The women organized by wards and made a house-to-house canvass. In this fashion they recruited some ten thousand members. In addition, the cooperation of factory employers was sought through the distribution of applications among their employees. Fourteen thousand members resulted. Thus the total membership was about 24,000.

Meanwhile, the City Government Plan Committee had requested that the Bureau of Municipal Research draw up a charter for Rochester embodying the city manager plan. About a week after the organization of the League, the bureau announced its acceptance of this project and obtained, as consultants, Howard Lee McBain of Columbia University, A. R. Hatton of Cleveland, Isaac Adler, prominent local attorney, and Charles L. Pierce, former corporation counsel of Rochester. The incumbent corporation counsel was also requested to assist, but he refused, stating that his lack of sympathy with the plan would make such action "improper, unethical and incompatible with my present position."<sup>1</sup> This statement emphasized the unwillingness of the Republican organization to have anything to do with the new charter.

The bureau went to work at a feverish pace to draft a charter which might be adopted at the general election in November, 1925. Under the City Home Rule Law, which had been passed in 1924, two possible courses were open: an entirely new charter might be prepared; or the council could adopt a local law to amend the existing charter and submit the amendment to popular referendum. The prescribed procedure,

<sup>1</sup> Statement of the corporation counsel, Clarence Platt, quoted in the *Rochester Times-Union*, May 14, 1925.

in the first course, required submission to the voters of the question, "Shall there be a commission to draft a new city charter?", and, if it passed, the election of a commission to draft the charter. After the complete new charter had been drafted, it had to be published, filed for between sixty and ninety days, and finally voted upon at a special election. Obviously, this procedure contained many possible pitfalls and would delay action for an indefinite period. By the alternative course, if carried through without a hitch, a popular referendum would be made possible in the fall of 1925. Even then, however, the new charter could not go into effect until after the next succeeding councilmanic election, or in January, 1928. This second course had the added advantage that the existing charter contained special powers which might have been lost if the charter were completely replaced. For these reasons, the city manager charter, as written and finally adopted, was really an amendment to the charter of 1907, not a new charter.

The agreed procedure for the adoption of the charter necessitated the greatest possible speed in preparing it and submitting it to the council. The Home Rule Law required adoption by the council on or before the second meeting in August. To allow time sufficient for the regular legislative procedure and for any possible delays in that body, the charter had to be introduced before the end of June. It was completed and introduced in the council on June 23.

The next step was to prevail upon the council to pass the new charter law as an amendment to the existing charter. This promised difficulties because of the Republican organization's iron control of the council. Although the Republican leaders had been noncommittal on the virtues of the plan itself, their opposition to, and fear of, the movement were generally acknowledged. Hopeful that procrastination and delay would frustrate the campaign, they indicated their preference for the two-referenda procedure provided for in the Home Rule Law over the amending procedure embodied in the bureau's proposed charter.

Before any action could be taken, however, a new complication arose. On July 7, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held the state Home Rule Law of 1924 invalid on a technical ground involving the manner in which the constitutional amendment had been passed by the state legislature. Until this decision could be appealed to the State Court of Appeals, the passage of local laws would be technically invalid. It was generally expected that the highest court would overrule the decision, but the appeal would require several months. This decision gave the party ample excuse to refuse to pass the charter.

The League decided to proceed with its program as though the decision had not occurred. Accordingly, it organized a "Right-to-Vote" drive, aiming to obtain 45,000 signatures to a petition demanding that the charter be passed and submitted to popular referendum. Before the campaign really got under way, the Republican council stole much of its thunder by suddenly passing the charter on July 28. Reasons for this action were probably the wholesome respect for the growing political power of the city manager group, confidence that the plan could be beaten at a referendum, and the feeling that such action would appease many of the plan's supporters and at once take the wind out of the League's sails.

Another important factor behind this move was the Republicans' respect for the political power of Meyer Jacobstein, a Democrat of liberal and rather independent leanings. Mr. Jacobstein was a former college professor who had twice been elected to Congress in this strong Republican district by substantial majorities. His unique personal record in politics established him as perhaps the most popular political figure in Rochester at that time. He had previously kept his hands strictly clear of local political issues, but during 1925 he became a strong exponent of the manager plan and hinted that he might run for mayor if his services seemed necessary for the success of the charter. The possibility that this might happen was probably more alarming to the Republicans than the chance that the charter would pass a referendum vote. The latter seemed the lesser evil.

Following the action of the council, the League decided to proceed with its campaign for petition-signers. The pledge was changed from the "Right-to-Vote" to the support of "any legitimate action necessary . . ." for passage of the charter. A large organization was built up by wards and districts, and nearly 1,500 captains and workers were appointed. Although the actual drive for signatures lasted less than two weeks (in August), the goal of 45,000 was passed five days before the end of the campaign, and the movement wound up with 69,756 signers. Two weeks later, on September 2, the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier decision on the Home Rule Law, and a referendum in November was assured.

On the fifth of August, the Republican designations for the coming elections were made known. The omission of Messrs. Wilson, Van Zandt, and Love marked the first open manifestation of the split in the Republican party. These three at once organized a campaign against the regular organization for the coming primaries. Soon thereafter,

both Mayor Van Zandt and Comptroller Wilson signed the League petition, and they later made statements favoring the plan. Since these officials had previously been evasive on the question, this action indicated that they thought it would be politically expedient to join the movement for the coming primary fight. The primaries, held in September, gave the insurgent group a solid victory, so solid in fact as to constitute a staggering blow to the organization. In the interest of harmony, however, the organization joined the insurgent group and backed it staunchly for the election.

The Democrats, meanwhile, planned to take the utmost advantage, first of the city manager movement, and second of the Republican split. They had come out in favor of the fall referendum during the spring and had more recently declared their support of the plan in general. They endeavored to persuade Mr. Jacobstein to run for mayor and even designated him after he had refused to be considered. He finally flatly refused to run but named, as a substitute candidate, LeRoy Snyder, former director of the Municipal Research Bureau and a staunch city manager advocate. The Democratic slate was considered to be exceptionally strong.

The nominations of Messrs. Snyder and Van Zandt were really victories for the City Manager League, since each had endorsed, and was committed to, the proposed charter. Mr. Van Zandt's endorsement was probably more a measure of political expediency than of conviction, but both candidates professed their belief in the plan and their belief that their election would insure the charter against attacks by the new administration. It is interesting that Mr. Snyder, while running on a partisan ticket, pleaded for nonpartisanship. He was supported by the majority of the original city manager group. However, the League took no stand on candidates, and George Eastman, to the consternation of many charter advocates, came out in open support of Mr. Van Zandt.

The League organization went into action in earnest in the fall of 1925, first in a spirited "Get-Out-the-Vote" registration campaign, which resulted in a record registration for a city election, and then in the election drive proper. No tricks were overlooked in the election campaign—speeches, mass meetings, distribution of thousands of pamphlets, radio talks, newspaper advertisements, etc. On election day, the entire organization was at work at the polling places, and emergency squads were available throughout the city.

Until a month before election day, the League's activities were, in effect, an exercise in shadow-boxing. Most of the opposition was silent and

invisible. To be sure, a Socialist party spokesman had described the plan as a "futile change in government machinery by floundering reformers in evasion of the real issue of capitalistic exploitation." A few labor unions expressed their disapproval of the charter, and two of the four local newspapers were cool. But the spearhead of the opposition, the Republican organization, was silenced by the embarrassing advocacy of the charter by its mayoral candidate.

It was not until October that the "Non-Partisan League for the Preservation of Popular Government" was formed. Led principally by the organization Republicans, it entered into a vigorous and probably effective campaign against the establishment of a "municipal monarch" and the removal of governmental controls from the people. It attacked the League as being a "blue-stockings" group, dominated by the wealthy business interests—a charge that was hard to refute. The charter proved to be most popular in the better residential wards and, despite the active support of several outstanding labor leaders, was not very strong in the industrial sections.

The charter was adopted by the comfortable, though disappointing, margin of 39,020 to 25,903, there being some 31,654 voters who refrained from expressing any preference. At the same time, the Republican candidate for mayor, Mr. Van Zandt, defeated Mr. Snyder by 46,729 to 41,981 in what was then the largest poll ever recorded in a municipal election. In view of the 70,000 signatures the League obtained for its petition, and of the League's tremendous efforts to arouse interest in the issue, the charter vote was a saddening demonstration of popular indifference. It should be noted, however, that the vote on the charter was high in comparison with the polls on other referred questions. By way of proving its fundamental faith in the Republican party, Rochester, for the first time, elected a full slate of twenty-four Republicans to its last aldermanic council.

### *The First Council*

Soon after the charter election, Harry J. Bareham, later to become leader of the local Republican party, brought a suit against the city of Rochester, challenging the validity of the charter, its passage, and its main provisions. This trial was welcomed by the City Manager League, which at once undertook to assist the city's defense. After long and thorough argument in several courts, the State Court of Appeals in July, 1927, upheld the charter in every important respect save one—its election provisions. It may be noted here that the foremost stumbling block of

the framers of the document had been the method of election of councilmen. Most of these men favored proportional representation, but the legal advisers recommended that the doubtful constitutionality of P.R. might endanger the validity of the whole document if it were challenged in the courts. The advocates of P.R. thereupon gave way to what they regarded as the second-best alternative—nonpartisan primaries and elections. The court, in its 1927 decision, ruled this plan out on the somewhat technical ground that the charter did not follow the procedure prescribed in the State Home Rule Law of citing the general state election laws which this provision superseded. It assured the city's power to establish nonpartisan election procedures in the future, but the immediate effect of the ruling was that the important councilmanic election of 1927 would be conducted on the usual partisan basis.

This decision placed the City Manager League in a rather embarrassing position. The League had become inactive immediately after its successful charter campaign. Its only full-time officer, Miss Kneubuhl, had departed from Rochester; its organization had disbanded and become nonexistent; its officers and executive committee had been replaced. It was faced with the necessity either of building up an entirely new organization and running its own candidates for office or of endorsing candidates on party tickets. The former course meant great expense and effort; the latter, an alignment with at least one of the partisan forces in town, contrary to its avowed principles of nonpartisanship.

A renewal of the split in the Republican party offered the League the opportunity which it eventually took. Shortly after the 1925 election, it had become apparent that the Republican solidarity at that time was only temporary. The new council divided along the old lines, with the Hotchkiss organization supporters in the majority. The death of Mayor Van Zandt in 1926, followed by the promotion of Martin B. O'Neil to his post, secured for Mr. Hotchkiss almost complete control of the city. Nevertheless, the insurgents reorganized in 1927 under the name of the Citizens' Republican Committee to carry on a primary campaign against the organization. The major leaders of this group were Messrs. Wilson, Bostwick, and Leo MacSweeney, the campaign manager, and a group of younger men in the party. Its obvious purpose was simply to overthrow the incumbent Republican leadership. As in 1925, the faction again turned to the city manager movement for ammunition and moral support against that organization.

The formation of the Citizens' Republican Committee precipitated a sharp and bitter division within the executive committee of the City

Manager League. Chiefly upon the initiative of Stephen B. Story, then the director of the Bureau of Municipal Research, a plan for alliance between the League and the Republican insurgent group was developed. Mr. Story, who had been an active leader in the 1925 campaign, was influential in persuading George Eastman to the idea, and Mr. Eastman in turn carried along many of the business and professional members of the committee. This group felt that the League, with its political inexperience, its lack of organization and political leadership, could not effectively cope with the established organizations. It was felt that the Republican faction would supply these deficiencies in return for the moral backing of the League.

The opponents of this view on the executive committee thought that the League, with its proved political ability of 1925, its enthusiastic popular backing, and its list of almost 70,000 petitioners, could defeat any partisan organization if it tried. Furthermore, they feared that the proposed alliance would constitute a betrayal of the League's avowed non-partisanship and entail a compromise that might weaken both the League's prestige and the caliber of the new government.

When the issue came to a head, the alliance plan prevailed in the League's executive committee by a vote of eleven to ten, and the League announced that it would cooperate with the Citizens' Republican Committee. This decision, perhaps the most momentous event in the whole city manager campaign, virtually ensured a League victory in the ensuing councilmanic election, but it alienated many of the League's members and provided an entering wedge for the partisan organizations.

With the advice and collaboration of the Republican insurgent faction, the League selected and endorsed eighteen persons as suitable candidates for the nine seats on the first council. This list was sent to each party organization in the city. Events subsequently proved that some of the eighteen were compromise candidates who were not in complete sympathy with the plan. One of the eighteen, who was subsequently elected to the council, was chosen completely by mistake; he was approached and enlisted instead of another man who had the same surname and of whom the League group had approved.

The Citizens' Republican Committee selected eight of the League's eighteen names for its slate; the Democrats picked five, one of whom was later defeated in the primaries; and the Republican organization ignored the list entirely.

The September primaries resulted in a smashing defeat of the Republican organization by the League-Citizen alliance. All eight of the in-

surgent candidates were nominated. The only Republican nominee to win was the candidate from the northeast district, who was unopposed by the League. At the same primaries, Mr. Hotchkiss was defeated for renomination to the position of county clerk. Soon thereafter he gave up his position as Republican leader to Harry Bareham. Following its defeat at the primaries, the Republican organization again swallowed its pride and supported the Citizens' Republican Committee candidates against the Democrats.

A series of strange paradoxes was presented by the campaign which followed. Republican city manager advocates and Democratic city manager advocates opposed each other. Staunch supporters of the city manager plan found themselves bedfellows of organization politicians who professed support of the plan. Isaac Adler, one of the early fighters for city management and chairman of the original City Government Plan Committee, ran on the Republican ticket and was ostensibly supported by the machine, although he argued against the "partisanship" of his opponents. Mrs. Helen Probst Abbott, likewise one of the founders of the movement, running on the Democratic ticket, sharply challenged him. Mrs. Abbott's endorsement by the League and her nomination by the Democratic party had been practically forced through by the Women's City Club, and the alienation of these women from the City Manager League was assured when the Citizens' group named Louis Foulkes to oppose her in the east district. Foulkes was a prominent and popular businessman who had been the first president of the City Manager League. Meyer Jacobstein, the prominent Democratic congressman, caused something of a sensation when he asked the voters to split their tickets. The whole campaign resolved itself into the questions, who would best support the city manager plan and which party was the more "non-partisan"; it must have been confusing to the voters.

This fantastic election struggle resulted in an overwhelming victory for the nine Republican candidates, of whom eight were endorsed by the City Manager League. Mrs. Abbott and the other manager plan advocates who ran on the Democratic ticket were snowed under in what was, in the main, a straight party ticket type of election. The newly elected council soon organized, designated Joseph C. Wilson, one of the initiators of the Republican split, as its choice for mayor, and chose Isaac Adler, the prominent city manager advocate, for vice-mayor. Stephen B. Story was made the first city manager of Rochester at a salary of \$20,000 a year.

With this slightly clouded victory won, the City Manager League



once again subsided into peaceful slumber. It had successfully brought about the adoption of its charter, and it had elected to the first council eight men reputed to be in sympathy with the plan. Its accomplishments were real in view of the handicaps it faced—the lack of a sensational failure or scandal in the existing government and the difficulty of awakening and maintaining citizen interest over several years. A timely split in the dominant political organization and the not-too-brilliant leadership of that organization favored the movement. But its strength and vitality were principally a product of the educational and publicity work of the League itself. It might have won without joining the insurgent Republicans.

The two principal arguments of the League were that the manager plan would lower the cost of government and would drive the spoils politicians out. The former was good bait for the business element which became the backbone of the movement. During the campaign, the analogy of the city manager plan to corporate organization was stressed, as was the plea for professionalized administrators. In answer to the Republicans' question, "What's wrong with our present charter?", several defects were cited: lack of representativeness of council; excessive size of council; too long a ballot; lack of centralized financial control; poor budget procedure; poor purchasing procedure; continued borrowing for current deficiencies; and lack of control of the personnel.

But the basic and essential element was the attack on politics and politicians. Such slogans as, "People vs. Politicians," or, "There is no Republican or Democratic way to pave a street," pervaded the campaign literature. Furthermore, the objective of the leaders of the reform movement was based upon common opposition to machine politics in government. The division in the City Manager League resulted from the existence of two different conceptions of what this objective implied. The more idealistic group, particularly the women backers, sought complete elimination of partisan politics of any sort. George Eastman, on the other hand, tended to identify machine politics with the Hotchkiss Republican organization. In this viewpoint, he was probably more practical than farsighted.

From the beginning Mr. Eastman wanted city manager government and was willing to employ political machinery to get it. But as the campaign progressed, it became increasingly evident that he particularly wished to overthrow the existing Republican leadership and was willing to use the manager plan for this purpose. A Republican himself,

he probably had difficulty in adjusting his own partisanship with the nonpartisan ideal. These conclusions are indicated by five acts:

1. His first attempt to establish city management was through the medium of the Republican Party under George Aldridge.

2. He publicly supported the Republican insurgent candidate for mayor in 1925, although the latter was a doubtful supporter of city management and his Democratic opponent was one of its prime movers.

3. He repeatedly attacked the Hotchkiss organization during 1925 and 1927.

4. He financially supported, at once, the City Manager League and the insurgent Republican organization.

5. He advocated an alliance between the above organizations.

The coalition with the Republican insurgent group in 1927 brought this basic difference into the open. Its results were unfortunate. It alienated many of the reform group and hastened the disintegration of the movement. It cast suspicion upon the sincerity and nonpartisanship of the incoming administration. The accomplishment of the League's major objective was thus jeopardized from the start.

#### IV. TEN YEARS OF CITY MANAGEMENT, 1928-1938

WHATEVER difficulties the City Manager League had experienced in the 1927 campaign, there is little doubt that the council which it elected was a strong one—from the standpoint of the League's own criteria, perhaps the strongest that Rochester ever had. Although amateurs in politics, most of the members were independent thinkers with recognized ability and a sincere desire to make the new government a success. Of the eight who were endorsed by the City Manager League, three had been outstanding leaders in the movement. Only one member was at first openly outside the pale, but he was later joined by two others. This left a working majority of six to three for the City Manager League group.

The council's principal weakness was probably the failure of the mayor, Joseph C. Wilson, to provide positive leadership, either in the development of policies or in representing the government before its electors. Mr. Wilson was an aging politician, popular but lacking in the imagination and forcefulness required to develop and carry through a

policy and lacking the ability to speak in public. Leadership within the council fell largely upon the shoulders of Isaac Adler, the vice-mayor. It was he who initiated and pushed through the charter amendment to provide nonpartisan elections during the early stages of the new government. Mr. Adler did not undertake to represent the government before the people. This job fell to the city manager.

"Steve" Story was thirty-eight years old when he became Rochester's first city manager. In training and experience he was eminently qualified. A native of New York City, he had had several years of study in engineering at Union College, taking a graduate degree there in 1915. His experience included work with engineering firms and with the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. In 1919 he was summoned to Rochester as staff engineer of the Bureau of Municipal Research. Two years later, in June, 1921, he became director of the bureau and remained in that capacity until he became city manager in 1928. He assumed a position of local prominence and was highly esteemed by those groups in town who were interested in government reforms. Especially did he gain the confidence of George Eastman. An excellent research man, he understood government, and he probably knew Rochester and her problems as well as any person in the country.

Mr. Story's generosity, sincerity, and affability won him legions of friends. He liked his friends and enjoyed contacts with people. He was a straightforward public speaker and enjoyed public speaking. Since it was apparent that the mayor and the rest of the council would provide neither an aggressive leadership in policy formulation nor a forceful program of selling the government to the people, Mr. Story vigorously undertook to perform both jobs.

### *The Program*

Mr. Story's assumption of leadership in matters of policy became evident when he delivered his inaugural address on January 3, 1928. In this speech he proposed fifteen major objectives for his administration. This program was an ambitious one—it struck at the most vital weaknesses of the previous governments and projected an extensive plan for capital improvements. The major administrative planks were: correction of the financial practices of current expense borrowing and deficits in sinking funds, adjustment of the pension funds, classification of positions and standardization of salaries, and installation of a scientific assessment system. The program called for improvement of the city utilities, and it requested a large general improvement program. The statement

was enthusiastically received by the papers as an excellent exposition of the major problems confronting Rochester.

The new administration immediately undertook to effectuate some of the objectives Mr. Story had outlined. The financial system was re-organized in accordance with a plan previously prepared by the Bureau of Municipal Research. A central purchasing system was established, and a municipal warehouse was placed in operation. In cooperation with the Bureau of Municipal Research, an inventory was made of the city's properties in all its departments. An office was set up to handle the purchase, custody, and sale of city real estate.

In the Police Bureau, a training school was added, as well as a police radio system and a modern Criminal Identification Division. A Research Division and an Auto Theft Division were established, and the records of the department were improved. The Fire Prevention Division was re-organized and transferred from the Bureau of Buildings to the Bureau of Fire.

An energetic program of capital improvements was likewise undertaken during the period. The sewage treatment plants were enlarged; work was begun on two new bridges; the airport was modernized and a new hangar built; and a major grade crossing was eliminated by the construction of an underpass.

In an evaluation of Mr. Story's administration it should be pointed out that, when city management came to Rochester, the city was enjoying the peak of the postwar prosperity; the government was finishing a decade of joyous expansion. New services were being undertaken and others were being broadened; ambitious improvements were under way in parks and streets and bridges. Few, if any, of the community leaders contemplated that the city's population growth might sometime cease or that its industrial and economic activities be restricted. One of the spectacular examples of this activity was the construction of a municipal subway, designed to stimulate and facilitate Rochester's industrial growth to undreamed-of dimensions. The subway, built in the bed of the abandoned Erie Canal, went into operation in 1927, a month before the city manager charter became effective.

The subway, which became the prize municipal headache after its construction, was only one of the foreboding elements in the inheritance of the new government. This and other capital improvements were causing a rapid rise in the city's debt, and when the city manager government went into action, the net city debt had reached a record peak of over \$55,000,000. The rate of increase between 1918 and 1928 was about \$3,000,-

000 a year, and the 1928 total represented a 150 per cent increase over 1918. Moreover, the interest charges alone amounted to more than \$2,000,000 in 1927 and were still on the rise.

Meanwhile, current operating expenses were rising at the rate of \$1,000,000 a year, and the per capita cost of government had doubled between 1917 and 1927, the figure being about \$32 in the latter year. As early as 1919, city expenses had exceeded the state's constitutional 2-per-cent tax limit, and the city was forced to resort to short-term borrowing to finance current operations. Since debt retirement was exempted from the expenses included in the tax limit, these borrowings could be repaid during the following year from current taxes; thus the constitutional provision was evaded both in letter and in spirit. As city expenses mounted, this type of borrowing grew annually in amount until it reached a peak in 1927 of almost \$3,000,000—more than one-quarter of the city's current expense budget of that year.

This type of deficiency-borrowing, while a convenient circumvention of the law, had two unfortunate effects: in the first place, it was annually costing the taxpayers unnecessary interest payments; in the second place, it was reducing municipal budget control to a farce. The Republican administrations were budgeting only the amounts they were expecting from current taxes and then, when funds ran low, borrowing whatever more they needed to complete the year.

Except to conservative and careful students of the government, this situation did not seem particularly alarming when Mr. Story assumed office in 1928. Backers of the manager plan confidently expected that the plan itself would almost automatically reduce the costs of government. Mr. Story, eager to have an enthusiastic response for the new administration, undertook an improvement program and at the same time tried to curb the unbridled expenses and financial abuses of the old regime. So, during its first years, the city manager government rode the wave with the rest of the nation. Few new services were undertaken because the city was already performing most of the common municipal functions, but the facilities for carrying them on were expanded and their quality was improved. The capital improvements proposed and undertaken by Mr. Story illustrate that Rochester and its government were still in the expansionist "Greater Rochester" mood. Mr. Story proposed the enlargement and improvement of the municipal airport; improvement of Rochester's lake port and the construction of a port terminal; construction of a civic center; a new water supply system; and many street and bridge improvements. The reorganizations and new

installations in the various departments showed that this same spirit was being applied to the government's internal administration.

Despite the imposing list of accomplishments, criticism of the new administration began to be heard soon after it got under way, and many of these comments came from the city manager group itself. George Eastman had gone on a hunting trip to Africa immediately after the election, probably in the effort to quiet rumors that he was trying to dictate the city's government. Perhaps with this same idea in mind, he continued to dissociate himself from the administration after his return in the spring of 1928. His apparent loss of interest was a further blow to the original City Manager League, already dormant. It appeared later that the first administration had been greatly handicapped by high anticipation of quick results and that some of its supporters too soon lost enthusiasm and faith in it.

One of the first sources of criticism was the alleged reliance of the manager upon politician advisers rather than upon the City Manager League group. The administration and councilmen almost never asked representatives of the old League for advice or support. The League itself had become a mere shadow. The councilmen had no organization upon which to lean and were strictly on their own.

On the other hand, the manager was said to have relied upon the insurgent Republican leaders for advice, ignoring the League group entirely. The grounds for this belief seemed to be weak and, in fact, the administration probably relied upon no outside group for advice and leadership. The most important fact, however, was that some of the supporters of city management believed the allegation to be true and lost confidence in the government. Their suspicion was aggravated by charges of patronage in Mr. Story's appointments, although there seemed to be little evidence of this in the first years either. Mr. Story's stated policy was to retain the incumbent officerholders unless they demonstrated incompetence for their positions, and relatively few new men were brought into the administration. Of the four department heads, Harold W. Baker, the commissioner of public works, and Clarence Platt, the corporation counsel, were held over from the previous administration. Clarence Higgins, a former associate of Mr. Story in the Bureau of Municipal Research, was made comptroller, and Louis Cartwright, a certified public accountant, was made auditor under him. The only appointments that might have had political implications were the designations of George Nier as commissioner of public safety and Curtis W. Barker as director of police, and these seemed distinctly doubtful. None-

theless, Dr. Franklin W. Bock, an outspoken independent, in open letters to the newspapers decried both appointments, describing the latter as "outraging the intelligence of the community" and stating that "Mr. Story has shown no inclination to eliminate politics."<sup>1</sup>

Other changes in personnel seem to have been relatively few. However, a number of the former office holders who had voiced their objections to the manager plan resigned when the new government came in. Mr. Story energetically enforced the provisions in the new charter against political action of employees, and he asked that those who would not respect the law resign. Nevertheless, rumors persisted and probably injured the administration's popularity.

Much ammunition was given to opponents of the administration by the sharp increase in salaries of important administrative officers. The outstanding changes were as follows:

Position	Salary Before	Salary After
City Manager .....	\$ —	\$ 20,000
Mayor .....	7,500	6,000
Commissioner of Public Works..	6,500	12,000
Comptroller .....	6,000	10,000
Corporation Counsel .....	5,680	10,000
Commissioner of Public Safety.	5,680	10,000

The plan of the new administration was to standardize salaries of department heads at \$10,000 and of bureau heads at \$6,000. Since many of the officers were holdover employees, the increases looked like extravagant raises to the same employees for the same work. Mr. Story's salary was a particularly vulnerable point. His opponents stressed the fact that his previous compensation while director of the Bureau of Municipal Research had been \$6,500.

Another source of discomfiture to the administration was occasioned by the dismissal of Charles B. Raitt, director of parks. Mr. Raitt, a career man in recreation, had just completed a thorough survey of Rochester's recreational needs when he was appointed to this post by the commissioner of public safety, George Nier, at the request of Mr. Story. The Raitt appointment was unpopular from the beginning because he was an outside man, a native of California, and it later became known that Mr. Nier had never seen Mr. Raitt until after the appointment. Messrs. Nier and Raitt never cooperated effectively, and, when a drowning occurred at the time of the opening of the public beaches in 1929, Mr. Nier dismissed Mr. Raitt, charging him with negligence in not having the beach closed or attended by an adequate lifeguard force. A public

<sup>1</sup> *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, January 12, 1928.

hearing was held, and Mr. Raitt was exonerated of the charge and reinstated by the city manager. A few days later, Mr. Nier discharged Mr. Raitt on the grounds of insubordination.

This incident, coupled with the feeling that Mr. Nier was himself a political appointee, militated against Mr. Story's strength among the city manager group. The incident was eagerly grasped by political opponents of the manager.

Another factor which rebounded against the administration among some of its chief supporters was the large amount of publicity given the city manager. In a talk soon after his inaugural, Mr. Story said:

The city manager should be seen and not heard I am told. The talking should be delegated to the mayor, but the council and I are going to talk. We shall let the people know what we are doing and why we are doing it. Our government shall be conducted under the public eye, and the people of Rochester shall know about our work and plans.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with this declaration, Mr. Story delivered a large number of speeches in the course of 1928 and 1929. He frequently appeared in the movie newsreels, and many of his speeches were on the front pages of the newspapers. The *Times-Union* and the *Democrat and Chronicle*, both ardent supporters of the plan, gave the administration much free publicity. Each carried question-answer columns on the city government in which questions addressed to the paper were answered by the manager himself. The failure of the mayor or other leaders to present the administration's points of view to the public was perhaps a justifiable reason for this activity, but many persons later felt that it was overdone and that it caused a reaction against the manager and his administration.

A final reason for the gradual loss of enthusiasm among the backers of the charter was the failure of the administration to accomplish some of the administrative objectives which they had visualized. Some criticism appeared very early. In a talk given in April, 1928, Mr. Story admitted that some people were already criticizing the work of the administration and he sought to answer their remarks. In January, 1929, the Bureau of Municipal Research made a confidential report to its trustees, appraising and criticizing the administration during its first year. This report was written upon the request of George Eastman. A copy of it was placed upon Mr. Story's desk, and he wrote a reply and presented it personally to the trustees.

The bureau report carefully listed the major gains of the year and

<sup>1</sup> *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, January 7, 1928.



described the record as "not unimposing." These accomplishments, it stated, were largely in the "mechanics of government and municipal housekeeping." It then went on to criticize the failure of the administration to attack some of the basic problems which Mr. Story had outlined in his inaugural address. The major points were three:

1. Failure to make headway toward a city plan. During the year a planning commission had been appointed as well as two advisory citizens' committees, but no definite progress had been made. The bureau felt that a planning consultant should have been retained and a thorough-going work and financial plan completed during the year.

2. Failure to eliminate current expense borrowing because of slow progress in revaluation of property. This borrowing was made necessary by the 2 per cent tax limit. The only means of avoiding it were a large reduction in operating expenses or an upward revaluation of property. Such a revaluation had been under way for some years before 1928 but was making slow headway. By hiring a large temporary staff and pushing the work, the manager could have entered the new valuations on the 1929 tax rolls and, according to the bureau, would have insured a balanced budget in 1930.

3. Failure to establish a personnel office, as provided in the charter, and to standardize positions and salaries. The State Civil Service Commission had early in 1928 ruled against the charter provision that a secretary of the local commission be appointed by the city manager and act as his personnel officer. Following this announcement, the city manager made no appointment to the position and appeared to drop the standardization plan entirely.

Mr. Story's reply emphasized the progress that had been made in other directions and gave the reasons why accomplishments were delayed in the fields of personnel and property revaluation. Major emphasis was placed upon the political hazard of hiring more experts and of raising tax payments through immediate revaluation or salary standardization. Mr. Story estimated that salary standardization would increase the personal service budget by about \$350,000 every year. With regard to city planning, he listed some seventeen planning projects which were then under way in various fields of the government's operation and declared that no intelligent plan could be completed in the course of a few months. It is interesting to note that ten years later the three projects of planning, property revaluation, and salary standardization remained as major problems of the city government.

The principal difference between the manager and the bureau re-

volved around the speed with which these reforms should be effected. Both agreed on their ultimate desirability. The bureau felt that Mr. Story was sufficiently familiar with the situation when he assumed office to start the wheels turning at once at full speed. In a later memorandum the bureau stated its belief that:<sup>1</sup>

The value of an accomplishment in the first year of the new administration is four times the value of the same accomplishment in the second year, when it is remembered that the administration's biggest job is to insure the perpetuation of better municipal government in Rochester by commanding the respect of a majority of the voters in time to assure success at the polls in 1929.

This sentence is, perhaps unintentionally, an interesting reflection of the city manager group's identification of the city administration with politics. The statement that the "administration's biggest job" was to assure success at the next election was indeed a realistic one, but it was a different tone from that taken by the City Manager League in 1925, when the theme was businesslike administration by a businesslike manager. The Story administration had become the political issue, and, as the 1929 election approached, the lines were divided solely on the question of retaining or removing that administration.

The charter provided that the five at-large councilmen be elected for four-year terms in the odd year following the Presidential election and that the four district councilmen be chosen on the odd year preceding the Presidential election. Thus, the five at-large seats, of which four were held by the City Manager League men, were to be filled in 1929. The League again arose from its slumber, reorganized, and undertook the campaign in its usual vigorous fashion, silencing any internal grumblings that might have been heard and championing the Story administration. It nominated four of the incumbents endorsed in 1927, including Mayor Wilson, and completed its slate with Charles Stanton, a Democrat.

Perhaps the chief factor in reuniting the Republicans in 1929 was the common opposition to the Story regime. This opposition might have been a good indication that the city manager had not, as charged, played political favorites with the insurgent group. At any rate, the now solid Republican front included two former insurgents—one of them Mayor Wilson—and three organization men.

The Democrats presented a full ticket, which included Charles Stanton, a City Manager League candidate. Except for Mr. Stanton, this ticket was entirely eliminated from the contest by the nonpartisan primary

<sup>1</sup> Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research, Report No. 222, p. 6 (untitled).

election, which narrowed the field down to ten candidates. Later on, the Democrats tied their organization in with the City Manager League, and its workers aided the entire city manager ticket. This agreement was probably engineered by the nonpartisan city manager leaders who were also affiliated with the Democratic party, notably Meyer Jacobstein and Lester Fisher.

The campaign, nominally nonpartisan, was run along straight political lines—a clear-cut struggle between the League, supported by the Democrats, and the Republicans. Mr. Story, though playing no personal part in the campaign, was the *casus belli*. The Republicans played up the mistakes of the first two years and dwelt upon the extravagance of the government. The League pointed out the accomplishments of the first two years and urged nonpartisanship. The Central Trades and Labor Council publicly endorsed the Republican ticket and cited instances in which Mr. Story and the commissioner of public works, Mr. Baker, had allegedly discriminated against labor.

The election was one in which both sides could claim victory. The actual result was rather inconclusive. The two successful Republicans both ran ahead of the two successful League candidates, Messrs. Stanton and Adler. Mr. Wilson, endorsed by both organizations, was elected with the largest vote of all. The new council thus included four League representatives, four Republicans, and Mayor Wilson, who had never been forced to show his hand. Subsequent events relieved him of this painful task entirely. He became ill during the fall of 1929 and died the following March, leaving an even division of four to four in the council.

### *Deadlock—1930-31*

The next two years were a nightmare in Rochester's political history. In the first council meeting of 1930, a motion by the Republicans to declare the office of the city manager vacant was defeated by a four-to-four tie. The effort of the city manager group to elect Mr. Adler as vice-mayor was defeated by three to three, the two candidates not voting. From that time until the first meeting following the 1931 election, the council was hopelessly deadlocked on every issue of any political significance. The charter provided that vacancies in the council arising otherwise than by expiration of term or by recall should be filled within one month "by appointment by majority vote of the remaining members of the council." Failure among the divided councilmen to agree on anyone to fill the vacancy prevented such a solution. During 1930

no less than eight attempts were made by one side or the other to appoint a ninth councilman. All were turned down by the same tie vote. On May 12, 1930, the Republican group introduced a local law to amend the charter to provide a special election to fill the vacancy. The League group, logically fearing that a League candidate would fall before the organization in a special election, defeated the measure by the usual tie vote.

A complete stalemate was the net effect of all these efforts. During 1930 eighteen questions upon which no action was taken because of the deadlock came to a vote in the council. Some of these were of major legislative importance. Passage of the 1931 budget was held up and long debated before a compromise could be reached. On grounds of economy the Republicans refused to vote the city manager's budget and demanded that it be cut by \$80,000. The cuts that were demanded were aimed particularly at the central executive offices, a major pride of the manager group. Mr. Story's salary was cut from \$20,000 to \$15,000, and requests for the Personnel Bureau, the Service Bureau, and the Purchasing Office were clipped or denied altogether.

The Republican move to pass a provision for salary increases for policemen and firemen was another attempt to embarrass the administration. Passage of the bill in 1930, when retrenchment seemed to be in order, would probably have been an extravagant move. The manager group stalemated the bill by the usual vote, charging that it was solely a political gesture to get police and fire votes.

On the whole, little was accomplished by the council, which for two years argued and wrangled helplessly. Its activities emphasized to the public its partisan political character and the deadlock was probably a damaging blow to the prestige of the manager plan.

Mr. Story continued as city manager during this period and proceeded, as best he could, with his program of the first term. In fact his capital program was greatly expanded. Construction began on a new grade-crossing elimination, a municipal port terminal, a municipal bathhouse and a new bridge. In 1931 Mr. Story started an unemployment work relief project financed entirely at the city's cost. A comprehensive city plan, started in 1929, was completed by a firm of planning consultants. The council passed one part of it, the major street plan, in 1931. A Personnel Office was set up and a survey was made for purposes of salary standardization. A Service Bureau was established but dropped in the 1932 budget. A revaluation of property for purposes of reassessment was completed, but the new appraisals were not put into effect

because Mr. Story feared public reaction to the general rise in the assessment level which might have resulted.

Altogether, the city's expenditures increased greatly during 1930 and 1931 as a result of the unemployment burden and the ambitious capital improvement program. The year 1931 was the most expensive in the city's history up to that time. This fact was to prove embarrassing to the administration's supporters in the coming election campaign, for they had promised economy in every campaign since 1925. They could point to great improvements, capital and operating; but the Republicans could point to a greatly increased debt, a failure to balance the budget, and an increased total tax payment—telling arguments in a depression period.

The 1931 election, for the purpose of selecting four district councilmen and the one vacant at-large seat, was similar to the 1929 campaign in issues and political alignments. The City Manager League revived for a third time and reorganized under new leadership. A coalition was formed with the Democratic party and the Lincoln Republican Club, a group of independent Republicans representing a wing of the old insurgent group. The Democratic party decided not to run a ticket of its own, justifying this action on the ground that to present a slate would be contrary to the nonpartisan provision of the charter. The slate of these groups included three Republicans and two Democrats, mostly independents. LeRoy Snyder, former candidate for mayor and a leader of the nonpartisan element in town, was nominated to fill the vacancy of councilman-at-large. The district candidates included two incumbents—two new men, one a Republican and one a Democrat—both with previous political experience. In the at-large contest a nonpartisan league was formed in each district to support the district candidates and Mr. Snyder.

To oppose Mr. Snyder, the Republican party nominated Charles S. Owen, who had been active many years earlier in the city administration; and it designated its two incumbent district councilmen and two new men for the district seats.

The issues revolved about the Story administration, nonpartisanship, and governmental costs. The manager group was largely on the defensive against attacks of extravagance. The Republicans dwelt on the allegedly excessive cost of the purchasing office, the new storehouse, and the public works program. They charged that the city government cost \$6,933 more per day in 1930 than it had in 1927. The manager group responded by pointing out examples of Republican inefficiency in the past,

specifically defending its expenditures, and pleaded once more for maintaining nonpartisanship and the substance of council-manager government.

But this time, though the returns were close, the results were conclusive: Mr. Owen won the at-large contest for the Republicans by a narrow margin, and three of the four Republican district candidates were victorious. The election gave the Republican machine a council majority of six to three and assured the departure of Mr. Story. As a gesture to the new councilman-at-large, the old deadlocked council elected Mr. Owen to the vacant seat in the council to fill out the unexpired term immediately after the election, but the turnover in administration was not effected until January, 1932.

### *The Return of the Party*

It was generally rumored that the Republicans intended to appoint Mr. Owen as city manager, were a Republican majority elected. If this was true, the idea was abandoned, perhaps because such an appointment might have conflicted with provisions of state law. The party did the second-best thing—Mr. Owen was made mayor, and C. Arthur Poole was appointed to the managership. Mr. Poole had been the city engineer under the old Republican administration and had been retained as consulting engineer by Mr. Story. A competent and respected engineer, Mr. Poole had few other qualifications for the position of chief executive. It was generally understood that Mr. Owen would manage the affairs of the city as well as serve as its mayor. This was what, in effect, happened. Mr. Poole was referred to as the “office-boy” manager.

The new council lost no time. Among its first acts was the repeal of the nonpartisan provisions in the charter. Most important of these was, of course, the nonpartisan election law, but others prohibited political activity and the solicitation or contribution of funds for political purposes by city employees. The removal of these provisions, though fully anticipated, was looked upon by many of the early city manager advocates as the death knell of the plan.

The administrative branch of the government likewise returned to thoroughgoing partisan practices. An entirely new cabinet of “approved” department heads was appointed. The bureau heads, however, were protected by the State Civil Service Law, and, in order to surmount this difficulty, the charter was modified to change the bureaus into divisions. The division heads then officially became deputies of their department heads, a status which placed them in the exempt classification from which

they could be removed without a hearing. There was not a great turnover among the other city employees, because many of them were hold-over Republicans from the old regime and others were protected by civil service.

The new council made two major changes in the administrative structure. First, it created a separate Department of Welfare under the direction of a commissioner of welfare—a justifiable action since the welfare function had become so large that the old Bureau of Charities was hardly adequate to perform it. Secondly, it established an independent Department of Assessment to be administered by a board of three assessors. The Bureau of Assessment had formerly been part of the Department of Finance and had been directed by a single appointed assessor. This change seems to have been dictated by the political drive for more good jobs.

The thoroughgoing nature of the Republican housecleaning and reorganization was apparent. The city manager group saw much of their earlier work destroyed. The machine's power was complete, and its methods were the same as those before 1925.

Strangely enough, the first major difficulties the party ran into came from within its own ranks. In the fall of 1932 the new comptroller, George Argetsinger, charged that there were irregularities in the Departments of Public Works and Welfare. Payment on a large number of welfare checks was stopped until investigation could be made. He likewise claimed that some of the public works pay rolls were being padded. He made certain further charges, one of which involved collusion in the letting of certain public works contracts. These statements embarrassed the manager, Mr. Poole, and the mayor, Mr. Owen, considerably since the statements came from one of their own appointees. A statement attributed to Mr. Argetsinger by the newspapers that there were "some honest people in the administration," though later denied by him, added to this feeling.

A grand jury investigation, conducted during the winter months, to a certain extent confirmed the Comptroller's statements, but its findings were in no sense sensational. Two employees in public works were later indicted and found guilty of pay-roll manipulation. Even if the alleged welfare irregularities were true, they were not very serious. Some of the other charges arose from incidents which had occurred years before the city manager plan of government went into operation.

To top this embarrassment, the administration ran into financial difficulties. In 1932 it became apparent that the city would have to make

drastic economies if it were to meet its financial obligations. The 1933 budget was severely slashed. Capital and local improvements were entirely abandoned, and voluntary salary contributions were asked of the city employees. The offices of personnel director and director of police were abolished, and the departmental requests were lowered by flat percentage cuts. These cuts meant severe restrictions in service, especially in the Parks Bureau, which was cut about 22 per cent; the library, about 30 per cent; and the museum, about 70 per cent.

In July, 1932, the administration appointed a Financial Advisory Board to go over the city's financial situation and help put the city on a sound basis. This board, consisting of five prominent businessmen and professional men, recommended sharp cuts in costs, especially in welfare payments. The council took no action upon these recommendations, and the mayor, Mr. Owen, apparently ignored them.

The refusal of the administration to accept the advice of the financial committee and the alleged inefficiency in the administration finally led the banking and business element to demand a change. The bankers had the whip hand, since they could refuse the city credit, and their recommendation would, of course, have dissuaded the New York or other banking groups to invest in Rochester. In May this group virtually took over control of the government. They demanded a new city manager and a new mayor of their own selection and insisted upon a voice in the future affairs of the city.

A new committee was chosen to advise the government. This consisted of five men, headed by Ernest A. Paviour, a prominent local Republican and city manager plan advocate, and included Mr. Bareham, the Republican boss, and three business leaders. Mr. Owen resigned his posts of mayor and councilman and assumed the office of comptroller, which Mr. Argetsinger had previously resigned. Mr. Poole was removed from the post of city manager and returned to the Engineering Bureau.

Two prominent citizens, both little known in the political world, were brought in to be the mayor and the manager. Percival D. Oviatt, an outstanding local attorney, was made mayor. His appointment was the first employment of the provision in the charter that allowed appointment to the mayoralty of a man outside the council membership. Theodore Briggs, a competent and successful businessman with no previous governmental experience, was made city manager.

The quiet revolution which brought in the Oviatt-Briggs government was a product of Rochester's businessmen and bankers. Mr. Briggs' state-



ment, when accepting the membership, struck the keynote of the new government:<sup>1</sup>

With the proposal that I take it, however, came a promise of complete support from the county chairman, the new mayor, the new comptroller, and the Businessmen's Committee. The job presents itself to me as a business problem and I intend to approach it on that basis.

This administration was apparently free from political pressures, and almost no changes were made in administrative personnel with the single exception of the dismissal of Leo MacSweeney as commissioner of welfare. Many in Rochester considered this the best administration the city had had. Its administrative accomplishments were not great, perhaps because it was in office only a few months; but during this period the city's financial solvency was restored and its credit was reestablished. Costs were held down, and yet many of the services which had been sharply restricted when Mr. Owen was mayor were restored.

Mr. Briggs was initially handicapped by his complete lack of familiarity with the government. He had administrative ability, however, and rapidly acquired the necessary knowledge for his position. The mayor, Mr. Oviatt, was referred to as an ideal choice. He was highly respected in the community and offered intelligent leadership in the council and in public. Unlike Mr. Story's regime, this administration was backed by a continuing advisory committee, composed of influential and intelligent people.

However able this government was, it was not good enough to counteract the national swing to the Democratic party occasioned by Roosevelt and his New Deal. Five councilman-at-large seats and one vacant district seat came up for vote in November, 1933, only about six months after Messrs. Briggs and Oviatt had assumed office. The relatively quiet election contest which took place resembled the pre-1925 pattern. The City Manager League, after four vigorous election campaigns, did not revive; partisan ballots and frank partisanship returned; the parties were, once more, the incumbent Republicans and the envious Democrats. But there were two marked differences between this and the former contests. First, party leaders recognized the political power of the city manager group and, consequently, made efforts to gain its favor. Thus the Democrats nominated for the council three candidates who had once been leaders in the city manager movement—the incumbent, Mr. Stanton, and Julius Hoesterey and Joseph Silverstein, both independents.

<sup>1</sup> *Rochester Times-Union*, April 29, 1933.

None of its other candidates had a partisan political background. The Republicans, though running much the same slate as they had in 1929, stood by the Oviatt-Briggs administration, which was supported largely by the businessmen who had backed the manager campaign. The City Manager League, ostensibly dead, was influencing both parties.

The second difference between this and the pre-1925 contests was, of course, the national surge to the Roosevelt-led Democratic party—a surge which even staid Rochester could not counteract. The Democrats relied heavily upon the national swing and raised few issues of major local import. Their course proved wise. They catapulted into office behind the most sweeping Democratic landslide in Rochester's history. They won all five of the at-large seats, as well as the single contested district seat, and consequently were assured at least four years of control of the city council.

#### *Baker and the Democrats—1934-37*

At the beginning of 1934 the council was composed of six Democrats, two Republicans, and one City Manager League Republican, Louis Foulkes. It was understood by at least two of those elected on the Democratic ticket, Messrs. Hoesterey and Silverstein, that no party strings were tied to their nomination. They were asked to run on the Democratic ticket, but as independents. Mr. Stanton, who was chosen mayor, was likewise an independent type of thinker. Mr. Rippey, who was still leader of the Democratic party after twelve lean years, apparently did his best to place in office good men who would make a good record and thus gain the backing of the City Manager League group.

The city manager and the major department heads were chosen by Mr. Rippey and the council. For city manager, they selected Harold W. Baker, who was at that time employed as engineer for the District of Columbia. Mr. Baker, like Mr. Story, was an engineer who received his training at Union College and who had also been brought to Rochester to work for the Bureau of Municipal Research. His association with the bureau, however, was rather brief. The mayor appointed him commissioner of public works in 1924, and he served in that capacity until Mr. Story's dismissal at the end of 1931. After that he filled an engineering post in Washington, D. C.

Mr. Baker's appointment was well received, especially by the business group. He had a good reputation for efficiency and administrative ability, and, in fact, the first council under the manager plan had seriously considered his name for the managership in 1927. He was disliked by labor,

largely because of his policies in administering the Public Works Department. He was politically independent, however, and was certain to stand up for the principles of the City Manager League so far as possible.

The department heads were all replaced by the incoming administration, but the influence of Mr. Baker and the independent group in the council prevented the dismissal of some of the key men who were directing the various bureaus. Furthermore, the new appointments that were made indicated that qualifications for the work were carefully considered, even at the expense of more deserving Democrats. The administrative staff was certainly the best qualified since Mr. Story's tenure. The Democrats effected a thorough turnover of personnel among the labor and noncompetitive classes.

The Baker administration was not marked by many innovations. It was a steady-going government, intent on economy and the efficient performance of essential functions. It was conservative, sound, and not particularly imaginative. It reduced the city's net debt in every year of its incumbency. This debt, which had reached an all-time peak of \$69,000,000 at the beginning of 1933 and which amounted to \$65,000,000 when Mr. Baker assumed office, was reduced to less than \$59,000,000 by the end of 1937. The debt and expenditure reductions have been important in giving the city, once near bankruptcy, a favorable credit rating. Few changes were made in administrative techniques or in the direction of expanded services. In these respects it contrasted sharply with the Story government. The city's main problem was welfare costs and economy. The effort to keep the budget balanced and at the same time meet debt installments pervaded the whole four years. Mr. Baker's administration saw no decline in the tax rate, but it kept the costs of normal operations, other than welfare, at a stable level despite heavy payments for debt retirement.

The policy of undertaking no local or city improvements at the city's expense was continued by the Baker administration. A number of major structures were built by the Public Works and Work Projects Administrations, however, and several current operating and maintenance activities were likewise assumed by the WPA.

One of the principal issues that confronted the Democrats resulted from a water shortage in 1934. For many years, Rochester had been advised that its chief source of water supply, Hemlock Lake, would not be adequate in a dry season. A committee of engineers had been appointed to study the problem in 1926 and had concluded with a recommendation that a near-by lake, Honeoye, also in the hills south of

Rochester, be dammed and connected with the city mains. After a number of hearings before the State Water Power and Control Commission, permission was granted for this project in 1928, but, having won its right, the city did nothing to exercise it. In 1934 nature forced the issue with a drought season. The immediate water shortage was met by purchasing water from a private company in a neighboring territory and from the Eastman Kodak Company, both of which pumped water from Lake Ontario. It was apparent, however, that something should be done to guarantee an adequate supply in the future, and Mr. Baker appointed a committee of twelve to study the problem. Two alternative plans had been suggested: one contemplated the development of Honeoye Lake, as described above; the other proposed the pumping of water from Lake Ontario into the city. After careful study, the committee recommended the Honeoye Lake project since its long-run cost would be less, although it would involve an immediate large capital expenditure.

The city administration, however, favored the Ontario, or so-called Bogus Point, plan, and it proceeded to petition the State Water Commission for permission to develop it. The effect of this move was to arouse a storm of popular protest. Rochester citizens were particular and emotional about their water. They insisted that the Honeoye Lake water from the hills was the best, and that Lake Ontario was dirty and polluted. The administration, however, stubbornly went ahead with the Bogus Point plan. The Republicans were quick to grasp this opportunity and distributed recall petitions against the Democratic councilmen who were backing Mr. Baker's stand. This was the first and last attempt to employ the recall provisions of the charter. It was blocked when the administration appealed to the courts on the question of the legality of the recall under the charter as it stood amended. The court ruled that it was illegal, owing to the technicality that the recall provision was so worded as to depend upon the nonpartisan election provision, which had been repealed in 1932.

The water fight ended a stalemate when the State Water Power and Control Commission refused the Bogus Point application in 1935. Although the Republican party frequently strove to revive the issue, nothing was done on the question. The effect of the incident was to lessen Mr. Baker's prestige and to weaken the Democratic position as it approached the 1935 elections for district councilmen.

This campaign was again fought on straight party lines, but since the continued Democratic control of the council was assured by its five incumbent at-large councilmen, it was not a vital or exciting contest.

Capitalizing as best they could Roosevelt's already ebbing local popularity, the Democrats retained their one district seat while the Republicans gained the other three. The Democratic majority in the council thus remained six to three, but the Republicans were licking their chops in anticipation of 1937, when five incumbent Democrats were to go on the block.

They had reasons for optimism. In 1934, shortly after the installation of the Democratic administration, the leader of that party, Harlan Rippey, was appointed to a judgeship. He relinquished leadership, at least nominally, to Donald Dailey, a businessman who had served under Mr. Story as commissioner of public safety. Even at that time, a factional conflict was brewing, as Roy F. Bush, clerk of the county board, and other lesser leaders challenged Mr. Dailey's position. This division developed gradually into an open split in the Democratic ranks in 1937. It was said that this insurgent movement was directed against Mr. Rippey, who continued to exercise control from the bench. At any rate, the long-standing division in the Democratic party, which had apparently been fairly well patched up, became as pronounced as before.

The Democratic situation was further complicated in 1936 by the formation of the Rochester unit of the American Labor party. This group coalesced with the Democrats in the state and national elections of 1936 and elected George B. Kelly to represent the Thirty-eighth District in Congress. As the 1937 election approached, the Kelly group controlled a substantial number of the Democratic ward organizations, and, for the first time, it turned its attention to city politics.

The Labor party and a considerable number of the Democratic ward leaders were opposed to the Rippey political leadership and to the Baker administration. The former opposed Mr. Baker chiefly because of his labor policy. Mr. Baker had little use for unions, and collective bargaining was frowned upon by the administration. The labor group also objected to the method of handling a meat packers' strike by the Police Department. The Democratic ward workers opposed the administration because of its resistance to patronage. There remained several unprotected jobs which were still filled by Republicans.

Messrs. Stanton and Hoesterey were the principal supporters of Mr. Baker, and the animosity of the group was directed chiefly at them. Mr. Stanton was the special target because he was considered unfriendly to labor.

The labor group, therefore, demanded that Mr. Stanton be dropped from the councilmanic ticket and an American Labor party representa-

tive be substituted. It was reported that all five of the incumbent councilmen-at-large agreed to stick together on a policy of all or none. At the meeting at which the Democratic slate was chosen, Mr. Dailey was undecided and threw the matter open for discussion. An all-night debate ensued, the final result being that Mr. Stanton was eliminated from the ticket. Mr. Hoesterey withdrew with him. The other three incumbent councilmen, however, stuck with the organization and were nominated on the regular party slate. Mr. Stanton and Mr. Hoesterey then proceeded to establish an independent Citizens' party. They placed a full slate of five candidates in the field. One of these was Joseph Silverstein, an incumbent who was also designated on the regular ticket. The Labor party set up a slate of its own, identical with that of the Democrats except for the omission of Mr. Silverstein.

While the Democrats were going through a process of disintegration, the Republicans were unifying and strengthening their organization. Following the elections of 1933, in which the party had lost control of both city and county governments, Thomas Broderick, then a relatively little known supervisor from one of the neighboring towns, became leader of the Republican organization. Mr. Broderick's appointment was the result of an internal revolution which swept out most of the conservative anti-city-manager-plan group and replaced them with a younger and perhaps more progressive element. Mr. Broderick's leadership was vigorous, and his control became increasingly effective.

The 1937 election thus presented the once familiar picture of a united Republican party facing a sharply divided Democratic one. The Republicans selected an unimposing array of candidates, but they had a solid and resourceful leadership. Harold S. W. MacFarlin, an emerging Republican star in the local firmament, prepared a written Republican platform that covered most of the problems facing the city and presented some truly original ideas for meeting them. Among these was the establishment of a Municipal Labor Relations Board and a Department of Commerce with broad powers for the development of the city. The platform also called for abolition of the office of mayor.

The so-called Citizens' party attempted to corral the old City Manager League votes. Most of its following was unquestionably from that group, and its appeals were the familiar arguments of efficiency, freedom from politics, and economy. It waged a good campaign in defense of Mr. Baker and his administration, pointing particularly to economy and the restoration of the city's financial reputation. This party was the only one that definitely promised to retain Mr. Baker in the event of its

winning the election. The apparent feeling before the election was that neither the Republicans nor the regular Democrats would keep him. The Democrats were largely dominated by the labor group which opposed him. As for the Republicans, the rumor was circulated that Mr. MacFarlin was their choice for manager.

Mr. Silverstein, who was endorsed by both Democratic divisions, received the largest number of votes of any candidate, but the next five in the canvass, of whom four were elected, were all Republicans. Averaging about seven thousand votes behind were the other four Democratic nominees. The Citizens' party mustered less than half the regular Democratic vote, and the American Labor party showed little strength.

The effect of the election was, of course, a return of the Republicans to power in the council. Their majority as a result of that election was seven to two. The strength of the Citizens' candidates, who averaged about 20,000 votes, reflected the continued importance of the independent vote in Rochester. The Citizens' and regular Democratic vote together would have topped the Republican vote by about ten thousand. On the basis of this election it seems reasonable to assume that the independent vote in Rochester may potentially control its local elections.

### *Baker and the Republicans—1938*

The importance of this independent vote was probably one reason why the Republican leadership retained Mr. Baker. Another reason was that a large group of businessmen called on Mr. Broderick and urged that Mr. Baker be kept. And the same group of men wrote letters to headquarters giving reasons for retaining Mr. Baker. Another important—perhaps the most important—factor was the support of Mr. Baker by Frank Gannett, the newspaper publisher who had emerged from an avowed status of political independence to become one of the dominant powers in the local Republican party. Shortly after the election, certain Republican leaders made statements favorable to Mr. Baker, and it was finally announced that he would be kept.

The department heads were selected by the organization, just as the manager was. There was a complete turnover of these officers, but again it may be said that the incoming group were for the most part qualified. Many of the bureau chiefs were retained, but some of these were Republicans who had lasted through the Democratic administration. The turnover among the labor and noncompetitive employees was again thoroughgoing.

Lester B. Rapp was selected as mayor, perhaps largely because he was

one of the few councilmen with previous councilmanic experience. The effort to abolish this office in fulfillment of the campaign promise was forestalled by state laws which would have to be amended before this could be done. In the meantime, Mr. Rapp threatened to resign his position, arguing that it required too much time for too little compensation.<sup>1</sup>

The major changes in the administrative structure by the council were the creation of a Department of Commerce and the abolition of the Board of Assessors in favor of a single assessor. After much debate the Department of Commerce was set up in April, 1938, and Mr. MacFarlin was made its commissioner. This organization was charged with the functions of public relations, planning, management of municipal utilities, general development of the city of Rochester, and a number of miscellaneous activities. At the time of the department's creation, the Democratic<sup>2</sup> opposition charged that the sole purpose was to give Mr. MacFarlin a job. Since most of its activities were formerly performed in other departments and since some of the others might well have been placed directly under the manager, the opposition held that it was an effort to embarrass Mr. Baker and to prepare Mr. MacFarlin ultimately for the job of city manager.

The other major administrative change effected by the Republicans was the creation of a single-headed Department of Assessment in accordance with a recommendation made in a thorough study by the Bureau of Municipal Research in 1937. Conditions in this office were found to be grossly inefficient.

The Baker administration continued along the major lines it followed under the Democrats. The introduction of new blood in some departments seemed to bring about an awakening and a greater show of alertness. The reorganization involved in setting up the Department of Commerce somewhat upset certain bureaus, and the development of this new unit was viewed with mingled feelings both within and without the administration. The city, in cooperation with the *Democrat and Chronicle*, started an intensive traffic enforcement drive. A committee was appointed to investigate thoroughly the housing situation. The incumbent manager, however, as well as many of his advisors, were thought to be opposed to public housing, although Rochester was far behind many other cities in the housing movement. The manager, Mr. Baker, brought forth a plan for building a much-needed new city hall

<sup>1</sup> Since the preparation of this report it is understood that Mr. Rapp has resigned the mayoralty and has been succeeded by Samuel Dicker, Republican councilman-at-large.



with a PWA grant. Application was made to the federal authorities, while at home taxpayers' opposition to the project flared.

Thus, with the City Manager League and the nonpartisanship issue in the background, Rochester was, in 1938, back on the old familiar grounds of Republicans vs. Democrats, economy vs. extravagance, ins vs. outs. Interest centered on politics, current problems, and personalities, especially Mr. Baker and the commissioner of commerce, Mr. MacFarlin. Rumors persisted that Mr. MacFarlin was slated to become the next manager; that the Republicans were merely biding their time until the pressure for Mr. Baker's retention died down, in the meantime encouraging Mr. MacFarlin's rise in the city administration. Mr. Baker's support in the council, as well as at Republican headquarters, was doubtful. The presence of Mr. MacFarlin in the administration did not seem to lend him comfort, especially since Mr. MacFarlin was performing many functions that should have been directly under the chief executive. The relations of the two men were reported as cordial, however, and public rumors of conflict were probably without foundation.

In Mr. Baker's favor was the fact that the Republican party itself was not any too firmly intrenched. The party evidently felt that it must produce good government in order to retain its control. In June, 1938, Mr. Broderick, the local party leader, resigned on grounds of ill health and was succeeded by Arthur Lochte, a young disciple of his, whose decisions and policies were expected to reflect the guiding hand of Mr. Broderick.

Another factor in Mr. Baker's favor was the strong personal backing he had gained in the community, although he made no effort whatever to build an organization or to publicize himself. In fact he shunned publicity and was somewhat brusque in his relations with the press and public, and he did not have an exceptionally broad personal acquaintance. Yet he was generally reputed to be a good administrator, and some citizens almost associated his name with efficient city government. Their statements ranged from: "I guess we will have a good administration as long as we have Baker," to "I would stack Baker up against any city manager in the country." Mr. Baker was regarded by the "good government" people as the chief safeguard against the "old gang." A few Republican leaders even pointed with pride to his retention as a specific example of the Republican interest in Rochester's welfare.

As indicated earlier, Mr. Baker's support, in 1938, was from the independent "good government" people and business people, to a large extent identical groups. He was disliked by a large sector of labor, espe-

cially the C.I.O. faction, though he had the personal support of some outstanding labor leaders. He was disliked by the ward politicians of both parties. This line-up was a pretty good indication of where the balance of power lay. It was also suggestive of some of the major features of the incumbent manager's administration.

## V. POLITICS AND POLICY-MAKING

IN AN ANALYSIS of the effects of the manager plan in Rochester, it must be kept in mind that the city manager movement was born in an environment of party politics and that one of its most potent motivations was the opposition to that system of local control. The manager plan affected that system in two interconnected ways: first, the new charter contained several important structural and procedural provisions that aimed to defeat local partisanship, both in legislation and administration; second, the force and spirit of the Citizens' movement caused a temporary upheaval in political alignments and a continuing change in political modes of behavior. The early city manager advocates, perhaps mistakenly, essayed to eliminate the parties, not alone from the administrative, but also from the legislative, process. This objective meant establishing a city council that would not be conducive to political manipulation and an election system that would encourage independents to run and would bar political designations. It also meant a nonpartisan political campaign to carry these provisions into force.

Until 1926 the legislative process in Rochester was a completely party affair—a one-party affair. The minority opposition of the Democrats was inconsequential, and the Republican party was checked only by its own discretion and the nebulous restraint of a ponderous and inarticulate electorate. The city council was merely a front for the organization. All important decisions were reached in party caucuses before the public meeting, and the council's operations were in the nature of formalities, its decisions foregone conclusions. The Republican split which occurred in the last years of the old regime changed this situation somewhat, but the general nature of the council prior to the manager plan was about what would be anticipated in a thoroughly machine-controlled government. All votes were either unanimous or strictly along party lines. For three years before the Republican split of 1926 there had not been a single negative vote by a Republican in that body.

The Rochester Common Council then consisted of twenty-four alder-

men, representing each of the city's twenty-four wards. They were elected biennially in the odd-numbered years for a two-year term. The president of the council, its nonvoting chairman, was elected by the city at large for a like term. The council was thus built on the political ward organizations, and the first requisite of an aldermanic candidate was control of his ward or the backing of his ward leader. This was neither a fair nor logical basis of representation, if, indeed, it was representation at all. In terms of numbers, the wards varied in 1930 from 3,363 persons to 39,622 persons; the total population of the twelve smallest wards was less than that of the two largest, and half the council represented less than one-quarter of the city's gross population. Furthermore, the ward lines had been built up for a century without plan or apparent reason. This planlessness was reflected in their irregular shapes and widely varying sizes. They were purely political artificialities, reflecting only such relationship to local homogeneity and socio-economic differentiation as occurred by accident. The whole setting was thus ideally suited to ensure perpetual political control by a single party.

The drafters of the manager charter aimed to correct all this in accordance with principles approved by authorities on city government. If they had not feared a judicial rebuff, they would have incorporated proportional representation as the best safeguard against party domination. Instead, they inserted nonpartisan election provisions whereby candidacy would be established by petition, a single nonpartisan primary would be held to reduce the number of candidates, and party designations would be forbidden on election ballots. Pursuing the theory that representation at large was more conducive to a broad perspective on the city's problems than strictly local representation, they provided for five councilmen, elected by the city at large. At the same time, they provided that a minority consist of members chosen by each of four geographic districts. The districts were so outlined as to produce approximate equality of population and to follow logical lines. As before, the elections were in the odd-numbered years; thus they conflicted neither with the state nor the national elections. Every councilman served a term of four years. District councilmen were elected in the odd years preceding the presidential election; at-large councilmen, on the odd year following the presidential election. This overlapping feature was undoubtedly advantageous because it assured that there would always be some experienced councilmen familiar with the city's complex business. Under the old charter such drastic political changes as occurred in 1933 or 1938 would have brought in totally inexperienced groups.

*Nonpartisanship*

How did all these drastic structural changes work? How did they affect the voters and their votes, the political organizations, the make-up of the council, and the legislative process itself?

One unanticipated result of the nonpartisan experiment was a striking decline in citizens' interest as reflected in ballots cast at municipal elections. It will be recalled that the 1925 election, when the charter referendum, was held, resulted in a record mayoralty vote of over 92,000 ballots, whereas only about 65,000 electors were sufficiently interested in the issue to cast a ballot on the charter proposal one way or the other. In 1927, in the first councilmanic election under the new charter, the total vote dropped to 82,000, and in 1929, when the nonpartisan election clauses took effect, another 10,000 were lopped off. The second and last nonpartisan election in 1931 resulted in a rise to 83,000 votes cast, but at that election 23,000 voters who went to the polls declined to vote in the councilmanic contest. In 1933 the city returned to its old footing. The City Manager League had vanished as well as the nonpartisan clauses, and 115,000 Rochesterians cast ballots for councilmen. Every election after that drew forth a comparable or greater number of ballots. A somewhat better index of this change is the proportion of eligible voters who actually cast ballots. In 1925, 50 per cent of Rochester's voters participated in the municipal contest. In 1927, the proportion was 41 per cent; in 1929, 35 per cent; in 1931, 39 per cent; and in 1933 and subsequently, the figure rose again to 50 per cent.

Several explanations of this interesting phenomenon may be offered. One is that many voters simply did not understand how to employ the new type of ballot in 1929 and 1931. This explanation, of course, would not account for the drop in 1927, when the regular party designations were used. Another possibility is that the party workers failed to get out the vote in these years. It is particularly likely that this occurred in 1927 when the Republican organization was only halfhearted in support of its own ticket. In 1929 and 1931, the Democrats may not have worked very hard for the city manager slate which they were ostensibly backing. But this lack of energy again would not adequately explain the extraordinary number of blank votes in those years. There is also a possibility that the decline reflected a silent protest among the more idealistic city manager sympathizers who objected to the way in which the City Manager League and the League's city administration were being handled. Disaffected in 1927 by the League's so-called "unholy alliance" with the Republican insurgents, and, later, either suspicious of,

or disappointed with, the Story administration, they were still unwilling to vote for the Republican machine and, consequently, cast blank ballots. That this theory may be plausible is suggested by the fact that some of the largest drops occurred in the strong city manager wards and also that the largest losses in actual voting support through the period were suffered by League candidates. The return of the Republicans was occasioned less by gains in their total votes than by the decline of their opponents' strength.

However much weight may be attached to these various theories, the inescapable conclusion is that the nonpartisan election idea was tried and was abandoned in Rochester and that it did not work very well during its trial. Rochester, for decades accustomed to local party control, could not accept nonpartisan elections. The campaigns of these elections were in truth party campaigns, and the electorate looked upon them in much that way. Indeed, the City Manager League itself became a political party. Yet the three elections of 1927, 1929, and 1931, which provided perhaps the most exciting political fireworks in the city's history, apparently weighed heavily upon a bored or an irritated or just an indifferent electorate. And it was seemingly relieved and happy to return to the straight party system in 1933. The repeal of the nonpartisan election clauses elicited no great popular protest, although some of the ardent reformers felt that the heart had been carved out of their plan. Twice thereafter amendments to reestablish nonpartisan elections were introduced in the council, but they aroused little interest and both died in committee. Some in Rochester were contemplating a campaign for proportional representation, but the idea was only in the conversational stages when this study was made.

That the City Manager League and its nonpartisan election plan disappeared is not to say that they did not leave a permanent impression upon the local scene. The reform organization could not outlast the experienced political parties, but it aroused the permanent interest of a substantial and influential group of citizens in pursuing its aims. It impressed both upon the political parties and upon its own members its potential power and left an independent and government-conscious element of perhaps 20,000 voters—about the number that voted for the Citizens' slate in 1937.

If this group should vote together in any given election, it would swing the balance between the two major parties. This situation was so far different from the one-party system of 1925 and earlier that it is worthy of emphasis. Both parties were seeking the favor of this minor-

ity element, and the only way it could be gained was to maintain at least minimum standards of administration. The Democrats gave four years of pretty good government from 1934 to 1938. The Republicans persistently ignored the League and its power until 1934, after they had been overthrown. The new Republican leadership followed an entirely different tack, attempting to appeal to that element of the population which had formerly belonged to the League or would have continued to belong had it remained active.

The potency of this independent group was manifested strikingly on at least two occasions after the abandonment of the League. As described in a bulletin of the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research,<sup>1</sup>

In 1933, almost at the mid-point of an administration, public opinion forced changes in the two ranking officials of the administration, the mayor and the manager. In 1938, in response to public opinion, the city manager survived a sweeping political overturn that toppled from power the party that had appointed him. Obviously these things could not have happened, regardless of how intelligent the political leadership of the party in power, under the elected executive system.

Both incidents resulted directly from the pressures of the banking, business, and "good government" elements, which were to a large extent identical. And the retention of Mr. Baker by the Republicans in 1938 was in many ways remarkable: it was the first time that a political party had so subordinated purely partisan considerations to the principle of professional competence in administrative office. Even though those leaders who decided upon his retention might not have been guided by such ideas, they were responding to pressures that directly reflected a recognition of this principle, which is itself the foundation stone of the city manager plan of government.

### *The City Council*

While this same influence was evident in the recent city councils to some extent, the caliber of the councils appeared to be reverting to the pattern of pre-1928. The standards of the City Manager League for its legislative body were nearly achieved in its first council. It was a small body having a good deal of local prestige and including a number of highly regarded citizens. Its meetings were open, and debate was free and spontaneous. The entire council—including minority members—met with the city manager in a caucus before each meeting, but no binding decisions were made, and members frequently did not know how

<sup>1</sup> Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research, "Municipal Research," July, 1938.

their associates would vote until the questions arose in the public meeting. The meetings were described as interesting and sometimes exciting, and they were well attended. Much of the council's work was delegated to nine committees, each of which contained three members, including at least one minority member.

This council was deficient principally in its lack of leadership and its political inexperience. Unable to present a very convincing appearance before the public, it lapsed into the completely ineffective deadlock of 1929 to 1931 and then gave way to the Republicans in 1932. The Republicans soon showed that the new legislative structure could be adapted to the political-machine type of control to which they were accustomed. The Republican members were, for the most part, political henchmen, ready to carry out the dictates of the organization. The caucuses withdrew to Republican headquarters and were restricted to Republican members. But for the raised voices of the minority, the meetings became programmed formalities.

After the ousting of the Republican party in 1933, the council rested somewhere between these two extremes. The council of 1934-37, controlled by the Democrats, including as it did at least a minority of independents, was apparently not subservient to the organization's demands. It supported the manager in resisting patronage and eventually split with the ward leaders on this very question. It restored the full council caucus and held it in the manager's office as Mr. Story had done previously.

The Republican leadership and its council majority in 1938, apparently restrained by its sad experience in 1932 and 1933, made a sincere effort to reconcile its accustomed habits with the system which it inherited from the Democrats. It retained the full caucus meeting and the committee system with minority membership. It held informal, unscheduled meetings at Republican headquarters, but there was much less secretiveness and behind-the-scenes control than before 1928. The Democratic minority felt that they were discriminated against in being appointed to the least important committees so that there would be no minority representation on the others. But at least a semblance of minority recognition remained.

Council meetings in 1938 were frequently methodical, uninteresting events, sometimes run off with such dispatch that the innocent spectator was hardly able to follow the proceedings. Consequently, the ordinary meeting was not usually well attended. When an important issue was to be argued, however, several hundred persons might turn out to hear

and—in some cases—to join in the fight. The discussions which this observer heard were all on a political plane, the issues being used only as a springboard for attacking the opposing party's representatives. The city manager and his various department heads attended the council meetings, but they spoke only when called upon—a relatively rare occurrence.

The hope of the city manager advocates that their charter would encourage independent candidacies for the council was in 1938 conclusively frustrated. It was virtually impossible for any who were not backed by a well-organized machine to compete successfully, and the voter's choice was again restricted to the slates nominated by the two major party organizations. The principal qualifications for candidates were that they be politically "right," that they manifest at least minimum qualifications of competency for the office, and that jointly they present a balanced and popular ticket. These same elements had been present before 1928, though perhaps with somewhat different emphasis. Then, the aldermanic candidates had to have control or full support of the political organization of their respective wards. After 1928 local ward power remained an important, but not a dominant, factor.

Thus, the incumbent council included only two or three persons who had been political figures or, in fact, who had had any political experience whatever before their election. The council was a fairly representative cross-section of the city's middle and upper-middle classes. From the standpoint of intellectual caliber, it would probably not have ranked with the one nominated by the City Manager League in 1927. Few of its members achieved prominence in political, civic, or business endeavors, and one member questioned his own and his colleagues' competence to tackle the complex problems involved in running Rochester. Yet the group was industrious in its work.

One reason why the caliber of candidates for the council was not higher was that the prestige value of council membership had fallen far from that sought and temporarily achieved by the City Manager League. It was said that the Republican leadership approached a large number of prospects for candidacy in the 1937 election before it received enough acceptances to fill its slate. Council membership involved much work and much time, and some of the more industrious members were seen in the city hall almost daily. Caucuses, committee meetings, and council meetings must have averaged a full day every week. For this there was relatively little monetary or other return. Council salaries were set in the council-manager charter at \$1,500 per year. Party men might



hopefully look upon membership as a step toward more lucrative positions, but in relatively few instances was a hope of promotion realized.

It was the hope of the charter-framers that the enhanced power and the reduced size of the council would raise its estate to one of civic leadership and would attract competent and highly regarded citizens to candidacy. While the incumbent and past councils unquestionably included many citizens with a civic—even altruistic—spirit, the prestige of membership was but slight inducement, and its importance was probably still on the decline in 1938.

### *Legislative Leadership*

The problem of effective leadership in the formulation of policy and in the representation of that policy before the electorate is, of course, related to that of electing competent men to the council. Second only to the nonpartisanship issue, this problem was the most vexing one in Rochester's manager plan experience.

The problem of leadership had been simply and effectively solved under the old mayor-council government by the office of mayor and the controlling party organization. The office of mayor was the focal point of all governmental activity. The mayor, as the city's chief executive, represented the city before the public, and his political status gave him actual, if not statutory, leadership of the council. The president of the Common Council presided over that body and acted as its floor leader. But, except for those months in 1926 when there was a split between the council and the mayor, the latter was the dominating figure of the government. Of course, behind-the-scenes control rested with the party organization.

The problem was especially simple in George Aldridge's time when Hiram H. Edgerton was mayor. Messrs. Aldridge and Edgerton were long-time friends, and Mr. Aldridge could keep the party in line and direct governmental developments while Mr. Edgerton represented the government before the public. Mr. Edgerton was mayor for fourteen years until his death in 1921. Even before he became mayor, he was a popular political and civic leader, long identified with the city government and various other municipal enterprises. Mr. Edgerton had a further advantage in holding office at a time when Rochester was booming; he planned and carried through many municipal improvements—a great expansion of the park system, streets, bridges, a municipal exposition ground, and other undertakings.

Mr. Edgerton's successor, Clarence D. Van Zandt, enjoyed less spec-

tacular success, but he was respected in business circles and well liked. Mr. O'Neil, who was promoted to the post upon Mr. Van Zandt's death, was widely known, especially among political groups.

Under the old system, Rochester citizens thus became accustomed to looking upon one man—the mayor—as the accountable representative of the government. The mayor, with his political boss, developed the policy, explained the policy, defended the policy, and executed the policy.

Then the city manager plan cut this office of mayor into two offices, divided by an amorphous, shifting area in which both offices took part. The Rochester charter gave the city manager a number of duties closely related to the legislative process: he had to prepare the budget; he had to make recommendations to the council; he had to keep the council informed as to financial needs; he had to attend council meetings and might take part in its discussions. Relative to the mayor, the charter provided that "he shall preside over the meetings of the council . . ." and made no mention of popular or political leadership. Nevertheless, it was anticipated that the mayor should continue to represent the city as ceremonial and (in the larger sense) political leader.

Rochester had a varied and, on the whole, unsuccessful experience with the office of mayor under the city manager plan. During the first two years of Mr. Story's regime, its mayor was not sufficiently educated or imaginative to guide policies and was physically handicapped, shy, and unable to speak in public. Mr. Wilson filled this position as a full-time job and received full-time pay of \$4,500, in addition to his \$1,500 as councilman. During this period the manager was virtually compelled to do the speaking, which he did with zest; and he planned the legislative policy quite on his own initiative. Mr. Story's capacity was as completely dominating over the scene as the old mayors' had been—more so, in fact, since the city manager had no party headquarters to check upon him. The council majority, politically inexperienced and unable to fall back on a continuing political organization for advice and support, simply followed Mr. Story's lead. The deadlocked council which followed in 1930 and 1931 was totally lacking in internal leadership and direction. It had no mayor, and Mr. Story continued with his previous program as far as possible.

Then with Mr. Owen as mayor the situation was reversed. Under the aegis of the Republican organization, Mr. Owen became virtually responsible for both policy and administration—a position entirely comparable with that of mayor under the strong-mayor charter.

Mr. Oviatt, who succeeded Mr. Owen in 1932, was the first and only outside mayor selected for this post—outside in the sense that he was not an elected member of the council. Mr. Oviatt was considered by some as the nearest approach in Rochester's experience to what the mayor should be in the manager theory of government. He did not interfere with administration as Mr. Owen did; he performed the public and policy-leadership functions as Mr. Wilson had not. Thus the city manager was allowed to concentrate on administrative problems. Mr. Oviatt's high civic reputation helped him in selling the government to the public. He was supported by an advisory committee, unlike any other mayor. His command of the council was nearly authoritative, largely as a result of the circumstances under which he was appointed.

Under the Democrats, the mayoralty again became a full-time, fully paid position. Mr. Stanton, who served as mayor from 1934 through 1937, was a man of commanding and handsome appearance and was a good speaker. He was generally regarded as an exceptionally able mayor for ceremonial and public contact purposes. His leadership in the council, however, was not particularly brilliant or imaginative, and most of the original ideas probably emanated from the city manager, Mr. Baker, and a councilman, Mr. Hoesterey. Mr. Stanton's popularity was lessened among some of the city manager group by the suspicion that his motivation was primarily political and that he was using his office for fence-building.

Nonetheless, the Democratic administration was a smoothly operating one, and, on the whole, a good one. The existence of a full-time mayor alongside the manager might conceivably have created difficulties. But Mr. Stanton and Mr. Baker apparently worked this problem out. Mr. Baker kept himself in the background for the most part and seldom declared himself on controversial issues. Most of the government's policy probably developed in his office, but Mr. Stanton carried it through the council and announced and debated it in public.

The Republicans made the office of mayor a campaign issue in 1937. They challenged Mr. Stanton's position as a useless political plum and declared that the full-time mayor created a dual executive, contrary to the theory of the charter. In their campaign platform, they pledged themselves to abolish the office and to substitute therefor a president of the Common Council.

When the Republican council took office in 1938, their plan met with several obstacles, among them that state legislation would be required to permit abolition of the office of mayor. Another was that a number

of relatively minor but necessary functions would have to be transferred to someone else. Temporarily blocked in their original intention, the new council proceeded to lower the salary of the mayor and declared it only a part-time job. Lester B. Rapp, who had been elected to the council in 1936, was chosen mayor.

Mr. Rapp soon came to realize the dimensions of the job of mayor. He publicly issued a demand for a salary commensurate with his duties and responsibilities and threatened to resign were this not granted.<sup>1</sup> His leadership within and without the council was not impressive. The council's policies emanated largely from Republican leaders outside the council—notably Harold MacFarlin—and from the city manager, who maintained much the same demeanor as he did under the Democratic regime.

The position of mayor thus remained an unsolved riddle in Rochester. The city failed to find a satisfactory midway position between the full-time executive mayor and the elimination of the office entirely. The duties of the office in 1938 were time-consuming and called for considerable ability. Yet the acceptance of a capable, full-time mayor would undoubtedly have weakened the position of city manager and might have led to disharmony.

The lack of effective leadership in the office of mayor resulted in a varying degree of reliance upon the city manager or the political party as a source of political and legislative guidance.

During the City Manager League and the Democratic administrations, organization leadership was almost totally lacking. The City Manager League failed to maintain a continuing organization, and its council representatives were entirely on their own. Interpretation of governmental activities was neglected, and the council members had no source of advice or support outside their own membership. Much the same situation prevailed during the Democratic regime from 1933 to 1937. The controlling group of the Democratic council was independent of party counsel. The council included three major factions: the Republican members, the faithful organization Democrats, and the more-or-less independent Democratic nominees. Only the latter group gave unqualified support to Mr. Baker. The Republicans and organization Democrats could have combined to overthrow Mr. Baker, but the former realized that the Democrats would appoint his successor

<sup>1</sup> This action embarrassed the Republican leadership which was still pledged to abolish the position entirely. Since this report was made, Mr. Rapp has resigned the position. He has been succeeded by Samuel Dicker.

and might select a man even less to their liking. Consequently, the Democratically endorsed independents occupied a strategically strong position, but their downfall in 1937 might be attributed partly to their lack of outside political support and leadership.

The most unfortunate aspect of this lack of continuing political support was that the two city managers during these periods had to assume personally the responsibility of proposing, interpreting, and defending policies as well as executing them. Actually, both Mr. Baker and Mr. Story were probably responsible for preparing and initiating most of the important measures adopted by their councils. Mr. Story, seizing the bull by the horns, assumed personal responsibility for his government's policies by sponsoring them in public.

In an address before the International City Managers' Association in 1929, Mr. Story said:

The greatest problem which faces council-manager government, in fact any government whether that of city, county, state, or nation, is that of informing the electorate . . .

You city managers have a solemn obligation to your cities to arouse interest in what the government is doing. . . . You should use every legitimate means to tell your people about their business. The newspapers, the radio, the movie, the direct speech, the printed leaflet, the personal letter should be used in a never-ceasing effort to "tell the world. . . ."

Mr. Story delivered another address at the same convention on the subject of "Ways of Securing Citizen Support of Government," in which he suggested means for developing a public relations program. In accordance with these proposals, late in 1930 Mr. Story established a service bureau and appointed a director of the agency. The proposed activities of the bureau included such functions as receiving fees, applications, and complaints; supplying information and distributing printed materials. Before anything was accomplished by the agency, however, it was wiped out of the budget. No attempt was made to revive it.

In 1930 the Bureau of Municipal Research prepared a consolidated municipal report for the city at the manager's request. A complete descriptive document for public consumption was drawn up with many photographs and charts to illustrate the written material. This effort did not get beyond the first draft and, like the service bureau, fell by the wayside without leaving any permanent traces.

Although these two efforts to sell the government to the electorate failed, they indicated Mr. Story's philosophy of direct relationships be-

tween administration and citizen and illustrated his continuing effort to supply the political responsibility in his government, which the mayor and the City Manager League were so neglecting. The assumption of the task by the city manager so identified him in the public mind with all the activities of the government that the manager himself became the political storm center in the city—the symbol of the administration in both the larger and the restricted senses.

Mr. Baker, though faced with somewhat comparable situations during his career with the Democrats, approached them in an entirely different manner. He was as careful not to bring himself before the public eye as Mr. Story was eager to do so. Although he probably initiated many of the measures which came before the council, he let the mayor and friendly councilmen carry them through, seldom identifying himself with a controversial proposal. Mr. Baker's term was, of course, a much quieter one than Mr. Story's. It was accompanied by few innovations and few heated local issues, the struggle over the water supply being the most prominent exception. On the other hand, it was faced continuously with the harassing problems of welfare, debt retirement, taxes, and economy. There was, therefore, perhaps more need for a municipal public relations and reporting program than during the preceding years of periodic political excitement. But Mr. Baker shared none of Mr. Story's ideas on a public relations program. He refrained from making speeches or public appearances; he even seemed reluctant to seek favorable reactions in the press. He did not undertake any municipal reports, and Mr. Story's service bureau plan was never revived.

Nevertheless, Mr. Baker attained unquestioned popular confidence and support, especially among the business classes. Perhaps the principal reason for Mr. Baker's success in this direction was his skillful handling of committees. Mr. Story had employed committees, and so had some of the earlier mayors, but none had been notably successful. Ever since Mr. Baker's appointment, however, almost every major political problem occasioned the creation of a committee, appointed and called by the manager. There were purely ex-officio committees, committees composed of official and civic representatives, and citizen committees. The last-named type was most effective in maintaining popular interest and confidence in the administration. These committees met in the city manager's office regularly during the fall, winter, and spring months. Mr. Baker made wise appointments so as to include the leading representatives of interested citizen groups, regardless of party. He selected many men of such civic prominence that their recommendations would have

great weight in swinging popular opinion. He directed the committee meetings with consummate skill, listening and not telling. The members were made to feel that their own opinions were being impressed upon the conduct of the government and that, in fact, they were part of the government. Their recommendations were referred to the council, and they usually resulted in legislative action. The weight of committee backing greatly strengthened Mr. Baker's position in effectuating his policies. There were also citizen advisory committees to assist in most major political problems of the city government, including finance, welfare, housing, WPA projects, and special problems as they arose.

The importance of the committees to Mr. Baker's administration was demonstrated by the trouble which followed on two occasions when he departed from the usual procedure. In the water controversy, Mr. Baker disputed the committee recommendation and personally backed an unpopular plan. The result was a major personal defeat for the manager and the institution of recall proceedings against the council members who supported him. The second instance was the dispute over the building of a new city hall. Mr. Baker recommended this to the council without resorting to any committee, apparently for the reason that he had to make immediate application for a PWA loan for the building. The issue aroused a storm of protest, particularly from taxpayers' organizations, even though it was generally realized that a new city hall was a prime requisite for the government. Mr. Baker personally explained his action in a newspaper statement in which he set forth his arguments for the undertaking, concluding that "in this sentiment I am supported by the full city council, regardless of political affiliation."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Baker's committees were continued under the Republican council in much the same manner as under the Democrats. But the Republican leadership assumed a more active role in political and policy leadership than its predecessor. Some of the important legislation adopted in the first part of 1938 grew directly out of the Republican campaign platform of 1937. This included the establishment of the Department of Commerce and the reduction of the mayor's salary. It appeared that the organization was vitally interested in abiding by its pledges so as to maintain public confidence in its good faith. It may be reemphasized that the Republican platform was drawn by Harold MacFarlin, who was himself no longer a member of the council. It is probable that the compelling or, at least, persuasive force behind many of the important measures of the council derived from the party organization and its

<sup>1</sup> *Rochester Evening News*, July 28, 1938.

leaders outside of the council. However, where party pledges or very important issues were not involved, the council and the manager appeared to be substantially free to apply their own intelligence.

Furthermore, where Mr. Story failed and Mr. Baker did not try, the Republicans seemed to be succeeding in developing a municipal public relations program. One of the principal functions of the newly created Department of Commerce was public relations, and its program was even more ambitious than Mr. Story's. The law under which the new department was operating required that it publish a consolidated annual report—something that Rochester had not had in almost forty years. It also provided that the department issue four quarterly reports on the activities of the various bureaus. The department had authority to request information and perhaps even to prescribe the reporting systems of the bureaus.

In addition to these formal reporting activities, Mr. MacFarlin, the commissioner of the department, undertook an aggressive program for civic education and good will, including movies, radio talks, photographs, circulars, exhibits, and the like. A central complaint bureau was established, and most of the licensing, which was scattered through various agencies, was to be centralized within this department. Among Mr. MacFarlin's innovations was the uniforming of all his employees who had direct contacts with the public. It should be noted that the dominant purpose of these activities—and of all the rest of the new department—was to advertise and promote and thus develop the city of Rochester as a commercial and industrial site and as a place in which to live. The department was not merely a reporting agency for the city government, although, of course, such reporting was an important element in its program.

It may be significant that this tardy venture in public reporting was not a product of the city manager plan or of the city manager supporters or even of a city manager. Rather it was being carried out by a frankly partisan representative under the nose of an unenthusiastic city manager. Some of the "good government" people, as well as the Democratic opposition, were suspicious of, or hostile to, Mr. MacFarlin's activity, feeling that it was self-advertisement for political purposes. Nonetheless, Mr. MacFarlin seemed to be doing a job of public relations that should have been done long before.



## VI. THE CITY MANAGER AND ADMINISTRATION

A FACT OF BASIC importance in the consideration of the administrative effects of the manager plan was that the city managers of Rochester were as concerned with matters of policy as with the mechanics of execution. The two principal city managers, Mr. Baker and Mr. Story, either through force of circumstance or from personal inclination, took the lead in legislation and devoted much of their energy to this phase of work.

The job of city manager proved to be little different from that of the old mayor. Most of the manager's time was devoted to conferences with citizens, committees, council members, and chief administrative subordinates. He did not maintain intimate contact with the routine operations of the government. When problems arose or were anticipated within the administrative framework, they were brought to the manager by the department heads and perhaps thrashed out. But the authority for departmental operations was freely delegated. This situation was comparable with that before 1928. The political responsibility was somewhat altered in 1938 by the fact that the incumbent manager was not a free choice of the party organization as were the old mayors. Since he was not closely identified with the party, perhaps he had more freedom, but his freedom was still circumscribed within fairly narrow limits.

In a large city like Rochester the manager probably could not maintain close touch with the day-to-day functioning of all the various bureaus. He dealt principally with the larger problems and relied heavily upon his administrative subordinates. For example, the incumbent manager in 1938 was primarily concerned with the reassessment of properties, the projected construction of a city hall, a traffic enforcement drive, a housing study, the financing of welfare, and the coming city budget. Although these problems had obvious administrative implications, they were also the chief political issues in the city—political in the sense of broad governmental policy and of party responsibility. The manager's office was the focal point of the government; it was where legislation and execution came together; it was where information was digested and where important decisions were made.

It is pertinent to inquire whether the appointive feature of the manager plan had as a result the selection of better qualified men to the

chief executive post. From the standpoint of acquaintance with governmental problems and techniques and of training and experience for the job, the city managers on the whole were far better equipped for their jobs than were the mayors that preceded them. The following comparisons between Rochester's four city managers and the three mayors who governed the city for the twenty years from 1908 to 1928 are salient:

The average age of the four city managers at the time of their appointment was about fifteen years less than that of the mayors when they assumed office.

The average term of office of the managers was about two and one-half years, whereas that of the three mayors was almost seven years. The latter figure is weighted by the extraordinary career of Mayor Edgerton, who held office from 1908 to 1921.

The managers all had college training, whereas none of the mayors had had any higher education.

During all except seven months after 1928, the position of city manager was held by an engineer. The mayors were all businessmen.

Two of the three mayors had had previous governmental experience in the city legislature, but, except for Mr. Edgerton, none had had close contact with the administrative departments. Two of the managers had previously held administrative positions in the Rochester government, and a third one, Mr. Story, was thoroughly familiar with the city administration.

All the mayors were native Rochesterians, whereas the two managers who served all except two of the years after 1928 were not.

From the standpoint of political and community leadership, if this be regarded as a proper part of the executive's job, the mayors, perhaps, had the advantage. The managers were not very widely known at the time they assumed office, and neither Mr. Story nor Mr. Baker was a native of Rochester. Mr. Edgerton, on the other hand, was a civic leader even before he became mayor. He was a leader in his line of business, had had experience in various civic enterprises, and had long been identified with the municipal government. Mr. Van Zandt was respected as a business executive but had had no previous experience in the city government. Mr. O'Neil was widely known, particularly in political circles.

### *Administrative Techniques*

The fact that the city managers had had more training and experience

in public administration would lead one to expect a more highly developed use of formal techniques, such as administrative reports, coordinating devices, supervisory techniques, and administrative planning. Except in the field of finance and financial controls, which are discussed in a later section, this was not generally true. None of the managers attempted to formalize administrative relationships through an administrative code, and no regular machinery was set up to coordinate plans and procedures. There had been no formal system of administrative reports before 1928, and none of the city managers developed such a system. Certain of the bureaus prepared reports which were sent to their department heads, and the Department of Finance presented to the manager monthly statements of the status of appropriations, revenues, and debt. After the establishment of the plan as before, the chief executive relied mainly upon the spoken word of the department heads for information about current operations, and, in fact, he apparently felt no insistent need for more extensive reporting. Some of the operating bureaus employed systematic reporting systems, but, on the whole, the bureau and departmental reports were not effectively developed.

The city manager's principal means of supervision and contact with his administration was personal conversation with the department heads. Some went to his office almost daily. However, no city manager, and none of the preceding mayors, developed the idea of a cabinet meeting of department heads. Sometimes groups of administrative officials were called together by the manager to confer on particular problems. It is probable that the managers were scrupulous in dealing only through the department heads. Bureau chiefs were frequently called into the manager's office with their administrative superiors, but no instance of the manager's short-circuiting a department head came to the attention of the writer. Most department heads employed essentially this same practice in supervising their subordinates. Some of the department heads, however, employed the device of cabinet meetings.

The incumbent manager developed administrative committees beyond the state of any of his predecessors, and through them there was a great deal of coordinated effort toward the solution of problems of overlapping significance. A good illustration of such committees was one established by Mr. Baker to promote the traffic enforcement drive. It included—besides the manager—the commissioner of public safety, the chief of police, the captain of the police traffic bureau, the city traffic engineer (who was in the bureau of fire and police telegraph, not in the police bureau), the city engineer, the superintendent of city planning in

the engineer's office, and the superintendent of fire and police telegraph. Another, the WPA Projects Committee, included, besides several city officials, a representative of the Board of Education. This group received suggestions for work projects, studied them, and recommended them to the city council and the WPA. These committees and others like them represented the only formalized effort by city manager administrations to coordinate the efforts of the different bureaus. Most of these committees might be described as specially set up bodies, aimed at the correction of specific situations. There were few, if any, continuing agencies, intended to coordinate the routine operations of the departments.

The policies of the executives, both before and after the city manager plan, have varied about circulating among the offices to see how things were running. It was said that Mr. Story did a great deal in this direction and developed a large degree of loyalty among the subordinate employees. He was popular with the rank and file city employees, partly because he freed them of political obligations and partly because of his own personal interest in their work and his frequent contacts with them. Mr. Baker, on the other hand, seldom left his office and was not so well known by the lower-ranking employees. Not a ready mixer like Mr. Story, Mr. Baker relied upon the information he received indirectly through the regular channels. Nevertheless, he was a strong and forceful personality and commanded the respect and loyalty of his administrative subordinates.


### *Administrative Organization*

One of the principal features of the city manager plan is the unification of administrative powers under the control of the city manager. As was noted earlier, the administrative organization was already well integrated in Rochester under the elective mayor before 1928. The administrative reorganization effected by the city manager charter brought about some further integration and some shifting of functions but constituted no revolution in the general structure.

The mayor's appointive control over the so-called line functions was virtually complete before 1928, except in the field of finance. There were six departments under his immediate supervision, of which four, those of public safety, public works, parks, and charities, performed line functions. He also appointed the heads of two departments whose functions were more of the staff type—the city engineer and the corporation counsel. The important gaps in the mayor's appointive power were the

FIG. 1. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF ROCHESTER UNDER MAYOR-COUNCIL GOVERNMENT, 1927

VOTERS



EX OFFICIO BOARDS

BOARD OF ESTIMATE AND APPORTIONMENT  
(Mayor, President of Council, Comptroller,  
Corporation Counsel, City Engineer)

BOARD OF CONTRACT AND SUPPLY  
(Mayor, Comptroller, Corporation  
Counsel, City Engineer, Commissioner of  
Public Works)


financial offices of comptroller, treasurer, and assessors, all of which were elective. The two ex-officio administrative boards, those of estimate and apportionment and of contract and supply were legally, and practically, perhaps, the most powerful agencies in the city. The former controlled the budget, salaries, and certain other financial functions; the latter was in charge of the letting of contracts and purchasing. Since the mayor and his appointees constituted a majority of each of these bodies, his control over them was established.

The line departments were already well integrated along functional lines before 1928. The Department of Public Works performed all the maintenance functions ordinarily associated with public works, and was, besides, charged with the operations of the public market and water works. The city engineer was in charge of new public works construction, planning and design, surveys, and testing. The Department of Public Safety was a broadly constituted organization covering police, fire, health, the city hospital, and building regulation. Park maintenance and recreation were united under the commissioner of parks. A number of functions were performed by commissions and boards appointed for fixed terms by the mayor. Their terms overlapped his, and they were, therefore, outside of his immediate control. Important among these were the Mt. Hope Commission of three which operated the municipal cemetery of that name; the Civil Service Commission of three; the Library Board of five; and others.

The city manager charter of 1928 transferred all the mayor's powers to the city manager and added to them the appointive control over all financial functions. The complete consolidation of finance within a single department was probably its most important contribution, and, as will appear in a later section, it provided the city manager with his most effective tool for managerial control over the whole administration.

The charter provided for an extreme consolidation of functions. The number of administrative departments was cut to an irreducible four—finance, law, public safety, and public works. The Public Works Department was expanded by the addition of the City Engineer's Office, the Municipal Cemetery, and the Bureau of Buildings. To the Department of Public Safety were allocated the Bureaus of Welfare and of Parks and Recreation, both of which had previously constituted full-fledged departments. This department thus became a congeries of such heterogeneous activities as police, fire, welfare, health, and recreation. This grouping was predicated upon the theory that it would encourage coordination among those agencies that normally carried on direct per-

FIG. 2. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF ROCHESTER UNDER THE CITY MANAGER CHARTER, 1928



sonal contacts with citizens. It was hoped that a mutually accepted philosophy and a more cooperative spirit among the employees of these bureaus would result.


The severe departmental consolidation proved only partly successful and was partly undone after 1928. The number of departments had grown to seven with the establishment of separate departments of assessment and welfare in 1932 and of commerce in 1938. The separation of assessments from the Department of Finance was apparently dictated for political reasons and had unfortunate results. The separation of welfare activities from the Department of Public Safety became essential with the tremendous expansion of welfare services. The lofty hopes of the framers regarding the Department of Public Safety had already proved vain, and it appeared in 1938 that the department might well be further decentralized. Some of its bureaus, such as health and the city hospital, received little attention from the department head and had little in common with their organizational bedfellows.

Like the Department of Public Safety, the new Department of Commerce was charged with a diverse group of activities. These included public relations, planning, management and maintenance of city real estate, regulation of weights and measures, and operation of certain municipal utilities, such as the subway, the port, the airport, and the city market. The logic behind this grouping was not entirely apparent. Largely through the direction of Mr. MacFarlin who administered the Department of Commerce, this grouping may well have contributed to a more aggressive performance of these activities.

In this connection it may be noted that the personal and political relationships existing within the framework of the charter were at least as important in day-to-day operations as the legally established scheme of organization. Indeed, the structural alterations growing out of the charter, even those in the field of finance, did not greatly affect the effective authority of the chief executive, even though these changes were designed to facilitate the exercise of the manager's authority. As before the adoption of the manager plan, the ultimate authority rested with the political organization which held the reins. Before 1928 political control encouraged coordination where the city charter failed to provide it, but the manager's authority was weakened by the fact that many of the department heads, theoretically appointed by him, were actually selected by the political organization. The department heads were responsible to the manager, but they were also responsible to the party.



FIG. 3. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF ROCHESTER UNDER CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT, 1938



*Financial Administration*

The integration of financial activities that was effected by the new charter made the Department of Finance perhaps the most important administrative unit in the city government. Organization, procedures, and administrative personnel all changed radically in 1928, and the organization then established persisted for the most part.

Until 1928 there were six separate agencies concerned with finance, and no one of these was legally responsible to any other. The major functions of these agencies were as follows:

**MAYOR:** preparation of budget; administrative supervision of the various departments, through control of the two boards; controlled general policies, purchases, contracts, salary rates, etc.

**BOARD OF ESTIMATE AND APPORTIONMENT<sup>1</sup>:** revision and presentation of budget to council; establishment of salary rates; supplementary appropriations of excess receipts; etc.

**BOARD OF CONTRACT AND SUPPLY:** letting of all city contracts; purchase through contract of all items of more than \$250; appointment of secretary who acted as purchasing agent for purchases under that amount.

**COMPTROLLER:** keeping of control accounts for all departments; audit of all claims and pay rolls.

**TREASURER:** receipt, disbursement, custody of moneys; keeping of accounts with all departments.

**BOARD OF ASSESSORS:** appraisal of properties; preparation of assessment rolls; hearing of allegations and revision of rolls.

The Board of Estimate and Apportionment, chiefly through its control of the budget, was the most powerful executive agency in the field of finance. Since this body, as well as the Board of Contract and Supply, was dominated by the mayor and his appointees, a degree of central control and coordination was assured. But there were still many opportunities for conflict, duplication of work, and accumulation of red tape in the operations of the various agencies. Both the comptroller and the treasurer had to keep accounts for all departments; the purchasing procedure was inexcusably complex and time consuming; control over budgetary expenditures was scattered and consequently ineffective; during 1926 and 1927 the mayor and the comptroller, representing different political factions, did not communicate with each other often, and then they frequently clashed.

That the financial functions were carried on as efficiently as they

<sup>1</sup>The Board of Estimate and Apportionment included the mayor, the president of the Common Council, the comptroller, the corporation counsel, and the city engineer. The Board of Contract and Supply was the same except that the commissioner of public works replaced the president of the Common Council.

were under this organization speaks well for the political leadership of the party in power. Without such leadership, a unified policy and any degree of coordination might have been lost. Rochester was in this respect fortunate in its consistent Republicanism. If men of opposing political faiths had held these various offices at the same time, the performance of the city's business might have been very seriously hampered.

Under the city manager charter, all financial functions were concentrated in the Department of Finance, under the administrative direction of the comptroller, an appointee of the city manager. Four bureaus were established within the department: the Bureau of Audit and Control, directed by a deputy comptroller and auditor; the Bureau of Treasury, directed by the city treasurer; the Bureau of Purchase and Supply, directed by the city purchasing agent; and the Bureau of Assessments.

The major change in this organization after 1928 was the separation of the Bureau of Assessments and the creation of the Department of Assessments in 1932. A board of three assessors was created to govern this new department. In 1938 this board was abolished and replaced by a single administrator who was assisted by two deputy assessors. The department, however, remained a separate unit in the city government.

The distribution of major functions among the various units was in 1938 as follows:

**CITY MANAGER:** revision of budget estimates and submission of budget to council; general supervision of Department of Finance; financial supervision and administration of other departments; formulation, with comptroller, of financial policies.

**COMPTROLLER:** administrative supervision of department; preparation of budget; formulation, with manager, of financial policies; preparation of financial reports; administration of debt; selection of depositories; advice to line departments, and control of appropriation expenditures; other.

**DIVISION OF AUDIT AND CONTROL:** keeping of control accounts of all departments; audit of all claims and pay rolls; keeping of financial records and data; accounting and billing of water charges; preparation of pay rolls for a number of departments; tax accounting; miscellaneous book-keeping.

**DIVISION OF TREASURY:** collection of tax and other receipts; disbursements; depositing of funds and keeping accounts with depositories.

**DIVISION OF PURCHASE AND SUPPLY:** making of open market purchases and letting of contracts; transfers of supplies; maintenance and operation of city warehouse; purchase of real estate and insurance policies.

**DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS:** appraisal of real estate; preparation of assessment roll.

**BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW:** hearing appeals from tax rolls.

Since all of the above functions, except assessments, were performed under the direction of the comptroller, unified policy and central control were assured.

The city manager charter thus inaugurated an organization which accorded with the recommendations of most financial authorities. This organization made possible a smooth, simple procedure by which the ordinary financial operations might be carried on. It avoided the possibility of conflict and jealousy to a large degree and encouraged greater coordination of the various financial activities.

One of the most obvious and immediate effects of the plan was the improvement of administrative personnel in the finance offices. When the chief officers were elected and their prime qualification was the ability to garner votes, there was little guarantee of their experience and ability in the field of finance. Mr. Story, the first city manager, promoted Clarence Higgins, deputy comptroller who had previously worked for the Municipal Research Bureau staff, to the comptrollership, and Louis Cartwright was appointed as his deputy. Mr. Higgins proved himself a competent comptroller and was responsible for the many improvements which were inaugurated during the first few years. Mr. Cartwright, a certified public accountant, remained in the position of deputy and auditor until 1938, when he was made comptroller. His retention through every administration was a tribute to his ability. Paul B. Aex, long experienced in private banking and financial fields, was the city comptroller during the Democratic administration. All these men brought to the city a knowledge, an ability, and a professional prestige which the election method could not have provided.

Partly as a result of statutory provisions enhancing the authority of the comptroller, but largely as a consequence of the respect and the esteem held by the various incumbents of this office, the comptroller became a dominant figure of the administration. This change gave the city manager his most powerful and effectual control over departmental activities. The principal device through which this control operated was the city budget.

Rochester had an executive budget long before the city manager charter was adopted, but for various reasons it did not function effectively. In the first place, although the fiscal year both before and after 1928 began on January 1, the budget under the old charter was never adopted before the middle of March. In fact, in many years the departmental estimates were not submitted to the mayor until January, although the law required their submission by the first of November.

This delay meant that, for the first two and one-half months of every year, operations were carried on without any financial plan or control. Under the new charter, the budget had to be submitted and passed several weeks before the start of the year.

In the second place, the practice of omitting from the budget all expenditures that were to be financed later in the year by deficiency borrowing made the budget a false and deceiving statement. As has been noted earlier, the city had operated for nine years prior to the city manager plan with a current expense deficit. At the time the budget was made out by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, it was fully anticipated that borrowing would become necessary later in the year to meet estimated expenditures. The board, however, actually allowed in the budget only the amount that could be financed within the tax limit. Several hundred thousand dollars of anticipated expenses were not mentioned in the document which went to the council and the public. A tacit understanding was reached between the board and the affected department heads that later on in the year they could obtain the amount of their requests by this method. There was apparently no legal reason why deficiency borrowing could not be included as a resource of the budget. The effect of the procedure followed was to make the budget incomplete, ineffective, and dishonest as a plan of expenditures for the year.

This practice was abruptly ended in 1928. The new charter contained the following sentence: "At the same time [when the appropriation ordinance is adopted], the council shall state the amount, if any, not provided for out of current revenues, which may be deemed necessary to be borrowed in addition to the amount to be raised by tax or other current revenues." After that time the budget was a complete plan of all expenditures, regardless of the method of financing. The charter also provided that deficiency borrowing for current expenses be completely eliminated by 1934. It was not eliminated, although it was greatly curtailed, amounting to only \$250,000 in 1933. Beginning in 1934, however, the city had to borrow several million dollars annually for welfare purposes, which were exempt from the charter prohibition. While the welfare emergency prevented the eradication of current expense borrowing, the budgeting of such expenditures with other appropriations removed the administrative evil once associated with the practice.

Another major source of weakness of the pre-1928 budget related to the appropriation of excess receipts. It was provided that any moneys received during the year which were not already appropriated should

be appropriated by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. It was the usual practice to underestimate revenues so that there would be a substantial surplus available for supplemental appropriations. The effect of this practice was that some departments anticipated a supplementary donation and deliberately lived beyond their budgets so that they might get a bigger slice when the surplus was distributed. There was thus presented an inducement to spend rather than to save. The city manager charter returned control of these excess funds to the city council; the funds could be redistributed only by a supplementary councilmanic appropriation. It appears that the evils of the old practice were eliminated.

In addition to removing specific defects in the budgetary process, the city manager plan strengthened the budget in a number of positive ways. The unification of financial functions in a single department not only increased the prestige and authority of that department in budgetary matters but also made possible a better integration and coordination of the financial functions which affected budget execution. For example, where once the financial accounts of the city had been kept by the comptroller, and the budget-enforcing agency had been the Board of Estimate and Accounts, after 1928 the comptroller's office handled both functions. Control accounts of all departments and funds were kept by the comptroller, and, under the city manager regimes, the detailed accounts became more and more centralized in this office. A logical and simple system of control accounting was developed so that the budget officer, the comptroller, had at his fingertips any information he needed about appropriation expenditures. By gradual stages this office assumed the detailed accounting of pay rolls, water billing, individual tax accounts, and like functions and made a number of machine installations to make these systems efficient.

Centralization and improvement of accounting operations made the comptroller an indispensable aid to the various spending departments. He developed an informal method of allotment control, whereby he might easily tell whether the different bureaus were running ahead or behind their appropriations and might advise them accordingly. All purchase orders near the end of the fiscal year were pre-audited in this department, and it might refuse payment if appropriation balances were exhausted. Furthermore, a record of purchase orders was kept against the appropriation accounts, so that ready information was available about encumbrances as well as of actual expenditures. Under the pre-1928 system, the comptroller's office never even saw many of the purchase orders.

The effectiveness of the comptroller's control was further enhanced by the improvement of audit procedures. Until 1928 a highly complicated system for the audit and payment of claims was prescribed in Rochester's basic law. The procedure was so cluttered with requirements as to delay payments from one to two months; to inconvenience the dealers who were attempting to collect; and to put the city to a great deal of unnecessary expense. At the same time, the audit was ineffective in many respects.

The city manager charter included general provisions for a thorough audit, and a comparatively simple procedure was installed which created a good system of audit with relatively few loose ends. The process of auditing claims was materially speeded up, and, for the first time, the city began to save on cash discounts for prompt payment on claims. Such discounts amounted to nearly \$14,000 in 1928, the first year the new procedure was in effect. Furthermore, in 1938 the city was saving about \$6,000 a year, formerly spent for the publication of all claims against the city as required in the old charter. In addition to procedural simplification, the audit was extended to cover pay rolls, other claims, and receipts in a far more thorough manner than before. Among the features introduced after 1928 were a nonfixable traffic violation tag, a more thorough annual independent audit, and a modernized tax account and audit system.

All these changes were factors in making the Department of Finance a key unit in the whole city government and in making the city budget an effective and vital instrument of control. It is true that the budget was not developed to the extent that it might have been. The financial plan was not closely correlated with the planning of work as it could be through the use of departmental reports on work and costs, through work programs, and through cost accounting, none of which was developed by the government. But the budget under the manager plan was a long step from the one under the old charter, which was once described by the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research as a "meaningless document, without value as a plan and a means of control."<sup>1</sup>

### *Purchasing*

The city manager administrations had somewhat less complete success in introducing reforms in the purchasing of the city's supplies, although the organization and practices of their predecessors offered many oppor-

<sup>1</sup> Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research. *Financial Defects of Rochester's Charter*. Report No. 196.

tunities for improvement. Until 1928 purchasing was nominally centralized in the ex-officio Board of Contract and Supply. All purchases in excess of \$250 were made by open competitive bidding to that body, and smaller purchases were made directly by its appointed secretary.

Although purchasing was thus structurally centralized, the organization and practices were such that few of the benefits of centralization were realized. There was split responsibility between the board and its secretary, and frequently the two were not cognizant of what the other was doing. There was no professionalization of the purchasing function, and members of the board were chiefly interested in other matters. The secretary had little authority and in reality was little more than a clerk. The law was continually evaded by the splitting of large purchases so as to fall below the \$250 limit, by the use of blanket orders to local dealers against which the departments could order what they pleased, and by the excessive use of emergency orders, whereby purchases were simply made by the departments and later reported to the purchasing office. A report of the local research bureau in 1922 estimated that 35 per cent of all purchases were made by the emergency-order method.<sup>1</sup>

The spending departments had reason to circumvent the purchase office. The regular procedure was so surrounded by legal requirements and other red tape that speed and efficiency were impossible. Furthermore, the major virtue of central purchasing—quantity buying—was lost because there was no pooling or coordination of departmental orders. All went out separately. There was no programming of requirements, and little attempt was made to take advantage of price fluctuations. There were no central stores, and whatever departmental storage existed was outside of central control. Little progress had been made in the development of specifications, standardization of goods, inspection of deliveries, and salvage, and the purchasing office had no systematic record of prices and vendors.

The purchasing process thus appears to have been one of the weakest points in the government, and regarding this particular function, the political machine was resistant to change. In 1915 the New York Bureau of Municipal Research made several proposals to improve the purchasing operations; in 1922 the Rochester bureau surveyed the situation and made several criticisms and proposals, many of which were similar to those made in 1915. There was no evidence that much was done on either occasion for reasons probably political. Following the adoption

<sup>1</sup> Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research. *Recommendations as a Result of Purchasing Study*. Report No. 144. 1922.



of the manager charter, the last aldermanic council passed a charter amendment in 1926 to establish a purchasing agent who was to operate according to approved practices of purchasing. The bill, however, provided that he be appointed by the council, and it was apparently a move to embarrass the mayor who represented the insurgent Republican group. He vetoed the bill, and the old system remained unchanged until 1928.

The city manager charter, by eliminating the Board of Contract and Supply and establishing a single-headed Bureau of Purchase in the Department of Finance, brought purchasing within the city manager's administrative hierarchy. The purchasing office and its procedures were completely reorganized by the Story administration. The purchasing process was simplified and integrated with the budgeting and auditing procedures in accordance with generally approved practices. The purchasing procedure, inaugurated in 1928 and maintained with but slight modifications, unquestionably saved the city much, in terms of speedier service, cash discounts, and lower prices.

The 1928 administration made a number of other innovations. A municipal storehouse was acquired, and this unit of the purchasing division supplied standard types of equipment to all the departments on a cost basis. The storehouse had a delivery truck and could fill the requests of the using departments promptly. With a turnover of more than \$100,000 a year—about four times the value of the average supply on hand—the storehouse was a major contribution to the operations of the various departments, at relatively little cost.

Another innovation at that time was the purchase of a multigraph machine by the purchasing division. Similar equipment was added later, and most of the city's reproduction work was in 1938 performed by a full-time city printer at substantial savings over private printing costs. The 1928 administration made renewed efforts to standardize requirements and to develop specifications for standard types of supplies. An inventory was made of all the goods of the departments, and the warehouse was employed for salvage purposes, a function which was later discontinued. The use of contracts was increased, requirements were programmed, and a thorough system of recording prices, price trends, goods, and vendors was installed. Buying was put on a strictly competitive basis, and emergency orders were minimized. In the last six months of 1928, the number of such orders was reduced to twelve, and their total amount was about one hundred dollars.

After 1932, however, some of the gains of the Story administration

were lost. This trend resulted from the partial return of political patronage and from the increased pressure of work and decreased appropriations. The purchases for Civil Works Administration and WPA projects were a responsibility of this office and required a large share of its time. Most records were abandoned and more time was devoted to meeting immediate needs than to the continuance of a scientific system. The programming of requirements and recording of prices was neglected, and the specifications work, which was carried on in the Public Works Department, was greatly curtailed during the depression. Furthermore, a distinctly political flavor remained in much of the purchasing. Every administration since 1928 had been charged by its opponents with favoritism in its purchases. Recently, the Republican organization was said to have furnished the office with a list of approved vendors and, it was held, the purchasing office was bound to abide by this list. Emergency or confirmatory orders became more frequent, although the purchasing office tried to discourage the practice.

Nevertheless, the purchasing office in 1938 was unquestionably more efficient and more economical than the old Board of Contract and Supply and its secretary. It had, on the whole, improved the staff personnel despite the heavy hand of politics in influencing the appointments of the heads of the division. It was severely handicapped by the lack of a large enough staff to do as complete a job as was undertaken in 1928, but it maintained the theory and the practice of competitive bidding, of fast, efficient service to the buying bureaus, and of cooperation with, and encouragement of, prospective bidders.

### *Assessments*

As with purchasing, the city manager plan promised great improvements in the administration of property assessments but accomplished only partial success. But because local assessments became a major political issue during the depression, the shortcomings in the administration of this function were more marked. The manager plan brought improvements in the organization and procedures involved in assessing, but it was a distinct failure in effectuating a fair and just appraisal of local properties, which should have been, after all, the substance of its activities.

Assessments were in a bad way when Mr. Story assumed office in 1928. For thirty years the administration of assessments had been in charge of four assessors elected at large. Few of the assessors had had any particular qualifications, and the office was regarded as a political

stepping-stone to better things. In fact, it was a pretty good thing in itself. It was reported that little work attended the job. There was no specialization or allocation of work, and responsibility was diffused. The assessors' staff was small and inadequate, its records and procedures were not developed, its maps were inadequate, and it had no uniform system of appraisal.

A survey which was made by the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research in 1921 recommended that the organization, equipment, and system of the office be changed to conform with scientific standards. Work was begun with that aim in 1924, four years before the first city manager government was installed. From then until 1930, a great amount of work was done to provide a thoroughly equitable and efficient system of assessment. This included a comprehensive study of land values for the determination of base prices, a land value map, a complete set of cards containing a thorough description and value of each property, and, finally, a systematic inventory of all property to be used in a reassessment. In addition to these, a set of comprehensive city assessment maps was drawn up in the office of the city engineer. An assessment manual, containing a thoroughly modern system of standardized land and building valuation, was prepared, and the city was on the road to a new deal in property assessments.

This work, well under way when Mr. Story became city manager in 1928, was completed by the reorganized Bureau of Assessments in 1930. The new charter abolished the Board of Assessors and designated a single assessing officer, responsible to the city comptroller. Methods and procedures of the office were completely reorganized under the single, appointed assessor. The reassessment, then ready after several years of intensive work, might have been readily installed. Unfortunately, the data gathered in the reassessment were never transferred to the assessment rolls. In 1927, a flat assessment increase of 20 per cent had been made, principally for the purpose of relaxing the debt and tax margins. The Story administration, already charged with extravagance, did not dare to put into effect a new valuation which would have tended further to drive assessments up. The average increase in assessments would probably have been about 10 per cent. Mr. Story feared that there would be feeling against another increase and planned that the new figures should be installed gradually over a period of years. Following this plan, a number of changes were made on the rolls in 1931 in accordance with the revised appraisals. This program, however, was guillotined by the Republican victory at the polls that year. Although subsequent

gestures were made to install the adjusted valuations, the rapid decline in values occasioned by the depression soon made such action both inadvisable and impracticable.

The Republican council in 1932 removed the Bureau of Assessments from the Department of Finance and set up a three-membered Board of Assessments, appointed by the city manager. Under the board's control, assessment administration rapidly deteriorated to a chaotic and inefficient condition. The reappraisals and the system by which they were determined were left dormant. The land value maps were soon out of date, as well as the assessment manual. The assessing staff became disorganized, lacking effective direction, supervision, and morale, and the board itself fell into a state of bickering and conflict. Meanwhile, the inequities which remained on the assessment roll became more painful as taxes mounted and private resources declined. A large number of certiorari cases were initiated by taxpayers in 1937, and the city lost one vital case.

Under these circumstances, the city manager, Mr. Baker, called upon the research bureau in 1937 to make a study of the assessment situation. Following this survey, which brought to light the full gravity of the problem, the department was again reorganized in 1938. The board was abolished and replaced by a single-headed assessor appointed by the city manager. The internal administration was in the process of reorganization in 1938, and at the same time another reassessment survey was under way. It was believed that the net effect of the reappraisals, which were to go into effect for the 1939 tax levy, would be to reduce the total assessment by about 15 per cent or about \$100,000,000.

The Rochester Department of Assessment had for eight years been excellently equipped with maps, property descriptions, standard rules of appraisal, and office records on properties. Since work on a scientific system had been inaugurated several years before the manager plan went into effect, the manager government may be credited only partly with these improvements.

In terms of end results, however, there was little change for the better until 1938. The inequities in valuations were gross, and charges of political favoritism were still heard. The principal reasons for this situation were two: first, the apprehensiveness of the Story administration that the new values would have unfavorable political effects and its consequent failure to install them; second, the return of the administration of the department to a political basis, especially in the appointment of administrative personnel. The reorganization in 1938 was virtually

compelled by the obvious inequities of appraisals, reflected in the certiorari cases, and by politics and inefficiency within the department. While the reorganization and reappraisals undoubtedly alleviated the immediate situation, the distinctly political flavor which continued to cling to the appointments and activities of the department did not bode too well for the future. City manager government had certainly not fulfilled its promise in this important administrative function.

### *Personnel Administration*

One of the prime objectives of the city manager movement was to displace the spoils system of personnel selection with a system based upon merit. The discussion in previous chapters has indicated that this effort was only partly successful respecting the supervisory and administrative personnel. Professional qualifications received more consideration in the appointment of the city manager, the department heads, and the division heads, but the political party was still the deciding factor in filling these positions; and each political change in the council was followed by a large-scale turnover in the administrative posts.

What influence did the manager plan have upon the personnel and the employment policies of the rest of the service? How did it affect the formal personnel processes essential to a corporation of about four thousand employees?

Rochester had had a Civil Service Commission for many decades. Its duties, which were defined in the state civil service law, included the giving of entrance examinations, the certification of eligible lists, the checking of pay rolls, the maintenance of a personnel roster, and similar functions. It may be said categorically that the manager plan made no noticeable dent on the make-up or the activities of the commission, despite the appointment by the city manager of the three commissioners for their fixed, overlapping terms. The commission's small staff, little changed for many years, operated under rules adopted in 1911, and its procedures were long entrenched. The competitive service, which included about half the city's employees, had not been markedly expanded after 1928; and the commission had either not been financed, or not disposed, to expand its personnel activities. It was apparently doing an acceptable job of examining and was carrying out its pay-roll checking and other routine functions satisfactorily.

The framers of the city manager charter wished to give the manager a direct, executive control over personnel matters within the framework of the state civil service law. Accordingly, they provided that the city

manager, not the Civil Service Commission, appoint the secretary to the commission and that this officer also act as the city manager's representative in personnel matters. Before the clause was ever invoked, the state Civil Service Commission advised that it would be illegal under state law. In 1930, however, Mr. Story appointed a personnel officer directly responsible to him and not connected with the commission. This office was subsequently abolished but was reestablished in 1933; thereafter it operated under the immediate direction of the city manager.

Thus there were two personnel agencies in Rochester—the Civil Service Commission and the manager's Personnel Office. Contrary to the wishes of the charter framers, these offices were physically and psychologically distinct, and their working relations were complementary rather than integrated. The Personnel Office, confronted from the start with the restricting ruling of the state body on the one hand, and with the spoils demands of the political parties on the other, developed uniquely within its confined sphere. It gave the city manager immediate touch with the personnel situation and problems; it took some of the personnel headaches away from the appointing officers; and it raised minimum qualification requirements for some of the noncompetitive and labor jobs. The office worked closely with the party organization in selecting employees that were not under civil service control. The party saw to it that deserving men got the call; the Personnel Office saw to it that they were at least capable of doing their jobs. On many occasions, this office turned back applicants recommended by the party organization.

The personnel officer also performed a number of miscellaneous services for the city manager and the department heads. He maintained a card file of past and present employees, canvassed civil service lists, interviewed applicants, and checked upon departmental personnel policies for the manager.

The Personnel Office thus made some contribution to the improvement of the city's employment policies and augmented the managerial control of the chief executive. But Rochester still fell far short of a positive personnel program. One of the basic deficiencies was the lack of an occupational classification of the employees. For many years before 1928 a sore need was recognized for a complete classification of the service and for the introduction of a uniform plan of salary standardization. Salary standardization was mentioned in the charter campaign and was named by Mr. Story in his inaugural address as part of his program.

In 1930 and 1931 a thorough survey was made of the city's service

for this purpose, and a classification plan was presented, from which salary standardization was to have evolved. The change in administration in 1932 and the subsequent financial retrenchment postponed the program indefinitely. Although the personnel officer was attempting to introduce the plan in gradual stages, the situation was probably about the same in 1938 as in 1927. The findings of the 1931 survey were, perhaps, as applicable in 1938 as they were then. They may be summarized by saying that there were numerous instances of misleading titles; positions involving different kinds of work had the same title; positions involving substantially the same kind of work had different titles and widely ranging salary rates; and salary increases had been based, in some instances, upon seniority alone.

Lacking a sound classification plan, the development of a well-balanced executive personnel program was impossible, if indeed it was seriously sought in later years. There was no effective central control over such matters as promotions, transfers, service ratings, time and leave regulations, working conditions, and development of morale. Most of these matters had to be handled by individual departments and bureaus—if they were handled at all.

The first city manager administration, with its fanfare, its well-advertised aspirations, and its genial manager, undoubtedly brought with it some rejuvenation of the city's service—both to prospective and to incumbent employees. Some of this influence was still evident in 1938 in many bureaus where the caliber and the morale of employees were high. But, on the whole, the personnel operations of the city were one of the most disappointing results—or lack of results—of the city manager plan. Some improvements had been made in the increased central control over appointments in the labor and noncompetitive classes, and the executive had a staff aide who kept him in touch with the employment situation. But the failure to develop an aggressive personnel program and the return of spoils in 1932 prevented substantial permanent improvements. The continuing vitality of the spoils system was illustrated in the first six months of 1938 when the change in control of the city council was followed by a turnover of more than one thousand city employees.

### *Other Administrative Changes*

For the most part, the city manager type of administration had relatively little effect upon the activities of the operating bureaus. The structural changes in the city charter and the vigorous spirit of Stephen

Story during the early years brought some reforms in line operations, but some of these efforts proved impermanent.

One of Mr. Story's principal objectives was the development of a city plan. In 1929, the city retained a well-known firm of planning consultants to prepare a plan under the general direction of the City Planning Commission. The work of this group resulted in a plan of five parts: a major street plan, a civic center plan, a transportation plan, a traffic plan, and a recreation plan.

The first two of these were adopted by the City Planning Commission, which had been reorganized under the new government. The major street plan was accepted by the council in 1931 and was put into effect as the official city map. The civic center plan was never officially adopted, nor were any of the other parts of the plan. Nevertheless, they influenced the new construction work of the city. The new public library, which went into operation in 1936, was constructed in accordance with the civic center plan, and the proposed city hall was to occupy approximately the same spot as proposed in the plan.

The city was excellently equipped for planning in 1938. In addition to the general planning data that had been accumulated, a number of special studies had been made on such matters as sewage disposal, the municipal port and harbor, the water supply, and the airport. The maps and data available in the engineer's office were more than adequate.

Yet the over-all plan was not thoroughly implemented, and certain capital improvements constructed within recent years were at variance with its proposals. Probably the basic reasons for this were the defeat of the Story administration at the polls in 1931 and the emergency economic conditions which followed. The immediate reasons were the failure to develop a financial program and a working schedule with which to put the plan into effect. The Bureau of Municipal Research made a thorough investigation of the financial aspects of the plan, and, with the Department of Finance, prepared a tentative financial program. In the stress of welfare financing and with the coming of federal funds, this program was shelved and was never revived. A work schedule was never developed, and its absence was evident in the rush of work projects in recent years. Relatively little progress was made on two of the major parts of the plan—the civic center and the street plan.

The protective bureaus of police and fire received many innovations during the Story administration, and most of these proved to be permanent contributions. A new training school and an Auto Theft Division were set up in the Police Bureau; both made a good record. The records



system of the Police Bureau was greatly improved at that time and was still being progressively handled in 1938. Likewise, modern methods, records, and equipment were introduced into the identification division. The chief accomplishments in the Bureau of Fire were the establishment of a Fire Prevention Bureau and an arson squad, both of which proved their worth. A modern type of hose depot was established, and training activities were stimulated.

Despite these advances, some of the vital problems of these bureaus were not successfully handled. Political influences lingered in the Police Bureau; its administrative set-up indicated a need for reorganization; the expensive precinct organizations, outmoded by the motorization of the force, remained in spite of urgent recommendations that they be abandoned. The organization and the location of fire stations, likewise, might have received some attention to the benefit of the taxpayers, and the records and the administrative procedures of the Fire Bureau could have been modernized.

The consolidation of police, fire, health, welfare, recreation, and other functions in the single Department of Public Safety did not accomplish the hoped for coordination of activities. The Bureau of Health, while progressively managed, operated independently and free of administrative supervision by the department head. The Division of Parks and Playgrounds seems to have been little affected by the new organization. Its activities in the physical development and maintenance of the parks made Rochester noteworthy for its fine park system, but public recreational facilities were underfinanced and underdeveloped, falling far short of the ideal standards in this field. The Bureau of Charities was, of course, separated from the Department of Public Safety in 1932 and was completely reorganized as the independent Department of Public Welfare. This department appeared to be operated progressively and with a better than average degree of efficiency. Among its features were an excellent system of checking client resources, modern systems and equipment for secretarial and clerical work, and a clothing commissary.

The integration of engineering and public works maintenance activities in the single Department of Public Works, which resulted from the city manager charter, had a salutary coordinating effect. A visitor might see concrete testimony that coordination had been needed—an idle power unit, designed and installed by the former engineering department at one of the sewage disposal plants. Intended to furnish power to operate the plant, the power unit was never put in use by the main-

tenance unit, which had apparently not been consulted at the time of the installation. Under the manager plan both the engineering and maintenance units were well coordinated under a strong commissioner of public works. In 1938 the Department of Public Works appeared to be progressively managed, and it had an exceptionally able and enthusiastic group of division heads and supervisors. Record systems and methods had been improved. Political influences, however, were a continuing handicap to the selection and supervision of labor personnel.

## VII. CONCLUSION

ALTHOUGH THE city manager movement in Rochester was far from spontaneous and its prime movers constituted only a small minority of the citizens, city management came to Rochester as the result of what amounted to a political revolution. Not only did it replace a strong-mayor type of government, but it represented revolt against the political leadership, the political methods, and the political philosophy that had prevailed. The city manager plan was much more than a new form of government; it was the banner around which the forces for political reform could rally.

Like most revolutions, this one resulted neither in a complete victory for the cause nor in a complete reversion to the old system. Its effect was a blend of the new ideology with the habit patterns that preceded it.

Rochester fully accepted the council-manager form of government. There were no attempts to vote it down after 1928; no group in 1938 was contemplating an attack on it. On the other hand, the spirit behind the charter had been successfully attacked. That spirit rested on the nonpartisan ideal, upon which primary stress was placed during the campaign of 1925. The removal of the nonpartisan clauses of the charter in 1932 signalized the defeat of the reform movement's effort to establish a government entirely devoted to the ideals of efficiency and service. The absence of any widespread protest or counter-activity to this move seems to indicate that most of the citizens had again become quiescent about party government. Indeed, the abnormally low voting returns in the charter election of 1925 and in the subsequent nonpartisan councilmanic elections of 1929 and 1931 led one to believe that many of Rochester's electorate had not been greatly concerned about the reform ideal even before 1932.

In the wake of the nonpartisanship reform campaign was left a sizeable minority of independent thinkers and voters who were interested in progressive city government. Many of them had realistically accepted political government and were hoping to work with and through the parties for the achievement of their aims. Perhaps the main, long-run contributions of the manager movement in Rochester were the vitalization of at least a minority of government-minded citizens and their realization that there was more to city government than the political party.

The strength and influence of this group were evident in 1933 when it forced the turnover in the positions of mayor and manager in the middle of a term. It was again evident in the choice of councilmen by the Democrats in the same year and by the selection of an independent, Mr. Baker, as city manager. The strong showing of the Citizens' party slate in the 1937 election gave voting proof of this independent strength. Finally, and foremost, the retention of Mr. Baker by the Republican party in 1938 indicated both that the dominant party respected this group and that the ideology of professionalized administration was penetrating the party's ranks.

Thus the seeds of the city manager movement found fertile soil even though the movement itself, insofar as it was an antipartisan movement, withered. One might conclude, on casual observation, that the movement had utterly failed in its primary purpose of eliminating party politics from the city government. The incumbent government in 1938 deviated in many ways from the nonpartisan utopia pictured by the initiators of the manager plan: in the absence of nonpartisan or proportional election machinery; the dependence upon, and the close alliance of the local parties with, national politics in elections; the considerable degree of dependence of the council upon the political party for leadership; the selection of the manager and the department heads by the political party; the substantial subordination of the efficiency concept to partisan influences in administration, particularly in personnel and purchasing.

Yet the manager charter and the enthusiastic reform movement that sponsored it brought about definite accomplishments in the city's governance. There was an unquestioned improvement in the general administrative capacity of the city's chief executives and some degree of improvement in the city's other administrative personnel. The smaller city council seemed, in general, to be a more effective and more representative body than its aldermanic predecessor, although it was far short of the ideal dreamed of by the reform group.

The principal achievements in the administrative realm were the integration of financial functions under the administrative hierarchy and the strengthening of financial controls, notably the budget. The city purchasing office and storehouse were likewise distinct advances; the improvements in the fire, police, welfare, and public works agencies should also be mentioned. Against these, it must be stated that some of the more ambitious undertakings fell by the wayside because of financial curtailments, political vicissitudes, lack of courage, or just plain dilatoriness. Outstanding were the failures to install the reassessed property values; to develop a potent executive personnel office; to install a personnel classification plan and other approved employment practices; to effectuate the city plan; to reorganize the Bureau of Police; and to develop a reporting and public relations program.

That the achievements were not more spectacular was the result partly of the return of political party pressures, partly of the fact that administrative processes were already on a fairly respectable plane of performance, and partly of the depression, which focused efforts on economy and welfare.

The course of Rochester's administration between 1928 and 1938 may be generalized into two periods. The first, covering the four years of the Story government, was characterized by many innovations in the techniques of administrative housekeeping; the second, which was most pronounced after 1934 under the managership of Mr. Baker, was a period of retrenchment in which attention was devoted to the curtailment of expenses rather than to the adoption of new or improved devices. The Baker administration, perhaps from necessity, attacked the basic problems of the government with more positiveness than did Mr. Story's administration and demonstrated its ability to keep costs down and to reduce debt.

Mr. Story and Mr. Baker were both strong managers, although the circumstances surrounding their administrations and their personalities compelled them to follow utterly different courses. Both were dominating figures on the local scene, and both assumed the initiative in fields of policy as well as administration.

The failure of the office of mayor to provide effective political leadership made the manager's dominance almost inevitable. In fact, his position and responsibility in many ways resembled that of the mayor under the mayor-council plan. But there was one vital difference. The mayor always was the face, the expression of the political party in power. The incumbent manager and, for the most part, those that preceded him, were

rather expressions of the group, unorganized in 1938, whose members believed in professionalized administration. The manager worked with the party, but he was not its essence. The very fact that the incumbent city manager held his job indicated the lasting impress of the ideology behind the city manager movement of 1925. Rochester did not have the council-manager plan of the textbooks, but neither did it have the closed-shop machine of George Aldridge. During its first ten years, the Rochester city manager government seems to have approached a combination of the two—the concept of professionalized administration and a political system of party responsibility for policy. In broad, oversimplified terms, that was the general trend. But the situation in 1938 was still only an approach to such a combination.



## CONTENTS

I. Introduction . . . . .	101
II. Governmental Changes and Elections . . . . .	112
III. The Council and the Manager . . . . .	127
IV. The Government and the Public . . . . .	142
V. Municipal Services and Administrative Practices . . . . .	147



### IMPORTANT DATES IN BERKELEY'S GOVERNMENT

Incorporation .....	1878
First Charter .....	1878
Second Charter .....	1895
Commission Government Amendment Adopted ..	1909
City Manager Charter .....	1923
John N. Edy, City Manager .....	1923
Hollis R. Thompson, City Manager .....	1930



*Field Work: Summer, 1938*  
*Report Written: Spring, 1939*

# City Manager Government in Berkeley, California

---

## I. INTRODUCTION

ON THE EASTERN shore of San Francisco Bay, opposite the Golden Gate, is the city of Berkeley. This community, essentially a residential and university town, is situated on a low-level plain rising from the water's edge and ascending gradually to rolling hills which culminate in a summit over seventeen hundred feet in height, known as Grizzly Peak. Topography has played a leading part in Berkeley's development. The level stretches along the bay offered good locations for manufacturing establishments—and manufacturing is today the city's prime activity in the business field. The hills and foothills made excellent sites for residences. But, most important, it was the natural beauty of this region that determined its selection as the setting for the University of California, an institution which from the beginning was a dominant influence in Berkeley life and was responsible in large measure for the city's growth.

Berkeley's land area is  $9\frac{1}{2}$  square miles, and its water area 8 square miles. In this space is contained a population estimated in 1938 at 100,000.<sup>1</sup> Population growth has taken place primarily since 1900. The greatest increase was caused by the San Francisco fire of 1906; the population figures jumped from 13,214 in 1900 to 40,434 in 1910, a change of 206 per cent. The population in 1930 was 94.4 per cent white (79.6 per cent native white; 14.8 per cent foreign born), 2.7 per cent negro, and 2.9 per cent other races. Fifty-three per cent of the total population in 1930 was female, 47 per cent male.

Although the population is racially quite homogeneous, the town is divided into definite sections determined by economic and geographic factors. West Berkeley, which contains manufacturing establishments, is the residential district for lower-income families. One finds a variety of groups in this area, including Mexican, Portuguese, Italian, Finnish,

<sup>1</sup> This figure excludes college students whose permanent residences are not in Berkeley.



Scandinavian, and Negro. Above Shattuck Avenue, the main business street, is the university, around which are the boarding houses of the college students and the apartment houses for middle-class white-collar workers. Homes of other middle-class and well-to-do families are located in the northeast hill district. Annexations have added four sections to Berkeley. South Berkeley, annexed in 1892, is essentially a middle- and low-income family district, while the other areas annexed, Claremont (1906), Northbrae (1908), and Cragmont (1920) were developed as residential areas for wealthier families. In addition to the central business district, other shopping areas have grown up in the various sections, especially in West and South Berkeley and around the university. Before the adoption of city manager government there was considerable bitter feeling and jealousy between West Berkeley and the east hill districts in local affairs, but subsequently this division was not very marked.

Manufacturing, which is confined to West Berkeley along the shore of the bay, stands first as a source of income. Manufacturing and mechanical industries employed 24 per cent of the working population in 1930. Other occupational divisions of the 35,233 working people were (1930) as follows: professional services, 19.4 per cent (including 7 per cent professionally engaged at the university); trade, 18.3 per cent; clerical services, 16.7 per cent; domestic services, 11.5 per cent; public service, agriculture, and transportation, 10 per cent. The city's annual volume of retail trade, \$25,000,000, is not proportionate to its size, since Berkeley is the seventh largest city in California in population, but stands twelfth in retail trade.

Berkeley is a conservative community. It runs along fairly well on an even keel with no big booms and no real depressions. Labor troubles are few and strikes are rare. Business men work in close cooperation through the Chamber of Commerce and their trade associations. *The Berkeley Daily Gazette* has been the city's only daily newspaper since 1913. Its circulation is relatively small, a little over 11,000, which is less than the distribution of the university student daily. An explanation of this is the wide distribution in Berkeley of newspapers from other cities in the metropolitan area, San Francisco and Oakland. There are also several weekly papers. The town has a good number of service clubs and promotional groups. Sectional improvement clubs were important during the city's earlier growth but their influence subsequently waned. Women's leagues are quite active, and the women of Berkeley show considerable interest in civic affairs. The cultural tone of the community has been set by the university, and this institution also tends to encourage a

higher standard of living. Religious sentiment is manifested by over eighty different congregations. There is little vice in Berkeley. These "metropolitan amusements" are confined to the larger cities of the bay region.

For a true picture of the Berkeley community one must visualize it in relation to the metropolitan region around the bay. San Francisco Bay, with its strategic position on world trade routes and its accessibility to both important local markets and those of the Pacific and Orient, was a significant and guiding factor in the development of this entire area—a determining element in the growth of such industrial, commercial, and financial centers as San Francisco and Oakland. Suburban towns were formed as people from the larger cities sought more spacious and attractive places for residence. With improvements in transportation, these various local units became closely knitted together. East Bay communities are so compactly joined in a continuous municipal area that they might well constitute one city, and, since the construction of the bay bridge, San Francisco is easily accessible. Berkeley's part in this metropolitan whole is that of a residential city and the home of the University of California. The proximity of two big business centers explains why Berkeley's commercial development and retail trade are not so extensive as one would expect to find in a city of about 100,000 persons. It means, too, that over 8,000 Berkeley breadwinners in Berkeley's 24,372 families (1930) had their business interests in either Oakland or San Francisco and used Berkeley as their "bedroom." This daily migration reflects a dependence of Berkeley to a certain degree upon these cities for its people's livelihood.

Local government units directly affecting Berkeley citizens are a county, a city, a school district, a utility district, a regional park district, and a mosquito abatement district. Berkeley is located in Alameda County, which is governed by five county supervisors elected from supervisorial districts. Berkeley, a small city named Albany, and part of Oakland constitute one district.

The boundaries of the school district are coextensive with the boundaries of the city. Public school management in this district is vested in an elected school board of five. Election of four school directors is provided for in the city charter; the fifth member is the Berkeley mayor who serves *ex officio*. The Board of Education may request a tax levy from Berkeley up to 35 cents for each \$100 assessed valuation. Additional funds are received from the state and from a school district tax which is levied by the county supervisors. Berkeley is one of the few California cities

which contributes to the support of its schools; most other municipalities leave school finance entirely in the hands of the state and the school district.

The California Legislature in 1921 authorized the formation of utility districts throughout the state for the distribution of light, water, power, heat, transportation services, and the disposal of garbage and sewage. These districts could embrace more than one city and more than one county. In 1923 Berkeley citizens, with the voters of eight other cities located in two counties, approved the creation of an East Bay Municipal Utility District to furnish their water supply. Although the district could develop other utility services, its activities have been limited to water distribution. The district is governed by a board of five directors elected from wards within the district boundaries. These wards have been arranged so as to place an approximately equal number of electors in each division. Capital investments of the utility district have been financed through bond issues. A tax is levied to pay principal and interest on these bonds. The district employs the tax collectors' offices of the two counties in which its property is located to collect the tax.

A legislative act in 1933 authorized two or more municipalities with contiguous territory to organize park districts with the proviso that the district's territory must be within the boundaries of a municipal utility district. The purpose of this special governmental unit was to develop extensive regional recreational areas and park facilities. The East Bay Regional Park District, governed by five elected directors, established a park in the Berkeley-Oakland hill area, purchasing land from the East Bay Municipal Utility District. Its operations are financed by a tax levy which is collected through the county tax collector's office. The district may incur bonded indebtedness, but up to 1939 it had not utilized this method of finance.

The establishment of mosquito abatement districts within one or more counties was authorized by the state legislature in 1915. Berkeley is in the Alameda County Mosquito Abatement District, which includes that portion of the county facing on San Francisco Bay. Each municipality in this special unit must vote separately to become a part of the district. The district is governed by an unsalaried Board of Trustees, one trustee being appointed by the council of each city within the area. Abatement work is under the direction of a full-time superintendent, assisted by several divisional firemen. All income of the Mosquito Abatement District is secured from a special tax levy. Assessments are collected by county officers.

*History and Early Governments*

Berkeley's beginnings were much the same as those of other communities in the San Francisco Bay region: first the Indians, then the Spaniards, finally the Yankees. The site of this city was originally part of the vast Peralta domain—a grant received by Don Luis Peralta, a Spanish soldier, from the King of Spain and later divided among four sons who ruled over their ranchos until the coming of American squatters. The Peraltas' dispossession is the age-old story of progress. In 1853 a stage stopover was established along the travelled road in that section now known as West Berkeley, and with the addition of several small factories the settlement of Ocean View sprang up by the shore. But development of this locality would have been slow had it not been for the selection of land in the northeastern part of the rancho as a site for the College of California. Gradually three distinct little communities grew up: Ocean View, with its manufacturing establishments; Berkeley, the name given to the area in the vicinity of the university; and a section which is now the business center of town, but which at that time was a small group of buildings at the terminal of the railroad connecting this district with Oakland and San Francisco. In 1878, after several unsuccessful attempts, these communities were incorporated by a special legislative act into the town of Berkeley, and the government was vested in an unpaid Board of Trustees. The impetus for incorporation started not so much from a need for municipal government as from the entire lack of a school system.

Since 1879 California cities have adopted their charters under home rule sections of the state constitution. Cities with over 3,500 inhabitants may frame charters for their own government. They are given power to make all laws and regulations governing municipal affairs, "subject to the restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters, and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws."

Berkeley's second charter, framed by a Board of Freeholders in accordance with those home rule provisions of the state constitution, was adopted in 1895. It also provided for a Board of Trustees but they were to be elected by wards. One of the prime reasons for the adoption of this charter was to lift the strictly limited tax rate and to extend it to 75 cents per \$100 valuation. This charter was hailed as the dawn of a new era.

*Commission Government*

Berkeleyans approved in 1909 the charter under which their government was operating in 1939. Until 1909 demands upon the local govern-

ment had not been great, but civic leaders realized that, as the city grew, the extent of municipal services would increase. Again, one of the motivating factors for the adoption of a new charter was the necessity for increasing the tax limitation. It was increased to \$1.00 per \$100 valuation, where it remained despite numerous efforts to change the levy. The leader of the movement for charter adoption and the president of the Board of Freeholders that drafted the document was William C. Jones, dean of the University of California School of Jurisprudence. Mr. Jones, a keen student of local government, was interested in developing for his own community the best type of municipal organization, and his charter provided for a commission government, the progressive form of that day.

The charter placed governmental affairs in the hands of four commissioners and a mayor—salaried officials who were elected at large rather than from wards. They were the legislative body and the administrative heads, upon whom rested the responsibility of determining policy and supervising its execution. Other elected officials were the auditor and four school directors. Certain specific appointive officers were provided for in the charter, namely, assessor, treasurer, city clerk, collector, attorney, engineer, street superintendent, health officer, chief of police, fire chief, and five library trustees.

The mayor was designated the chief executive officer of the city and was "charged with the general oversight of the several departments of the municipal government." Provision was made whereby the council could establish citizen commissions, and direct legislation and action by the people were guaranteed through sections providing for the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. The city was empowered to make and to enforce all rules governing municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in the charter itself. The city was given the power to acquire and to maintain all types of public buildings and institutions and to engage in the operations of public utilities, such as water works, electric light, heat and power works, and transportation services of all kinds. Provision was made for financial control through requirements for the submission of departmental expenditures to the commissioner of finance and revenue and through the preparation of an annual budget by this official.

While the caliber of the commission was always high and the honesty and the sincerity of commissioners were unquestioned, it was inevitable that the weaknesses inherent in this form of government should finally manifest themselves. Vote trading occurred; it was difficult to exercise budgetary control; commissioners favored their own city functions; and

they were unable to give the time and the expert attention that growing municipal services required.

With few exceptions Berkeley elected capable men to public office. The mayor served a two-year term; the commissioners, a four-year term. Beverley Hodghead, a prominent San Francisco corporation lawyer, was chosen as the first mayor. In 1911 J. Stitt Wilson, a Socialist, was elected. Mr. Wilson was one of the first Socialist mayors in the country, and by a strange set of circumstances much of his support came from the town's Republican newspaper. Although he did not run for reelection, Mr. Wilson unsuccessfully waged mayoralty campaigns later in 1915 and in 1917. Failing to receive newspaper support because of the feeling "that his Socialistic inclinations did not harmonize with a war-time administration," he lost by 124 votes (6,271-6,147) in 1917. Charles Heywood was the people's choice in 1913. Although he lost the 1915 election to Samuel C. Irving, a wealthy business man, who was the vice-president and the manager of the Paraffine Company, Mr. Heywood returned to the city hall in 1917 as a commissioner, a position which he retained until 1923. Mr. Irving was reelected mayor in 1917 but was defeated in 1919 by Louis Bartlett, an attorney interested in public utilities. Mr. Bartlett's majority was 62 votes (4,574-4,512); his great strength was in West Berkeley. He was reelected by 43 votes (6,472-6,384) in 1921.

Commissioners were active political leaders in the community, in the sense that they were chosen to determine and to carry out municipal policies, but they were not politicians in the common meaning of the term. Berkeley was never the type of city that would stand for graft-and-corruption politics. Most commissioners were either fairly successful business men or attorneys, and, although they were supposed to be full-time city officials, they usually devoted only part of their day to municipal activities. They left administrative affairs largely in the hands of department heads. City programs and policies, however, were referred to, and decided by, the commissioners. The commissioners' legislative meetings were open to the public, although they discussed a number of controversial issues in an executive session which usually preceded the regular meeting. Such star-chamber sessions were vigorously criticized and condemned by the press. Commissioners were not always unanimous in their decisions on public policies; they often engaged in vigorous controversies and were definitely split on issues such as municipal garbage collection versus private collection. But they debated matters thoroughly and adopted action which the majority felt was best for civic interests. The mayor occupied a position of leadership in the community, and to the

public he was the real head of the city, although in the council his voting strength was only that of one commissioner. The commissioners published an annual report of their activities until 1916. After 1916 they merely printed an annual summary of municipal achievements in the daily newspaper.

General supervision of administrative matters was divided among a commissioner of public health and safety (police, fire, and health), a commissioner of public works, a commissioner of finance and revenue, a commissioner of public supplies, and the mayor, who was responsible for miscellaneous activities, such as city planning, charities work, and the parks and playgrounds. While these commissioners were nominally responsible for administrative activities, they gave administrative heads of the departments considerable freedom in the conduct of their activities. The commissioners usually met once a week with the department heads whose activities they supervised, and at these meetings they discussed new problems and the conduct of everyday work.

The commissioners' faith in these public servants was well founded, for the administrative staff of Berkeley's city government was always good. Under commission government the police and fire departments were considered as models. The success of these two departments was attributable not so much to the commission form of government as to the men heading the departments. The growth and the development of Berkeley's Police Department were the work of the chief, August Vollmer, who had been elected police marshal in 1905 and who served the city continuously as its chief law enforcement officer until 1932. The Fire Department's reputation was synonymous with the names of Kenney, Rose, and Haggerty. The public health service received its impetus from men of the university. Throughout most departments the story was the same.

The functional organization of the Berkeley commission government (as of June, 1916) was as follows:

MAYOR (general oversight of all departments and officers of the city)

City Attorney

Board of Library Trustees (5 members)

Main Library (6 branches)

Civic Art [Planning] Commission (10 members)

Park Commission (5 members)

(City Parks—In Department of Public Works)

Playground Commission (5 members)

(City Playgrounds—In Department of Public Works)

Commission of Public Charities (7 members)

Agent, Commission of Public Charities

Labor Bureau

Berkeley Dispensary

Berkeley Day Nursery

Charity Organization Society

} Supervisory control

COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE AND REVENUE (member of Board of Education by virtue of office)

Assessor

Treasurer and Tax Collector

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

(Advisory Board of Health)

Health Department (Health Officer)

Milk Inspector and City Veterinarian

Sanitary Inspector

Bacteriologist and Chemist

Fire Department (Fire Chief)

3 Engine Companies

4 Hose Companies

2 Chemical Companies

Machine Shop

Police Department (Police Chief)

Poundmaster

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SUPPLIES (This commissioner and the commissioner of finance and revenue constituted the membership of the Finance Committee.)

City Clerk

Building Janitors

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WORKS

Department of Public Works (City Engineer and Superintendent of Streets)

Bureau of Streets

Division of Street Maintenance

Division of Sanitation (Street Cleaning)

Division of Inspection

Bureau of Engineering

Division of Construction

Division of Surveys

Bureau of Building and Inspection (Chief Building Inspector)

Plumbing Inspector

Electrical Inspector



Corporation Yard (Equipment Repair and Maintenance)

Municipal Wharf

City Parks

City Playgrounds

CITY AUDITOR (elected)

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (elected)

Financial procedures were centralized under the commissioner of finance and revenue, who was responsible for the preparation of the city's budget. The treasurer and the assessor acted directly under his supervision. The elected auditor checked warrants to see that payments were legally due, kept a complete set of books, and was required to furnish the council with a monthly financial statement. All department heads who collected funds had to make a monthly settlement for this money with the auditor. The commissioners were required by the charter to maintain a cash basis fund, a sum equal to not less than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cents on each \$100 assessed property or a sufficient amount to meet legal demands against the treasury for the first four months of the succeeding fiscal year. In preparing the budget, department heads sent estimates to the commissioner of finance and revenue, who then submitted an annual estimate of the city's requirements and revenues to the commission. A budget was passed before the levying of the annual tax rate. The mayor was required to employ an auditing firm to check the city books twice a year.

A major weakness in financial operations was that no system of budgetary control existed. Consequently, funds were spent during the earlier part of the year, and, if additional money came into the treasury, it was used by those departments under the commissioners who were strongest in vote-trading. The commissioners were not unduly extravagant with city funds, and it was only during the last years of its existence in Berkeley that the commission government showed a deficit. Financial difficulties increased in the depression year of 1921. The last true surplus was shown in the fiscal year 1920-21 at \$6,850; in the fiscal year 1921-22 there was a true deficit of \$26,793; in the fiscal year 1922-23, a true deficit of \$27,791. The term *true deficit* is used because, although total cash operating assets remained at the end of these years, the cash basis fund had not been kept up to a level required by the charter. The financial situation was further aggravated in 1923 because, as a result of litigation, back payments of \$48,000 were owed to the East Bay Water Company; a defunct municipal market had left a debt of \$2,660; and no transfers had been made during the year from the general fund to the fire and police pension funds.

Berkeley had had centralized purchasing since the charter became effective in 1909. Before the change to city manager government purchasing had been the responsibility of the commissioner of public supplies, and all bills for goods ordered by requisition had to be passed upon by a Finance Committee consisting of the commissioner of public supplies and the commissioner of finance and revenue.

Usually personnel policies were left largely in the hands of department heads, subject, of course, to final approval by the commissioners. The police and fire departments developed rather complete systems for recruitment and training, and both departments had pension funds. Some favoritism was shown in selecting municipal employees, although with few exceptions the commissioners never tried to exploit their positions. The charter gave the commission authority to establish a civil service bureau and a civil service commission, but it never utilized this prerogative.

The commissioners effected some cooperation between departments of the city government and with outside agencies. A system of cooperation between the city and the schools was introduced in recreation activities. This cooperation rested entirely upon a gentleman's agreement rather than upon legal regulation. Another example of cooperation between the city and the schools was the Coordinating Council, an informal group started in 1919 by the police chief, Mr. Vollmer, and Dr. Virgil Dickson (the superintendent of schools in 1938), to discuss policies in handling and rehabilitating juvenile offenders. This council was a voluntary organization and consisted of the heads of various public agencies in Berkeley that had an important relation to child welfare. Internally the department heads worked cooperatively. A corporation yard with a general equipment maintenance service was an important coordinating agency.

The city charter provided that the commissioners could establish citizen commissions on civil service, civic art, parks, playgrounds, and public charities. The commissioners were also required to appoint five library trustees. All these citizen boards were created by the commissioners before 1916 with the exception of the Civil Service Commission. The Public Charities Board which aided welfare organizations and assisted in the relief of municipal unemployment was formed in 1910. The Playground Board was set up the same year. The Civic Art Commission (later the City Planning Commission) came into existence in 1915. This group had an interesting beginning. In 1914 influential Berkeley citizens were appointed to a City Planning Committee and in cooperation with

other organizations, such as the Berkeley City Club and the Oakland Chamber of Commerce, secured the services of Werner Hegemann to make an extensive study of a city plan for the municipalities of Berkeley and Oakland. As an outgrowth of his report, considerable interest was manifested in civic planning and the Civic Art Commission was created, although actually its functions were those of city planning. Its first report stated: "The purpose of the establishment of the Civic Art Commission is to provide for, and regulate, the future growth and development of Berkeley." This commission prepared a general zoning ordinance in 1916 and a more comprehensive ordinance in 1920. Berkeley was the third city in the nation to adopt zoning regulations. The Park Commission was created in 1916. In 1921 Mayor Bartlett appointed Paul Eliel to investigate the possibilities of establishing a civil service commission, but no action was taken on Mr. Eliel's report. These boards were still functioning in 1939 with the exception of the Park Commission, which had been abolished in 1927 when the park and playground activities were consolidated. Public participation in local government through advisory boards had been, therefore, an active part of Berkeley city affairs under commission government.

## II. GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES AND ELECTIONS

BERKELEY'S ADOPTION of city manager government was not the result of a sudden agitation by irate citizens disgusted with "city hall rascals" but rather was the culmination of many years' discussion. The change from a commission to a manager system was a transition rather than an upheaval, although it took a clash of personalities and issues to stir up sufficient civic interest to get the city manager amendments added to the charter.

### *Early Campaigns for City Manager Government*

In January, 1914, Mayor Charles Heywood issued to the 1909 Board of Freeholders an invitation to reconvene and to discuss certain suggested improvements to the city's charter. Included among these suggestions, but not of prime importance, was the city manager plan—a scheme that had just been adopted by Dayton, Ohio. Although the mayor felt that this

plan was premature for Berkeley, the attitude of some freeholders led the daily newspaper to report, "It is not unlikely that this novel and highly commended system of municipal government may be made a part of city government." W. C. Jones pointed out that the plan could easily be grafted onto the local charter.

About this time the Berkeley City Club appointed a special committee to study the manager system. Prominent on this committee was Thomas H. Reed, later city manager of San Jose and after that connected with the National Municipal League. The Berkeley City Club was an outgrowth of the 1909 charter campaign. It started as the Tennis Club—an organization of influential civic leaders interested in promoting the charter's adoption and in electing the first mayor, Beverley Hodghead. The Tennis Club changed into the Berkeley City Club and declared its purpose to be that of discussing political, social, and economic conditions in the city. Membership was open to all Berkeley men and women, and most of the prominent people of that day belonged. Various committees were appointed to study different issues and to report their findings to the club.

The club's City Manager Committee made its report in an open meeting, March, 1914, and strongly recommended that the manager plan be incorporated into Berkeley's charter. The committee outlined the defects of commission and strong-mayor governments and submitted proposed amendments that would effect the desired changes. Perhaps the general attitude of the club toward this issue was summarized best by Benjamin Ide Wheeler, president of the University of California, who, unable to be present at the meeting, sent a note saying, "I have always felt that the plan of government by commission represented only a halfway progress toward the ultimate goal . . . not a goal, because in the first place it confuses legislative and administrative functions and in the second place fails to give the city the full benefit of trained expert advice." Members of the Board of Freeholders attended this meeting, and Mr. Jones intimated that they would suggest that the proposed changes be submitted to the people.

After months of preparation the freeholders submitted to the mayor and the city council their report recommending many charter amendments. Most vital of these was the city manager proposal. For reasons best known to themselves the commissioners eliminated the manager plan from those amendments which were to be placed before the voters. Mayor Heywood expressed his opinion that "there was no immediate call for so radical a change in government."

But certain civic leaders were of a different mind. Circulation of initiative petitions was considered, and in November the City Club held a meeting on the question: "What is the city council going to do about the Freeholders' amendments?" After a rather heated debate the mayor agreed to submit the city manager proposal to the electorate if those favoring it could secure the equivalent of an initiative petition. A campaign was immediately started but soon called off when, after a meeting of all concerned, a gentlemen's agreement was reached to submit the city manager amendments at the spring election. When the spring of 1915 arrived, however, several other civic issues were occupying the people's attention, and the city manager plan was not placed on the ballot.

In August, 1916, Mayor Samuel Irving and his commissioners decided to submit to a vote of the people the city manager amendments and other charter changes recommended by the Board of Freeholders. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons for the commission's action, it is quite likely that the proposals were submitted as a counterattack. A group of citizens, aroused over street-paving problems, were circulating petitions that would have introduced damaging amendments to the charter. Possibly to forestall their activities and to defeat their movement, the freeholders' amendments were revived.

No intense campaign was waged by proponents of the city manager plan, for many men interested in the amendment had left the city. Then too, the amendments were voted upon in the November national election in which President Woodrow Wilson was standing for his second term. It was natural that there should be more interest in state and national affairs. Thomas H. Reed, who had become city manager of San Jose, spoke under the auspices of the Berkeley City Club, and several other civic leagues discussed the plan. There was no organized opposition.

The manager amendment was defeated in the November, 1916, election by 663 votes (7,642-6,979). Early returns indicated that it had carried, but the western and southern portions of the city offset the majority given for the measure in East and Central Berkeley. The large vote accorded the amendment was a surprise to its supporters.

The city manager proposal was not considered again until 1920. In September of that year arrangements were made for a special election to place before the voters amendments to raise the tax limit for general-fund purposes, to increase the auditor's salary, and to adopt a system of preferential voting. Then a number of citizens interested in city manager government asked that this proposition be added to the call. Prime mover of the idea was Thomas H. Reed, who had now returned to Berkeley.

Mayor Louis Bartlett and the commissioners acted favorably and agreed to submit charter amendments practically identical with those of 1916. However, on October 2, a month before the election, the commission, following the advice of William C. Jones, voted to drop the city manager plan from the ballot. This action was necessary because of legal difficulties which would have arisen had both the auditor's salary increase and the city manager amendments passed. One of the two proposals had to be dropped.

Mayor Louis Bartlett, issuing his statement of explanation, said that there was a "likelihood that within the next two years we will be living under a new charter and in that event the city manager plan can be incorporated in it in a manner that will make it a thoroughly workable project without dislocating a going government." Thus he anticipated the change, but not the manner in which it was to be effected.

### *The Winning Campaign*

The adoption of city manager government by Berkeley in January, 1923, cannot be ascribed to one cause. It was the result of many issues and circumstances which finally created enough dissatisfaction with the commission system to achieve a change.

Perhaps most important of these was garbage collection; a long series of controversies and disputes had arisen over the inauguration of a municipal garbage service. This was not a new problem. An ordinance establishing such a public utility had been passed in 1916 but had later been rescinded by referendum. After continual dissatisfaction with private collection the commissioners decided in July, 1921, to put the city into the garbage business. The system was placed under the supervision of Charles Heywood, a former mayor, and then commissioner of public health and safety, and the commissioners agreed to stick together on the matter until a trial period of ninety days had passed. But Mayor Bartlett and a commissioner, Mr. Schmidt, broke with the "garbage bloc," and the two groups started bickering back and forth on the financial condition of the garbage department. This controversy created a badly split council and showed off some of the finer faults of commission government. The *Berkeley Gazette* bitterly opposed municipal collection. It gave full play to the garbage issue, editorializing, for example: "After six months the undertaking has proved a heavy financial loss to the city with little if any prospects of its ever being made a self-supporting municipal department." (The garbage service in 1938 was making an annual profit of over \$25,000.) The commissioners also became divided

over the system of garbage disposal: fill versus incineration. This dispute made matters worse.

As the depression fiscal year of 1921-22 came to a close, the council faced budget difficulties and had to make some drastic cuts.<sup>1</sup> Many citizens blamed the garbage system and the Street Department activities<sup>2</sup> for Berkeley's financial woes. There was talk of a possible change in the form of local government: either reversion to the ward system or the adoption of a new plan, such as the city manager system.

In September, 1922, a movement for a special election to remove the \$1 tax limit was started on request of the Berkeley Welfare Society. The society wanted to have a special tax for the support of public charities, but the commissioners felt that it would be better to submit a general-fund increase. At the same time Mayor Bartlett introduced, and the council approved for inclusion in the election call, an amendment which provided that city legal notices could be posted in ten prominent places instead of being printed in the newspaper. This proposal was the culmination of four years of bitter feeling between Mr. Bartlett and the *Berkeley Gazette*. The *Gazette* had opposed Mr. Bartlett's election and administration, and he, in turn, through his "happy faculty for antagonizing people" did much to arouse the paper's ire. The *Gazette*, the only daily in town, had a monopoly of city printing, and the commissioners felt that they were being charged excessive prices. After several analyses by out-of-town shops of the *Gazette's* bids on certain printing jobs, the amendment to post notices was prepared. The effect that it had on the *Gazette's* attitude toward the incumbent commissioners is obvious.

Another issue placed on the ballot concerned Berkeley's waterfront. One Rufus Jennings had arranged to secure a long lease on Berkeley's waterfront with the provision that he make certain improvements within a stipulated time. After several extensions of the required period, Mr. Jennings went to the commissioners in 1922 for a further extension. This was granted, but Mayor Bartlett, who alone opposed the move, circulated petitions and secured a referendum on the commission's action. This act antagonized the Berkeley Manufacturers' Association and certain groups in West Berkeley, who favored the lease because they believed that Mr. Jennings' plans would aid the development of the part of town near the waterfront.

<sup>1</sup>One of the persons dropped from the pay rolls was Hollis R. Thompson, later the city manager, who was then industrial secretary of the Y.M.C.A. and was working part time for the city as an "official job-finder."

<sup>2</sup>The Street Department was under the direction of George Schmidt, one of Berkeley's few "politician" commissioners.

Thus, a wide variety of problems—municipal garbage collection, budget difficulties, the movement for the removal of the \$1 tax limit, a quarrel with the city's only daily newspaper over the publication of official legal notices, and the question of waterfront development—brought together diverse groups of citizens who viewed the existing local government administration with critical and unfriendly eyes.

In late September a number of business men met at a luncheon with the commissioners to discuss the adoption of a city manager plan. A commissioner, Mr. Heywood, said that, if amendments were prepared, they could be submitted at the special election. Thereupon a committee, headed by William Morrish, president of the Berkeley Commercial and Savings Bank, was appointed to draft the proposed changes. Those who served on this committee represented important organizations in the city: Earl Sinclair, former city attorney and secretary of the Downtown Association (later first city attorney under the manager system and acting city manager in 1930 after John N. Edy's resignation); Frank Stringham, former city attorney (first mayor under the manager system); L. D. Sanderson, city attorney; Roy Long, president of the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce; Charles Keeler, secretary of the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce; Matthew Lynch, dean of the University Law School; and Samuel C. May, professor in the University of California Political Science Department (later a member of the first city manager council). This committee held a number of meetings and prepared amendments. When they offered their plans, however, the council repudiated its earlier promises and refused to place the manager amendments on the ballot. Only one commissioner, Carl Bartlett, favored such action.

The mayor then arranged for a public meeting to discuss the issue and at this gathering the people demonstrated that they were overwhelmingly in favor of voting on the proposals. With this display of public sentiment and with additional support given by such organizations as the Berkeley City Club, the Rotary Club, and the Berkeley League of Women Voters, the commissioners were practically forced to place the amendment on the ballot and called the special election for January 20, 1923.

This time proponents of the measure realized the value of an organized campaign. They formed a Berkeley City Manager Committee under the leadership of Messrs. Frank Stringham and E. Clarence Holmes. Those who comprised the committee were primarily from northeast Berkeley and the business section of town. The Berkeley Manufacturers' Association, aroused over Mr. Jennings' waterfront lease, was only too glad to



lend a helping hand. The Berkeley City Manager Committee naturally had whole-hearted support from the *Gazette*, and this active press promotion was a valuable asset in the campaign, for it meant that the city manager proposal was more than a mere question of academic interest. This time, too, there was an organized opposition led by Charles Heywood and George Schmidt, two commissioners incumbent in 1922.

The campaign was a spirited one. Debates were held; local improvement clubs discussed the issue; and the *Gazette* press fired away at "petty potentate" Bartlett and the "city hall gang." Original points of departure were forgotten. The City Manager Committee used the very effective argument that, if its plan carried, the increased tax rate measure should be defeated since "the commissioners want and need it; the city manager doesn't, and wouldn't want it." The committee extolled the financial virtues of city manager government: "Would Berkeley's heaviest taxpayers be in favor of the plan if it wouldn't save money?" The opposition held: "It isn't the lack of efficiency but lack of money that handicaps Berkeley." It contended that the effectiveness of any plan depended upon the men administering it and cited examples of Berkeley's nationally recognized fire and police departments under the commission government. Systematic canvasses were made in various parts of town. City managers were imported to describe the plan in operation. There was even the usual accusation that city hall employees were being given the "shake-down."

In spite of this campaigning there was an extremely light vote, particularly in West Berkeley. The turnout of a larger percentage of the registered voting strength from the northeast hill districts than from the west end assured a victory for the amendment. When the final votes were counted, the city manager amendment had been carried by 5,226 to 3,076, a total vote of 8,302 out of a registration of 32,000. Sixty-seven of ninety-three precincts favored the plan. Votes against the plan were primarily in West and South Berkeley; the reason for this division was the strong sectional feeling that had developed between West Berkeley and the east hill district. Residents of the manufacturing section did not have much regard for university folks and the "highbrows" whose main economic interests were in San Francisco. Shattuck Avenue, the main business street, represented a sharp dividing line. Explaining West Berkeley's vote against the city manager amendments, one old-timer said, "They probably didn't trust the plan, but figured it was one of those highfalutin' schemes of the long haircuts."

As for the other issues, the tax increase and the extension of Mr.

Jennings' lease were voted down, but the printing amendment was carried.

Thus, after almost ten years of active discussion, the city manager plan was incorporated into Berkeley's charter. The effect of this innovation was well expressed by Chester Rowell, former editor of the *San Francisco Chronicle* and prominent Berkeley resident:

This change in the government of the city was not a reform from a bad form of government to a good one. There had been pretty bad government in other cities, but Berkeley with its high standards had a long record of good government—so Berkeley went from good government to better government. What actually happened was that we went from a system in which the best of men could work imperfectly into another system in which the best of men could work better.

### *The First Election*

After its successful campaign for the adoption of charter changes, the Berkeley City Manager Committee formed itself into a permanent organization known as the Berkeley Municipal League. The league's immediate purpose was to elect a ticket for the first city manager council, a legislative body of nine persons—eight councilors and a mayor; its ultimate end was to unite those who had shown an active interest in city manager government with the hope that they would work constantly for its successful operation in Berkeley. This first election was held in May, 1923. Leaders of the league felt that it was important for influential citizens to support candidates for the city council in order "to help elect and to assist them in the discharge of their duties." The league's first task was to select a slate of candidates, and a very wise and politic course of action was adopted. Following the advice of their general chairman, Mr. E. Clarence Holmes, the group decided to choose representatives from different sections of the town in order to avoid any suspicion citizens might have had that the northeast hill people and the business men were trying to dominate and control this new system of municipal government. A subcommittee visited district improvement clubs and asked them to nominate candidates among eligible leaders in their localities. Though skeptical at first of the league's sincerity, these clubs finally cooperated, and the result was a well-rounded ticket: for mayor, Frank Stringham, former city attorney; and for council members, Mrs. A. C. Moody, clubwoman and educator; Mrs. Carrie Hoyt, leader in women's patriotic organizations; Thomas Caldecott, South Berkeley druggist; M. B. Driver, small business man; Samuel C. May, professor at

the University of California; Walter Mork, West Berkeley manufacturer; E. E. Nichols, attorney-at-law; and Frank Wentworth, North Berkeley business man. Selection of candidates in this manner did much to break down the strong sectional feeling and the local jealousies which had developed among the districts in Berkeley. One of the league's effective campaign slogans was that it was working for "a united Berkeley."

An opposition ticket, under the title All Berkeley Club, was formed by those who had fought the city manager amendments. Their campaign was no longer against the manager form of government but was a move to obtain positions on the city council. With the exception of a former commissioner, George Schmidt, none of the opposition candidates had engaged previously in political activities, and all who were interviewed stated that, when they had run for office in the first campaign they had been in favor of the manager system.

The division of forces in this election was essentially the same as that which had appeared during the earlier contest for the manager change. The Berkeley Municipal League again received strong support from the *Berkeley Daily Gazette* and endorsement from many of the town's prominent citizens. In spite of the league's representative candidates, the All Berkeley Club referred to them as a "handful of highbrows" and attempted to divide the city on sectional prejudices. The Berkeley Municipal League won the election without difficulty; its entire slate of candidates was elected to office. It polled its greatest strength in North and East Berkeley, while its strongest opposition came from the west end and the center portions of town.

### *City Councilors and the Vote*

From the introduction of city manager government in Berkeley to 1939, twenty-five citizens served on the council, including the mayors. Counting members of the first council, only fourteen had been directly elected; the other eleven acquired their positions through appointment to a vacancy. All changes that took place in the council personnel after 1929 were by appointment, and the appointees stood for office at the following elections. Judging from the classification of council members by occupation, Berkeley had a strong business men's administration. Table 1 lists fifteen councilors as business men, four as attorneys, four as educators, and two as clubwomen. Except during a short period, there were always two women on the council, indicating, as one councilwoman stated, "The men of Berkeley are always willing that women should take an active part in civic affairs." The position of mayor had been occupied

by four men, all of whom, with the exception of the first, had previously served on the city council.<sup>1</sup> Frank D. Stringham, the first mayor, declined

TABLE I. BERKELEY COUNCILORS AND MAYORS, 1923-39

Councilmen	Method of First Selection*	Served		Reason for Leaving Council	Occupation
		From	To		
Frank D. Stringham <sup>a</sup> . . . . .	E	7/23	6/27	Declined Reelection	Attorney
Thomas Caldecott <sup>b</sup> . . . . .	E	7/23	12/32	Resigned	Druggist
M. B. Driver <sup>c</sup> . . . . .	E	7/23	3/30	Resigned	Storage Hse. Owner
Samuel C. May . . . . .	E	7/23	6/25	Declined Reelection	Professor, Univ. of Calif.
Mrs. Carrie Hoyt . . . . .	E	7/23	—	—	Clubwoman
Walter Mork . . . . .	E	7/23	—	—	Manufacturer
Mrs. A. C. Moody <sup>d</sup> . . . . .	E	7/23	5/32	Resigned	Educator and Clubwoman
E. E. Nichols . . . . .	E	7/23	6/27	Declined Reelection	Attorney
Frank W. Wentworth . . . . .	E	7/23	7/26	Resigned	Business Man
J. M. Atthowe . . . . .	E	7/25	3/28	Resigned	Marine
Fred C. Koerber . . . . .	E	7/25	10/25	Resigned	Transportation Business Man
Neil C. Cornwall . . . . .	A	10/25	7/26	Resigned	Banker
Frank A. Berg . . . . .	A	7/26	—	—	Funeral Parlor Director
Richard S. French . . . . .	E	7/27	—	—	Supt. of Blind School
Blake Vandler . . . . .	E	7/27	8/27	Resigned	Professor, Univ. of Calif.
E. J. Hardy . . . . .	A	8/27	6/29	Declined Reelection	Optician
J. J. Rahill . . . . .	A	3/28	3/30	Died	Manufacturer
Reese Clark . . . . .	E	7/29	2/33	Resigned	Attorney
W. C. James . . . . .	A	3/30	10/32	Resigned	Manufacturer
William A. Porter . . . . .	A	4/30	—	—	Real Estate Broker
Edward N. Ament <sup>e</sup> . . . . .	A	5/32	—	—	Furniture Store Owner (Retired)
Mrs. B. A. Herrick . . . . .	A	10/32	—	—	Clubwoman
Edward A. Martin . . . . .	A	1/33	—	—	Attorney
J. M. Bomberger . . . . .	A	2/33	9/36	Resigned	Seed Company Owner
Frank S. Gaines <sup>f</sup> . . . . .	A	9/36	—	—	Manufacturer (Retired)

\* E, elected; A, appointed.

<sup>a</sup> Mayor, 7/23 to 6/27.

<sup>b</sup> Mayor, 3/30 to 12/32. Resigned to run for office of county supervisor.

<sup>c</sup> Mayor, 7/27 to 3/30. Resigned when appointed county sheriff.

<sup>d</sup> Resigned, 6/25; reappointed 7/26.

<sup>e</sup> Mayor, 12/32 to 6/39.

<sup>f</sup> Elected mayor 7/39 (see footnote p. 126-27).

Sources: City Clerk's Records; Occupations from newspaper reports and interviews.

<sup>1</sup> Frank S. Gaines, a councilman, was elected as the fifth mayor under the city manager system in the 1939 election.

to run for reelection and M. B. Driver, a councilman, was elected to the office. He resigned later to become county sheriff, and Thomas Caldecott, a councilman, was appointed for his unexpired term. Mayor Caldecott was reelected and then resigned to run for county supervisor. He was succeeded through appointment by Edward N. Ament, the incumbent mayor. Thus the last two mayors prior to 1939 originally attained the position by appointment and were elected later.

Berkeley held its municipal elections biennially and used a system of preferential voting which eliminated the necessity for a primary and a final. One half of the councilors stood for election every two years. The preferential voting ballot proved extremely unsatisfactory. At one local election only 10 per cent of the voters attempted to indicate their second choice votes, and only 1 per cent of this 10 per cent did so correctly. Political organizations supporting candidates urged the voters not to cast their second choices. At the time of this study the city council was considering a new system of preferential voting, known as the "vote and a half" system which was devised by Thomas S. Dabagh, then law librarian of the University of California.<sup>1</sup>

Berkeley elections on the whole were singularly dull and unexciting, and no incumbent councilman or mayor was ever defeated when he chose to run for reelection. After the adoption of the manager plan incumbents always received newspaper support from the *Gazette*. Berkeley voters showed little interest in local political campaigns. In 1937 only 21.5 per cent of the registered voters cast their ballots for municipal candidates. Table 2 shows the percentages of registered voters who participated in local council elections from the time of the introduction of the commission government in 1909 until 1937. The percentage voting for city manager councils was much smaller than the percentage casting its ballots for commission-plan councils. Before the introduction of city manager government the percentage of registered citizens voting had never fallen below 40, but after the first city manager council election in 1923, it rose above 40 per cent only twice—once in 1933 and once in 1935. The numerical vote in 1937 was about the lowest the city had had since the introduction of woman suffrage in California.

### *Local Elections, 1925-37*

The Berkeley Municipal League successfully supported a slate of four candidates in 1925. Shortly after this election the league members dis-

<sup>1</sup> This "vote and a half" system of preferential voting was voted upon by the people in the May, 1939, election. It failed to receive the required majority vote.

TABLE 2. THE VOTE IN BERKELEY COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1909-37

	Year	Number of Registered Voters <sup>a</sup>	Number of Registered Citizens Voting	Percentage of Registered Citizens Voting
Commission Government	1909.....	8,416	4,197	49.87
	1911.....	7,709	4,550	59.02
	1913.....	18,039 <sup>b</sup>	8,564	47.47
	1915.....	20,571	12,011	57.82
	1917.....	27,036	12,616	46.66
	1919.....	21,987	9,178	41.74
	1921.....	30,115	12,863	42.71
City Manager Government	1923.....	32,027	14,090	43.99
	1925.....	33,309	12,742	38.25
	1927.....	37,241	12,035	32.23
	1929.....	45,257	11,479	25.36
	1931.....	43,341	10,639	24.55
	1933.....	42,774	19,388	45.32
	1935.....	41,461	17,699	42.69
	1937.....	46,947	10,082	21.47

<sup>a</sup> Figures for number of registered voters in years 1909-31 from the county clerk's office. Those for years 1933-37 from the city clerk's office.

<sup>b</sup> Woman suffrage adopted in California.

Source: City Clerk's Minute Book.

banded their organization, although their original intention had been to maintain themselves as a permanent group. The primary reason for this dissolution was that those in charge of league activities were being accused of dominating city affairs and of establishing a business men's political machine. League leaders felt that by this time city manager government had become firmly entrenched in Berkeley and that, perhaps, they could serve those purposes for which they had banded together more effectively by dissolving and acting individually. Although the league as an organization took no further part in local elections, a Citizen's Committee was formed for the 1927 council campaign. The *Gazette* described the committee editorially as being "in no sense a political organization, but a group formed some months ago at a meeting of citizens called to discuss the approaching election." A comparison of the roster of this Citizens' Committee with the names of the Berkeley Municipal League members indicated that it was essentially the same group of men who were actively directing this "non-political" committee. The Citizens' Committee endorsed incumbent candidates running for reelection and selected two others to complete its ticket. The ticket was opposed by an ineffectual last-minute organization known as the 'Taxpayers' Pro-

tective League. A campaign which was anything but spectacular culminated in an impressive victory for the Citizens' Committee ticket. This was the last time that an organized group supported candidates for election until 1933.

The 1929 election was quiet indeed, for, to quote the *Gazette*, "never before in the history of Berkeley has there been so little interest in a municipal election as this year." Few candidates filed for the four vacancies on the council, and of those who filed three were incumbents. The *Gazette* urged their return to office, saying that it did not matter who was selected for the fourth vacancy since all were capable individuals. On the whole, the community was more interested in its school-board election. The three councilmen running for reelection were successful, and the fourth position was filled by a candidate who was (up to 1939) the last councilman to be originally elected by Berkeley voters. Again in 1931 there was little fuss over the election, and with the exception of the incumbents, who all stood for reelection, only two persons filed for council positions. As in 1929, the school-board contest was the most important issue; the *Gazette* stated, "If it weren't for this the election would be a colorless affair." The paper suggested that incumbents be retained, a suggestion duly followed by the electorate.

In 1933, however, the usual tenor of local elections was somewhat changed when three organized groups—a Workers' Alliance, the Citizens' Economy League, and the Berkeley Council Manager League—supported candidates for the council. The Workers' Alliance ticket was accused of representing Communistic interests, and it aroused a typical red scare. Local patriotic societies banded together in Americanism committees and urged voters that this was the time to awake before Communists seized control of public affairs. The Workers' Alliance candidates' records and previous activities were well aired and their possible financial connection with insidious influences was successfully intimated. The Citizens' Economy League was a local political organization, the leaders of which were opposed to any local extravagances and were interested in bringing about a further reduction of municipal expenses. The incumbent candidates were endorsed by the Berkeley Council Manager League, an organization about which more will be said shortly. The *Gazette* actively supported the Berkeley Council Manager League, ignoring as completely as possible the other tickets. Typical was this quotation from one of its editorials: "The *Gazette* has been reluctant at times to publish some of the unwarranted charges directed against the administration, charges that were intended to weaken the chance of

victory at the polls for those candidates we believe are best qualified to serve the city as mayor and city councilmen." Although it was a heated campaign, the incumbents were returned to office by large majorities.

The incumbents and the Berkeley Council Manager League were opposed in 1935 by the Voters' and Taxpayers' League. It was a rather weak organization, composed in part of Epic Democrats, and it used as political ammunition the usual accusations of waste and inefficiency by the incumbent administration. The position of the incumbents was never really threatened, and they were returned to office by a handsome majority.

The 1937 election was somewhat reminiscent of those held previous to 1933, only a few independent candidates opposing the incumbents who, supported by the Council Manager League, won without much difficulty.

### *The Berkeley Council Manager League*

In 1933 voters throughout the country were turning the "ins" out, and the entrance of several organized groups into the municipal election presented this possible danger to Berkeley's incumbent councilmen. Since the Berkeley Municipal League had been disbanded, there was no organization to give incumbents active political support, nor were there men in the community who were willing to assume political leadership. The city manager, Hollis R. Thompson, felt that the election of some candidates supported by opposition tickets might present real dangers to the existing operation of city manager government in Berkeley. He called together business men and leading manufacturers, and soon the Berkeley Council Manager League, which was primarily an organization to support incumbent councilmen, made its appearance.

This league did not have a continuing organization but functioned only during election time. Because no one had stepped forward up to 1939 to assume political leadership, the league, of necessity, depended upon the initiative of Mr. Thompson. Business men of the community gave the league name endorsement and financial contributions.

One business man who acted as chairman of the league during one campaign characterized the league as a "loosely knit organization interested in maintaining the city manager form of government in Berkeley. It has no formal membership, but business men who know one another get together when election time comes around and support the incumbents. The league as such is just a stand-by organization, having no paid secretary or advertising head."



Although in 1937 the Berkeley Council Manager League traced its origin back to 1923, it had no connection with the Berkeley Municipal League, the group which had conducted the campaign for the adoption of city manager government and had supported candidates for the first two council elections. The *Berkeley Gazette* in 1937 carried the following item: "It was revealed this morning that the Berkeley Council Manager League, organized in 1923 at the inception of the city manager form of government in Berkeley . . . will support the incumbents seeking to retain their positions on the council."

Interviews with men who had been leaders in the original Berkeley Municipal League indicated that they were not acquainted with the new Berkeley Council Manager League, nor did they know of any possible connection it could have had with their organization which was disbanded shortly after the 1925 election.

In its campaigns the league was seldom faced with the problem of selecting new candidates; its support was for incumbents.<sup>1</sup> The candidates themselves made few speeches, leaving most of the political activity in the hands of the league's leaders. The league key-noted its campaigns upon two central themes: maintenance of the city manager government; maintenance of the incumbent council. As far as the league was concerned, the two were complementary. For example, in 1935 A. R. Udall, assistant cashier of the Bank of America and general chairman of the

<sup>1</sup> After the preparation of this study the 1939 municipal election was held. Mayor Ament declined to run for reelection, and the Berkeley Council Manager League's candidate for this position was Frank S. Gaines, incumbent councilman. Four other incumbent councilmen also stood for election. This time the Berkeley Council Manager League did not indorse one of the incumbents, Edward Martin, but gave its approval instead to another candidate, Emery Stone, formerly secretary of the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce. The Forward Berkeley Committee supported a complete ticket of other candidates for the council and the mayoralty. The campaign program and platforms were similar to those in previous years; the *Gazette* again supported Berkeley Council Manager League candidates. Councilman Martin stood for reelection as an independent, using the slogan: "Elect a Councilman—Not a Rubber Stamp."

Berkeley citizens in an improved turnout elected Mr. Gaines mayor and returned all incumbents, including Mr. Martin, to office. Thus, the Berkeley Council Manager League failed for the first time to elect one of its candidates to office. The vote at this election (19,297) represented 43.26 per cent of registered voters (44,604). One of the reasons behind the increased vote was a controversy over an initiative civil service ordinance (for discussion of this ordinance see footnote pp. 63, 64). Since Mr. Gaines had not resigned from the council before running for mayor, his election created a vacancy on that body. This position was filled by the appointment of Donald Parce, a Berkeley laundry owner. Mr. Parce was not a candidate for the council at the general election. The appointment procedure was the same that had been followed since 1929 to fill council vacancies.

Indications in August, 1939, were that Mayor Gaines would take a more active part in the direction of city affairs than did his predecessor, possibly resulting somewhat in a change in the spheres of influence of the manager and the council. The new mayor was keenly interested in encouraging citizen participation in civic affairs and he had already made some revitalizing changes in the personnel of city commissions.

league's campaign for that year, issued a statement that its program was "a vigorous campaign to retain the present form of Berkeley city government." Advertisements carried slogans such as: "Do not be misled—the real issue of this municipal campaign is a continuation of true council manager government which has brought to our city worldwide recognition." Thus the league indicated that its prime purpose was to maintain city manager government in Berkeley (although the existence of the plan had never been threatened since its introduction) and intimated that only those candidates supported by the league were pledged believers in this form of municipal organization. A resulting transition in local elections was that the selection of councilmen no longer centered upon voting for persons as individuals, but upon returning incumbents, essentially on the ground that incumbency was synonymous with support of city manager government.

### III. THE COUNCIL AND THE MANAGER

**C**HARTER AMENDMENTS adopted in 1923 contained a clear, distinct statement of the division of responsibility and authority between the city manager and his council, definitely establishing the manager as the administrative head of the government. Fundamental changes affected the composition and the powers of the city council and relegated the executive and administrative powers, formerly residing in the commissioners as heads of departments, to the city manager.

Municipal officials who are elected at large include the mayor, eight councilmen, four school directors, and the city auditor.<sup>1</sup> All these officials have terms of four years; four councilmen and two school directors are elected every two years. Councilmen receive \$5 a meeting, \$20 a month maximum; the mayor, \$10 a meeting, \$40 a month maximum. Although the mayor is elected directly by the people, he possesses no important additional powers, such as the veto. The mayor is known as the general chairman of the council, presides at all meetings, and is ex officio a member of the Board of Education. He is recognized as the

<sup>1</sup> This elected auditor is responsible for the issuance of all city warrants, and no warrant can be paid without the auditor's approval. The auditor has to examine pay rolls, bills, and other claims against the city to check that they are justly and legally due; that there is a budget appropriation covering the item or that it is otherwise legally authorized; and that there is sufficient money in the city treasury to make payments. All city officers collecting city funds must submit monthly reports to the auditor.

head of the city for ceremonial and military purposes. The charter expressly states:

this shall not be construed as conferring upon him administrative or judicial functions or other powers or functions of a Mayor, under the general laws of the State. The powers and duties of the Mayor shall be such as are conferred upon him by this amendment, together with such others as may be conferred by the Council in the pursuance of the provisions of this amendment, and no others.

He is also authorized to employ a certified public accountant for the purpose of auditing the city's books at least twice a year.

The city council is the governing body of the municipality and is "vested with all powers of legislation in municipal affairs adequate to a complete system of local government consistent with the Constitution of the State." It has the power to levy the tax rate and to set the assessed valuation. Before it fixes tax levies, however, it has to meet and to act on the budget submitted by the city manager. Three councilmen are appointed to act as a Board of Equalization two days out of the year. On all purchases of over five hundred dollars the council receives bids and awards contracts to the lowest bidder.

The city manager is the administrative head of the municipal government and is responsible to the council for the efficient administration of all municipal affairs. The manager is appointed for an indefinite period by the council and can be removed only by a two-thirds vote of that body. His salary is fixed by the council, but there is a maximum of ten thousand dollars a year stipulated in the charter.<sup>1</sup> The manager is responsible for the proper enforcement of all laws and ordinances. He has power to appoint and to remove all department heads and employees of the city (except the library personnel) subject to the civil service provisions of the charter, should they ever be put into effect. As under commission government, certain chief appointive officials are specified in the city manager charter: city clerk, assessor, treasurer, collector, attorney, engineer, chief of police, fire chief, street superintendent, health officer, and five library trustees. The manager may consolidate the functions of any two or more offices when, in his judgment, it is for the best interest of the city. Compensation of employees is fixed by the council, but only upon the city manager's recommendation. It is expressly stated in the charter that

<sup>1</sup> During the depression when cuts were being made in the salaries of all city employees, the city manager decreased his own salary by 20 per cent. These cuts were subsequently restored.

Neither the Council nor any of its committees or members shall dictate or attempt to dictate, either directly or indirectly the appointment of any person to office or employment by the City Manager or in any manner interfere with the City Manager or prevent him from exercising his own judgment in the appointment of officers and employees in the administrative service.

The charter also provides that the council shall deal with the administrative service solely through the city manager except for purposes of inquiry and that its members shall not attempt to give orders to subordinates of the manager. The manager exercises complete control over all departments, all divisions, and all bureaus of the city government. He may make recommendations to the council for the adoption of measures which he feels are expedient to the conduct of municipal affairs, and he attends council meetings with the right to take part in all discussions. It is his duty to supervise all public utility companies insofar as they are subject to municipal control. The manager is responsible for keeping his council informed on the city's general financial condition and submits to them the annual budget.

### *The First Council*

The first city manager council was composed of a majority of men who had taken an active part in the campaign for the charter changes. It was a council the members of which were entirely in favor of city manager principles, and it was natural that the system should receive a strong start. Also conducive to a good beginning was the absence of an incessantly fighting opposition. Although a group had waged a campaign against the introduction of city manager principles, this organization did not continue to manifest its opposition after these principles were finally accepted by the people. As a whole, the council represented conservative business interests in the town, although the individual members represented various sections of the city. They realized that their conduct would play a part in setting, to a certain degree, the pattern and the standards of future councils and that their interpretation of the distinction between policy and administration would have a significant bearing upon the relationship between future managers and councils. Because these men had thoroughly studied city manager government and were sincerely desirous that it should work well in Berkeley, they were insistent from the beginning that the city manager should be absolutely responsible for administrative affairs. The council knew that such matters were entirely out of their sphere of influence, and individual

members had little time to bother with these details. Never, after the system's inauguration, were the authority and the power of the city manager decreased; rather they tended to increase with the passing of years and the change in councils. The mayor no longer retained the position that he had held under commission government, but Frank Stringham, the new mayor, assumed political leadership in an admirable manner. He had been one of the organizers of the Berkeley Municipal League, and with other members of the council he felt a personal responsibility for assuring the successful operation of city manager government. The willingness of the mayor and the council members to assume the task of selling the plan to the public was a great help to the first city manager.

Gradually, as city manager government took hold in the community, the men who had occupied positions of leadership in securing its inauguration either resigned from, or refused to run for, the city council. They felt that their task had been completed, that city manager government was firmly established in Berkeley as an efficient, business-like method of conducting municipal affairs. They were replaced, primarily through appointment, by other business men of the community. Never was there a drastic change in the council's composition, either in membership or in its attitude toward the principles of city manager government.

### *The Incumbent Council, 1939*

Of the nine incumbent members of the city council,<sup>1</sup> only three had been originally elected to office, the other six having received their first council position through appointment. Five of these appointments were made after 1930. The mayor, Edward N. Ament, was a retired retail furniture dealer, at one time active in South Berkeley. He began his civic service as a member of the Board of Library Trustees and was president of that board during the library's active building program. He was appointed to the city council in 1932 and then appointed mayor in the early part of 1933. His first political campaign was for his unexpired mayor's term in 1933. He was reelected for the regular four-year period in 1935. The mayor was a rather elderly man, quiet and unassuming in his activities, but able to carry a fair share of the speech-making and ceremonial duties required of his office. The mayor was in no sense the political leader of the community, nor was he the public character the mayor had been under commission government and earlier city manager councils.

<sup>1</sup> May, 1939.

Walter Mork, a West Berkeley sheet metal manufacturer, and Mrs. Carrie L. Hoyt, a leader in women's patriotic societies, such as the Woman's Relief Corps, were elected to the first council in 1923 and had been returned to office regularly (as of 1939). Richard S. French, superintendent of the California School for the Blind, had served on the council since 1927 and was the third member of the incumbent group who had originally been elected to his position. The other councilmen were Frank A. Berg, a funeral parlor director, first appointed to the council in 1926; William A. Porter, a real estate broker, appointed in 1930; Mrs. Benita Herrick, a leader in the Berkeley League of Women Voters and other women's clubs, formerly a member of the Berkeley Charities Commission, and appointed to the council in 1932; Edward A. Martin, a local attorney, appointed in 1933; and Frank S. Gaines, a retired business man, manufacturer, and farmer, formerly a member of the City Planning Commission, appointed in 1936. It is interesting to note that three members of the council, Mrs. Herrick, Mr. Ament, and Mr. Gaines, had served on other city commissions before they were appointed to the council.

Most members of the council were over fifty years of age and were definitely not the type of person who would have accepted public office if it had involved any degree of political activity on their part. Councilmen felt that the office should seek the man rather than that the man should seek the office, and their attitude, when election campaigns were held, was that of standing rather than running for office. As individuals they did little campaigning, made few speeches, and left political affairs in the hands of the Berkeley Council Manager League. It was altogether probable that the council members' indifference toward political activity was largely responsible for the growth of this league. Members of the council would not assume political leadership in elections, and the burden was necessarily assumed by the city manager, who was keenly interested in city government and was concerned that incumbents should retain their positions. Council members thoroughly understood Mr. Thompson's relations with the Council Manager League, and some frankly admitted that the leadership was left to him by their own fault. In discussing the problem one member said that he believed that Mr. Thompson took more part in political activities than, perhaps, the manager wanted to take but that the composition and the attitude of the council practically forced him into this position of political leadership.

The council members were divided on what a councilman's relations with his public should be. Some welcomed citizen problems, were willing

to discuss them freely, and then referred them to the proper authority. Others preferred that citizens either present their difficulties to the entire council at its regular meeting or to the city manager. The general feeling on the part of both the council and the citizens at the time of this study was that the primary burden of contact with the public rested essentially upon the city manager.

### *Council Procedure*

Council members were seldom at the city hall except on the weekly council meeting day, but the mayor gave more time to civic affairs and was at his office every morning. The regular council meeting was held on Tuesday mornings at ten o'clock, and citizen attendance was usually very small. The meeting time might have been a reason for the small attendance, although several years before each fourth meeting had been held on Friday evening, and the public turnout had been just as poor. Special hearings were called occasionally, and once a year there was an evening budget session for the citizens, also poorly attended.

Council meetings were routine, the procedure being systematic and somewhat monotonous. The important discussions took place at the private meetings of the committee of the whole, held in the city manager's office during the hour preceding the regular sessions. Speaking of this executive session, the editor of the *Gazette* remarked: "True, it is a star chamber session, but such meetings are necessary to conduct the city's business expediently." In this committee of the whole the city manager outlined to councilmen those matters which required their decision. He presented material and factual data relative to these problems and suggested possible courses of action. The council relied almost entirely upon information furnished by the city manager, and in about 95 per cent of the matters it accepted his recommendations. The council seldom took a vote in the committee of the whole but came to a general agreement on important issues. Then, in the regular meeting after the minutes had been approved, communications to the council had been received, and consideration of bids had been undertaken, those items which had been considered in closed session were presented by the city manager in his report. Usually most communications and petitions addressed to the city council were referred to the committee of the whole for further action. This action meant that they were really referred to the city manager who, through his assistants, gathered the material and the information which would eventually shape the council's decisions on these petitions and communications.

In voting at the regular meeting the council usually acted unanimously. There was no dominant leader among councilmen, nor was there a minority bloc. Occasionally there was a division of the vote on an issue, but it caused no hard feeling among councilmen. They had a definite attitude, clearly emphasized in interviews, that the council should always work together for the civic good and that, whenever there was a division of vote, there should be no "bad blood." The council never attempted to establish standing committees.

### *The First Manager and His Councils*

When the first city manager council undertook the task of selecting Berkeley's executive head in 1923, it received well over a hundred applications, many of which were from men already engaged in the profession of city management. After considerable deliberation and interviewing, the council selected John N. Edy, who had recently moved from Montana to Berkeley. Mr. Edy was a graduate of the University of Missouri and had worked in the public service most of his life. Although he had had no experience as a city manager, his previous governmental positions had given him practical training for this job. He had been assistant street engineer in St. Louis; county engineer in Missouri and Montana; chief inspector and assistant engineer in Billings, Montana; engineer in the Montana State Highway Department; and chief engineer and managing executive of this department for four years.

Mr. Edy, with his engineering background and his command of techniques for administrative management, did much to establish this new system upon a solid foundation. He was hard-working and straightforward to the point of bluntness, and while people often disagreed with what he did, they could never question his motives. He was the type of man to come in and do the rough work of reorganization. From the beginning, Mr. Edy took a professional attitude toward his work. He received a master's degree in political science (public administration) from the University of California; he encouraged his subordinate officials to register for graduate studies; he conducted a monthly seminar on municipal administration problems for the city employees; and he lectured at Stanford University on city manager government. He became an active member of the International City Managers' Association and was president of this organization in 1927-28.

One of the first things which John N. Edy did was to come to a clear understanding with his council about his and the council's powers and duties. Undoubtedly this task was made easier for him because of the



composition of the council, its willingness to cooperate, and its knowledge of the general principles of city manager government. It was agreed that the city manager was to have complete control over all administrative matters and that policy issues were to be the council's responsibility. Occasionally there were misunderstandings on new problems, but both the manager and the council always showed an earnest effort to work out any divergent views satisfactorily. Both sides made a sincere attempt to retain a distinction between political leadership and administrative control. Mr. Edy approached this division of responsibility with engineering precision and never let the council forget that he was entirely responsible for administrative activities. In discussing the relationship between the manager and the council, he wrote:<sup>1</sup>

As "The administrative head of the City Government," the City Manager is responsible only to the legislative body, the Council, which is the supreme authority of the City. This responsibility runs to the Council as a body and not to any member or group of members. The City Manager shall observe and be governed by all instructions emanating from the Council, whether offered formally as resolutions or ordinances, or informally as suggestions of the committee of the whole. Beyond this, he shall recognize in the Mayor and individual council members a most helpful source of information and advice; but in all administrative matters so discussed he shall make his own decisions and assume responsibility therefor.

The City Manager, while endeavoring conscientiously to follow the broad policies laid down by the Council, can never afford to bend his decisions or recommendations to please individual members of the legislative body. His assumption must be that he pleases his Council most when he gives it his honest and independent judgment. If this is not true, the Council has erred in its choice of a City Manager, or the people have erred in their choice of a Council. . . .

There must prevail the utmost frankness between the Council and the City Manager. Meetings of the entire body as a Committee of the Whole should be held at regular intervals with the City Manager and in his office. Standing committees of the Council are to be discouraged as inconsistent with the form of government, since they are certain to result in encroachment upon administrative authority. . . .

The City Manager is not a messenger for, nor a glorified secretary of, the legislative body. While he serves by appointment of and may be dismissed by the Council, its members must expect him to exercise independently the authority which attaches to the position. . . .

<sup>1</sup> John N. Edy, *Municipal Management*, M.A. thesis, University of California, 1926, pp. 21-31.

The City Manager shall advise the Council in respect to legislation which he deems desirable or necessary; but all legislative decisions shall be those of the Council. . . .

In the case of legislative matters in respect to which the Council requires the City Manager to make an investigation or supply pertinent data, the City Manager shall accompany his report with a recommendation only when directed by the Council to do so. . . .

Wisdom, good taste, and courtesy dictate that he [the city manager] shall recognize he is not a member of the legislative body.

Mr. Edy left a good portion of the public relations work to the members of the city council, feeling that it was their duty to maintain good will among the citizens. He did not shun all public meetings, for on occasion he would address civic organizations and interview citizens in his office. However, because of his rather blunt, decisive manner and because of his ability to say "no," Mr. Edy was not the man to meet the public. Often in carrying out city projects he created antagonism among community leaders. But John Edy was not particularly bothered about such experiences because he felt that it was up to the city council to do the hand-shaking. Indicative of his attitude was his statement that "the work of promotion—of selling the idea [of services and improvements] to the public—is not his [the city manager's], but is the Council's; and he should engage actively in public educational and promotional discussion relating to such matters only by direction of the Council."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Edy got along well with his first councils because he and the councils had a mutual appreciation of their respective powers and because the councils had a great deal of confidence in him, viewing with pleasure the tangible results of his good work. He was doing his job well; he was laying a solid foundation. There were signs of approaching danger, however, which grew out of Mr. Edy's impersonal and unmoving attitude toward the relationship between council and manager. Through the personal qualities and characteristics which were so necessary to effect the successful administrative operations and reorganization in Berkeley government he sometimes got into difficulty with his council, particularly toward the end of his service in the city. Thus, while Mr. Edy was honest and had independence of judgment and objective, impersonal administrative qualities, he lacked a certain tact and finesse in dealing with his councils. The councils did not attempt to interfere with,

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

or to restrict, the manager's administrative authority, but in his later years of service Mr. Edy's relationships with his council were simply not so cordial as they had been in the beginning. Mr. Edy resigned his position in 1930 to accept the managership of the city of Flint, Michigan.

### *The Second Manager and His Councils*<sup>1</sup>

The city councilmen's selection for Berkeley's second city manager was a local man, Hollis R. Thompson, manager of the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce.<sup>2</sup> Again, the council made its choice after considerable deliberation on a large number of applications. Mr. Thompson's background, training, and personality were different from those of Mr. Edy. He was graduated from the University of California in 1921 and until 1924 was the secretary and the personnel director of the Berkeley Y.M.C.A. For a short period in 1921 he was employed by the city in a part-time position in which he was charged with finding jobs for the unemployed. From 1924 to 1927 Mr. Thompson was the assistant cashier in charge of new accounts of the Berkeley First National Bank—a public contact man for the bank. He was appointed to the Berkeley Charities Commission in 1924 and retained his membership on this citizen advisory board until he became city manager. Mr. Thompson assumed his duties as the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce manager in 1927, a position which brought him into close contact with the business men of the community and with their problems.

Mr. Thompson was a dynamic, energetic man with a winning personality and an easy, pleasing speaking manner. He occupied a position of leadership in both the council and the community, but his personality was more that of a political leader than an administrative head. While conducting municipal affairs much along the same policies pursued by John N. Edy, Mr. Thompson put more emphasis upon public relations, for, in his opinion, "over 50 per cent of the city manager's job is public relations work." He was tactful with the representatives of the press, cautious with his council, and accessible to the public. He was a natural

<sup>1</sup> On March 5, 1940, Mr. Thompson resigned as city manager to accept a position in private industry (resignation effective as of March 20, 1940). On the same day the city council promoted Chester C. Fisk, who had been executive assistant to Mr. Thompson, to the city managership by a five-to-four vote. The dissenting councilmen criticized the procedure which was followed in filling this vacancy. They expressed the opinion that applications from other candidates should have been considered. Before the council voted on the managership, Mr. Fisk himself requested that their decision be delayed, but the majority of the councilmen were ready to take definite action.

<sup>2</sup> Earl J. Sinclair, the city attorney, served as acting city manager during the interim between Mr. Edy's resignation and Mr. Thompson's appointment.

leader, one who would assume a rather dominating position in almost any group. His leadership, however, was not bold and commanding but rather subtle and persuasive. One of his weaknesses was that in his constant contacts with numerous individuals and their problems he committed himself on many occasions and made promises difficult to fulfill. He did not possess Mr. Edy's ability to say "no" but sought a possible compromise or alternative.

General community feeling was that Mr. Thompson had grown in his job and had gained the respect and the confidence of the public and of those who worked with him. The *Gazette* opposed his appointment in 1930 on the ground that his background was not suitable for the position of manager, but at the time of this study the city manager's office had no more ardent supporter than the *Berkeley Daily Gazette*. Mr. Thompson developed a professional attitude toward his work and was president of the International City Managers' Association in 1935-36. He took an active interest in local municipal government and was a prominent figure in the League of California Municipalities, of which he was president in 1935-36.

Relations between Mr. Thompson and his city council were harmonious. Council members made no attempt to interfere with the city manager's powers. He exercised complete freedom in the selection of all employees, and councilmen realized that their influence in employment matters was more than likely to be negative. The council dealt with subordinate officers through the city manager, who, in turn, tried to avoid discussion of municipal problems with individual councilmen, because he felt that it would be a dangerous procedure.

In making decisions on legislative matters the council depended primarily upon data compiled by the city manager. The council usually accepted his recommendations and advice. As a result, the city manager actually initiated legislation, and Mr. Thompson himself acknowledged the important part a manager might play in determining municipal policy. Both in regular meetings and in committee of the whole, the council was dependent upon the manager's leadership. Although councilmen occasionally took part in developing a program, they usually left the initiative to the city manager.

The city manager kept the councilmen informed on current municipal activities through a monthly report. This report was compiled from periodic memoranda submitted by the departments to the manager. The council also received a monthly financial statement which indicated estimated and actual receipts and expenditures for the period

covered by the statement. Mr. Thompson was always prompt in obtaining answers to any special questions which individual councilmen raised or in investigating civic problems which they called to his attention.

Both Mr. Thompson and a majority of the council believed that public relations activity was largely the responsibility of the city manager, and, as a result, the role of spokesman for administration policies was assumed by the city manager rather than by the mayor. Although the mayor as the ceremonial head presided at civic functions, a large portion of the speaking burden which would ordinarily have fallen to the mayor of a city was shouldered by the city manager, who made over 460 public addresses in 1938.<sup>1</sup> Several councilmen, however, disapproved of the extent of his activity in this field; they believed that, perhaps, he spent too much time with these minor affairs, which could well have been relegated to a subordinate officer, leaving the manager free to study broader administrative problems.

### *The Administrative Staff*

When Mr. Edy assumed the position of city manager, he retained substantially the same staff that had previously been employed under the commission government. A few department heads were changed and several new ones were added to fill the positions created by the reorganization. Replacements after that were primarily owing to voluntary resignations or deaths, and most new appointments were promotions from the service. Only two administrative heads, the city attorney and the personnel and research director, entered the municipal service after the second city manager took office. Other changes made in department heads after 1930 were: the police chief, a vacancy created by resignation; the building inspector, a vacancy created by death; the executive assistant to the city manager, a position recreated in 1935; the assessor, reappointed from the position as land valuation expert.<sup>2</sup>

When this study was made there were seventeen persons who could be considered as administrative heads in the Berkeley city government.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This number included out-of-town speaking engagements.

<sup>2</sup>After the preparation of this report additional changes were made. They were: the fire chief, a vacancy created by death; the assessor, a vacancy created by death; the superintendent of electricity, a new department head.

<sup>3</sup>This number was increased to eighteen in August, 1939, when the Bureau of Electricity, formerly under the Department of Public Works, was given departmental status; its head became the superintendent of electricity, and, as such, reported directly to the city manager.

This number did not include the city librarian, who was appointed by the library board, nor the auditor, who was elected. Outstanding was the high educational standard of these department heads, eleven of whom were college trained. Seven of these eleven were graduates of the University of California. Six department heads had entered the city service before the inauguration of the city manager plan, although only one, the incumbent assessor, had occupied the same position when the change was made. Incidentally, the assessor had been connected with city government since 1897.<sup>1</sup> The fire chief had served for almost thirty-five years,<sup>2</sup> and three other department heads had passed their twenty-year service mark.

The city manager's staff officers were well trained. His executive assistant had formerly been the assistant city engineer and had received his master's degree in political science (public administration) from the University of California. His engineering training and experience were a valuable asset to the city manager. Both the city manager's budget officer<sup>3</sup> and his personnel director were university graduates, the latter having done graduate work in public administration. Mr. Edy's two immediate assistants had also been trained in public administration. The city attorney, who had had considerable private experience, was an active leader among city attorneys in the state.

The city engineer also served as the superintendent of streets. He had been working for government, especially local agencies, since his graduation from the university. He did a fine job with his department considering the resources at his disposal. The superintendent of garbage had been associated with the city ever since municipal garbage collection had been started in 1922. He learned his business from the bottom up, starting as a helper and rising through promotion to the head of this municipal service. All trucks and rolling equipment of these two departments, as well as rolling stock of other city departments, were handled by the superintendent of equipment. He first entered the city service in 1916 after he had purchased some motorized equipment for the commissioners. Previous to 1916 the city had been using horse-drawn equipment. The superintendent was responsible for the development of the corporation yard and for initiating Berkeley's system of equipment rental and maintenance.

<sup>1</sup> The assessor, Harry J. Squires, died in March, 1939. His assistant, James Briggs, was appointed to this position.

<sup>2</sup> The fire chief, George Haggerty, died August 12, 1938. The chief deputy, John S. Eichelberger, long in the service, was appointed to fill his position.

<sup>3</sup> The budget officer resigned in August, 1939.

Both the police and the fire chiefs worked up from the ranks, were thoroughly acquainted with their predecessors' policies, and were attempting to carry through a continuous program, gradually introducing needed improvements. Thus, disruptions which sometimes occurred when a new department head assumed office were avoided. The city health officer enjoyed a good reputation for his work. He reorganized the Berkeley health service in 1923, coordinating the city and the school health programs. After effecting this reorganization he resigned but returned to the city service in 1928. Since he conducted public health courses at the university, he was employed part time until 1937 when he discontinued his teaching activities because he felt it was necessary to devote full time to municipal health work. The superintendent of recreation had had considerable experience in his field. He had taught physical education at various schools in the East and was an instructor at Stanford University for seven years before he went to Berkeley. Since he was employed jointly by the Board of Education and the city, he had to possess teaching qualifications and a knowledge of the school's recreational program.<sup>1</sup>

The women of Berkeley extended their interest in civic affairs to actual management, for the treasurer-tax collector, the city clerk, the executive secretary of the charities commission, and the auditor (elected) were all women. The treasurer, whose previous experience had been with a Berkeley banking firm, assumed her position in 1923, shortly after Mr. Edy's appointment. This was one of the few department-head changes made by Mr. Edy. The city clerk had served in this office since 1915. The Charities Commission's executive secretary, who was appointed in 1926, was a trained social worker.

The assessor began his city service as one of the early organizers of the volunteer fire department. He first became the city assessor in 1907 when that position was an elective office and continued in this job after it was made appointive by the 1909 charter. In 1926 he was moved to the position of land valuation expert but was reappointed assessor in 1931. The executive secretary of the City Planning Commission had an engineering background. He had been secretary for over ten years and was entirely responsible for all supervision of the city's planning and zoning, since his was a one-man department. The building inspector had been promoted from the service.

<sup>1</sup> He was granted a temporary leave of absence for 1938-39 to act as director of recreational exhibits of the California Commission for the Golden Gate International Exposition.

The city auditor had been connected with this office since 1916. She was appointed auditor in 1926 to fill a vacancy caused by death. In 1927 she stood for election, won, and after that was always reelected. She was endorsed in her campaigns by the Berkeley Council Manager League. The auditor was an active member of the Municipal Finance Officers' Association and in 1935 was appointed chairman of the editorial council of this association.

Mr. Edy did not attempt to interfere with the workings of individual departments but set down the broad policies under which they operated. Administrative heads were responsible to the city manager for their activities, but they were free to use their own initiative and to establish departmental controls. They had responsibility with authority. Occasionally, Mr. Edy would hold luncheon meetings with his administrative staff. Some department heads who had served in Berkeley under both the commission form and the manager plan felt that these gatherings were not so satisfactory as those which they had had with their commissioners, because the staff meetings with Mr. Edy were too large to produce any results.

Mr. Thompson was well aware that the city services were directed by capable people, and he allowed the department heads even more freedom in conducting their activities than had Mr. Edy. Mr. Edy had been exacting, a stickler for detail, while Mr. Thompson was lenient and easier to deal with. Department-head meetings were held irregularly and infrequently. Whenever the city manager had some particular problem he consulted the individual head concerned. Of course, the manager was in almost daily contact with his immediate assistants, such as the executive assistant, the personnel director, and the budget officer.

It was these administrative heads, serving Berkeley in their individual capacities, who had collectively brought the city its reputation for good government. Manager government introduced many improvements in administrative techniques, but its accomplishments would never have been so extensive had it not been for the personalities who were charged with the supervision of the various municipal departments.



## IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC

THE EXTENT of citizen interest in Berkeley city manager government as indicated through the ballot was not an encouraging criterion of public participation. Table 2, on page 23, shows the relatively small percentages of registered citizens voting in local elections. Means were provided, however, for citizen participation in local government through advisory boards and, indirectly, through the city's extensive public relations program.

Citizen commissions established when Berkeley had commission government were retained under the city manager system. They were the Board of Library Trustees, the City Planning Commission, the Commission of Public Charities, and the Recreation Commission; all were set up under charter provisions. The charter also authorized the creation of a Civil Service Commission, but such a board had never been established.<sup>1</sup> In 1927 park and playground activities were consolidated by the city manager, and, as a result, the Park Board's functions were absorbed by the Recreation Commission. The two city managers worked well with these advisory groups. They found them to be a help rather than a hindrance and were glad to encourage this citizen participation in government. Mr. Thompson himself had formerly been a member of the Charities Commission. The commissions did not try to usurp powers, nor did they publicly agitate against administration policies. The advisory groups provided a good opportunity for the city to get constructive advice and suggestions from active community leaders.

These citizen boards exercised varying degrees of authority over their functions. The Library Board was administrative in character, having complete charge of managing the library and of appointing all library employees including the city librarian. The city manager, however, retained budgetary control. The Commission of Public Charities made decisions on the endorsement of various social agencies and the issuance to these agencies of permits for solicitation. Action on these permits by the commission was final, although either the council or the commission might revoke them. The City Planning Commission had two sections: civic design and development, and zoning. Through its zoning division, which met at least once a month, the commission heard requests

<sup>1</sup> In the 1939 municipal election an initiative ordinance setting up a civil service commission was defeated.

for new zoning permits or for rezoning and made its recommendations to the council. The council usually accepted these recommendations. The civic design and development section met irregularly to discuss proposals for city beautification. The Recreation Commission merely acted in an advisory capacity to the superintendent of recreation, meeting informally with him once a month to discuss program developments.

The council created from time to time special citizen commissions to study particular problems. Two of these were appointed to assist the city manager in planning for the city's future needs and to propose a program of civic development. The first, known as the Committee of Sixteen, was appointed by the mayor in 1925. Its task was to survey the possible and probable extraordinary needs of the city for ten years, 1925-35. The committee subdivided into sections on waterfront development; public health and safety; parks, playgrounds, and landing field; public buildings and civic center; and traffic ways, transportation, and public utilities. It employed John Nolen as special planning consultant and in its report recommended extensive improvements, such as the purchase of a civic center, new playground land, and better facilities for municipal departments. The committee suggested a bond issue to finance these improvements, but the issue was decisively defeated when it was placed on the ballot. In 1928 the mayor appointed a Citizens' Committee of Thirty-six for the same purpose, to study the extraordinary needs of the city of Berkeley between 1928 and 1933. This group divided itself into essentially the same subsections as its predecessor, and its recommendations were similar. No action, however, was taken on the committee's report. Another commission of civic development was the advisory Board of Five appointed in 1934 to plan Berkeley streets which were to connect with the San Francisco Bay Bridge and to recommend a ten-year street improvement program.

Other examples of citizen participation in municipal affairs through special commissions were the committees appointed by the council in 1925 and 1933 to assist the assessor in reappraising all land in the city and the Berkeley Traffic Safety Commission organized to bring about a saner observation of traffic regulations.

In addition to those advisory boards officially connected with city government, service clubs and civic organizations played an important part in encouraging citizen interest in municipal affairs. The Berkeley Chamber, and Junior Chamber, of Commerce and the Berkeley League of Women Voters carried on a number of promotional campaigns. Local improvement groups and women's societies frequently discussed

civic problems, and one North Berkeley women's club had a member covering council meetings for a number of years.

### *Public Relations*

After the introduction of city manager government, Berkeley developed an extensive and effective public relations program. Although these activities received more emphasis after Mr. Thompson became city manager, city officials always made a sincere effort to keep the public informed about municipal activities and to build up good will for municipal services. This good will was secured through the intelligent, diplomatic handling of citizen problems and by showing the people that they were receiving services worth one hundred cents on the dollar.

John N. Edy early expressed his belief that "no citizen can discharge his civic responsibility without accurate information," and assumed the responsibility of supplying the public with data on municipal affairs through reports, newspaper articles, and special bulletins. The city manager's first accounts of accomplishments followed the usual form of municipal reports, but later he introduced the rather novel idea of presenting the report as a series of news stories. This was one of the first conscious efforts to create citizen interest in municipal reporting, and it was well received. In 1930 city officials felt that improvements could be made by following the plan for municipal reports suggested by Clarence E. Ridley, the executive secretary of the International City Managers' Association. Reports after that received national recognition as outstanding publications.

The annual report, which was titled *Civic Affairs*, was a neat, clear, and concise document prepared in an attractive style and generously illustrated with charts and before-and-after pictures. It was a report that briefly informed citizens about the municipal departments' significant accomplishments during the preceding year.

The Recreation Department mimeographed several hundred copies of its own departmental report and distributed them to those who were interested in municipal recreation programs. The Police Department also mimeographed some copies of its reports, which were made available primarily to libraries and to persons engaged in police work. For a while the auditor's report was included in the annual report, but it was later issued as a separate publication.

The city government occasionally issued special publications especially designed to supply the public with "civic facts." Most regular of these was a small pamphlet called *Berkeley's Business Affairs*, the

publication of which was first authorized by the city council in January, 1925. This bulletin described current municipal activities and until 1935 was sent out every two months with the garbage bill. The first pamphlet contained the following statement: "Believing that the public is entitled to full knowledge of the city's business affairs, this pamphlet is one of a series that will be issued every two months in an effort to acquaint the citizens and taxpayers not only with the facts pertinent to municipal government, but with the problems as well."

In March, 1938, the city manager's office issued a small four-page newspaper known as the *Berkeley Municipal News*. It contained general information on city activities and was distributed to most Berkeley homes. One quotation reads:

From time to time the *Berkeley Municipal News* will be issued to bring to you—the citizens, responsible for your government through taxes and the ballot, and to whom the city officials are in turn responsible—the information to which you are entitled concerning your city government, its personnel and its activities. . . . The functions and operating costs of the various city departments will be explained in subsequent issues.

Other bulletins made their appearance at different times. Some of the titles were: *Facts about Berkeley's Accomplishments under 10 Years of Council Manager Government*; *What Berkeley's City Government Has Accomplished during the Past Year*; *Berkeley's Advances*; and *Tax Fax*. All were designed to inform the citizen and to build up his confidence in the city government.

The daily newspaper, the *Berkeley Daily Gazette*, cooperated splendidly with municipal officials, giving them adequate space for their stories and giving them favorable publicity for their activities. Before Mr. Edy had sufficient funds to publish his own bulletins the *Gazette* ran a weekly column on "Berkeley Municipal News." The press up to the time of this survey always vigorously supported the incumbent administration.

In 1929 the city held its first "Open House." This event was sponsored jointly by the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Berkeley League of Women Voters. "Open House" became an annual event and the attendance gradually increased until in 1938 it was over ten thousand. The purpose of "Open House" was to set aside a day and a night when all citizens were invited to the city hall to inspect the functions of the municipal government and to see the city departments in operation. There were various exhibits and displays and the fire and police depart-

ments gave special demonstrations. "Open House" was a novel and thoroughly successful phase of Berkeley's public relations program.

A public relations program would have been of little value if municipal employees who were in daily contact with the public did not conduct themselves properly. Berkeley city employees were well trained to deal with the public in a courteous, businesslike fashion. Mr. Edy outlined for them in his *Manual of Administrative Practice* procedures which should be used in answering phones, in furnishing information over the desk, and in handling complaints. Careful attention to these details meant good will for the government. The fire chief remarked that men in his department were instilled with the spirit that they were selling government to the people at all times. Occasionally these men performed small services for persons in their own neighborhoods, such as climbing in through windows for women who forgot their keys or removing dead animals from back yards. "Little things like these create good impressions among the citizens."

An important, almost integral, part of Berkeley's public relations system was the city manager himself. He had had considerable experience in public contact work and was an excellent and ardent speech-maker. His constant appearance before luncheon groups, civic organizations, local improvement clubs, and graduation classes, was an almost daily reminder to the public of Berkeley's city manager government. As indicated previously, he made over 460 speeches in 1938.

A great deal of publicity work, such as preparing the annual report, making arrangements for "Open House," and writing various news articles, was the responsibility of the director of personnel and research.

A public relations program must be subtle and should avoid the obvious. Unfortunately, Berkeley carried its promotional work to extremes in several instances. For example, in 1938 the city government made a movie about Berkeley showing the accomplishments under the city manager system. The propaganda in this piece of work was over-emphasized, and audiences in the community treated the presentation rather lightly. People interviewed who were in no way hostile to the government felt that on occasion the city misrepresented the true situation existing in municipal activities and that by constantly mentioning only good and failing to indicate needed major improvements it gave a false impression of perfection. Such a situation had its dangers, for if the public, by constant suggestion, came to believe that Berkeley was the model community, they might well fail to see and to correct its shortcomings.

One city councilman summarized a not uncommon feeling among citizens when he frankly expressed his belief that "we brag too much in Berkeley."

## V. MUNICIPAL SERVICES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

THE MAJOR problem that faced the city manager when he took office in 1923 was financial. Proponents of city manager government in Berkeley had not advocated change because they favored an extensive program of civic development or because they wanted new municipal services. They had expected an improved, businesslike administration of public affairs, with responsibility centered in a full-time expert. John N. Edy said in his first report,

While it does not appear that Berkeley previously had been extravagantly or wastefully governed, it was, nevertheless, obvious that if the then prevailing rate of spending continued, additional revenue would have to be provided from existing or new sources. And upon previous occasion, it appears, the people of the city had rejected a proposal to increase the general-fund tax limit.

Mr. Edy's task was to bring municipal spending in line with the available revenue without cutting down the existing municipal services. Through the establishment of a rigid budget and effective budgetary control, the larger entries in the city books returned to the credit side, an outstanding water bill was paid, existing municipal services were improved, and reorganization of several departments placed them upon a better operating basis. But there was no extensive program of civic development, equipment replacements were slow, and capital outlays were few.

Limitation of municipal services in Berkeley in 1939 was owing essentially to the same factor that brought difficulties to past city governments, a lack of sufficient revenue. The departments were well managed, their activities were conducted efficiently, and in most instances they were able to give necessary service. But the lack of sufficient resources put a wearing pressure upon facilities, equipment, and personnel. This lack meant practically the cessation of general replacements, capital

outlays, and plans for civic development. A quotation from the city manager's 1938-39 budget message to the city council reads:

E items [additions and betterments] have been almost completely eliminated and supplementary budgets, which include things desirable but not absolutely essential to the operations of the department, have been eliminated completely. In addition, the original requests of the several departments and bureaus have been cut approximately \$79,000. Every cent of this sum of money is actually needed for a sound governmental job but the income of the city would not permit of the inclusion of this amount. This leads me to say again that it is imperative that we increase the revenue of the city government at least \$100,000 a year.

Mr. Edy stated in his 1936-37 budget message that "revenues from taxation are still inadequate to carry out a proper program of capital investment and replacement. . . . After careful investigation, I consider that the full request of each department is far under the amount that could be adequately justified for the operation of the City's business." Sources of municipal revenue in 1939 were tax income, money from bond issues, and subventions from various outside sources.

The Berkeley charter allows the city council to make certain specific tax levies: for the general fund (\$1 per \$100 assessed valuation limit); for the school fund (35 cents per \$100 assessed valuation limit); for bond redemption; and for the library. In addition to these, special taxes may be approved by a two-thirds vote of the people. After Berkeley established city manager government the tax was kept at a steady levy of \$1.59 to \$1.60 until 1932. Then it was cut until it reached the low point of \$1.36 in the years 1934-37. This reduction took place in the school tax and in the amount levied for bond redemption. After that the rate moved up to \$1.42. With the cut in the tax rate there was a reduction in the assessed valuations. The major cuts were made in 1932-33 and 1933-34. An increase in 1935-36 was caused by the addition of public utility property to city assessment rolls. Thus, the reduction of both the tax rate and the assessed valuation meant a monetary saving to the property owner but a loss of revenue for the city.

In the later years between 1923 and 1939 the Berkeley budget was balanced by subventions from outside sources. Most important of these was the return made to all California municipalities from the state gasoline tax. This had to be used for the maintenance of major streets. Other state financial aid came from the motor vehicle tax, the auto license tax, and the liquor tax. A small return was also received from the

county on probated estates. Profits from the city's one municipal utility, garbage collection, augmented the general fund by an average of \$25,000 annually. Work Projects Administration assistance was secured for Berkeley's recreation program and in the construction of an aquatic park and a yacht harbor. The city manager readily admitted that money from these sources saved Berkeley and that without this aid the budget would have been unbalanced long ago, unless taxes had been increased.

Berkeley's bonded indebtedness, 1937-38, was \$853,072.50, or less than 1 per cent of the assessed valuation. The state legal limitation on bond indebtedness for general municipal purposes was 15 per cent of the previous assessed valuation. Berkeley bonds had an AAA rating. Four bond issues had been placed before the voters since the city manager system was inaugurated; two were turned down. The first issue, voted on in 1925, was for \$1,090,000 to secure lands and public improvements, such as a civic center, an auditorium, and parks; it was defeated.<sup>1</sup> The second bond proposal in 1928 providing for storm sewers was carried, while the bond issue proposal in 1929 which involved the expenditure of \$350,000 for public parks failed to pass. In September, 1938, Berkeley citizens approved bonds by a vote of three to one for the construction of a police administration building. This was a Public Works Administration project, and the federal government was providing a grant of \$160,724 toward the \$357,166 building. The bonds covering the city's share, a total of \$197,500, were termed pay-as-you-go bonds and would be retired in a five-year period. This obligation would mean an annual increase of five cents in the tax rate for this period.

"At first glance this low debt might seem a matter for congratulation, but on further study it is seen to mean that Berkeley has made very inadequate provisions for the well being of both her present and future citizens." This quotation appeared in the report of the Citizen's Committee of Sixteen, appointed in 1925 by the mayor to assist the city manager in planning Berkeley's needs for the next ten years. After extensive study the group recommended a far-reaching program of civic development, the first phase of which was turned down at the polls. John Nolen, the planning consultant for the committee, said:

The financial policy of Berkeley has been over-conservative, especially in the matter of bond issues. The method heretofore followed appears unfair, unsatisfactory and unnecessarily expensive and wasteful. It has

<sup>1</sup> In November, 1926, the council put before the people a plan to purchase the civic center land by a special tax of ten cents on a hundred dollars valuation, for a period of three years. This tax proposal failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote.



resulted in low standards of municipal development and in a failure to provide not only for the future of Berkeley, but even for some of its present needs. . . . A city must always consider not merely the cost of carrying out a particular project, but also the cost of not carrying it out, or the increased cost of carrying it out at a later date.

A Citizen's Committee of Thirty-six appointed in 1928 for the same purposes made an almost identical report indicating its belief that these major and permanent improvements could best be provided for through bond issues.

After 1928 few aggressive efforts were made either by the council or by the city manager to place squarely before Berkeley's citizens the issue of the city's limited municipal development program growing out of inadequate finances. Sincere attempts were made to tap outside sources of revenue directly and indirectly. Mr. Thompson played an important role in securing the adoption of the state gasoline tax return to municipalities. He was instrumental in arranging WPA projects for the city. This was a depression period, but with the exception of the bond issue for the police administration building, no effort was made to secure increased revenues through bond issues or through a higher tax rate. Some such step would probably be necessary for a long-range financial plan of civic development, for the release of pressure on the municipal plant and on the personnel, and for the provision of needed capital outlays and betterments.

### *Police and Fire Departments*

The police and fire departments were, perhaps, the most widely recognized of Berkeley municipal services and the ones in which there was the most civic pride. A few of their outstanding features, therefore, are briefly considered.

The development of the Berkeley Police Department might be largely attributed to one man, August Vollmer, who was elected town marshal in 1905 and resigned as police chief in 1932. Under his guidance the Berkeley Police Department attained a national reputation for efficient operation by a well-trained staff, during both commission and city manager systems.

Outstanding was the recruitment and the training of police officers. Mr. Vollmer was insistent that his force should be staffed with the best available material. He developed stringent entrance examinations and put a great deal of emphasis on college training. Before a man was recruited, his past record was subjected to an extensive and exhaustive

study. All men served a two-year probationary period during which they were continually tested and observed for their physical and mental abilities to remain in the service. If they failed to meet requirements, they were dropped. From time to time there were intensive in-service training programs, and the men were required to take instruction in certain subjects on their own time. According to the statistics for June, 1937, fifty-one out of a total of seventy-one police officers had attended a business college or university, and twenty had graduated from a university. The men were comparatively young, thirty-two being under thirty years of age and fifty-seven being under forty years.

Berkeley did not have a serious crime problem. There was little vice, and by a state law the sale of liquor was prohibited within a one-mile radius from the university campus. The major crime rate of Berkeley in the fiscal year 1936-37 was 1,291 cases per 100,000 population.<sup>1</sup> Its biggest crime problem was larceny. In 1936-37, 35.8 per cent of all major crimes in Berkeley were cleared by arrest, compared with 26.3 per cent for cities in the United States of 50,000 to 100,000 population and 29 per cent for the average of all United States cities of all population groups.

Berkeley developed an excellent police radio communication system, and through cooperative arrangements with other communities in the vicinity it established a regional network. The system was first started in 1929 and had developed by 1939 into a five-hundred-watt station. It was the largest and most complete police communication network on the Pacific Coast, serving thirty-five agencies as of June, 1937.

The Fire Department also had high requirements for recruitment. Appointments were made only after thorough physical and mental examinations. The turnover was low in the department (as contrasted with that of the Police Department). The men served many years and moved up gradually through the ranks.

Important in the Fire Department's program was its fire prevention work. There was a Fire Prevention Bureau staffed with two full-time men, but others on the force donated a great deal of their time to making inspections and to carrying out an intensive educational program for fire prevention, such as distributing literature to schools and homes and conducting fire prevention meetings. The department had a high national standing for this work.

<sup>1</sup> The crime rate for United States cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population was 1,469.5 per 100,000; for California cities of all population groups, 1,973.4 per 100,000; and for Pacific Coast cities of all population groups, 2,047.8 per 100,000 population.

The Fire Department had its own corporation yard, where all fire equipment was maintained and repaired. This shop was entirely separate from the central corporation yard and was used exclusively by the Fire Department.

Berkeley was among the leaders in cities of its class for low-fire loss. The per capita loss in 1936-37 was twenty-four cents.<sup>1</sup> Besides the direct benefits, the low-fire loss gave Berkeleyans a reduction in fire insurance rates.

### *Administrative Organization*

When John N. Edy became city manager of Berkeley, he inherited a traditionally sound administrative machine. Some improvements were needed, and a better financial organization had to be inaugurated. On the whole, however, the actual administration of city affairs was divorced from politics, and there were few extreme examples of inefficiency. The change to city manager government removed the five commissioners as administrative heads and placed responsibility in one executive. General administrative departments were left much the same; shifts were made in several bureaus; some services were combined; and the city manager created new staff agencies.

Mr. Edy introduced several major reorganizations. First, he coordinated the public health activities of the city government with those of the school system by arranging with the Board of Education, through a gentlemen's agreement, to place the supervision of these affairs in one man. This cooperation between the city and the schools had been introduced in the recreation activities when Berkeley had commission government. Second, he combined parks and playgrounds into one department. Third, he reorganized the Garbage Department, keeping it under his supervision for a while, then placing it in the Department of Public Works, and finally making it a separate department. Fourth, and perhaps most important, he created the position of budget officer, giving this official the duties of assisting in the preparation of the budget and of exercising budgetary control over departmental activities. Later, he added purchasing to the budget officer's responsibilities.

Mr. Thompson retained essentially the same administrative organization although some changes were made. The Bureau of Equipment Maintenance was separated in 1936 from the Public Works Department

<sup>1</sup> The inadequacy of per capita loss as a good comparative measure of fire service is well realized, but it is the commonly accepted measure and the one usually quoted for comparative analysis.

and established as a separate department. The position of executive assistant to the city manager was re-created in 1935, when the pressure of detailed work became too great for the city manager to handle alone. The duties of the personnel and research assistant were increased. He was placed under a separate budget item at the beginning of the fiscal year, 1938-39, and was given the title of director of personnel and research. His relation to the chief executive as a staff officer remained the same. In July, 1938, ordinances on the organization of all departments were brought together in one organization ordinance.

Following is the functional organization of Berkeley's municipal government as it was in 1939.

CITY MANAGER

Executive Assistant

Purchasing and Budget Officer<sup>1</sup>

Director of Personnel and Research

CITY ATTORNEY

CITY CLERK

TREASURER AND TAX COLLECTOR

ASSESSOR

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

Bureau of Streets

Division of Street Maintenance

Division of Sanitation

Bureau of Engineering

Division of Surveys and Records

Division of Construction

Division of Permits

Bureau of Electricity<sup>2</sup>

Harbor Bureau

POLICE DEPARTMENT

Record Division

Traffic Division

Patrol Division

Vice Division

Crime Prevention Division

<sup>1</sup> The purchasing and budget officer resigned in August, 1939. No new appointment was made to this position. Instead, the executive assistant to the city manager assumed supervision over this function and there was an increase in responsibilities of the assistants in the purchasing and budget office.

<sup>2</sup> The Bureau of Electricity was given departmental status in August, 1939. Its duties and responsibilities were the same as before.

Detective Division

Pound

Radio Bureau

FIRE DEPARTMENT

Nine Station Houses

Fire Prevention Bureau

Fire Department Corporation Yard

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Bureau of Food and Sanitation

Bureau of Preventable Disease

Bureau of Vital Statistics

Bureau of the Laboratory

BUILDING DEPARTMENT

Plumbing Inspector

Electrical Inspector

Housing Inspector

Gas Inspector

DEPARTMENT OF GARBAGE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL

Collection

Disposal

DEPARTMENT OF EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

*Recreation Commission*

DEPARTMENT OF RECREATION

Division of Playgrounds

City Playgrounds

School Playgrounds

Division of Parks

Summer Camps

*Commission of Public Charities*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION OF PUBLIC CHARITIES

*City Planning Commission*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, CITY PLANNING COMMISSION

*Board of Library Trustees* (Administrative Board)

Main Library

Four Branch Libraries

CITY AUDITOR (elected; budgetary control exercised by city manager)

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND CITY COURT (elected; budgetary control exercised by city manager)

This outline shows that Berkeley municipal services were divided into a relatively large number of departments and that the trend was to

create, rather than to combine, departments. Such an organization, however, had presented no great administrative difficulties up to the time of this survey. This was largely because of the caliber of administrative heads and because of their exercise of authority commensurate with responsibility subject to final control by the city manager.

### *Coordination among Municipal Departments*

Examples of coordination of the various departments were numerous. The Fire Department gave its worn-out hose to other municipal departments that requested it. This department also lent to the park service certain watering equipment. The Garbage Department cooperated with the fire and health services by having its truck drivers report possible fire or health hazards. The building inspector supplied the Garbage Department with a list of new houses so that customers might be obtained for the service.<sup>1</sup> His work brought him into constant contact with the Planning Commission (on zoning matters) and with the health, public works, and fire departments in checking to see that regulations set down by these departments were complied with in building specifications. The Charities Commission secretary coordinated various WPA projects that were sponsored by different departments. Unnecessary pavement cuts were eliminated through the office of the city engineer and the superintendent of streets. Whenever a new street was to be laid, all utility companies were notified, so that they could lay their equipment. Estimates were made of the area's probable future growth so that cuts would not have to be made for expanded utility uses. The city engineer reported that there was always good cooperation between his department and these private utilities. There was close cooperation among the four department heads concerned with fiscal management. This harmonious relation was absolutely necessary since there was no centralized finance department.

A plan of disaster preparedness was adopted by the city council in 1927. This plan set up an organization which coordinated municipal services and Red Cross activities in the event of a community catastrophe. The purpose was to establish the most efficient scheme for protecting persons and property, preserving order, and administering public

<sup>1</sup> Berkeley's municipal garbage service was not supported from the general-fund tax levy. A monthly charge, based on container size and length of haul, was made for this garbage collection and disposal. The service was entirely voluntary, and individuals might haul their own refuse to the city fill. In 1939 there was about an 80 per cent coverage of the city. The Garbage Department billed customers once every two months and received payments in its own offices. Money collected was later turned over to the treasury.

relief in such an emergency. The plan was revised from time to time.

One of the best examples of efficient management, the result of co-ordination, in Berkeley was the work of the Department of Equipment Maintenance, which was separated from the Department of Public Works in 1936. It owned all trucks and all rolling stock used by the municipal departments and had complete charge of the rental, the maintenance, and the replacement of this equipment. The equipment was housed at the corporation yard.<sup>1</sup> Departments were charged a fixed rental rate an hour for the use of the equipment; the money was provided in departmental budgets under the heading of repairs and maintenance. Trucks and other rolling stock might also be rented to outside public and quasi-public organizations. The hourly rate for these agencies was slightly higher since it included a depreciation charge. It was recognized that city departments should pay the depreciation cost, but their budgets were so limited that it was impossible for them to do so. Whenever equipment was used by the Public Works Department and costs were being charged against funds received from the state gasoline tax, the higher rate was charged. The rental rate was figured very closely, and equipment had to be in use 99 per cent of the working day if the rate was to cover the operating cost and to provide a profit for replacements. A careful check was kept on each piece of equipment—the time it was used and the repairs it received. A card was attached to every truck to indicate how long it was operated and how long it was standing on a particular job. Thus, it was sometimes possible to coordinate two or more jobs. Trucks that were too old to be used for difficult work were shifted to easier duties, and when the record showed that a piece of equipment was operating constantly in the red, it was sold. The department operated on a 24-hour day, doing most of its repair work on the night shift so that equipment might always be used during the day.

The Department of Equipment Maintenance also kept a check on all automobile allowances for privately owned cars used in city business. Gasoline and oil had to be purchased at the corporation yard. They were not sold at cost but at a rate which would allow a slight profit.

Occasionally, the department would make minor repairs on the equipment of other municipal departments, billing them through the Budget Office. The difficulty to which this led will be discussed in the budget section below.

This department operated on its own fund, which was separate and distinct from the general fund. It received its revenues from rental

<sup>1</sup> The Fire Department had a separate equipment maintenance yard.

charges against budgeted departments and from the sale of gas and oil. The auditor made payments into the equipment maintenance fund through warrants in much the same way that money was paid to private creditors. Profits from all sources were pooled and were used to purchase new trucks and to make replacements in equipment. The department made its own purchases of supplies needed in its work. It sold material, such as pipe, to the other departments at cost.

The head of the Department of Equipment Maintenance exercised control not only over trucks but also over the drivers. Although the drivers were hired by the individual departments, the equipment and maintenance department head could refuse to let them operate the trucks, and the departments could not override his orders. Care was taken to train the drivers and to instruct them in safety practices. As a result, the number of accidents to the city's rolling equipment was low.

### *Cooperation with Other Agencies*

Outstanding was the coordination of the municipal recreation and health services and similar activities performed by the Berkeley school system. Cooperation in recreation work was started when Berkeley had commission government, while the combination of health services was one of the first reorganizations introduced after the city manager system was established. In both instances cooperation rested upon a gentlemen's agreement to appoint the same man as head of both the school and the city services in these fields. The salary of the superintendent of recreation was paid one half by the city and one half by the schools. The salary of the health officer was paid by three agencies: the city (45 per cent), the schools (45 per cent), and a private organization, sponsored by the Community Chest, the Berkeley Health and Visiting Nurses Association (10 per cent). A motivating factor in health service coordination was to eliminate duplication of the nursing service. A major feature in Berkeley's health program in 1939 was its generalized public health nursing service. One nurse in a district could handle everything from school health problems to bedside care and communicable diseases.

The Coordinating Council, established when Berkeley had commission government to bring together heads of local public agencies dealing with problems of child welfare and juvenile delinquency, was continued after the city manager system was established. The school superintendent and the city manager served as ex-officio members of this council. While originally the group met once a week for discussion, in 1939 meetings were held irregularly.



Public services of the city were closely coordinated with many of those of the county. The city maintained only a small jail, and after detention for one or two days its prisoners were transferred to the county jail. There was no city hospital, and emergency service was performed under contract by the Berkeley General Hospital. If patients needed more than emergency treatment they were moved to the county hospital. Berkeley had had its own employment service and work relief program from 1930 to 1932. This was under the direction of the Charities Commission. Relief and welfare activities were later administered by the county and the state governments.

Berkeley's position in a metropolitan area made close relations and many cooperative arrangements with other communities of the region almost inevitable. Berkeley's police broadcasting station greatly expanded its activities and served a number of East Bay communities. The city's sewer system was a cooperative function with Oakland and Albany. Berkeley and eight other East Bay cities voted to form the East Bay Utility District in 1923. This district furnishes water for the area. In 1934, after considerable agitation, Berkeley joined with other cities in the county to form a Regional Park District. Berkeley was also included in the Alameda County Mosquito Abatement District.

### *Management Aids*

The most direct sources of management aid in Berkeley were the manager's staff officers—his executive assistant, the personnel and research director, and the purchasing and budget officer—all of whom maintained daily contact with the city manager. Their function was to facilitate the manager's control over municipal departments. The executive assistant performed much detail work, especially in obtaining data on problems which were to be discussed in the council's committee of the whole. The executive assistant had formerly been the assistant city engineer and was in a position to give the manager first-hand advice on technical problems. He acted as manager in Mr. Thompson's absence.

The personnel and research director handled all preliminary work in the recruitment of city employees. He interviewed applicants for positions and conducted any examinations that might be given, except for police recruiting. His research activities involved the compilation of the city manager's annual report, the conduct of the "Open House" program, and the preparation of several publicity notices and press releases. Functions of the purchasing and budget officer are described below under *Fiscal Administration*.

Department heads made monthly reports to the manager. These reports usually summarized the work accomplished, noted the changes in personnel and gave the manager a picture of the developing activity program. Occasionally statistics were included comparing the month's work with that of the previous month and year. These comparative statistics made it possible to note quickly month-to-month changes and to see where the city services were improving on or were falling behind the previous year's accomplishments. These departmental memoranda formed the basis for the city manager's report to the city council.

In 1928 John N. Edy issued a *Manual of Administrative Practice for the City of Berkeley*. Its purpose was to outline for all municipal employees the objectives, the organization, the procedures, and the practices of administration under city manager government. It described the duties and the responsibilities of department heads and clarified fields that might lead to conflicts of authority. An example of definition of responsibility is the following: "The Fire Prevention Bureau of the Fire Department will be responsible for housing and fire-escape inspections as the same relate to stores, office buildings, hotels and apartments; and it will submit an appropriate report thereof to the Building Inspection Office." This manual defined the relations between the council and the manager and the duties of the city manager, and it set forth budget procedures and personnel regulations. Methods to be followed in handling complaints and other public contacts were fully described. General rules were laid down for office practices, letter forms, interdepartmental memos, and conduct in the field service. The manual was amended from time to time and was used in the amended form by Mr. Thompson and his staff. Its importance in clarifying details and in acting as an aid to management can not be overemphasized.

### *Fiscal Administration*

Fiscal administration during commission government had been centralized under the commissioner of finance and revenue. He had been charged with the preparation of a city budget, and the treasurer and the assessor had acted directly under his supervision. Management of city finances after Berkeley adopted the city manager system was the responsibility of four department heads—the budget officer, the treasurer-tax collector, the assessor, and the elected auditor. While at first glance this might seem to be a decentralization of fiscal management, actually there was close cooperation among all the fiscal officials, their activities being coordinated through the office of the city manager. The treasurer-tax

collector was responsible for the custody of city funds, for the collection of taxes and licenses, and for the payment of claims against the city after they had been checked by the auditor. Funds collected by other departments were periodically turned into the treasurer's office upon settlement with the auditor's office. As tax collector the treasurer-tax collector made a monthly report to the auditor who ordered the distribution of moneys into the proper funds.

The city auditor was the only official who might permit the disbursal of city funds. She had to examine the legality of all claims against the city and to check total budget figures. More detailed budgetary control was the responsibility of the budget officer. The auditor controlled the tax-delinquent roll, which was reduced to 2.1 per cent in 1936-37. The auditor also had to watch the cash basis fund to see that it did not drop below a level sufficient to meet the city's needs during the early months of the new fiscal year. Responsibility for typing tax bills was shared by the auditor, the assessor, and the treasurer-tax collector. This work was done by an automatic bill machine which made up three copies—one for the assessment roll, one for the tax bill, and one for a skeleton for the next year's assessment roll.

### *The Budget*

Assistance in the preparation, and in the control after the adoption, of the budget was the responsibility of the purchasing and budget officer. It was his duty to assemble all the factual data and to work with the city manager on the compilation of the budget document. After this budget was approved by the council he kept a close check to see that departmental expenditures did not exceed the monthly allocations.

The budget itself was built upon an account code and classification, the major subdivisions of which were: A, personal services; B, transportation expense; C, repairs and maintenance; D, materials, supplies and services; E, additions and betterments. This code of accounts was inaugurated by John N. Edy when he completely revised the budgetary procedure that had existed before the adoption of the city manager plan. The first four divisions covered operating expenses; the last, outlays and betterments. For a while department heads submitted two requests to the budget officer: one, known as first requests, covered expenditures absolutely needed for operation; the other, known as supplementary requests, included items desired but not essential. The city manager and the budget officer went over these requests making revisions where necessary. For several years previous to 1939, however, supplementary requests

were eliminated entirely. Three sets of figures in the budget showed the comparative amounts spent during the preceding year, budgeted expenditures for the current year, and proposed expenditures for the ensuing year. The final budget was then prepared for the council, to which the city manager fully explained the document. The budget itself was always preceded by a budget message discussing the major points of interest. The council, relying upon information supplied by the manager, usually accepted the budget with few changes. Budget revisions might be made during the year, but only upon the recommendation of the city manager. Considerable revision of the budget was necessary near the end of several fiscal years prior to 1939 in order to balance municipal revenue and expenditures.

### *Budgetary Control*

The inauguration of the city manager system brought with it the introduction of budgetary control. It was in 1939 one of the strong features in the city's fiscal administration. After the budget was approved and the appropriation ordinance was passed, department heads were required to break up their budget allowances into monthly estimates which became the basis of expenditure control by the budget officer. These allotments did not need to be uniform but might follow the department's seasonal needs. Requests during the year were checked by the budget officer against monthly allotments for individual department items. If funds were available, the expenditure was allowed, but if there was not sufficient money, the department head was so notified.

Budget transfers might be made in several ways. The department head could request a transfer *within* a letter classification. This might be effected by the budget officer alone. The department head might request the city manager to make transfers from his emergency fund or might ask for additional moneys from unapplied appropriations. The latter required action by the council. If a transfer was to be made from one letter classification to another, however, it had to be done by amending the budget through a vote of the council.

Since purchasing was also the duty of the budget officer, it was a relatively simple matter for him to check allotments before making the purchases for the departments. This control had one weak spot. Departments occasionally had repair work done by the Department of Equipment Maintenance. The charge against the department's budgeted items on repairs was not made until the budget officer received a bill from the equipment maintenance department for a completed job. Usually the

charges were small, but they were increasing in number. On a budget figured as closely as Berkeley's, these small sums become significant. The budget officer was aware of this weakness and had it on his program of future improvements.

Every month the budget officer sent each department head a statement showing the condition of the items in his department's budget, showing the amount allotted for the following month, and listing the accumulated funds available for the remainder of the year. This gave the department head a complete picture of his department's financial status. The city manager received a recapitulation of these reports with a statement of receipts, and the budget officer received a monthly report from the auditor on the sums of money that had actually been paid out.

### *Purchasing*

Centralized purchasing when Berkeley had commission government was the responsibility of the commissioner of public supplies. In 1939 all purchases under \$500 were made by the purchasing and budget officer. All contracts in excess of \$500 were awarded to the lowest bidder by the city council. This combination of purchasing activities and budgetary control under the direct supervision of the same department head was extremely satisfactory. When a department sent in requests for purchases, the budget officer was able to check immediately whether that department had the necessary funds. Changes in the purchase order system during the few years prior to 1939 assured even more centralized control. All order blanks were kept by the budget officer, thus preventing departments from making commitments beforehand, which they had sometimes done when they had known the order numbers. Departments sent requisitions to the budget officer, who checked and charged the items against the proper budget classification. The budget officer tried to estimate as closely as possible the approximate cost of the purchases. A card index file on previous bids and prices was maintained. Local firms were given a 5 per cent preference-price differential on purchases under \$500, but on all purchases over \$500 the charter required that the contract be awarded to the lowest bidder. Shipments were made to the department, but the invoice for payment was sent to the budget office. Before payment was authorized the invoice was checked in the budget office for price and then forwarded to the department head for his signature indicating that the proper order had been filled.

Storeroom facilities were not satisfactory. A few general office supplies were kept in the city hall, while heavy materials, such as lumber

and cement, were stored at the corporation yard. Efforts were being made to standardize some of the general supplies. The development of proper storeroom facilities and of a record system was in process in 1939. Until a few years before 1939 storage facilities and a record system were not considered essential, but with an addition to the personnel of the purchasing and budget office more attention was being given to these matters.

### *Audit*

An outside audit was made by a private firm twice a year. The company, in accordance with charter provision, was employed by the mayor, the same procedure which had been followed when Berkeley had commission government. The firm made a detailed audit of all department accounts and checked its findings against the city auditor's books.

### *Personnel Administration*

Berkeley never developed any formal personnel system, although the council was authorized by the charter to appoint a civil service commission with power to hold open competitive examinations and to make classifications for all types of public employment. The commissioners had considered establishing this civil service body at one time, but no civil service ordinance had ever been passed. When Berkeley had commission government, personnel selection and regulation had been largely the responsibility of department heads, subject to the final approval of the commissioners. Recruiting and training in the police and fire departments had already been developed along professional lines.

With the introduction of the city manager system, the manager was given complete authority over the appointment, the discipline, and the removal of all municipal employees except those in the library service. Direct responsibility for carrying out the details of this work was placed in the hands of the personnel and research director. Although the council still had power to appoint a civil service commission, it had not done so up to 1939. Such a move would probably incur the disapproval of the city manager, who believed that a commission would tend to weaken his control over municipal employees.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In 1939, before the general election, there was considerable agitation for the establishment of a civil service commission. The issue arose primarily over the questions of the city manager's power to dismiss employees without public hearings and of vacation and sick leave privileges. The council appointed a subcommittee to study the problem, but it made no recommendations. A group of citizens and employees then prepared a civil service ordinance, circulated petitions, and qualified the ordinance as an initiative measure at the 1939 municipal election. The ordinance was so poorly drafted that it

The first city manager, John N. Edy, realized the importance of recruiting good people for the public service and of developing a true merit system. He established personnel rules and regulations on recruitment, probation, promotion, training, vacations, sick leaves, grievances, discipline, and general employee conduct. These were contained in his *Manual of Administrative Practice for the City of Berkeley*. He also issued a form letter addressed, "To persons entering the employ of the City of Berkeley." In this message he tried to explain the philosophy and the spirit of public service as he saw it. Typical were these quotations:

the public does not owe you or me a place on its payroll. . . . Loyalty to your colleagues and to your particular branch of the service should but intensify your loyalty to the organization as a whole. There is but one administrative service. . . . The municipal service is exacting; but it is an honorable service, worthy of your best efforts and your fullest faith.

### *Recruitment*

Applicants for city employment had to fill out a one-page application indicating their personal history, education, and experience. All employees were recruited through oral interviews, but policemen, firemen, and playground directors had also to pass a written examination. The personnel director held consultations with the administrative head to whose department a new employee was to be assigned before making the final appointment. Recruitment of subordinate employees was left largely with these two officials. Selection of administrative heads, of course, was made by the city manager, who also interviewed police officers and firemen after they had been appointed to the service. The Police Department, which had developed rigid recruitment procedures for prospective police officers, was entirely responsible for selecting its men, subject to final approval by the city manager. All appointees had to pass a physical examination. This examination was also given once a year to salaried employees in the service.

The probationary period was supposed to be three months, but this requirement was not rigidly followed. The fire chief said that, as far as he was concerned, his men were always on probation. Vacation and sick-

---

failed to receive the support of organizations and persons usually found among the strongest supporters of civil service. These groups urged the defeat of the ordinance, suggesting at the same time that if the measure failed, the city council should adopt a satisfactory and workable civil service system. The city manager, campaigning against the issue, advocated a sound, progressive personnel plan. The initiative was decisively defeated at the election. The council was considering an ordinance to establish a personnel commission in August, 1939.

leave privileges were granted to all personnel employed on a monthly basis.

### *Classification, Compensation, and In-Service Training*

In 1931 Fred Telford of the California State Personnel Division made a general classification and pay survey of the Berkeley municipal service. The work of the personnel was analyzed through a job-analysis questionnaire, and job specifications were established for certain positions. A complete study was made of the pay schedules. For 1938-39 salaries see Tables 3 and 4.

There was no centralized training program, because this phase of personnel work was left to the departments. The police and fire departments, of course, had intensive programs for instructing men in the service. Included in training for police work at one time or another were

TABLE 3. SALARIES OF BERKELEY CITY EMPLOYEES, 1938-39

Administrative Heads	Monthly Salary	Selected Subordinates	Monthly Salary
City Manager .....	\$833.33	Police Captains .....	\$275.00
Executive Ass't to City Mgr...	325.00	Fire Captains .....	205.00
Purchasing & Budget Officer..	225.00	Asst. Supt. of Recreation....	250.00
Personnel & Research Director	150.00	Supv. of Playgrounds <sup>c</sup> .....	125.00
City Attorney .....	350.00	Supt. of Electricity.....	260.00
City Clerk .....	225.00	Deputy Supt. of Streets.....	210.00
City Engineer .....	400.00	Radio Technician .....	200.00
City Health Officer <sup>a</sup> .....	225.00	Sanitary Inspector .....	200.00
Chief of Police.....	375.00	Housing Inspector .....	170.00
Fire Chief .....	375.00	Milk Inspector .....	225.00
Treasurer-Tax Collector .....	250.00	Bacteriologist .....	145.00
Assessor .....	275.00	Patrolmen .....	165—185
Superintendent of Recreation <sup>b</sup>	175.00	Firemen .....	165—185
Building Inspector .....	275.00	Playground Directors <sup>d</sup> .....	110—130
Executive Secretary, City			
Planning Commission .....	200.00	Draftsman .....	170.00
Executive Secretary, Commission			
of Public Charities.....	190.00	Rodman .....	145.00
Superintendent of Garbage...	250.00	Poundmaster .....	170.00
Superintendent of Equipment.	260.00	Gardeners .....	115—135
City Librarian <sup>e</sup> .....	333.33	Clerk—license,	
City Auditor .....	250.00	audit, budget .....	130.00
Justice of the Peace.....	383.33	Janitor .....	135.00

<sup>a</sup> Salary divided: city 45 per cent, schools 45 per cent, Berkeley Health and Visiting Nurses Association 10 per cent.

<sup>b</sup> Salary divided: city 50 per cent, schools 50 per cent.

<sup>c</sup> Salary approximately equal to this sum also received from schools.

<sup>d</sup> Three months full time, nine months half time; salary varies with size of playground.

<sup>e</sup> Appointed by Library Trustees.

Source: 1938-39 Budget.



TABLE 4. WAGES OF BERKELEY CITY EMPLOYEES, 1938-39

Position	Daily Wage
Lineman .....	\$8.50
Garbage truck drivers.....	5.63-6.03
Garbage helpers .....	4.84-5.23
Foremen, Bureau of Streets, Division of Maintenance .....	5.72-5.98
Laborers, Bureau of Streets, Division of Maintenance .....	5.68-5.94
Sewer foreman .....	5.98
Truck drivers, Bureau of Streets, Division of Sanitation .....	5.20-5.46
Laborers, Bureau of Streets, Division of Sanitation .....	4.68-4.94
Cleaners, Bureau of Streets, Division of Sanitation .....	4.16-4.42

Source: 1938-39 Budget.

fingerprinting, ballistics, criminal psychology, and psychiatry, and yawara.<sup>1</sup> The Park Division held a semimonthly seminar for instruction and discussion of current problems. The Recreation Department had frequent meetings of playground directors. Both city managers encouraged their staff officers to attend graduate seminars in public administration at the University of California. Several officers, including the first city manager, received their master's degrees in political science (public administration). For a while Mr. Edy conducted seminars in municipal administration on Saturday afternoons. These were open to any city employee who cared to attend.

### *Promotions, Transfers, and Records*

When higher positions were to be filled, the usual procedure was to make the appointment from the ranks. Nine of the seventeen department heads in office in 1939 received their positions through promotion. Transfers were made occasionally if a person possessed proper qualifications and had good reason for requesting a change. Some employees, especially stenographers, were used by two or more departments.

The Probst system of service ratings was used for a while, but it was considered unsatisfactory for Berkeley's needs, and in 1939 the appraisal

<sup>1</sup> Similar to jiu-jitsu.

of employees was largely the responsibility of department heads. The personnel director kept a file on all employees, using the back of the application blank as a record card on which were noted such things as leaves of absence, pay increases, and promotions.

### *Protection*

The city councilmen never attempted to interfere with the city manager's appointing power nor to exercise any control in the selection of employees. Politics did not play a part in recruitment, and employees were not asked to engage in political activity.

The manager was the person of final authority in dismissal cases, and there was no appeal from the manager to the council. Department heads might dismiss employees immediately for serious reasons, such as drunkenness on the job or gross insubordination. In 1937 there was a total of nine dismissals or 1.8 per cent of the total personnel. Several of these dismissals, however, were from temporary positions, so that a more accurate figure would be 1 per cent. There was no security of tenure except that which came from efficient performance. The philosophy that the public did not owe the employee a job still prevailed in the Berkeley municipal service. The turnover of employees was moderate. Fifty-three voluntary resignations were submitted in 1938, most of these being from persons employed on temporary projects, such as summer weed-burning. There was no general clean-out of personnel when the manager plan was introduced nor when there was the change in managers.

### *Service and Superannuation*

In 1937 there were 477 employees in the Berkeley municipal service.<sup>1</sup> Excluding day laborers, a tabulation made in 1937 showed that 242 employees had served over five years. In 1938 twenty-year service buttons were awarded to forty municipal employees, mostly from the fire and public works departments. A total of forty-eight service buttons had been awarded previously, in 1929, 1930, and 1932.

No general pension plan for all city employees was created, but the fire and police departments each had a separate pension system. The Fire Department's pension plan was amended to make it a joint contributory system, and there was every indication that similar changes would be made in the police retirement plan. Contributions were still not sufficient to make the plans actuarially sound. During the city coun-

<sup>1</sup> This figure does not include thirteen nurses, substitute playground directors, or extras in the Garbage Department.

cil's committee-of-the-whole discussions on the amendments to the firemen's pension some councilmen indicated that they would like to see the city adopt a retirement system for all employees.

Superannuation was an ever increasing problem. In 1937, 221 employees in the Berkeley municipal service were over 40, and 100 were over 50. This number of older employees worked hardships on certain departments and decreased their efficiency. But it would be difficult to remove these older people from the service, in view of their past performance. Some were transferred to lighter tasks.

### *Overtime*

Berkeley employees put in many overtime hours. A quotation from *Facts about Berkeley's Accomplishments* reads:

The high morale of Berkeley's public employees is evidenced by the fact that 26,150 hours of over-time were put in by members of the Police Department in 1932. If this had not been voluntarily given, it would have been necessary to employ 12 additional men to properly maintain Berkeley's high police standards. This would have meant the added expenditure of approximately \$30,000. The voluntary over-time was not confined to the Police Department. Employees in other departments have been equally cooperative in performing their duties regardless of working hours.

While some overtime might indicate a strong employee morale—and it might, perhaps, be expected during rush periods—Berkeley asked employees to work more extra hours than should rightfully be expected.

### *Organization*

City employees were not organized into a union, and all attempts at unionization were discouraged. When efforts were made to unionize the park employees, the city manager, with council approval, took the following stand: employees could join any organization, but the city manager would not bargain collectively with them. Mr. Thompson felt that if Berkeley employees unionized, there would be a transfer of loyalty from the city manager to the union; and that the city budget could not meet salary increases which might be demanded by a collective bargaining organization.

Employees had informal gatherings and picnic parties, and for a time they issued a small employees' magazine. They established a credit union, which was a cooperative bank run by employees under the supervision of the treasurer's office.

## CONCLUSION

Inauguration of the city manager plan in Berkeley represented the culmination of almost a decade of discussion and campaigning on this proposal. As a change in government it was motivated, not by a zealous program for municipal reform, but by a desire to introduce more business-like administration into the conduct of municipal affairs. Impetus for the successful campaign came from several distinct groups, each with a particular grievance against the commissioners. Local legislators serving under the commission system had attempted to provide good government. There was no denial of necessary services, nor were there indications of wasteful extravagance. Politics in its derogatory connotation did not exist in this residential and university town. The change to the manager plan, therefore, symbolized to Berkeleyans a progressive step toward better government, rather than a panacea for intolerable conditions.

The primary problem which faced the first city manager was to cut down municipal expenditure to the level of revenues without curtailing services. This necessitated a rigid system of budgetary control, the introduction of which constituted, perhaps, the major innovation made by manager government. The manager was limited to existing revenues since citizens generally opposed the provision of additional funds for municipal affairs, either through an increased tax rate or through new bond issues. Advocates of the manager system in Berkeley had urged adoption of this plan as an alternative to increased taxes. In 1939 limitations of municipal services were caused by the lack of revenues rather than by any deficiencies in administrative operations. City departments were handled efficiently by a capable staff that was doing a good job with the facilities at its disposal, but administrators of the city manager government were no more successful in winning the people's approval for needed additional funds than were their predecessors. Few concerted efforts were made to put this problem to a citizen vote in recent years prior to 1939.

Manager government increased the efficient operation of municipal affairs in Berkeley, although city services had been handled well when Berkeley had had commission government. It was inevitable, however, that the inherent defects in this form of government, such as the division of responsibility and the combination of legislative and administrative functions, should make it more difficult to obtain the optimum in municipal operations. Introduction of manager government meant that a

good staff could do its work in a better organization and that the inauguration of administrative controls would assure an improved utilization of existing municipal facilities.

Berkeleyans were apparently satisfied with their government. Voting at local elections was always light, and incumbent councils were always retained. Any turnover in the council personnel was effected by appointment rather than by the election of new councilmen at the polls. The manager was in 1939 the dominant figure in Berkeley municipal affairs, and the council played a less important role. Such a relationship assured the manager of complete freedom to exercise all necessary administrative powers without fear of council interference. It meant, too, that the administrative head of the government exerted considerable influence in determining legislative policies. Citizens looked to the city manager for political as well as administrative leadership, and through his activities with the Berkeley Council Manager League the manager was placed in the position of aiding the election of incumbent councilmen. Were Berkeley a different type of community, this dual role might have placed the manager in a vulnerable and sometimes embarrassing position. But the manager's effective personality and the public's complacent temper prevented such difficulties from arising.

Berkeley was a fortunate city in its government. Civic leaders always sought to give the community the most modern and effective form of government available. When the commission plan was at its prime and was considered as the most efficient way of running a city, Berkeley was among the first to make use of the system. Then, with the inauguration of the city manager idea, community leaders, recognizing its advantages, early attempted to amend the city charter so that Berkeley could operate under this improved method of municipal management. Local circumstances delayed the adoption of these amendments for several years, but, when they were finally approved, both the council and the manager started out with a clear understanding of the fundamental principles necessary for the successful operation of the manager system. The willingness of the council to give the manager complete freedom in conducting administrative affairs was a significant factor in getting the city manager government off to a strong start. The twenty-five councilmen and two managers who guided the city manager government during its first sixteen years—the period covered by this study—served Berkeley well.

HAMILTON, OHIO

*Howard White*

## CONTENTS

I. The City . . . . .	173
II. Hamilton's Governments: A Quest for the Perfect Form . . . . .	178
III. Quest for the Perfect Form: Continued . . . . .	192
IV. The Council and Its Selection by Proportional Representation . . . . .	199
V. The Council, the Mayor, and the Manager . . . . .	212
VI. Municipal Administration Under Hamilton's Mayor- Council and City Manager Governments . . . . .	217



## IMPORTANT DATES IN HAMILTON'S GOVERNMENT

Named after Alexander Hamilton . . . . .	1794
First Incorporation . . . . .	1810
Federation with Rossville . . . . .	1827
Separate Incorporation . . . . .	1831
Annexation of Rossville . . . . .	1854
Direct State Control of Hamilton . . . . .	1889
Commission Government by Charter . . . . .	1898
Mayor-Council Government . . . . .	1903
City Manager Government . . . . .	1928
Russell P. Price, City Manager . . . . .	1928



*Field Work: 1938*  
*Report Written: Summer, 1939*

# City Manager Government in Hamilton

---

## I. THE CITY

NAMED IN 1794 for Alexander Hamilton, this Ohio city has gradually become an important center for the manufacturing that he sought to encourage. In recent years Hamilton's diversified industries have typified America's technological progress. Since most of these industries have a long history of growth from humble beginnings and are still largely owned by citizens who are descendants of their founders, there is not much absentee ownership. But the interests of some of these citizens have extended far beyond the limits of the city. The chairman of the board of the large Champion Paper and Fibre Company was, for several years prior to 1939, president of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce as well as of the Hamilton chamber; he succeeded the publisher of the city's one daily newspaper, which absorbed its rival in 1933, as a director of the United States Chamber of Commerce; and a citizen of nearby Middletown was, in 1938, president and, in 1939, chairman of the board of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Some citizens, including several municipal officials, have not considered it an unmixed blessing to have in their midst these men of wealth who are accustomed to wield vast economic power and to have their commands obeyed. The situation is not intolerable, however, for no one industry dominates the city. Bankers, industrialists, and large stockholders in one or another of the more than sixty plants located in and around the city are not likely to agree on any policy affecting municipal government that does not coincide with the interests of many other citizens.

### *Hamilton's Abundant Power*

Hamilton's location gives access to cheap power. At the outset it was dependent upon the "hydraulic," a canal from which water was diverted from the Miami River over wheels or through turbines and returned to the river. The fall was only about thirty feet, and hydraulic power gave



way to steam as the improvements in steam engines made them more economical. The Corliss engine was developed to a high efficiency in Hamilton, and water power ceased to be an important factor until about 1920, when the Ford Motor Company renovated the hydraulic diversion canal and installed modern hydroelectric equipment in its Hamilton plant.

The bulk of the power used in Hamilton is steam-generated electricity. The municipal electric plant, the construction of which had been begun in 1927 under the last mayor-council administration, competes with the plant of the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (a Columbia affiliate) located on the Ohio River. To the latter plant, coal is cheaply transported by barge. This advantage and an abundance of water contribute to low-cost, high-efficiency generation, but the municipal plant has led in rate reductions. Both plants face competition for industrial installation: the huge Champion Paper and Fibre Company generates electricity as a by-product to the heating and drying equipment used in paper making; and the Diesel engine factory encourages the installation of that type of power in the smaller factories in the city. These various forms of cheap and abundant power have contributed to the growth of Hamilton as an industrial center.

### *Population Characteristics*

Hamilton's population growth has been steady. In 1870 there were 11,081 inhabitants; in 1900, 23,914; in 1910, 35,270; in 1920, 39,675; in 1930, 52,176; and in 1936, by a Chamber of Commerce estimate, 56,240. According to the 1930 census its population was 92 per cent native white, 4.2 per cent foreign-born white, and only 3.8 per cent Negro. Illiteracy among inhabitants over ten years of age was 1.9 per cent.

The population of Hamilton has long been almost entirely of native stock. The wave of southern European immigration which swept over Youngstown, Toledo, and other northern Ohio cities did not reach Hamilton. In 1900 Hamilton had only 2,947 foreign-born, which grew to a high of 3,309 in 1910 and fell to 2,663 in 1920 and to 2,183 in 1930. Negroes have not presented any great problem as an enlarging segment of the population. For thirty years the number has only kept pace with the growth of the city, increasing from nearly a thousand in 1900 to 1,958 in 1930. Of the 52,000 population in 1930, 48,000 were native white, of whom 40,000 were born of native white parents.

Yet Hamilton has had an immigration problem—immigration from the mountains of Kentucky. Of 49,980 native-born, including Negroes,

31,374 were born in Ohio. Out of the remaining 18,606 born in other states of the United States, 11,391 were born in Kentucky. Indiana sent 2,387. Only two other states are represented by more than five hundred émigrés: Tennessee (569) and Georgia (505). Since most of the Indiana contingent came from the southern counties of the state, which closely resemble in culture the hillbilly regions of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, it can be said that substantially all the immigrants to Hamilton came from the marginal subsistence areas of the South. They brought with them standards almost as foreign to the native population as would a European immigrant group; but they were subject to no quota, literacy, or other restriction on their movements. The rapid growth of the city in the 1920's brought problems of sewerage, sanitation, education, recreation, welfare, and police activity similar to those encountered in many cities with large foreign elements.

The immigrants make up the labor reserve of unskilled workers employed in the plants. They occupy undesirable residential districts along the river, the railroad yards, and near some of the industrial plants. Peck's Addition and Gobbler's Knob present problems typical of the slum areas of large cities. In politics these immigrants constitute an important element of the electorate and require delicate treatment by any group that wishes to gain or to retain control of city and county government.

Normally almost one-fourth of the city's inhabitants work in the various industrial establishments. While the paper mills and the automotive parts factory (Ford) employ the largest numbers, other industries, such as machine tool, coke and iron, felt and blanket, safe, stove, and Diesel engine, employ many more. Despite the diversified industries, Hamilton's pay rolls and, consequently, the income of the retail merchants and professional classes quickly respond to the general business conditions of the nation, although the situation is doubtless better than in cities dependent upon one industry. None of the Hamilton banks or building and loan companies failed during the depression years of the 1930's.

### *Unplanned Growth*

Hamilton is the county seat and, with a density of 10.5 persons per acre, occupies 8.36 of Butler County's 452 square miles. The city has extended its boundaries to take in suburban developments so that there is now only one incorporated village, New Miami, within two or three miles of the city's limits. In New Miami is located the Hamilton Coke and Iron

Works, a subsidiary of the American Rolling Mills Company of Middletown which is about ten miles away. The greatest expansion took place in 1908 when the city limits were extended to include five areas containing about two square miles. Five extensions have been made since 1918—evidence of an alert civic consciousness which has been developing.

The only other city in the county (Ohio's constitution fixes the minimum population for cities at 5,000) is Middletown with 29,982 population. The two cities thus account for over 70 per cent of the county's 114,084 inhabitants. But they do not constitute a metropolitan district as defined by the Census Bureau; and Hamilton, being about twenty-five miles from Cincinnati, does not come within that metropolitan district.

Although Hamilton's growth has been steady, it was not guided by a definite plan until after 1920. For over a century Hamilton spread out along the banks of the Great Miami River. Many of its early industries utilized its water for power. The city's industries, places of business, and many of its homes suffered severe losses from recurring floods until the completion of the reservoirs and flood prevention levees of the Miami Conservancy District in the early 1920's removed that great handicap to long-range planning. That the handicap had been removed was clearly demonstrated in January and February, 1937. Cincinnati and other cities along the Ohio River and its other tributaries were flooded, while in Hamilton and in other cities in the Miami Valley, where the precipitation was substantially as heavy as elsewhere in the Ohio River basin, the flood waters passed by without inflicting damage.

Cooperative efforts in flood prevention led to a broader program for civic improvement. Previously, in 1912, a park development program had been successfully completed, and a movement to create a civic center on the river front north and south of High Street had been started early in 1913. But the flood came in March of that year and nothing further was done until after the war. Then the mayor was persuaded to appoint a city plan commission. The commission hired a city planning engineer but had to get the funds to pay for his survey from the Chamber of Commerce.

The engineer's report, submitted in December, 1920, after "practically sixteen months' continuous study in the office and on the ground," criticized Hamilton's haphazard development:

Following lines of least resistance, the city has begun a most uneconomical shoe-string growth to the south, along the river. Land has been subdivided and streets have been laid out with little or no relation to contiguous territory and small regard for the benefits of

correct street alignment. The railroads present great difficulties because of the location of their yards, terminals, grade crossings, and rights of way; large areas in the southern sections of the city have no intercommunication whatever because of these barriers. Present unsatisfactory housing conditions are the result of sporadic development, and because of a lack of proper ordinances and standards it is often possible to find good and bad housing in the same block.

Other unfortunate results of planless growth were explicitly enumerated in the report and, furthermore, a draft of a zoning ordinance was included. Nevertheless, the council that went out of office in December, 1925, after a charter commission had been elected, deferred action on a zoning ordinance on the ground that "it has not received enough publicity."<sup>1</sup> Reluctance to deal with this problem was one factor that created discontent with the existing government among civic and business leaders and that gave impetus to the movement for a charter.

### *Other Agencies Serving the Community*

The city of Hamilton is not responsible for the management of the schools since this function is not included in "all powers of local self-government" which the Ohio Constitution grants to municipalities. Education has been judicially construed as a matter of state concern. Elections for positions on the school board and on the city council are held on the same dates. Both are conducted by the county board of elections. The Hamilton City School District is a distinct corporate entity with its own taxing, borrowing, and spending powers directly conferred by state law, and, like the city, it is directly accountable in financial matters to the bureau of inspection and supervision of public offices, under the auditor of state. The boundaries of the Hamilton school district extend beyond the limits of the municipality in several places.

The city government has not been responsible for the maintenance of the public library since 1923. The board of education assumed control on January 1, 1924, but delegated management of the library to a board of trustees which it appointed. This arrangement has not been changed since the city manager government began operating in 1928.

Cooperation between Hamilton's school and municipal authorities by centralized purchasing of coal and other supplies has not been established, although such cooperation has been in effect for six or eight years in nearby Cincinnati. Potential monetary saving for the city would not counterbalance the legal and political complications which the council

<sup>1</sup> *Hamilton Evening Journal*, January 2, 1926.

and the manager fear that they would face in the demands from the Roman Catholic citizens for similar inclusion of the parochial schools in which almost half of Hamilton's children are educated. The total enrollment in the elementary grades of the public schools was 5,739 for the year 1937-38, with 5,243 in the same age group in the care of parochial or other private schools. The total enrollment in the public schools was 9,307, and 8,524 of corresponding ages were not enrolled in tax-supported schools.

The board of education employs a physician to care for the health of the city's children; but the city, the county, and a private association have practically merged their health activities in one organization. The city has given some funds to the Public Health League Nursing Association since its organization in 1912. Nurses of this association work under the supervision of the welfare director of the city, who, shortly after the establishment of city manager government in 1928, was induced to accept that post in addition to his work for the county board of health. The city pays two-fifths of the health officer's salary and employs a district physician, two nurses, and a hospital worker. Hospital care for the indigent sick is a direct responsibility of the city government. The council and the manager have put this aid on a per diem basis in place of the former annual grant to a local hospital, irrespective of the number cared for.

## II. HAMILTON'S GOVERNMENTS: A QUEST FOR THE PERFECT FORM

ABOUT 1890 citizens of Hamilton began to associate reform in their municipality with charter changes. Time and again private citizens and city officials joined in blaming some feature of the existing charter for the conditions currently being criticized in press, pulpit, and market place. When criticism became insistent, the charter was regularly held accountable by being more or less extensively revised, and thus attention was diverted from the errors of officials and of the electorate. Charter changes were obtained by special legislation until 1902, then by a general municipal code adopted (and later amended) by the legislature, and after 1912, by home rule.

This restless experimentation with charter forms was accompanied by the belief that with the proposed changes a perfect charter would be assured—a belief expressed by the advocates of charter changes in the recurrent campaigns for reform and accepted by the main body of

citizens, whose civic interest gradually relaxed for a period of years after each reform was adopted. When later aroused by obvious signs of misgovernment, the citizens of Hamilton would resume their quest for the perfect form. Previously unsuspected deficiencies in the charter would be discovered, and another campaign would be conducted for perfecting the form of government.

### *Variety of Governmental Structures*

By 1939 Hamilton had had, at one time or other, a governmental structure resembling every form evolved in the course of American municipal development. For a few years after its incorporation in 1810, it was governed by a mayor and three trustees. Failure to hold an election in 1815 resulted in dissolution of the corporation. In 1827 began a brief experiment with a federation of the "towns of Hamilton and Rossville," across the river; each elected three trustees, and the two elected one mayor. The two towns were separately incorporated in 1831. By a vote of both towns in 1854, Rossville was annexed to Hamilton, which three years later became a city by reaching the state constitution's minimum of five thousand inhabitants.

In addition to the foregoing changes in corporate form, groups of citizens had from time to time obtained from the General Assembly amendments to the powers granted in the charters. The practice did not stop with the adoption of the constitution in 1851 which instructed the General Assembly to "provide for the organization of cities . . . by general laws" (Art. XIII, Sec. 6) for the courts permitted classification which gradually sifted each city into a separate category. As Hamilton's government acquired new powers by this method, there was a tendency to entrust the added powers to newly created boards, often appointed by the council rather than by the mayor. Responsibility became more and more diffused. Then, in 1889, came a brief experiment with direct state control. The General Assembly provided for Hamilton a board of public affairs with four members, two from each of the leading political parties, appointed by the governor, to have entire charge of the departments of police, fire, streets, and public health. The act was repealed the following year, and the city returned to the *status quo ante*.

The idea of consolidating in one board the responsibility for administering various services had impressed some citizens. They began to work for a new charter. Public meetings were held, a committee was selected, it prepared a charter, and a subsequent public meeting approved the draft. Butler County's representative in the General Assembly

at the time was hostile to the plan, but a friendly successor, Bert S. Bartlow, sponsored the measure and brought about its passage March 25, 1898.<sup>1</sup>

### *Form Resembling Commission Government*

Then began Hamilton's experiment with what resembled a commission form of government—years before Galveston popularized the idea. The new charter provided for a board of control of five members, originally appointed by the judge of the Court of Common Pleas. Thereafter, one member was elected each year as the term of one appointee expired. No appointee was elected to succeed himself. This board succeeded to the duties of the council and of the several boards of trustees of water works, gas works, electric plant, and public library, also of the chief of police and city civil engineer. Presidency of the board passed each year to the member with the shortest term; he then assigned each member to the directorship of one of the five departments: public improvements, police, public works, public safety (fire, building inspection, health), and law and accounts. Salaries were fixed at \$1,500. Legislative sessions were to be held weekly. The board was empowered to adopt rules for the control of each of the five departments. Framers of the charter may have had some misgivings, for the board was authorized "temporarily to employ a person skilled in duties pertaining to any one of the said departments to assist and advise."

Had the charter contained no other structural features, Hamilton could justly claim to have antedated Galveston in devising the commission form. But the charter makers sought to retain the principle of separation of powers. They provided for a mayor and a city solicitor to be elected for terms of three years. Under the charter the mayor was to "be head and chief executive officer of the city and . . . enforce the ordinances thereof and the laws of the state . . . have control of the police of the city and . . . be responsible for the discipline and good conduct thereof." Ordinances had to be presented for his approval. There was no pocket veto. If the mayor vetoed an ordinance, it could be overridden by a four-fifths vote; but a majority of the board could override the veto of an item in any ordinance. Conflicts over the police must have been frequent between the mayor and the director of the Department of Police: six appointments of a chief of police were made during the five years that the charter was in effect. Relations between the city solicitor and the director of law and accounts could hardly

<sup>1</sup>Laws of 1898, pp. 496-505.

have been much better. Yet one writer praised this charter as "probably the most beneficent measure ever passed by the Ohio state legislature for the government of the city of Hamilton."

### *Mayor-Council Government*

This hybrid form was scrapped in 1903 to conform to the provisions of a uniform code enacted by the General Assembly the previous year, after the Ohio Supreme Court had belatedly decided that classification of cities was contrary to Article XIII, Section 6 of the constitution of 1851.<sup>1</sup> Even after constitutional home rule was granted to cities and villages in 1912, Hamilton continued to be governed under the form prescribed by the municipal code until the end of 1927—over twenty years with only such structural changes as the General Assembly saw fit to authorize for all cities.

The most important change was from a rather weak-mayor to a strong-mayor type by an act of 1908 which authorized the mayor to appoint without council confirmation single directors of public service (utilities) and of public safety, in place of an elective board of directors of public service and an appointive board for the police and fire departments. The size of the council was also changed. Until Hamilton reached 25,000 in population in 1908, four councilmen were elected by wards; three were elected at large, in addition to the president of the council, who could only vote in the event of a tie. For the remainder of the period under this form, six were elected from wards and three at large.

Dissatisfaction with this government developed from the amateurish management of municipal services. A mayor rarely served more than one term of two years. The director of public safety came and left with the mayor who had appointed him in return for his help in the mayoralty campaign. Even if a director seriously applied himself to his administrative duties, he remained in office hardly long enough to learn the routine. While subordinates enjoyed greater security of tenure, having been placed in the classified service as a result of the 1908 amendments to the municipal code, there was little or no inducement for them to improve their methods. Their department heads could not be expected to appreciate exceptional merit. Consequently, even routine duties were negligently performed. Careless performance was particularly noticeable in the municipal utilities. Leakage in the city's gas mains mounted yearly. Earnings of the electric department were not being

<sup>1</sup> *State v. Jones*, 66 Ohio St. 435.



TABLE 1. ORGANIZATION OF HAMILTON UNDER MAYOR-COUNCIL  
GOVERNMENT, 1927*Elected Officials*

MAYOR. Chief executive and appointing officer; no veto power; two-year term.

PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL. Presided over council and voted only in case of tie; two-year term.

COUNCIL (9). Six elected by wards and three at large; two-year terms.

SOLICITOR. Two-year term.

TREASURER. Two-year term.

AUDITOR. Two-year term.

MUNICIPAL JUDGE. Four-year term.

*Officials Appointed by Mayor*

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY. Supervised police and fire departments, building inspection, welfare.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE. Supervised production and distribution of electricity, gas distribution, supply and distribution of water, street maintenance, public buildings and markets.

*Boards and Commissions*

TRUSTEES OF THE SINKING FUND (4). Bipartisan, four citizens appointed by mayor for overlapping four-year terms. Management of the sinking fund with independent powers of tax certification.

BOARD OF CONTROL (3). Mayor, director of public safety, and director of public service ex officio. Control of contracts and budgetary agency.

CITY PLANNING COMMISSION (7). Mayor, director of public service, and president of board of park commissioners ex officio; four citizens appointed by mayor for overlapping six-year terms.

BOARD OF PARK COMMISSIONERS (3). Three citizens appointed by mayor for overlapping three-year terms. Control and management of parks; board appointed superintendent of parks and staff.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (3). Bipartisan, three citizens appointed by mayor for overlapping six-year terms. Commission appointed an examiner.

BOARD OF HEALTH (6). Mayor president ex officio; five citizens appointed by mayor and confirmed by council for overlapping five-year terms. Board had independent powers and appointed a health commissioner and staff. Supervised sanitary and food inspection, medical care and quarantine, hospitalization.

TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE RELIEF FUND (6). Two members of council who coopted one citizen; two policemen elected by police coopted one citizen; one-year terms.

TRUSTEES OF THE FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND (6). Two members of council who coopted one citizen; two firemen elected by firemen who coopted one citizen; one-year terms.

used to prevent the plant from becoming obsolescent. Influential users of both utilities neglected to pay their bills but were not cut off. Although the police department was larger during much of the twenty-year period preceding the city manager system than afterwards, the city acquired the reputation of being a safe place for criminals to hide.

### *Failure of First Charter Attempt*

Discontent came to a head in 1916 in a movement to elect a charter commission. Dr. Mark Millikin, who found time for public affairs despite the heavy demands of his medical and surgical practice, was chosen president of a Committee of One Hundred to conduct a campaign for a charter commission. Considerable interest was developed, partly because of the record which Dayton was reputed to be making. Newspapers supported the proposal to elect a charter commission; but the Socialist party, which had been strong enough to elect the mayor and a council majority in 1913, was induced by a Socialist from Dayton to oppose election of a commission and thus prevent the submission of a city manager charter, which it was assumed the commission would draft. A Socialist who let his name be put on the list of candidates for the commission was voted out of the party. Dr. Millikin's suggestion that the Socialists should work for a charter providing for a council elected by proportional representation was ignored. The opposition of the Socialists and the date set for the election, April 10, 1917 (four days after Congress declared war), resulted in the defeat of the proposal to elect a commission. The light vote cast was almost two to one (2,781 to 1,480) against electing a body to draft a new charter. The proposal did not get a majority in any of the six wards. The ex-Socialist, C. E. Deneen, was not among the fifteen who would have constituted the charter commission had the proposal carried.

### *Civic Betterment Without Governmental Aid*

After this defeat, those interested in civic betterment tried to accomplish their ends by working with, and, wherever possible, independently of, the governmental machinery provided by the municipal code. Culla J. Smith was retained as mayor for a second term, serving from January, 1918, to December 31, 1921. But the initiative in improving the city was taken by the Chamber of Commerce. Profiting by wartime experience in cooperation, the chamber encouraged the formation of the Hamilton Welfare Association in 1920 to raise and to maintain a community chest. It also prevailed upon the mayor to appoint a city planning commission.

The chamber then had to provide money for the city plan engineer who was hired to prepare the plan. The engineer submitted his final report on December 1, 1920.

The necessary complements to a city plan—a zoning ordinance and a building code—were not enacted for several years; the former on March 18, 1926, by the last administration under the general municipal code; the latter, July 5, 1928, by the first council under the new charter. Agreement on both measures was obtained only after prolonged conferences among interests affected by the legislation. The conferences were arranged by, and necessary compromises and adjustments were made in response to insistent demands of the officers of the Chamber of Commerce—particularly the civic-minded secretary, John Northway. The same organization took the first steps toward developing the city plan's civic center through the formation of a local company to build a modern hotel, the Anthony Wayne. Under such circumstances it was appropriate that the fiftieth anniversary edition of the *Hamilton Evening Journal*, December 19, 1936, should include in the section entitled "Municipal Activities of Hamilton" the history of the Chamber of Commerce.

There is no evidence that the general body of citizens became actively interested in the Chamber of Commerce program. The general attitude was reflected in the indifference of the city council. If a small group of the more substantial citizens wanted to improve the city and was willing to pay the bills, few would object. The government continued the pursuit of its partisan ends. Seats in the council and elective and appointive administrative posts went to the winners in the biennial electoral battle. Few held these posts for more than one or two terms. There was no incentive for those who had obtained responsible positions in city government through active work in a political party organization to discover latent possibilities for efficient, economical service. Small wonder that the men who had achieved a competence by managing their own establishments successfully became more and more dissatisfied with the management of their city's business!

Their discontent became evident to the general public in 1924 during a campaign to persuade the voters to accept the offer of a private utility company to buy the municipal electric light system.

### *Failure of Movement to Scrap Municipal Utilities*

Hamilton's experience with municipally owned utilities is an interesting chapter in the history of municipal enterprise in America. During

the 1880's its sturdy, industrious citizens, many of whom were not more than a generation removed from Germany, saw nothing improper in municipal enterprises. The city-owned water works dated from 1883, with subsequent enlargements and changes to accommodate increased demands. There had been no important movement to turn this utility over to private interests, although several interests had tried to get the franchise in the beginning. Long drawn out litigation attended the city's entrance into the business of producing gas for street lighting and domestic use, but a plant was put in operation in 1890. After 1905 the city bought gas from a private company but continued to operate the distribution system. The management was rather inefficient; leakage became so great that the city lost money.

The municipal light plant was authorized by a popular vote in 1893, and current was being generated by 1895. By 1916 the plant's capacity was obviously inadequate, and during 1922 over a third of the current had to be purchased from outside sources. A popular vote in November, 1921, authorized a bond issue of \$650,000 for a new generating plant and a pumping station for the water works. Some of the businessmen, alarmed at the prospect that the city administration should control the expenditure of so much money and fearful that higher taxes might result, began to work for sale of the light plant and the distributing system to the Union Gas and Electric Company. An imposing array of leading citizens, irrespective of national party affiliation, joined the movement for selling the utility. On one pretext or another, construction of the electric generating plant was deferred during the first term of the Democratic mayor, Harry J. Koehler, and during the term of his Republican successor, Howard Kelly. In the latter's administration, all except one member of the council, Leo Welsh, incumbent vice-mayor in 1939, were brought into line. Welsh's father, J. Henry Welsh, with a longer term of service on the council than that of any other man, had become known as the "Father of Hamilton's Public Utilities." Four men elected to the first council under the charter (Mayor R. H. Burke, Mark Millikin, Minor Beckett, and Homer Ferguson), were among the 117 members of the Citizens' Committee Favoring Sale of the Electric Light Plant. The superintendent of the light plant urged the sale because the city could not compete successfully with the private company. Of course, the Chamber of Commerce also urged the sale. Many full-page advertisements as well as editorials in both local daily papers warned the citizens that higher taxes were inevitable unless the sale was approved. The city's sinking-fund trustees, officers of the banks

TABLE 2. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS AND COUNCILMEN, 1914-27

*Mayors*

- FRED A. HINKEL, 1914-15. Attorney; Socialist; graduate of University of Cincinnati Law School; Protestant.
- JOHN A. HOLZBERGER, 1916-17. Saloonkeeper; Democrat; Protestant.
- CULLA J. SMITH, 1918-21. Attorney; Democrat; Protestant.
- HARRY J. KOEHLER, 1922-23, 1926-27. Attorney; Democrat; Protestant.
- HOWARD KELLY, 1924-25. Traffic Manager; Republican; Protestant.

*Directors of Public Service (appointed by mayor)*

- J. B. MEYERS, 1914-15, 1924-25. Councilman, 1912-13; Socialist, later Republican; machinist.
- H. R. GARVER, 1916-17. Democrat.
- F. J. J. SLOAT, 1918-21. Engineer; Republican (under Democratic mayor).
- W. F. MASON, 1922-23. Democrat—active in organization.
- G. G. MITCHELL, 1926-27. Democrat; mechanical engineer.

*Directors of Public Safety (appointed by mayor)*

- C. E. DENEEN, 1914-15. Socialist.
- A. E. EGRY, 1916-17. Democrat; councilman, 1908-11; insurance business.
- H. B. GREVEY, 1918-23. Democrat; machinist, collector for brewing company; postmaster of Hamilton in 1938.
- J. B. MEYERS, 1924-25. See above; director of public service.
- A. F. BOLI, 1926-27. Democrat; jeweler.

*City Solicitors (elected)*

- B. F. PRIMMER, 1914-15. Socialist; later Republican candidate for mayor.
- H. J. KOEHLER, 1916-21. Democrat; later served two terms as mayor.
- ROBERT SOHNGEN, 1922-23. Democrat; active in politics.
- MILLIKEN SHOTTS, 1924-25. Republican; director of law in 1938.
- LEON ZILIOX, 1926-27. Democrat (below).

*Presidents of City Council (elected at large)*

- E. G. RUDER, 1914-15. Republican (in Socialist administration); banker; Protestant.
- LEON ZILIOX, 1916-19. Democrat; attorney; Protestant.
- J. B. CONNAUGHTON, 1920-21. Democrat; Roman Catholic.
- GEORGE TANN, 1922-23. Democrat; Roman Catholic; machine shop foreman.
- E. M. LADLEY, 1924-25. Republican; Protestant; lineman and clerk; director of civil service and secretary to city manager in 1938.
- EDWARD J. GARDNER, 1926-27. Democrat; Roman Catholic; accountant; representative in Ohio General Assembly, 1937-38.

TABLE 2 (continued)

*Councilmen (six elected by wards, three at large)*

- C. J. NORRIS, 1912-15. Socialist; laborer.  
FRANK J. LEISNER, 1914-15. Socialist; machinist.  
J. R. VIDOUREK, 1914-17. Democrat; machinist.  
C. W. GATH, 1914-17. Republican; undertaker.  
J. P. BUCKNER, 1914-15. Democrat; machinist.  
CHARLES BAKER, 1914-15. Socialist; machinist.  
CHRIS BENNINGHOFEN, 1914-17. Democrat; manufacturer.  
FERD AKER, 1912-17. Socialist; shop foreman in Herring-Hall Co.  
J. HENRY WELSH, 1886-88, 1891-95, 1906-14. Republican; general yardmaster of Pennsylvania R.R., "Father of Hamilton's Utilities"; died 1914.  
DAN BAKER, 1916-23. Democrat; collector for *Hamilton Journal*.  
HENRY BRINKER, 1916-21. Democrat; machinist.  
J. J. CAHILL, 1916-17. Democrat; railroad engineer, insurance.  
GEORGE GRATHWOHL, 1916-21. Democrat; machinist.  
GEORGE RENNERS, 1916-17, 1920-21. Democrat; cafe owner.  
JOHN J. CONNELL, 1918-23. Democrat; railroad conductor.  
GEORGE JOHNSON, 1918-23. Democrat; foreman of Mosler Safe Co.  
CHRIS KAEFER, 1918-21. Democrat; barber.  
ARTHUR SAPP, 1918-19. Socialist; mechanic.  
M. F. VEREKER, 1918-19. Democrat; physician.  
TRUMAN ZILIOX, 1918-23. Democrat; machinist and insurance.  
HARRY L. FRONCK, 1920-21. Socialist; machinist.  
FRANK COPELAND, 1922-25. Republican; motorman.  
HARRY T. EDMONDS, 1922-25. Democrat; furniture dealer.  
JOHN KIEP, 1922-23. Democrat; machinist.  
EARL MUNCEY, 1922-23. Republican; florist; post-office clerk.  
A. D. PYLES, 1922-25. Republican; machinist.  
HENRY ALLSTATTER, 1924-25. Republican; machinist.  
CARL BERGLUND, 1924-25. Republican; machinist.  
GUS BIERMAN, 1924-33. Republican; operator gas station chain, active in party organization; finally defeated 1933.  
PAUL CARTIER, 1924-25. Republican; clerk in Champion Paper and Fibre Co.  
ARTHUR FORBERG, 1924-25. Republican; clerk in Herring-Hall Co.  
LEO WELSH, 1924—. Progressive Republican; railroad clerk; vice-mayor.  
BEN WILLEN, 1924-25. Democrat; machinist.  
JOHN CEPLUCH, 1926-27. Democrat; machinist with Herring-Hall Co.  
CHARLES F. CISLE, 1926-27. Democrat; foreman in Estate Stove Co.  
EDWIN MICK, 1926-27. Democrat; cigar maker.  
FRED PIPPERT, 1926-27. Democrat; cigar manufacturer.  
CARL ROSMARIN, 1926-27. Democrat; electrician.  
JOSEPH SENGER, 1926-27. Democrat; machinist.  
FRED STITSINGER, 1926-27. Republican; grocer; clerk of board of elections.

that held the \$650,000 from the bond issue, and other prominent citizens also recommended the sale.

The attitude of some may have been influenced by ownership of stock in the then rapidly expanding utility holding companies. Unverified rumors that influential citizens were being paid to advocate the sale were circulated. The general support for the movement among propertied citizens, however, indicated that the inducement was the prospect of lower taxes, which, it was assumed, would follow the reduction of the city's debt. In general, substantial citizens were dissatisfied with the way the city was being governed. Sound methods of private business were ignored. Then, too, public business had been carried on with little regard for the interests of these citizens not only because of their small number in relation to the total electorate but also because of their engrossment in their private affairs.

### *Workers' Support of Municipal Utilities*

Opposed to this formidable array of the city's "best people" were the working classes and the small property and business interests organized in neighborhood improvement associations. Two men were conspicuous in leading the opposition to the sale: B. F. Primmer, attorney (city solicitor, 1914-15, in the Socialist administration), and Leo Welsh, councilman from the Fourth Ward. They did not have money for an elaborate advertising campaign. The newspapers rarely mentioned their activities or published their arguments. But the election on November 4, 1924, demonstrated that they had the votes. The offer of the utility company was rejected. Only 5,899 voted for, and 10,290 against, the sale. Almost three thousand more votes were cast in this contest than on other issues. A special levy to provide funds for police, fire, and other services was defeated by nearly a three thousand majority.

Ensuing months revealed the city's precarious financial position. Subscriptions to obtain funds for police and fire departments were solicited. Officials of the city and of the Chamber of Commerce conferred with an official from the state auditor's office and with the newly elected state legislators of this, and adjoining, counties. The threat of suspension or curtailment of municipal services increased businessmen's discontent with the city government.

Still hopeful of reducing expense by limiting the city's utility undertakings, the Chamber of Commerce employed an accounting firm to investigate the gas distribution system. In the report it was asserted that the original bonds issued for the gas works in 1889 were still unpaid,

although the works had been abandoned in 1906. The claim was made that, because of leakage, the city was paying one dollar for every sixty cents paid by gas-users, the implication being that the balance was paid by the taxpayers; but there was no evidence that any expense chargeable to Hamilton's utilities had ever been paid out of general governmental revenues. It was proposed that the gas distribution system, which the city had continued to operate with gas purchased from a private company, should be leased to that company. In this instance, however, business interests and, in consequence, leaders of political parties were not united as they had been the preceding year. A local company that produced coke oven gas opposed the plan to lease the system to the natural gas company and offered to supply its gas at a lower rate, letting the city retain control of the distribution system. An initiated ordinance was put on the ballot to accept the local company's offer. Shortly before the election, a majority of the council voted to lease the system to the natural gas company. The Democratic campaign committee's platform prudently announced that the people were "competent to determine for themselves what shall be done." The Republican candidate for mayor was B. F. Primmer, whose opposition to the sale of the electrical plant in 1924 had been popularly endorsed. He was working for the gas ordinance "to give the people an opportunity to decide whether they want artificial gas." The initiated gas ordinance was adopted by a vote of 9,048 to 3,756; but it was used by the local coke oven gas interests as a bargaining point to force the natural gas company to buy all of their product, which was much more than could be used in Hamilton. When these conflicting interests were composed, the city finally had to accept a mixed artificial and natural gas.

The overwhelming majorities against the sale of the electric system and the lease of the gas distributing system demonstrated that the citizens of Hamilton would not let their government give up its utilities.

### *Movement to Improve Government*

In the meantime the business and propertied elements that had been working to restrict the scope of municipal activities began to seek another way out of their predicament. If the city, in spite of their efforts, was to continue to operate its utilities, then it would have to be organized in the most efficient manner for these responsible tasks; and these elements would have to have more harmonious contacts with the city. Dayton seemed to be doing well with the commission-manager form, which it had had for a decade; Cincinnati was adopting a similar



form; Hamilton should join the procession. So they took up again the proposal to elect a charter commission, hoping that the voters would not be so hostile or indifferent to the idea as they had been in 1917.

The charterites, as the advocates of a charter soon came to be called, based their hope upon a growing dissatisfaction with Hamilton's government, which, as previously noted, arose from an inability to maintain normal municipal services, such as police and fire protection and garbage collection. The incumbent city officials were denounced for a situation created by their predecessors. Increasing state control over local finances was forcing them to accumulate a sinking fund to retire bonds which had been issued from time to time between 1895 and 1925. At the same time, state law was more narrowly restricting the city's share in the proceeds of the general property tax. After the city government had complied with state requirements for debt service, insufficient funds remained for current operations. City officials were subjected to wild charges of extravagance and mismanagement. Many citizens did not realize that their own votes for bond issues in previous years, their inattention to bond retirement provisions, and the new state legislation were the principal reasons for the inability of the government to pay for normal municipal services. Such citizens were a fertile field for indoctrination in the merits of a new form of government.

### *State Control of Local Finance*

Before the account of the movement for a charter is continued, note should be made of the city's subordination to state control in levying taxes and in incurring debts, particularly since that control was being exercised during the years when Hamilton's movement for a charter was accelerating.

Despite the widely heralded home rule authorized in 1912, the Ohio Constitution permitted the General Assembly "to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes."<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to this authority, the General Assembly limited the aggregate of local government levies to ten mills on the dollar of assessed valuation. Some levies outside this limit were grudgingly authorized at almost every session of the assembly; in general, extra levies could be authorized by popular vote, but the voters frequently refused to approve them. Hamiltonians refused to permit such a levy in 1924. Revenues did not keep pace with the mounting cost of government during and after the World War.

<sup>1</sup>Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.

During the war period the assembly had been more lenient toward local governments' incurring debts. The inevitable result of these policies of the state, since debt service was made a prior charge on local revenues, was to force municipalities to curtail or abandon many services. Hamilton was in an especially vulnerable position because of its large bonded indebtedness for which inadequate bond retirement and depreciation provisions had been made. Many citizens began to feel the effects, but instead of attributing the impairment of customary services to a none too intelligent state control and to past negligence of citizens and officials which the men then in office were obliged to correct, they readily accepted the explanation that it was the form of government that was to blame.

In so far as the form facilitated frequent change of chief executives and of heads of administrative departments, the form was responsible; but such changes might be frequent in any form. Nevertheless, the existing form was blamed. The movement for a charter profited by the discontent.

In the repeated refusals of the voters of Hamilton during these years to authorize tax levies outside the limitation, there was some basis for the assertion frequently made by Hamilton's charterites that the people had lost confidence in their city government. But most citizens did not fully realize that more dollars had to be collected for three reasons: (1) the purchasing power of the dollar had declined for municipal services as well as for other purposes; (2) more of the tax dollar was required for interest on, and the retirement of, bonds the issuance of which in many instances the citizens had previously authorized; (3) more services were being demanded from their government. Hamilton's citizens were usually more reluctant to authorize a higher tax levy than to approve a bond issue. They refused to believe that the future, to which they transferred their financial obligations, would become the present. Moreover, their elected officials had usually held the same illusions or had avoided the task of telling their constituents the plain facts implicit in such financial methods.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Hamilton's city manager government was able to start without asking the citizens to authorize tax levies. Only a few months prior to the establishment of the plan the General Assembly had relaxed its close grip on municipal finances. After the charter had been adopted but before the new council had been elected—in the midst of the Coolidge era of prosperity—the General Assembly practically suspended its efforts to limit rigidly the tax levies

of local units of government through uniform state laws. The nominal limit of ten mills on the aggregate of local levies had become almost meaningless, and, while the limit was declared to be fifteen mills by a law passed in 1927,<sup>1</sup> municipalities were permitted to place in their charters higher limits for their levies than those imposed by state law, and below these limits their councils could impose levies without a popular vote. Cincinnati soon took advantage of this permission, but Hamilton's cautious citizens twice refused this power to their council: November 6, 1928, by a vote of 10,927 to 6,187 and August 13, 1930, by a vote of 5,233 to 2,558. Strictly speaking, the second vote was not on the broad grant of financial home rule that had previously been refused; the second proposal was only that the city be freed from the county budget commission's power to reduce the city's certified budget requirements even when the budget was below the 5.5 mills maximum fixed in the state law.

### III. QUEST FOR THE PERFECT FORM: CONTINUED

DISCONTENT with Hamilton's government became widespread during 1924 and 1925. The leaders in the Chamber of Commerce helped to stimulate further the dissatisfaction that paved the way for a city manager charter movement, but they did not claim to be the initiators of the actual movement. Indeed, had the citizens generally believed that the Chamber of Commerce was working for a charter, they would probably not have supported the movement any more widely than they had supported the proposed sale of the electric system. Leadership in the movement for a charter was assumed by the Woman's City Club, an organization containing over seven hundred members. The club created a special Charter Commission Committee after having heard Arch Mandel of the Dayton Research Association speak on the city manager form of government in January, 1925, and after having devoted its May and June meetings to the same subject.

Appealing to interested citizens, men as well as women, the club's committee formed a small Charter League of about thirty members in September, 1925. The league undertook to interest voters in the advantages of the city manager form and to raise money for the expenses of a campaign. Newspapers gave the movement some publicity and

<sup>1</sup> Ohio, General Code, 1935, Sec. 5625-2.

supported it in editorials, but they gave much more space to the question of leasing the city's gas distributing systems. The Charter League prepared and distributed a pamphlet. A committee arranged for a public meeting to be addressed by Murray Seasongood, the mayor under Cincinnati's new city manager government.

Typical of the lack of public interest was the statement in the minutes of the Charter League for the meeting of October 23, 1925: "Because of the small attendance at Mr. Seasongood's lecture, it was decided to dispense with any more public speaking." On the day before the election, however, the Woman's City Club met to hear Clarence Green, a speaker from Dayton, urge them to vote for a charter commission. All but one of the moving picture theaters refused to run slides on the charter question, but some of the churches were helping to arouse the voters, and organized labor was friendly. During its brief life the Charter League raised only \$207.00, of which \$13.43 remained after the election and was turned over to the charter commission.

Despite the campaign fireworks over leasing the gas distributing system and over Harry J. Koehler, who was again seeking the mayoralty, the people voted on November 3, 1925, that a charter commission be authorized to prepare a charter. The vote was 4,985 for the proposal and 3,519 against. Thus easily was the first hurdle cleared.

### *Election of Charter Commission*

At the same election there were twenty-two candidates for the fifteen places on the charter commission. With one or two exceptions the candidates were active members of the Charter League and comprised the majority of its membership. Among the fifteen elected to the commission were two women, one of whom, Ella Mae Cope, a teacher in the public high school, was selected by the commission to be its secretary-treasurer. The thirteen men were representative citizens, several of whom had been on the Citizens' Committee Favoring the Sale of the Electric Light Plant. Organized labor was represented, but businessmen were preponderant. Dr. Millikin was a member—the sole survivor of the 1917 commission which had found itself elected without authorization to prepare a charter. The charter commission elected F. K. Vaughn as its president. Mr. Vaughn, head of a building company "which has done much of the major construction in Hamilton in the last twenty years," was then serving his first year as president of the Chamber of Commerce. He was also in charge of the Community Chest campaign and chairman of a committee to organize a company

for building and operating a modern hotel in the city. He had consented to become a candidate for the commission only after representatives of organized labor had urged him to run and had assured him of their support. Obviously, this was an unusual combination, but the labor leaders fulfilled their promise, and Mr. Vaughn received the most votes—a decisive factor in his selection for the presidency of the commission.

During the three months following its election the commission conferred with Mr. Bingham, who was the manager of West Palm Beach, Florida, and who was brought to the city by the Chamber of Commerce; with Robert Taft, who recommended a council of seven and a manager but who opposed the election of the council by the Hare single transferable vote system; and with Walter J. Millard, who favored both features. The commission had also obtained the assistance of A. R. Hatton, professor at Western Reserve University. Mr. Hatton was the author of the Cleveland charter provisions for a manager and for a council elected by proportional representation and was in 1925 a member of Cleveland's council. Meeting with Mr. Hatton on January 30, 1926, the commission empowered him to draft a charter providing for a manager and for a council of seven, the latter to be elected by the single transferable vote system.

Delayed by illness and the pressure of other business, Mr. Hatton did not complete the draft until June. Copies were furnished to the newspapers, to the city solicitor (a Democrat), and to the attorney who had held the office in the preceding (Republican) administration, and each was asked for suggestions of possible improvements. The commission met with Mr. Hatton July 3, and some slight corrections were made. He was later consulted about criticisms from two local groups, but he advised against change. Accordingly, the charter was unanimously adopted by the thirteen members of the commission present at the meeting on August 10. Its submission to the voters was then set for November 2, 1926, the date for the regular election of state and county officials.

In addition to preparing the charter, the commission had to raise by subscription almost \$1,200 to pay for Mr. Hatton's services, for mimeographing copies of the charter, and for incidental expenses. Money was also collected from friendly industrialists and businessmen to pay watchers in each precinct to get out the vote. These funds were not handled by the charter commission but by men who were more familiar with customary election procedures. Just before the election, members of the commission contributed about one hundred dollars

TABLE 3. MEMBERS OF THE HAMILTON CHARTER COMMISSION, 1925-26

- FRANK K. VAUGHN, building contractor; president of the Chamber of Commerce.
- ELLA MAE COPE, high-school teacher of history; Woman's City Club.
- ELEANORE FRECHTLING, office manager, Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company.
- E. B. ALSTON, real estate.
- W. R. SNEED, manager of Valley Ice Company.
- REESE PIPHER, contractor.
- C. E. WOOLFORD, mathematics teacher in high school.
- H. H. HAINES, attorney; formerly Common Pleas judge.
- JOHN M. CROCKER, maintenance division, Bell Telephone Company; active member of the American Legion.
- LOUIS NAU, secretary of Trades and Labor Council; died before 1926 election.
- E. R. HALL, dentist; died shortly after election.
- R. H. BURKE, head of district insurance agency, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.
- MARK MILLIKIN, physician and surgeon.
- MORRIS TAYLOR, insurance agency; building and loan association; active in Y.M.C.A.
- B. W. RAMSEY, proprietor of small cigar store.

more to purchase space in the newspapers to answer objections to the charter which were being circulated by members of the city council. Obviously, the council distrusted the charter commission, whose expenses the city solicitor advised the council it could not legally provide out of public funds and whose work the council expected the voters to reject in the ensuing election.

### *Politicians Opposed to Charter*

The council reflected the attitude of the ward and precinct workers of the political parties—persons who regarded politics as a game or a hobby, who played the game for its excitement but who insisted on having a hand in the distribution of spoils when their side won. They were not corrupt or dishonest according to legal standards; when they accepted money from candidates or from organizations backing measures, they considered it legitimate payment for getting out the vote. Although they could have been hired to work on the side of the business interests of the city, they usually found it more profitable to work for the political parties; votes could be got for the latter more easily in greater numbers because of the widespread distrust of business and industrial leaders. For reward there would be two years in the city hall or at least access to the hall when some favor was desired.

The basis for the opposition by the council and its political cohorts became clear as the campaign for popular ratification of the charter developed. The Chamber of Commerce took the lead by calling a meeting of all organizations in the city that favored the proposed charter. As a result of the meeting a large committee was formed, representing participating organizations. This action gave the opposition its cue. Because the chamber had been so overwhelmingly defeated on the utility issues in the two preceding years, the opposition figured that it should be easy to defeat the chamber and its allies again. But the inter-organization committee for the charter was also working for other projects, such as a new city building, sewers for the east side, and a junior high-school building. The issue on civic improvement was clearly joined. Mayor Koehler sided with the groups favoring improvements and was denounced by the council for deserting them.

Nevertheless, the charter narrowly escaped defeat. One newspaper even published the story that it had been defeated and gave the election figures accordingly. The other newspaper, the *Evening Journal*, announced that the charter had been adopted by a majority of 159 votes. One explanation was that Walter J. Millard, of the National Municipal League, who had helped with the campaign for the charter, discovered an error in the count, and that the correction was called to the attention of the *Journal* reporter after the reporter for the *News* had left. It is more likely, however, that the *Journal* discovered the error in its own offices where the election results were tabulated on its own machines.

With the charter adopted by such a narrow and questionable margin, opponents proceeded to demand a recount but were blocked when Mayor Koehler pointed out that the election law of the state made no provision for recount of the vote on an issue. Many citizens of Hamilton believed that, if a recount could have been made, it would have shown that the charter had not carried. Whatever the truth may have been, the politicians, who figured that the voters would go against the Chamber of Commerce as they had in previous years, were not far off in their estimate of the popular reaction. The close vote also indicated that discontent with the city government was not so prevalent among the rank and file as some of the reformers had thought it to be.

### *Not a Sharp Break With the Past*

Before the achievements of the government under the charter are appraised, several facts mentioned in the foregoing account should be brought together.

In the Hamilton charter movement an objective observer does not see a clear-cut issue of right versus wrong, civic altruism versus selfishness and partisan greed. If one side spent money from its own pockets to convince the doubtful, so did the other. Hamilton's leading citizens could hardly have been indifferent to what the city government was doing. No individual's selfish motives could have been completely separated from his more altruistic interest in the general good. It seems quite obvious that the charter movement would not have been successful had not many of Hamilton's industrial, financial, and business leaders been dissatisfied with the mayor-council government's wastefulness and inefficiency. Perhaps a larger number of the citizens, actual or prospective officeholders, precinct and ward workers for the political parties, and other beneficiaries of the existing system, did not believe that their government was wasteful and inefficient. They thought it should give jobs to more men and be more lenient in collecting from users of the utilities. Some complained that the mayor and the council forgot their promises and became parsimonious and subservient to the interests of business and of the capitalistic class as soon as they were installed in office by popular votes.

The adoption of the charter was not a sharp break with the past. It was only one link in a long chain that was continually forged through the cooperative effort of active citizens. Charter government was the consequence, not the cause, of civic interest which had been responsible for several improvements before the charter government was established. For instance, continuance of municipal ownership and operation of utilities had been decided, bonds for a new electric plant had been voted, and the construction had been started before the new regime had taken office.<sup>1</sup> Again, after the city was freed from the danger of floods, more attention was given to beautifying the city. A city planning commission had been in existence for nine years before the charter was adopted; its objectives had been implemented by the enactment of a zoning ordinance early in 1926; and the detailed provisions of a building code were being hammered out in conferences conducted by the

<sup>1</sup> The president of the last council before the charter became operative contended that "despite the authorization of the bond issue, the actual sale of the bonds and the deposit of cash in the local banks, and the active opposition of the bankers and the newspapers together with Private Utility Political Organization, I am convinced that the plant would not have been built had the Charter group obtained control of the city government prior to its actual construction. . . . The plant was fully 30 per cent completed before January 1, 1928, when the council manager charter became operative. No changes were made in the contracts as let by the last Federal Council and the plant was completed under the plans as originally adopted."



Chamber of Commerce. At the same time the state was temporarily relaxing its financial control, so that a new administration was able to act more freely and to spend more liberally to meet local needs. Moreover, much of the distrust of city government as an agency for managing utilities as well as for rendering other services disappeared from the classes that had been loudest in their criticisms when representatives of these classes were elected to the council and were made responsible for deciding policies and for controlling administration through the chief administrator.

### *Agitation for Further Change*

Not all Hamiltonians were convinced that their quest for a perfect charter had ended. Perhaps the critical attitude of many toward various features of the charter helped those responsible for its operation to maintain a creditable standard of accomplishments. The charter's friends were determined to discredit its critics. Yet its friends were not unanimous in defending every feature.

The most vigorous attack was upon the single transferable vote system of electing the council. The criticisms of this feature will be analyzed later; but it is appropriate to note here that three initiated amendments to eliminate this method were defeated. In the election of November 5, 1929, only 3,166 favored the amendment while 8,600 voted to retain proportional representation. On May 2, 1933, 4,215 voted to abolish this system and 6,496 upheld it. Foes of proportional representation came back on November 7, 1933, but they could muster only 6,595 votes while its friends numbered 8,159. The ward organizations, both Republican and Democratic, were generally against proportional representation and were waiting for another chance to try to repeal it.

Even some friends of the charter were still attached to the idea that the entire responsibility should not be vested in one executive officer. Although they wanted to keep the manager under the control of the council, they wanted at least one executive officer independent of the manager. The incumbent mayor, R. H. Burke, proposed that the director of finance should be appointed by the council. The ex-mayor, H. J. Koehler, who had been city solicitor for three terms, thought that both the director of law and the director of finance should be elected. A duty of the law director, Mr. Koehler observed, was to prevent by proper court proceedings the unlawful expenditure of public funds and the abuse of corporate powers. As an appointee of the manager, however, the law director carried out the manager's directions, even though

such action might violate the letter as well as the spirit of the law. The law director's dependence upon the manager left to the taxpayers the responsibility of detecting irregularities and of bringing suit to restrain illegal expenditures. Mr. Koehler pointed out that this had occurred under Hamilton's managerial administration and that the city had been compelled to pay the expense of litigation, including the taxpayers' attorneys' fees. He contended that the election of the directors of law and finance would provide "the proper checks and balances to which the public is entitled."

No charter amendment calculated to impair the basic principle of city manager government, such as either Mr. Koehler's or Mr. Burke's proposal, had been submitted to a vote up to 1938, nor was it likely that one would be submitted in the near future. With the influence of the elements that formerly controlled the city still in eclipse and with most of the accomplishments of the new regime receiving general approval, it would require something more than an appeal to traditional American principles of government to develop strong sentiment in favor of charter changes.

Perhaps Hamilton's citizens will finally decide that their quest for the perfect form ended in 1933!

#### IV. THE COUNCIL AND ITS SELECTION BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

HAMILTON'S COUNCIL of seven members was elected on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in odd-numbered years. Nomination was by petition signed by not less than one hundred nor more than two hundred voters. Election was by the Hare single transferable vote system with a variable quota, since the number to be elected was fixed. An annual salary of \$300 for each councilman was fixed by the charter, but the council might, by ordinance provide additional compensation for the member whom it chose for mayor. The mayor's salary was set at \$900, so that he received \$100 a month.

The mayor presided at meetings of the council. He was the official head of the city for ceremonial purposes and for the serving of civil process. With the consent of the council he might take command of the police in order to maintain law and order in emergencies.

Vacancies, except as a result of a recall election, were filled by majority vote of the remaining members of the council. This power was

exercised by the first three councils under the manager plan, one member of each council having died during his term. Only in the third instance was the person so chosen subsequently elected by the voters.

A member might be removed by a recall election which would have to be held between forty and sixty days after the petition had been presented to the council. The petition must be signed by at least 15 per cent of the number voting in the last regular municipal election. On the same ballot, below the question on the recall of the councilman, there must be the names of all candidates for the prospective vacancy, nominated in the regular way. If a majority voted for the recall of the incumbent, his successor would be the candidate who was shown by the ballots, on which the first and other choices were marked, to be most nearly acceptable to a majority. It would not be likely that the newly elected councilman would be acceptable to the minority whose votes had originally elected the recalled councilman.

The records of the charter commission do not indicate that its members were aware of the inconsistency implicit in provisions for minority representation and for recall of such representatives by the majority. Only the good sense and the fairness of Hamilton's citizens prevent a majority from nullifying the purpose of proportional representation. No recall election had been held or even seriously urged up to 1939.

### *Continuity of Service in Council*

Hamilton entered its twelfth year under a city manager charter with its original manager and three of the seven councilmen first elected, including the mayor and the vice-mayor. Two other councilmen were serving their fourth terms; one was serving his third term; and the seventh, his first. In the six councils that had been elected under the charter between 1927 and 1937 a total of sixteen men were elected to the forty-two positions to be filled. One of the sixteen was first appointed after the death of an elected member. Two others, appointed to similar vacancies, were not subsequently elected; one of them was not a candidate. Leo Welsh, one of the three who served continuously, had been a member of the two councils preceding the charter. Another member of those two councils, August Bierman, served three terms in the charter council before being defeated.

In the last six councils under the mayor-council form (Table 2 gives the membership of seven councils), there were fifty-four councilmanic positions to be filled, three at large and six by wards, every second year. Thirty-five men were elected to the council and five men served as presi-

dent of the council (not counted in the total of fifty-four positions). No one served in the council throughout this period. One man served eight years; six, six years, including one whose six years began before 1915; and nineteen of the thirty-five served only one term.

The majority of the council for the two years (1914-15) immediately preceding the periods used for comparison was composed of Socialists. A Socialist mayor was in office at the same time, but the president of the council was a Republican and a banker. In the next six elections, the council majority, the president of the council, and the mayor were Democratic, except for one term (1924-25) in which the Republicans obtained control. These shifts in party domination account for some of the one- and two-term councilmen; but even in the eight consecutive years of Democratic rule the turnover in the council was large. One man served two terms as mayor and another served two terms as president of the council, four years out of the eight. Otherwise, each election placed new men in these offices as well as in many of the council seats.

#### *Proportional Representation as a Factor in Continuity*

The contrast between the election of so many new councilmen every two years—typical of Hamilton's discarded mayor-council government—and the regular reelection of either five or six of the incumbent council of seven was apparently a consequence of the adoption of proportional representation. Since no such record of continuous service was made under the preceding form, it is reasonable to conclude that the change in method of electing councilmen helped to develop a voting habit of returning them to office.

A contributing factor in establishing this habit was the superior quality of the council membership. Better qualified men were induced to serve on the first charter council. A comparison of the lists of councilmen serving on the last seven councils preceding, and the six succeeding, the adoption of the charter shows that the average of the latter possessed wider experience, more education, and higher economic status. Their work proved to be more satisfactory and the voters, therefore, had more reason to continue them on the council. But the quality of the members would hardly have kept such a large proportion of the councilmen unchanged during the depression years of the 1930's.

Without implying that the elaborate system of marking and counting ballots was unnecessary to accomplish such continuity, it should be noted that, out of the total of forty-two councilmanic offices filled in the six elections under the charter, thirty-eight of the successful candidates

TABLE 4. HAMILTON COUNCILMEN UNDER CITY MANAGER CHARTER, 1928-39

- R. H. BURKE, 1928—. Director of music, Miami University, 1906-14; insurance, 1915-16, 1926—; personnel work, 1916-23; Auto Finance Co., 1923-26; Oberlin, three years; B.S., University of Chicago; Republican Charterite; Presbyterian.
- LEO WELSH, 1924—. Railroad clerk, freight-car checker; local official of railroad union; grade school and business college; Independent Republican, endorsed by charter commission, 1935; by Democratic organization, 1937; Catholic.
- MARK MILLIKIN, 1928—. Physician and surgeon; Johns Hopkins Medical School; independent Democratic Charterite; Protestant.
- HOMER C. FERGUSON, 1928-33. Executive, Champion Paper and Fibre Co.; grade school; Republican Charterite; defeated 1933; Protestant.
- AUGUST BIERMAN, 1924-33. Operator of gas stations; high school; active Republican; defeated 1933; Protestant.
- J. W. MEYERS, 1928-29. Civil War captain; retired carpenter; secretary, Building and Loan Association; grade school; active Republican; defeated 1929; Protestant.
- MINOR BECKETT, 1928. Beckett Paper Co.; Mass. Institute of Technology; Republican Charterite; Protestant; died during first year.
- JOHN M. BEELER, 1928-29. Banker; president, draft board, 1917-18; high school; Democratic Charterite; appointed to fill vacancy; not candidate 1929; Protestant.
- H. L. SANDERS, 1930-31. Lumber and building supplies; high school; Democratic Charterite; Catholic.
- CHARLES SCHMITT, 1930-31. Auto dealer; grade school; Democratic Charterite; Protestant; died in office.
- L. D. MCGINLEY, 1931. Banker; college; Republican Charterite; Protestant.
- E. F. WARNDORF, 1932—. Building and loan officer; parochial high school and business college; Democratic Charterite until 1937; Catholic.
- HUGH BATES, 1932-33. Railroad foreman, track maintenance, railroad-union officer; high school; Republican Charterite; Protestant; died in office.
- PAUL BENNINGHOFEN, 1933—. Paper mill, felt and blanket executive; college; "Old Deal" Democratic Charterite; Protestant; first appointed to vacancy.
- JOHN SCHWALM, 1934—. Moving picture theater owner; vice-chairman Democratic County Central Committee; high school; Catholic.
- CALEB DODSWORTH, 1934-35. Iron molder; grade school; Democrat; Protestant; failed in two later attempts to be elected.
- ANDREW BRUCK, 1936-37. Cafe proprietor; grade school; Democratic Charterite; Protestant; defeated 1937, without Charter Commission endorsement.
- JOSEPH TOERNER, 1937—. Mechanic; grade school; Independent Democrat; Catholic.

were among the seven receiving the highest number of first-choice votes in their respective elections. In 1929 and again in 1931 the candidate ranking eighth in first choices eventually received enough votes

by transfers to crowd in ahead of the candidate ranking seventh. In a later election, candidates ranking eighth and ninth on first choices were elected. These four exceptions, on the face of the returns, were all that proportional representation could show in the way of results different from a simple system in which everyone voted for one candidate only and in which the seven receiving the most votes would be elected. It does not follow, however, that, if the simpler method had been used, the thirty-eight positions would have been filled by the men who were elected. On the contrary, it would have been a standing invitation to politicians to discover ways to beat the game. Its simplicity would have tended to encourage manipulation, whereas the complexity of proportional representation, with the multiple choices registered by each voter, minimized the importance of clever schemes to swing elections by controlling a small bloc of votes.

### *Other Aspects of Proportional Representation*

Despite the interest in the charter movement manifested by the Woman's City Club and the facility with which organized groups could obtain representation by the single transferable vote system, no woman had been elected to Hamilton's council up to 1939. Only one woman had even been a candidate; she was not endorsed by the charterites; and she polled few votes.

Although one attempt to elect a Negro was made, it failed. Moreover, it is not likely that another attempt would succeed because of the small proportion of colored people in the city's population.

Division of the electorate along religious lines was not accurately reflected in the council. The proportion of Roman Catholics was somewhat larger in the council in 1938 (about 57 per cent) than among the voters (about 40 per cent); in the six councils, however, five Catholics and eleven Protestants had been elected. Only one Catholic was elected to the first charter council. Consequently, religion could not have been the basis for the preferences expressed by most voters.

Residence within a ward or a section of the city was apparently less influential with the voters in 1938 than it had been when the first council was elected by proportional representation. All six wards were represented then. At that time it was noted that, with one or two exceptions, each candidate's first choices mounted most rapidly when the votes from his ward were tallied, but also, as the losing candidates' ballots were transferred, they tended to go to remaining candidates who lived in the same part of the city. In the incumbent council, however, no

councilman resided in either of two wards, and two resided in each of three of the other wards. Mayor Burke received about half his votes from the First Ward, which was two miles from his home in the Sixth Ward. The votes for Mr. Benninghofen, a resident of the Fourth Ward, came mainly from the First and Sixth Wards.

Critics of proportional representation often stress its tendency to divide the electorate into distinct factions. Results in Hamilton tended strongly toward unifying the electorate. Almost all the successful candidates avoided concrete, sharply defined issues. They were for honesty, efficiency, and economy. They did not want to take a stand antagonistic to any bloc of voters that might otherwise give them even third-, fourth-, or fifth-choice votes. They did not attack other candidates unless they were convinced that their supporters were negligible. Even in the 1937 campaign experienced campaigners were careful to sympathize both with those who favored slot machines and with those who wanted them suppressed. Any councilman who had learned the rudiments of the system realized that his reelection might depend upon transfers from the surplus or from second or other choices marked on ballots previously counted for some candidate who had been dropped. Consequently, he was reluctant to antagonize other members and their supporters.

### *Criticisms of Proportional Representation*

Precinct, ward, city, and county workers in the political party organizations were almost solidly against the single transferable vote system. As previously mentioned, three unsuccessful attempts were made to drop this feature of the charter. Opponents of proportional representation insisted that they strongly favored the city manager feature of the charter and objected only to this impossible-to-understand method of electing the council. They insisted that the voters were bewildered by the instructions. But the percentage of invalid ballots was only 2.7 in the first election, 4.2, 5.6, 4.9, 5.6, and 3.5 in succeeding elections. Obviously, most voters knew how to mark their ballots. Opponents contended further that the voters were dissatisfied because they did not know for whom their votes would be counted. But the regular reelection of so many councilmen indicated that the voters were persistent in the expression of their choices.

The alternative offered in the amendment voted down in 1933 showed the declining attachment to representation by wards. Those who drafted the amendment had been studying the election returns. Conceding the desirability of elections at large, they proposed that every elector should

vote for seven councilmen in a nonpartisan primary; that the fourteen candidates with the most votes be placed on the ballot for the final election; and that, every elector again voting for seven, the seven highest be elected. This plan would, of course, make it possible for one compact organization to elect the entire council.

While the issue was not put on the ballot again after 1933, opponents were not convinced that proportional representation had merit. The last mayor under the mayor-council form, Harry J. Koehler, who originally supported the charter, was active in the campaigns against this feature. The Republican mayor, Howard Kelly, who served one term between Mr. Koehler's two terms, was suspicious of the way in which the ballots had been counted but did not denounce the system so unqualifiedly as Mr. Koehler. From the partisan viewpoint, Republicans could hardly complain. Hamilton had long been preponderantly Democratic in state and national elections; but in the nonpartisan municipal elections with the proportional representation system, men whose national party affiliation was Republican were regularly elected to the council with others as strongly Democratic.

Since the one daily newspaper published in Hamilton claimed credit for electing a majority of the councilmen, Mr. Koehler contended that the council's policies did not receive the publicity that should have been given them. Moreover, he claimed, councilmen were dominated by the manager; the manager was not the servant of the council. Mr. Koehler insisted that the city manager had built a political machine and that the manager traded his political influence for the support of those candidates who would continue him and his policies in office. Such candidates received the votes of "the underworld, the preachers, and the women's city clubs."

These objections might have been made to the relations between the manager and the council irrespective of the method of electing the latter. The real issue was the concentration of power in one executive. Mr. Koehler's proposal to introduce checks on the executive's power was noted in the preceding section. Specifically attributable to proportional representation was his objection that a candidate popular with a small group could get enough votes to be elected by entering into a deal with the administration in power. This criticism does not seem to accord sufficient credit to the charter commission, whose activities as a nominating agency will be described later. Finally, the city manager's machine was charged with *sub rosa* encouragement to other candidacies for the purpose of splitting the opposition. Obviously, such tactics are not



confined to the election of councils by the proportional method. Indeed, many politicians opposed proportional representation because it made such tactics much more difficult, if not impossible. It would probably have been easier to split the opposition if the ordinary plurality system of nominating and electing officials had been employed. Such a nominating system was proposed to the Hamilton council by the charter amendments mentioned in the preceding section. Opponents of proportional representation, including Mr. Koehler, supported these amendments.

Some critics of proportional representation also complained of the lack of interest in voting. Unless there was a contest over an office in which substantial independent powers were vested, they contended, many voters would not bother to go to the polls. Nevertheless, the number of votes cast for candidates for the council increased from 12,071 in 1927 (when proportional representation was first used) to 14,309 in 1937. Allowing for population increase, the proportion of voters was at least as large in the sixth as it was in the first election. Previously, in 1925, 13,341 votes were cast for the mayor but only 12,271 for the president of the council and 12,683 for solicitor. The slightly larger vote was hardly an important factor in supporting the argument for electing administrative officers.

### *Retention of Proportional Representation*

Perpetuation of proportional representation will be closely linked with the continuance of the organization of citizen groups through the cooperation of which the charter was adopted. If these groups do not continue to work together—and the disintegration seemed to have begun during the 1937 campaign—the return to power of individuals who regarded public offices primarily as rewards for party service will probably be signaled by a new offensive against proportional representation.

Even if the citizen groups hold together, they must also retain a wide popular tolerance of, if not a positive faith in, the efficacy of proportional representation and other features of the charter. Members of the partisan organization who were conducting a frontal attack on proportional representation were also directing a flanking movement to capture the voters' allegiance. They, instead of the friends of proportional representation, were seeking to arouse a class-consciousness which was largely quiescent in municipal campaigns under the charter. Had voters been primarily influenced by class interests in marking their preferences on

the ballots for the council, the cooperation among councilmen would not have been so general.

With one-fourth of the city's inhabitants normally employed in industry, the proportion of those over twenty-one years of age who might respond to an appeal to their interests as laborers would be about 50 per cent of the electorate. The voting members of their families would make up part of this percentage. The election of a Socialist administration in 1913 shows that class-consciousness had existed. A survey of the occupations of councilmen from 1913 to 1928 indicates an evident preponderance of machinists and a scarcity of foremen or others in responsible positions. After the establishment of the charter the council was composed predominantly of businessmen. Labor was represented by Leo Welsh, only survivor of pre-charter councils, and occasionally by a second member. Evidently many men and women in the ranks of labor preferred bankers and business and professional men to their own fellows for seats in the council.

To alienate laborers from further support of the charter government, the opponents of proportional representation tried to direct the workers' attention to the class bias of the council. Economy and efficiency were alleged to be beneficial only to the wealthier citizens. The city council was charged with indifference toward humanitarian services. Several facts were urged to substantiate this charge. Unemployment relief was left largely to other agencies, public and private. Inadequate provision was made for a relief office in the new city building, although it was constructed during the depression.<sup>1</sup> The health service was divided among city, county, and private agencies; thus the council was enabled to economize on this function.

If labor came to believe that a city government should serve its distinct interests, labor could use proportional representation as a tool to elect a majority friendly to those interests. The opponents of proportional representation may have underestimated the ability of workingmen to grasp this fact. Nevertheless, they assumed that they could convince the workers that the system by which the council was elected was responsible for labor's inadequate share of representation.

### *Nonpartisanship Under Proportional Representation*

It was a paradox that the opponents of proportional representation

<sup>1</sup> The manager said that space for the welfare department in the new municipal building was provided for normal conditions but that owing to the increased load created by the depression it was necessary to have larger quarters, which were secured by taking over the old post office building.

should stir up class feeling in an attempt to abolish the method of voting designed to represent groups in proportion to their numbers. It was another paradox that the defenders of proportional representation in Hamilton contended that the government under the charter was non-partisan. If the government were nonpartisan, there would be no reason for a voting system that gave proportionate representation to all political groups.

There was nonpartisanship to the extent that, pursuant to the charter, partisan designations did not appear on the ballot as they had before its adoption. Candidates, successful and defeated, were, nevertheless, supported by organized groups of citizens, and, in some instances, factions bore the label of a national political party. In Hamilton many people accepted uncritically these organizational activities as consistent with nonpartisan elections—at least they accepted them when candidates whom they personally favored were successful.

If government is nonpartisan only when candidates for local office are not chosen on the basis of their stand on national political issues, then nonpartisan government can be said to exist even when candidates have party labels, so long as the labels signify each candidate's adherence to one of the *local* groups and its platform of *local* policies. But generally the term is applied when party designations are excluded from the ballots and when voters are forced to go to unofficial sources to find out what political organizations are supporting the candidates. Hamilton's experience illustrated this naive attitude.

The aspect of nonpartisanship was also maintained in Hamilton by the lack of periodic removals and appointments following elections. As a result, the tenure of city employees in the higher positions and in the few lower ones not in the classified service was in marked contrast to that under the mayor-council government. This tenure, however, was partly because of the continuity of the personnel of the council. Never more than two new councilmen had been chosen in any election since 1927. Consequently, there was little pressure from the council to discharge or to replace city employees. Hamilton's citizens expressed approval of appointment on merit by supporting the council that selected a nonresident manager and that upheld the manager for appointing a nonresident chief of police, a nonresident director of public works, and a nonresident superintendent of the power plant. It should be noted, however, that these appointments were made before the days of widespread unemployment.

Even under mayor-council government, in which Republican and Democratic tickets were designated on the ballots, the voters showed

some independence of party affiliations. They occasionally shifted the control of the city's government from one party to another although almost invariably they cast a majority vote for Democratic candidates for state and national offices. The voters were, therefore, not bewildered when party labels were excluded from the ballots. They were accustomed to scrutinize the qualifications of candidates. Probably their scrutiny was more careful because they had to vote only for councilmen and because they had to express preferences among the candidates under the system of proportional representation.

In the campaign for the adoption of the charter, national party lines were disregarded. As mentioned above, the Democratic mayor, Harry J. Koehler, urged the voters to adopt the charter. But the council of six Democrats and three Republicans distributed a handbill throughout the city giving reasons for rejecting the charter. The mayor aligned himself with the Chamber of Commerce and the other interests which were hoping that a new charter would enable them to get a government more nearly in accord with their interests. The support by the organization which the mayor had built up during his years in public service was more than enough to tip the balance and to give the charter its majority of 159 votes. To that extent the charter owed its existence to a Democratic machine.

### *Self-Perpetuating Charter Commission*

For the ten years preceding 1937 the influence of any Democratic or Republican organization in selecting a majority of the members of the council was eclipsed by the charter commission, which, taking a parental pride in its offspring, constituted itself an unofficial nominating body to endorse, and if necessary to draft, candidates whom it thought worthy for service on the council. The commission did not act in all respects like an ordinary political campaign committee. It did not maintain an organization in each precinct. Instead, it endeavored to keep in touch with citizen groups, the Chamber of Commerce, the Woman's City Club, churches, and labor unions which were friendly to the charter movement. These, in turn, were relied upon to produce the votes of their members.

The charter commission chose one of its members to be its executive secretary and in that capacity to be responsible for the campaign. The 1937 campaign was conducted by Miss Eleanore W. Frechtling. About \$1,500 was spent for cards on behalf of the commission's candidates, sample ballots, advertising in newspapers, circulars, a letter to every woman voter in Hamilton, and the salary of the executive secretary,

who was also chairman of the City Charter Committee of the Woman's City Club. In previous campaigns the expenses had been about \$1,200. These funds were obtained largely from several of the local industrial corporations, upon solicitation by members of the commission.

The commission was remarkably successful until the 1937 election. Four of its nominees were elected in 1927. Five of the seven elected in 1929, 1931, and 1933 were endorsed by the charter commission. The peak was reached in 1935 when six of its candidates were elected. This gain was more apparent than real, for the commission endorsed Leo Welsh who had regularly polled the necessary quota without its endorsement. Then came the fall: only two candidates endorsed by the commission were elected in 1937; three endorsed by the commission in previous campaigns were elected without its assistance.

### *Charter Commission Exacts Specific Pledge*

Not regarding its function as that of a political machine, the charter commission had declined to promise offices or personal favors to voters who supported its ticket, and it had not acted as an intermediary between citizens and the government after elections. But the commission had undertaken to formulate policies which its candidates were expected to put into effect after they were elected to the council. This program worked as long as the policies to which the candidates were committed were simple and general, such as economical management or maintenance of the charter.

Into the 1937 campaign was injected the issue of toleration of slot machines and other forms of petty gambling. Even though it was widely known that these devices were being operated more openly and extensively during the spring and the summer of 1937, the police rarely interfered.

When the charter commission surveyed the situation at the outset of the campaign, it became alarmed at the inroads which the "slots" were making and decided that enforcement of the ordinances against gambling should be the issue in the campaign. It was sure that the citizens interested in law observance would rally to support the charter platform and ticket. The commission overlooked, first, the broadmindedness of a large number of Hamilton's inhabitants and their resentment of governmental efforts to control their amusements. Prohibition of the sale of beer and liquor during the Volstead era had not been markedly successful either under the mayor-council or under the city manager government. Second, the commission was apparently unaware of the widespread

interest in gambling operations. Neighborhood drugstores and groceries as well as beer taverns had installed various inexpensive types of gambling devices, and some claimed to be paying their rents from their share of the proceeds. Third, the commission ignored the general Catholic opposition to sumptuary legislation, particularly to strict enforcement of gambling ordinances, for some of the churches had bingo nights during the week.

Ignoring these considerations, the members of the charter commission declared that the slot machines and similar devices must be seized and destroyed. These devices constituted a racket which was estimated to levy an annual toll of a half million dollars on the city. So the commission advised its six council members that, to be endorsed for reelection in the fall of 1937, they would have to stand on a platform pledging the complete elimination of the slot machine and allied rackets.

Only two of the six who had previously been elected on the charter ticket complied with this condition. The commission, therefore, filled its ticket with five new candidates. Only the two already on the council who received the commission's endorsement were elected from the charter ticket. The other four, who had had the commission's endorsement in previous campaigns, and the remaining member of the council, who had been originally elected by Democratic organization support, were all endorsed by the local Democratic organization. To make its friendly gesture complete, this organization endorsed the two on the council who had complied with the Charter Commission's requirement. It also put into its platform a denunciation of the "slots" but did not require the individual candidates to commit themselves specifically on this issue. These six members were reelected. The seventh was an independent with labor support. The Democratic organization could claim a victory almost as complete as that obtained in the 1936 national election. The victory may have been more apparent than real, for the chances that those six would have been reelected anyway were at least even. Nevertheless, it was a clever strategic move for the Democratic organization in its efforts to regain the confidence of the electorate.

### *Decline of the Charter Commission*

The charter commission's claim of being a nonpartisan agency endorsing only the best qualified candidates could hardly be resumed after the 1938 congressional campaign. Frank K. Vaughn, Mark Millikin, and Eleanore Frechtling, who had been active members of the commission during both its official (1925-26) and its subsequent long unofficial ex-

istence, took leading parts in "The Nonpartisan League for Better Representation." The campaign material that the league circulated was indistinguishable in partisan content from that circulated by the Republican committee for the Republican nominee for Congress.

The reign of the charter commission as a nonpartisan nominating caucus probably ended in 1938. If the regular national party organizations are to be kept from selecting most of the successful council candidates, as well as from scrapping proportional representation, a more intensive civic interest will have to be developed among various groups of men and women; and a new method of selecting their candidates and their platform will have to be devised.

## V. THE COUNCIL, THE MAYOR, AND THE MANAGER

THE CHARTER vested both legislative and executive powers in the council. The executive powers, however, were to be exercised through the chief executive, the city manager, whom the council appointed for an indefinite term. Thus the manager was subordinated to the council and was in legal theory an employee, not an officer. This interpretation made it legal to go outside the state for its manager, as Hamilton did, without violating the Ohio Constitution's declaration that "no person shall be elected or appointed to any office in this state unless possessed of the qualifications of an elector."

Whether the incumbent manager, Russell P. Price, was, in fact, an employee taking orders from the council was not clear. Mr. Price's attitude toward the council, as toward other citizens, was courteous and respectful. Yet the members of the council had to devote much of their time to their own affairs. They tended to rely upon the manager and his staff for the solution of most municipal problems. Leo Welsh, who had served in the council under both forms of government, said that under the manager plan he referred his constituents to the manager's office, whereas under the mayor-council plan he would have felt it necessary to handle their requests himself. Petitions from citizens to the council were regularly referred to the manager for investigation and recommendation before action was taken. Indeed, whether the petitioners complained about services or requested new services, they frequently had a preliminary conference with the manager or some departmental subordinate. If any question of legal authority was involved, the matter was referred by the

council to the manager and to the director of law for investigation and for preparation of necessary legislation.

### *Council Meetings in Committee of the Whole*

No surprise was manifested by council members when petitions involving questions of legal authority were read to them in their formal meetings, because matters referred to the council between public meetings were discussed in a committee-of-the-whole session. The council met as the committee of the whole in the board room on the Monday nights preceding the semimonthly formal sessions on Wednesday evenings. This council caucus was open to individuals or small committees with petitions to present or complaints to make. After the departure of the petitioners or complainants their pleas were discussed, but a vote was not taken until the formal meeting. The manager insisted that there was no pretense of secrecy. Reporters were permitted to attend the meetings of the committee of the whole, but they almost never did because they were not permitted to report what was discussed until after formal action had been taken in the regular council meeting. Most disagreements were, therefore, eliminated before the public knew the problems that the council had been considering. Any matter likely to prove controversial, however, was not passed through three readings in one session of the council under suspension of the rules, as were most routine matters.

Citizens were permitted by rules of the council to speak in its regular sessions; but owing to the formal character of these sessions, citizens rarely even attended council meetings. If they were interested at all, they relied upon newspaper reports of meetings. The public hearing on the annual appropriation ordinance required by the charter was merely a formality. After the roll call and the reading in full of the minutes of the previous session—which often took ten minutes and was enough to discourage any curious citizen from remaining longer—a member moved that the council go into the committee of the whole to hold a public hearing on the budget. When the motion carried and the mover regained his breath, the same member moved to terminate the hearing. Thus the charter provision was complied with.

Council procedure prior to the adoption of the charter was markedly different. After the establishment of the manager plan there was only the committee of the whole that tried to put ordinances in shape for passage; formerly there had been standing committees. Frequently the standing committees had failed to satisfy other councilmen, and debate in open sessions ensued. With due allowance for the incommodious



quarters in which the council met in those days, an audience of interested citizens had usually been on hand.

Much could be said in justification of the procedure by which differences are secretly composed and by which the public (if present) witnesses a smooth, machine-like disposition of the city's affairs. But if public opinion is to be formulated as a means of controlling municipal policies, the council chamber seems to be the best sounding board for dissenting minorities. The secret committee-of-the-whole meetings precluded the performance of that function by Hamilton's council. The chance for a minority to get a hearing so as to win a majority to its view was further minimized by the existence in Hamilton of only one daily newspaper that one was generally friendly to the charter government.

### *Cohesiveness of Council*

The cohesiveness of the six experienced members of the council was demonstrated in the slot-machine controversy. Prior to the Charter Commission's demand that its candidates favor strict enforcement, the council had approved, tacitly, the manager's policy of search and seizure only on complaint. When only two councilmen complied with the commission's demand, it appeared that the campaign against the slot machines had failed. It was even probable that these two councilmen would have been reelected with four others who were reelected in 1937 even if they had not come out against the "slots." Their record was probably the decisive factor. On that they stood together.

One of the two who accepted the charter commission's endorsement was Mayor R. H. Burke. Yet he was reelected mayor largely because of the support of Mark Millikin. The latter had opposed strict measures against the "slots," believing in persuasion rather than in forcible repression. But he declined to support the plan of the Democratic organization to displace Mr. Burke.

The council's policy toward slot machines was unchanged, the two committed to suppression saying nothing to embarrass their four colleagues, until the new councilman, Joseph Toerner, disturbed the placidity of the council in the spring of 1938 by charging that the police were showing favoritism to places that had obtained slot machines from one distributor. The net result of the investigation through the testimony of forty-seven witnesses who appeared before the council tended to discount Mr. Toerner's charge rather than to show negligence by the Police Department. The general tone of the questions asked by the other six councilmen indicated that they were skeptical of Mr. Toerner's charges.

Two witnesses testified that a man who contributed to Mr. Toerner's campaign had assured a Cincinnati distributor of slot machines that his councilman held the balance of power and that protection money would have to be split three ways. The chief of police testified that he had refused a place on the police force to a man brought to him by Mr. Toerner. Mr. Toerner did not directly deny the implications of the testimony regarding slot machines, but he insisted that the man was taken to the chief of police merely to get information about the procedure in applying for a position on the police force.

### *The Manager's Influence in Determining Policy*

The outcome of the investigation was a vivid illustration of the manager's influence in determining municipal policy. Councilmen presented their individual reports of findings at the regular meeting, June 1, 1938; recessed for a secret caucus to decide what to do; returned to the council chamber in which, for once, there was an audience consisting mainly of representatives of the Protestant churches and other organizations that wanted strict enforcement; and voted unanimously to refer their reports to the manager for appropriate action. They had not been able to agree upon what action would be appropriate. On June 6 the manager gave the press a copy of his letter to the chief of police. In it he demanded that "ordinances pertaining to gambling be rigidly enforced," that confiscated gambling devices be destroyed, and that two policemen be permanently detailed to the task of enforcement. He also asked the public to cooperate.

### *Mayor's Leadership of Council*

The outcome of the slot-machine controversy vindicated the political sagacity of the mayor. Once the issue had been raised, Mayor Burke took a definite stand for strict enforcement of antigambling ordinances. Although the election seemed to go against him, he retained his position, partly because he had Dr. Millikin's support and partly because he had polled the largest number of first choice votes in the 1937 election, as he had in all previous elections except the first. The main reason for his continuance as mayor was that the other members of the council had become accustomed to his leadership. Moreover, the manager did not issue his strict enforcement order until after he had conferred with Mayor Burke and three other councilmen, who assured him of their support.

The choice of Raymond H. Burke for the office of mayor in 1928 was the logical one for the first charter council to make. Through his varied experiences Mr. Burke had established wider contacts than other council

members. After attending Oberlin College and graduating from the University of Chicago, he had become director of music on the Miami University faculty in 1906. He had relinquished his work at Miami in 1914 because of a serious illness. He entered the insurance business in Hamilton in 1915. During the war he did personnel work for a local corporation. Afterward he was an officer in an automobile finance company. About the time he was elected to the charter commission in 1926, he became the district representative of one of the large life insurance companies. He retained his interest in music, being choir leader of the Presbyterian church and director of the choral group of men which was well known in musical circles around Hamilton. He was also the composer of the music for Miami's *Alma Mater* and other college songs.

Mayor Burke was an effective leader of the groups upholding the charter in the campaigns to strike out the proportional representation provisions. His connections with church and musical groups strengthened his influence, and his extensive contacts with business and working classes further developed among the voters an appreciation of his genial personality and helped greatly to achieve the successive victories for the charter.

Mayor Burke said in 1938 that he would not be a candidate again for a council seat. He complained that other candidates obtained first choices from voters who really preferred him. They pleaded with the voters to give them first choices because "Burke won't need so many first choices; he always gets more than a quota." As a result, the number of his first choice votes was declining. He admitted that the total of the first choices for candidates on the ticket nominated by the unofficial caucus, the charter commission, was probably higher than it would have been if the voters had been asked to give their first choices to the head of the ticket. He might be persuaded to run again if the charter seemed to be in danger and if there were enough evidence that his popularity would strengthen the charter forces.

The mayor was a realist in politics. He was keenly aware of the need for placating group interests. He realized the necessity for compromise and avoided explicit commitments until, as in the slot-machine controversy, he was sure of widespread support.

### *Comparison with Pre-Charter Councils*

The mayor, the other five experienced councilmen, and the manager learned to work with each other in handling the problems of city government. Their cooperation was reflected in the administrative services

which operated with dependable regularity; the citizens generally were impressed by the apparently frictionless working of their government and were disposed to let it run itself.

There was general agreement among those who had observed the councils both before and after the adoption of the manager plan that the councils after 1928 performed their duties in a more expeditious and intelligent manner. Councilmen no longer had the burden of caring for minor details that troubled councilmen under the earlier form. Before 1928 they distrusted the executive branch, the elective officers of which might seize any opportunity to undermine the councilmen's standing with their constituents. This distrust was illustrated in the campaign for the charter, in which the mayor supported, and the council opposed, it. Politically, both suffered heavily in loss of popular esteem. Incumbent members of the council were confident that the interests of the executive were not opposed to theirs. They left much more of the detailed work, both in the preparation of ordinances and in the care of complaints from their constituents, to the manager and his staff. This gave them more freedom to consider the broader problems of municipal government, although there was no indication in the formal, public meetings of the council that they were concerned with such problems. An observer was handicapped by a lack of knowledge of what had been said in the secret meetings of the committee of the whole; but the record of accomplishments of city manager government indicated a purpose to perform accustomed services economically and efficiently. It did not indicate any firmly held purpose to extend the scope of services.

## VI. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER HAMILTON'S MAYOR-COUNCIL AND CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENTS

FOR ABOUT twenty years prior to the establishment of the city manager plan in 1928, Hamilton's government approximated the strong-mayor type, although not more than one or two of the eight incumbents during that period proved to be a strong mayor. The mayor appointed a director of public service, a director of public safety, and a civil service commission of three for overlapping terms of six years. The board of health, consisting of five citizens appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the council for overlapping terms of five years, chose

TABLE 5. ORGANIZATION OF HAMILTON UNDER MANAGER PLAN, 1939.

*Elected Officials*

COUNCIL (7). Elected at large by Hare proportional representation system; mayor elected by council from among its members; two-year terms.

MUNICIPAL JUDGE. Four-year term.

*Officials Appointed by Council*

CITY MANAGER. Appointed for indefinite term and removable at pleasure of council. Chief administrative and appointive official.

CLERK.

*Officials Appointed by Manager*

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY.<sup>a</sup> Supervised police and fire departments.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS.<sup>b</sup> Supervised street maintenance, public buildings and markets, waste disposal, engineering, motor transport maintenance, building inspection, platting, zoning.

DIRECTOR OF UTILITIES.<sup>b</sup> Supervised production and distribution of electricity, supply and distribution of water, gas distribution.

DIRECTOR OF LAW. Legal counsel and prosecution.

DIRECTOR OF FINANCE. Accounting, treasury, purchasing, and supplies.

DIRECTOR OF PARKS AND PLAYGROUNDS. Supervision of parks, recreation.

DIRECTOR OF CIVIL SERVICE.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE. Incumbent in 1939 was also county public health officer and supervised activities of the Public Health League, a private organization; supervised medical care and quarantine, outdoor relief, sanitary and food inspection.

*Administrative Boards*

TREASURY INVESTMENT BOARD (3). Manager, director of law, and director of finance ex officio.

SINKING FUND COMMISSION (3). Mayor, director of law, and director of finance ex officio.

BOARD OF REVISION OF ASSESSMENTS (3). Mayor, director of law, and director of finance ex officio.

WRESTLING COMMISSION (5). Appointed by manager for overlapping three-year terms.

BOXING COMMISSION (5). Appointed by manager for overlapping three-year terms.

TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE RELIEF FUND (6). Manager was ex-officio chairman; five members of police force elected by force for one-year terms.

TRUSTEES OF THE FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND (6). Manager was ex-officio chairman; five firemen elected by firemen for one-year terms.

BOARD OF ELECTRICAL EXAMINERS (5). Director of public works was ex-officio chairman; four electricians appointed by manager for indefinite terms.

BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PLUMBERS, SEWER TAPPERS, AND SEWER BUILDERS (5). Director of public works, commissioner of health, and building commissioner ex officio; three plumbers appointed by manager for indefinite terms.

TABLE 5 (continued)

*Advisory Boards*

CITIZENS' TRAFFIC COMMISSION (5). Manager and secretary to manager ex officio; three citizens appointed by manager.

PARK COMMISSION (6). Manager, director of parks and playgrounds, and secretary to manager ex officio; three citizens appointed by manager.

PLANNING COMMISSION (5). Manager and director of public works ex officio; three citizens appointed by manager.

ZONING BOARD (5). Manager and director of public works ex officio; three citizens appointed by manager.

<sup>a</sup> Manager holds this position.

<sup>b</sup> One person holds both positions.

a commissioner. A superintendent chosen by a park board administered parks and playgrounds. In addition to the mayor, the voters elected a city solicitor, an auditor, and a treasurer for terms of two years.

Elective officers and directors of departments appointed by the mayor usually served only one term of two years. Except for the solicitors, who had to have legal training, one or two directors of public service with engineering experience, and possibly the last mayor, Harry J. Koehler, who had served three terms as solicitor, these officers could not be properly classed as professionally qualified for their administrative posts. The board-appointed administrators of health and parks were both professionally qualified and served for longer periods.

With the establishment of city manager government in 1928, administration was more completely centralized in the manager. He appointed the director of welfare, but the existing relations with county and private health agencies were continued. Parks and playgrounds were brought under his management, but he reappointed the superintendent who had been serving since 1917. In brief, professionally administered services were not seriously disturbed. The most important change was the appointment of the county health officer to serve as director of welfare for the city in addition to his county duties.

A transformation, however, took place in the services previously administered by partisan, transient amateurs: after January, 1928, there was continuity in management by persons whose previous training and experience fitted them for their responsible posts.

*Administrative Personnel After 1928*

In 1939 Hamilton still had its first manager, Russell P. Price, who had been assistant manager of Daytona Beach, Florida, before his appoint-

ment as manager of Hamilton. Prior to that time he had been foreman in the La Belle Iron Works and city auditor (1918-19) and director of public service (1922-25) in Steubenville, Ohio. A few months after failing to obtain the Republican nomination for mayor of Steubenville in 1925, he accepted an offer to become assistant manager of Daytona Beach. C. N. Teaff, who had been city engineer of Steubenville, was appointed to the same position in Daytona Beach. When Mr. Price became manager of Hamilton, he appointed Mr. Teaff as director of public works and public utilities. He appointed two other nonresidents: the chief of police and the superintendent of the new light plant. Both were experienced administrators. The chief of police had been the superintendent of police in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the police chief in Daytona Beach; the superintendent of the light plant had been the engineer of Muscle Shoals Plant No. 2 and the chief engineer of the Indiana Electric Corporation.

Heads of other departments were residents of Hamilton and had served in municipal offices. The director of finance was, until 1933, the man who had last held the office of city auditor. The director of law had been city solicitor in the next to the last mayor-council administration. The director of civil service, who also became the manager's secretary, had been president of the council for one term (1924-25). The fire chief and the superintendents of electricity, water, and gas distribution each had had many years of experience in their services.

Mr. Price grouped his subordinates into eight departments: public safety (police and fire), finance, utilities, public works, law, parks, civil service, welfare. There were, however, only six directors under him, and three of these did not give full time to their departments. The manager served as director of public safety, and his long-time associate, C. N. Teaff, was director of both public works and utilities. The director of welfare divided his time between his services as a city official and as the county health officer. The director of law had time to engage in private practice.

The director of civil service was also secretary to the manager. The latter duty was the heavier; access to the manager was through Mr. Ladley's office, and many who went to see the manager were taken care of by the secretary. Since there was almost a constant stream of persons going to the office, the preparation and the grading of examinations had to be done at night and over the week end when the offices were closed. Vacancies were not frequent; therefore, this phase of personnel administration did not require a great deal of time and attention.

*Citizen Participation in Administration*

There were eleven boards and commissions in addition to the eight departments. Except for the commissions regulating boxing and wrestling, which were composed entirely of private citizens, these agencies contained at least a minority of city officials. A park commission and a citizens' traffic commission were still listed in the directory of municipal government in 1938 even though they had not met since 1930 and 1931. With some changes in personnel, the planning commission and the zoning board were continued from the mayor-council days. The board of electrical examiners and the board of plumbers, sewer tappers, and sewer builders provided a means for reconciling occupational self-government and protection of the public interest. The remaining boards, all provided by the charter, were entirely *ex officio*: the board of revision of assessments, the treasury investment board, and the sinking fund commission. There was no marked tendency to increase citizen participation in municipal administration after the advent of city manager government. On the contrary, it might be inferred from the failure to call together two of these agencies for eight or nine years and from the failure to create others that there was a growing disposition to let the manager and his staff handle all municipal problems under the general supervision of the council.

*Coordination of Departments*

Although the directors of finance and of civil service listed all officers and employees by department and division, they did so mainly for book-keeping purposes. If the duties in one position were not heavy enough to require a full-time employee, the duties of a second position were assigned to the same person. Thus the clerk of the council was a book-keeper in the department of utilities; the secretary to the director of finance was the city treasurer; and the humane officer in the department of public welfare was the probation officer of the municipal court. These arrangements were all innovations under the manager plan. Without overworking municipal employees, the manager found ways to keep them busy. Under the city manager plan there were no longer elective administrators who had to have trusted subordinates to assist in keeping political fences in order.

Besides the tendency toward departmental coordination that resulted from placing all services under the manager, cooperation was further assured by placing the two large departments of utilities and public works under one director. Interchange of personnel was most frequent



among the divisions of those two departments; it also took place between other departments when the need occurred and the opportunity to keep men employed arose. Coordination was brought about in building, electrical, and plumbing inspection. The inspectors who performed these tasks composed, with an officer detailed by the fire department, a fire prevention bureau. The bureau and the positions of electrical and plumbing inspectors were established after the city manager government began to function.

The scarcity of cuts in the paving on Hamilton's streets was further evidence of coordination. Before a street improvement was started, abutting property owners were questioned about their probable future needs for water, gas, and sewer connections. Rarely was it necessary to reopen a street. In the years before city manager government, such foresight was unnecessary on many streets. They had been in such condition that a cut often resulted in a smoother surface! It should be said that a change in state policy toward municipal finance and the imposition of a tax on gasoline, part of which was returned to the city for street maintenance and improvement, gave Hamilton's manager more money to spend for such purposes than his predecessors had had.

The division of motor transport maintenance in the department of public works was an innovation of city manager government. It serviced and repaired the city's motor vehicles. The old electric light plant was converted into a municipal garage. Formerly there had been no central service shop, and repairs had been made, first, by local blacksmiths before vehicles were motorized and, later, by mechanics in private garages. Structurally, a staff service in one of the line departments might seem misplaced, but its location did not bother Hamilton's administrators.

A further indication of coordination was found in the work of the city storekeeper, who directed the salvaging of all discarded materials. When the quantity was sufficient to justify his action, the city purchasing agent obtained bids and sold the salvaged materials. The office of the central purchasing agent was established in 1928.

The other duties of the purchasing agent constituted a marked improvement over previous practice. By soliciting and insisting upon cash discounts on all purchases, the purchasing agent saved over \$1,700 in the eleven months of 1928 during which his office was in operation. This was the first time that cash discounts had been obtained on all purchases. Trade discounts were also obtained; they brought startling reductions in some instances from prices paid for the same materials in pre-charter times. In 1928 materials and supplies were purchased at from 5 per cent

to 80 per cent less than in 1927. The 80 per cent reduction applied only to coal for the electric plant during the last three months of 1928, after the expiration of the contract made by the last mayor-council administration. The grade of coal made little difference in the boilers of the old plant, which was soon to be scrapped. The manager and the director of utilities did not want to enter a contract for the purchase of coal for the new plant until they had experimented with different kinds of coal. Consequently, the council declared an emergency. Coal was bought on the spot market at an average price of 29 cents per ton f.o.b. mine. The contract price had been \$1.50 per ton. Soon after the new plant began generating current, purchase was resumed on contract, after advertising and competitive bidding required by state law and by the charter, and a price varying from \$1.25 to \$1.50 per ton was paid thereafter. The coal was selected after thorough tests to find the most economical grade. Checks were regularly made to insure conformity with the quality for which the contract was made. The director of utilities insisted, however, that coal could be bought much more cheaply on the spot market regularly, if the law permitted that procedure.

Asphalt sand (1,710 cu. yds.) was purchased during 1928 at an average price of \$1.45; the average price during the last year of mayor-council government had been \$2.70. Other price reductions claimed were: 33 per cent on street-marking paint; 30 per cent on wire and fir cross arms; 18 per cent on gas main clamps; 15 per cent on galvanized pipe; and 10 per cent on office supplies, street signs, and golf balls. In 1928 almost \$1,500 was turned into the city treasury, chiefly from the sale of junk copper, iron, and tires.

### *Personnel Administration*

Hamilton had had a bipartisan civil service commission of three members who served for overlapping terms from 1910 (when the provisions of a 1908 law went into effect) until January, 1928. Partisan removals had been restricted among subordinates, but it was not likely that meritorious service would be recognized by amateurish department heads who changed after almost every biennial election.

The principles of a merit system were more strictly observed and vigorously applied after the charter government began to operate in 1928. The charter, pursuant to the constitutional grant of "all powers of local self-government," provided for a single director of civil service in place of the bipartisan board. The director was responsible to the manager, whose interest in efficient administration was more immediate than

that of an elective mayor. The charter, by its elaborate provisions governing the department of civil service, emphasized the importance of a genuine merit system.

To be civil service director as well as his secretary, the manager, Mr. Price, selected E. M. Ladley, who had been president of the council when the Republicans controlled the government during 1924 and 1925. Aside from his wide personal acquaintance with municipal employees and other citizens, which made him a valuable aid to a manager new to the city, Mr. Ladley possessed no outstanding qualifications for administering a personnel system. But since no general discharge of employees was undertaken, the initial duties of the office were not too heavy, and he soon acquired a fairly adequate grasp of the fundamental techniques requisite to personnel administration. He was handicapped, as previously mentioned, by his duties as secretary to the manager. Furthermore, since the city made no allowance in addition to his salary of \$600 a year for personnel work (which by state law also included examinations for all classified civil service positions in the city school system), he did not have a membership in a professional organization, such as the Civil Service Assembly. He attended only the meeting of that organization which was held in nearby Cincinnati.

The director personally prepared, conducted, and graded examinations for all positions to be filled in the classified service. He certified the names of the three highest to the appointing authority. He also certified all payrolls for the classified service. He had only a minor role in connection with the suspension or the removal of an employee. Mr. Ladley and others connected with Hamilton's government upheld the charter provision that required a public hearing, when demanded by the person to be suspended or removed, to be conducted by the appointing officer rather than by the director of civil service. The latter only received and filed a copy of all relevant documents.

Up to 1939 only about ten removals had been made since Mr. Price began his work in Hamilton. Several employees demanded written copies of the charges, but the charter did not obligate the manager to hold a public hearing. Nevertheless, for the city engineer, represented by ex-Mayor Harry J. Koehler, an informal hearing was held on charges of insubordination and incompetency. He was removed June 7, 1928. The assistant city engineer was advanced to the vacancy some months later and was still the city engineer and the building commissioner in 1939.

While no formal system of in-service training seemed practicable for municipal employees in a city of Hamilton's size, some members of the

police and fire departments attended special training courses in Cincinnati or Columbus. Some of the clerical force attended night classes conducted by Miami University or by the University of Cincinnati. Such in-service training developed after the adoption of the city manager system. Employees found that their departmental chiefs could recognize merit and were also able to reward it with appropriate advancement.

Promotions for those in service, however, were obtainable only as a result of competition with others not in the city's employ, unless the work in the higher post was of a closely related nature. Several departmental directors and divisional chiefs who were incumbent in 1939 had served in the same or in subordinate positions for from eight to thirty years under the mayor-council government. There was no reason to believe that such career advancement had been retarded by city manager government. The few officials brought to the city by the manager were for positions for which no one then in municipal employment seemed adequately qualified.

For the rank and file of municipal employees, no marked change in compensation followed the establishment of the charter government. The number of employees was reduced in the finance and utility offices with the introduction of modern methods of billing and bookkeeping; but the salary scales for those retained were generally continued with little change. On January 1, 1928, the finance department's payroll carried twenty-five clerks, bookkeepers, meter readers, cashiers, and executives, whose salaries aggregated \$3,641.04 a month. By December 31, 1928, the manager had reduced the number to eighteen—who did more work at greater speed than the twenty-five had previously done—at a monthly saving of over \$1,000.

The manager installed a mechanical accounting system which was operated so as to provide him with a daily financial statement for every municipal service.<sup>1</sup> Neither the manager nor the director of civil service could tell, without laboriously counting the personnel cards, the number of city employees. But the manager, by the daily statement supplied by the director of finance, could at once tell how much of each department's funds had been expended—an indication of the type of control which the manager exercised over administration.

<sup>1</sup> President Edward J. Gardner of the last council under the mayor-council form says: "The last Federal Council would have installed the complete modern accounting system that is now in use in the municipal plant had it not been for the active opposition of the last mayor." This may be taken as one more indication of the costly friction that tends to develop when the executive and the legislative branches of government are independent of each other in their tenure.

The manager effected some economies by combining offices. On the other hand, some increases in personnel were made, notably, in the fire and police departments. Although the police department increased its force to a total of fifty-seven, it was not so large as it had been in 1913 when there were sixty-five in the department.

All employees of the city were entitled to retirement benefits by the provisions of a state law establishing a public employees' retirement system in 1938. Before the passage of this law and before the establishment of the manager plan the police and fire departments had had their own systems. Group insurance for employees in the department of utilities had been in operation since 1936 by action of the council on the recommendation of the manager and the director of utilities.

Employees were neither forbidden nor required to belong to unions of their crafts. No union or other organization of city employees, as such, existed. An annual picnic of employees, for which the council granted a half-holiday, was arranged through Mr. Ladley's office, presumably in his capacity as director of civil service. The *esprit de corps* seemed to be excellent.

### *Welfare Activities Little Changed*

The municipal functions least affected by the change to city manager government were those connected with health conservation and welfare activities. The leaders in the charter movement were concerned with the tangible, evident inefficiencies in utilities, streets, and general administration. The welfare activities of the community were outside their interests. Thus they were not inclined to insist upon a rigorous overhauling of existing arrangements, particularly since there was so little evidence that a change would result in marked economies or superior service unless much more money was applied to welfare purposes. The charter forces sought to reduce expenditures rather than to extend services—an objective being cited by opponents of the incumbent regime in an effort to reduce the strength of its popular support.

Another deterrent to the enlargement of control by the council and the manager in this field was the existence of voluntary boards of interested citizens who had identified themselves with a service. They were not disposed to turn over their prerogatives to a unified system that would take from them the control of services that they had been instrumental in creating. The Public Health League Nursing Association, the boards of the children's homes, and the Family Welfare Society felt that they were doing their jobs as well as the manager and his staff could do them.

The city's director of welfare exercised some supervision over the nursing association, whose staff received some financial aid from the city treasury. But efforts to coordinate these groups and to bring them all under the municipal administration were resisted with charges of wishing to "play politics with human misery."

### *Public Safety Department Improved*

The manager brought about many improvements in the department of public safety. He was himself the director of the department. Under him the police and fire chiefs handled the details of their divisions, or "departments," as they were usually called.

The police department was thoroughly reorganized and its equipment was modernized after 1928. Fingerprinting and photographing of all persons arrested on felony charges were instituted in 1931 by a member of the force who had been detailed to study these techniques in the state bureau of criminal identification. Maintenance of complete records of police activities, including all accidents reported to the police, was the task assigned by the manager to another member. An outstanding improvement was the acquisition in 1934 of seven police cruiser cars equipped with two-way radio sets. This innovation necessitated special preparation by members of the force assigned to the cars so that they might qualify for radio operators' licenses from the Federal Communications Commission. Two officers were assigned to each car, and one always had to be in it. The officers could immediately get into two-way communication with headquarters. It was also possible for the manager from his office or from his home to talk with the officers in any or all cars or to listen to conversations between them and headquarters.

Examinations given by the director of civil service for recent entrants were instrumental in bringing in better educated men. Indeed, the requirements for police service in Hamilton in 1938 were too difficult for the old type of "flat foot" to meet. Except for those who were assigned to patrol the business district and to direct traffic, there was no longer any serious occupational hazard of flat feet for Hamilton's policemen.

The manager not only raised the technical efficiency of the police department but he also destroyed Hamilton's former reputation as the hideout of criminals from Cincinnati and other metropolitan areas. Particularly during the prohibition era Hamilton had more than its share of criminals. Ridding the city of them was one of the early difficult tasks of the manager and his police chief. Their success was largely attributable to improved administration, although the growth of popular

interest in "public enemies" and their apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's G-men contributed to the more effective law enforcement by the local police.

The administration of the fire department was improved, although a fairly high standard had been maintained in this service prior to 1928. The manager found it necessary to bring J. C. Calhoun with him from Florida to serve as police chief and to build up the department; but he retained the incumbent fire chief until his retirement in 1929. Then the manager advanced a man who had been in the department since 1911 and who had been the marshal, ranking next to the chief, since 1918. A start in motorizing the service had been made in 1911 when two hose trucks were purchased. Complete motorization had been effected in 1919. Some of the equipment needed to be replaced by 1928; because of the expansion of the city a new station and additional equipment were also needed when Mr. Price became manager. Characteristically, he did not spend money for these purposes until he had obtained from fire insurance companies the promise that they would give property owners of the city lower rates when these improvements were made. When the improvements were completed, the insurance companies reduced rates, and the manager's 1931 report cited the substantial savings to the citizens.

The central fire company, police headquarters, and other city offices, such as the chamber of the council, the municipal courtrooms, and the city jail, were in the new city building, which was completed in 1935 with the assistance of a PWA grant. The building was located on the river front on the site recommended by the 1920 report of the city plan engineer. Thus had one vision been made a reality by Hamilton's city manager government!

### *Efficiency and Economy*

The leaders of the charter movement had also envisioned economical and efficient management. Statistical data indicate the realization of this objective.

The city building was financed by a bond issue of \$425,000 plus a PWA grant of \$251,000. Other unusual expenditures after 1928 included those for a new, deep-well water supply, for police radio cruisers, and for fire department improvements. Increases in personnel were made. Yet the total bonded debt showed a net reduction of over \$1,317,000 during the first ten years of Mr. Price's administration, bringing the total indebtedness down to \$2,571,000.

All financial operations of the city were conducted after 1930 without

borrowing from banks or from other private agencies. When funds were needed, either for some unusual purpose or because of delay in the county auditor's releasing to the city its share of tax funds, the council authorized the manager to sell the city's notes to the city's sinking fund commission. The cost to the city was much less than if money had been borrowed from the banks.

Operating expenses for the city's general governmental functions (which did not include utilities' operating expenses) in 1927 exceeded by 30 per cent those in 1937. These decreases, varying annually from \$89,000 to \$250,000, plus general bonded debt reduction during the same period, saved \$38.97 per capita.

This advertised saving, however, made a virtue out of necessity. The savings were the immediate result of tax limitations imposed by state constitutional amendments, particularly the one adopted in 1933 fixing the limit for all tax purposes at ten mills on the dollar. In addition the appraised value of property was reduced. In one year the state tax commission ordered a flat 20 per cent reduction in appraised values of property in the city of Hamilton. Finally, as mentioned previously, the voters of the city twice refused to let the council exceed the limits fixed by state law, although the council could have been empowered to do so.

It is indisputable, however, that large savings and improved service were obtained in the municipally owned and operated utilities. Consumers were given the benefit in lower rates; at the same time the city's general operating funds were not charged with electric current for street lighting or for water supplied to public buildings and hospitals. Gas rates were lower than when Mr. Price and his director of utilities took charge. Leakage from gas mains had been reduced quickly so that by 1930 it was only 4.3 per cent as against 31.3 per cent in 1927. Water rates were not raised, although consumers were supplied with softened water after 1935. The electric plant, begun in the last year of mayor-council government and opened early in 1929, was strictly modern with equipment of high efficiency. Rate reductions were made in August, 1929, in April, 1930, in February and November, 1931, in July, 1933, and in October, 1937. These reductions meant only temporary reductions in revenue. Increased sales brought revenues up within a year or two. Operating revenues of the municipal electric system were \$568,000 in 1928; in 1937, \$643,730. The kilowatt hours sold in 1928 were 12,377,000 and 25,154,039 in 1936, more than a 100 per cent increase. The excess of earnings over operating costs and debt and depreciation charges was mounting again; hence further rate reductions were planned.



*General Observations*

These evidences of efficiency and economy convinced many residents and many observers from other cities that city manager government was a success in Hamilton. Efficient and economical management of general governmental functions and of utilities had been the objective of the leaders of the charter movement. The leaders had been substantial citizens discontented with administration by frequently changing directors who had been appointed by partisan mayors and supervised by short-lived councils. Their discontent provided the effective stimulus for the movement to establish more businesslike administration under a city manager charter. Indisputably their objective was obtained. A remarkable improvement was made in the quality of the service rendered for each dollar expended both for general government and for municipal utilities.

The most serious danger to city manager government in Hamilton was that the citizens who sponsored the original movement might rest on their laurels and might ignore the challenge to assume a broader social outlook toward the functions that a modern, efficiently operated city should assume. Hamilton's council and manager were so intent on reducing per capita costs that they neglected to make outlays to increase per capita welfare in health, recreation, and welfare activities generally.

Their neglect or oversight was not a defect of the form of government. The effectiveness of this form for accomplishing certain objectives was demonstrated by Hamilton's record during the years between 1928 and 1939. The form may prove equally efficient for broader social purposes if the citizens come to realize these needs.

## Acknowledgments

IN PREPARING this survey of Hamilton's government for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my colleagues, W. F. Cottrell and Phillip H. Lohman, in collecting and verifying data within the fields of their special interests; and the valuable suggestions of a third colleague, Burton L. French. Members of my class in American city government aided by interviewing a score of prominent Hamiltonians. Louis E. Frechtling, a former student, later a Rhodes Scholar, and in 1940 a member of the staff of the Department of Government and Politics at Miami University, who has lived in Hamilton, gave liberally of his

vacation time to gathering additional facts and verifying many points in this report.

Material and information were generously supplied by the city manager, Russell P. Price; by his obliging secretary and director of civil service, E. M. Ladley; by the directors of administrative services; by the mayor, Raymond H. Burke, Leo Welsh, and other members of the council; by Ella Mae Cope, secretary, and other members of the charter commission; by the last two pre-charter mayors, Harry J. Koehler and Howard Kelly; the last president of the council, Edward J. Gardner; and the secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, John Northway.

HOWARD WHITE



AMES, IOWA

*John A. Vieg*

## CONTENTS

Transition to the Not-So-Great Change . . . . .	237
Ahead with Hopkins . . . . .	241
"Ames of Ames" . . . . .	244
The Manager as Administrator-in-Chief . . . . .	248
The Manager and the Public . . . . .	253
Significant Role of the Council . . . . .	254
"Made in Ames" and Still Indigenous . . . . .	256



## IMPORTANT DATES IN AMES' GOVERNMENT

Founding of the Village.....	1865
Incorporation of the Town of Ames.....	1870
Establishment of the Municipal Waterworks.....	1891
Organization as a Second-Class City.....	1893
Establishment of the Municipal Electric Plant.....	1896
Acquisition of the Municipal Cemetery.....	1917
P. F. Hopkins Appointed Director of Utilities and City Engineer.....	1919
First Manager Ordinance Enacted.....	1920
P. F. Hopkins Made "City Manager of Engineering" .....	1920
Revised Manager Ordinance.....	1927
J. H. Ames Appointed City Manager.....	1927



*Field Work: 1938*  
*Report Written: Spring, 1939*

# City Manager Government in Ames, Iowa

AMES IS A CITY of 12,000 residents and 6,500 college students living within an area of 5.7 square miles situated practically in the center of Iowa. The community was founded in 1865, was incorporated in 1870, was organized as a city of the second class in 1893, and was placed by ordinance under a modified form of the city manager plan in 1920. Ames acquired three-fourths of its population after the turn of the century. In 1900 the city covered about four square miles. Its one big enlargement—about one square mile—came in 1922. The population curve rose with striking rapidity: 2,400 in 1900; 4,100 in 1910; 6,200 in 1920; and 10,261 in 1930.

Though lacking industrial enterprises of any size or consequence, Ames is, nevertheless, a relatively wealthy city. This high economic level is owing to the location within Ames' borders of Iowa State College and the Iowa Highway Commission. The former has a \$14,000,000 plant, a staff of nearly 1,100, and an annual local pay roll of \$2,400,000; the latter employs in Ames a staff of 270 and expends currently \$480,000 a year for salaries. Flowing regularly into the community in the form of monthly pay checks, these sums contribute to the economy of Ames an element of stability so marked that they have safeguarded it from all except major fluctuations in the stream of middle-western commerce. The large and steady influx of visitors coming into the city to transact business with the college and the commission represents an additional cushion for the economy of the community.

The businessmen of the community were so far from being keenly conscious of the possibilities of Ames as a trading center that they allowed their Chamber of Commerce to pass out of existence. There are, therefore, no satisfactory figures available indicative of the volume of the city's commercial and industrial activity. There is a Junior Chamber of Commerce which engages in some civic work, but it neither collects nor keeps statistics on local business. Apart from the customary food, clothing, drug, hardware, and department stores, there are just a few special enterprises: a corn cannery, a jewelry, and a leather goods manufacturing company, a clay pottery works, a factory making collegiate garment

specialties, and two large dairies. During their rush seasons these firms employ, all told, several hundred persons. Careful statistics on the ratio of home ownership are not available, but because of the large number of college teachers who rent, rather than buy, homes it is estimated that home ownership in Ames may be a little under the average for Iowa cities.

Analysis of the racial composition of the city discloses a population 95.5 per cent native white, 3.9 per cent foreign-born white, and .5 per cent Negro. By national derivation the people of Story County are, in order of their numbers: Norwegian, Scotch, German, Canadian, Danish, Swedish, and English. The population of Ames alone is overwhelmingly Teutonic and Protestant. The male-female ratio in 1930 showed a slight preponderance of women, females exceeding males by 379 in a total population of 10,261. The proportion of adults gainfully employed is not known, but the special census of unemployment taken by the federal government late in 1937 revealed that the county in which this community was located had the lowest rate of unemployment in the country. A graph of the age composition of the population would reveal the greatest numbers between the ages of 35 and 44, both of men and women. For the years 1930-32 the average birth rate was 19.3 per 1,000, and the death rate 7.8 per 1,000.

The municipality owned in 1938 three of its public utilities: the water works established in 1891, the electric plant established in 1896, and the cemetery acquired in 1917. In addition, it owned the sewage disposal plant, the library, and the community hospital, Mary Greeley Memorial Hospital, received as a gift in 1916.

On January 1, 1938, the total valuation of all property subject to taxation in Ames was \$6,518,584, of which \$26,231 represented 506 acres of land within the corporate limits which was subject to taxation for road purposes only. The comparable valuation for the year 1919 was \$5,459,214.

Property was officially assessed at 100 per cent of its full value. Actually, the assessment ran between 40 and 50 per cent of the full value. The corporate millage levy during the fiscal year ending March 31, 1938, was 11.24 mills, a rate calculated to produce a revenue of \$58,712 or \$4.86 per capita. Delinquencies in the payment of 1937 taxes amounted in April, 1938, to slightly more than \$3,000.

The total general bonded indebtedness of the municipal corporation on March 31, 1938, was \$63,750, of which \$25,750 was outstanding for municipal industries. Special assessments for paving, curbs, and gutters

totaled \$97,000, making the grand total of all bonds of any character then outstanding \$160,750.<sup>1</sup>

All these facts combined to produce a community on the whole adequately fed, acceptably clad, and decently housed; a city conservative in social outlook yet progressive in governmental action; one favored economically by stability of income and favored politically by a great deal of the civic interest and the technical intelligence required for good government. The civic interest was latent rather than active most of the time, yet—and this, perhaps more than anything else, was the explanation of Ames' high standard of municipal management—it was available when needed. Cleanliness in politics and efficiency in administration became something of a habit for the people of the community. Apparently they wanted to keep it.

### *Transition to the Not-So-Great Change*

Like a good many other cities, Ames was "proud of her history but has not kept it very well." It is impossible to describe in detail the pattern of municipal government which existed prior to the adoption of the manager plan. Yet several pertinent things are clear. Ames had been free from politics, in the commonly accepted meaning of that word. The population being overwhelmingly Republican, party strife had been nonexistent in municipal affairs. There had not been anything resembling bossism or graft. On the other hand, the city had grown rapidly, and its government had failed to keep abreast of new needs and changed conditions. In view of the demands of the times it had been, as a former mayor declared, a "cheap government." Construction of a new city hall and a fire station had been completed in 1916, the municipal cemetery had been acquired in 1917, and fair progress had been made in the corporation's program of paving its streets and of enlarging and improving its public works and utility services. But passable government and average administration had not been good enough for a community increasing steadily in numbers and stature. Even though the residents of the city had thought they were being well governed, the leading members of the council had become aware that the public business of Ames was not operating on a genuinely sound basis. The government had been working to the limit of its capacities all the time. There had been practically no reserve either for future growth or for emergencies, and, with so small a margin to go on, a breakdown sooner or later had become a

<sup>1</sup> This figure does not include any part of the debt of the school district, which on June 30, 1937, amounted to \$149,000.



definite possibility. The leaders of the government set out to forestall any such event and they succeeded.

During the decade preceding 1919 direct management of the various departments of the municipal corporation of Ames had been entrusted to committees of the city council. The burdens which the aldermen were forced to carry by reason of this arrangement had been fairly light in the years before the World War, but because of a great jump in population (from 4,100 in 1910 to 6,200 in 1920) they had become heavy and exhausting by the end of the decade. Burdened with the details of street improvements, water supply, sanitation, and utility operations, the councilmen had first grown irritated and then annoyed with the duties of administration. Consequently, when in April, 1919, the council had to find both a new street commissioner and a new city engineer and, furthermore, learned that it would shortly have to secure a new manager for the municipal light and water plants, it occurred to several of the aldermen and to the mayor that it would be a good time to emancipate themselves from the responsibility for making numerous small decisions. The idea of having the council confine itself to the formulation of general policy and of entrusting authority and responsibility for execution to a single chief administrator had not, however, reached full bloom in the mind of any official at that time.

Looking back over their actions, we can see that the adoption of the new plan of government came through two distinct steps taken in filling the positions of street commissioner, city engineer, and manager for the light and water plants. Neither of these two events was destined to affect the outline of governmental structure on what may be called the political level. The council continued to be composed of six members, four chosen by wards and two at large, and the mayor continued as the political chief of the municipality. The public library of Ames and the Mary Greeley Hospital continued to be governed by separate boards chosen by the mayor and the council. There was no change in the control of the public school system. It had always been governed by a board of education elected directly by the voters of the community, and, as the law of Iowa provided, it remained entirely independent of the city corporate.

The first step began when Mayor E. H. Graves wrote to P. F. Hopkins in West Virginia offering him the position of city engineer.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Hopkins acknowledged in his reply that he really desired to enter municipal administration but, nevertheless, declined the position on the terms

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Hopkins had lived in Ames prior to 1917, being then on the staff of the Iowa Highway Commission.

offered. Sending a second letter, Mayor Graves inquired if Mr. Hopkins would accept a position as head of the engineering, electricity, and water departments combined. This offer was much more attractive than the first, and terms were soon arranged. Mr. Hopkins entered the service of the city on July 1, 1919, with no particular title, as he related the story, "excepting possibly an unofficial one of Director of Utilities."

The second step began ten months later when Dr. T. L. Rice was elected mayor to succeed Mr. Graves. One change introduced by the new mayor was a decision not to continue the man selected the preceding year to fill the position of street commissioner. What the reason was is neither clear nor important; in any event, the mayor requested the "Director of Utilities" to "look after" the street department until he could find a new commissioner.

Thinking that he would supervise the street department only temporarily, Mr. Hopkins acquiesced in the mayor's suggestion and proceeded to devote to the department such time as he could spare from his other duties. But, after two months had passed and there was still no sign of the selection of a new commissioner, he explained one night to the council that he would have to insist either that a new superintendent of streets be appointed or that he be given full authority to draft plans for the rest of the year and to direct the work accordingly. The logic of his remarks being perfectly clear to most members of the council, one of them—though it may have been the venerable city clerk—casually raised the question whether the time was not propitious for "passing that city manager ordinance we have been talking about."

The suggestion met with a favorable response. The mayor and the council decided to consider the idea in earnest; and the clerk and the solicitor were instructed to prepare a draft for formal consideration. An announcement of the proposal was made in the press the following day; a public meeting was arranged to be held in the council chamber before the end of the week; and on the Monday following, May 27, 1920, the ordinance was adopted.

To the man destined to be the first manager under the new plan the whole procedure seemed "casual and unpremeditated." There was, however, one councilman who had been working for this consummation for some time—John E. Brindley, then chairman of the Department of Economics at Iowa State College and alderman-at-large for the city. As chairman of the legislative committee of the Iowa League of Municipalities, he had played a leading part in securing the passage early in 1919 of a state law consolidating a whole group of separate municipal tax

levies. Enactment of this statute had made it possible to achieve more effective management of municipal affairs than had ever obtained before. Mr. Brindley had proposed (before the appointment of Mr. Hopkins) that the city should by all means avail itself of the opportunity. Stressing the negative consideration that the council was confronted in any event by the necessity of discharging its "harum-scarum utility engineer" and the positive one that the Iowa legislature had in 1915 passed enabling legislation for the adoption of the manager plan by ordinance, he argued that a manager ought to be appointed to administer all services under the newly combined levies and that the question who should be the new utility engineer was distinctly subordinate to the question whether the city should not have a general engineer-manager in charge of all its activities.

The proposal was sound in all its implications, but the city fathers were not prepared to give a full application to the principle embodied in it. Instead of creating an administrator-in-chief for all municipal services, they established an office carrying the infelicitous title of city manager of engineering and clothed with power not over the whole range of municipal activity but mainly over the department of streets, the electric plant, the water works, and the engineering operations. Aside from this major consolidation, the features of administrative organization were left practically unchanged.

As has already been indicated, there was never anything like a campaign for the manager plan in the community. It was discussed once before the Ames Commercial Club and there endorsed in principle, as the diplomats would say. It was criticized adversely by the *Ames Daily Tribune* on the day of the public gathering in May, 1920, to which reference has already been made. And the two speakers who addressed the mass meeting (the alderman, Mr. Brindley, and Louis B. Schmidt, professor in the Department of History and Government at Iowa State College) devoted their efforts not so much to a vigorous agitation for the plan as to a calm and objective analysis of its advantages.

There was no evidence that the movement was either supported or opposed by local political organizations, labor groups, or municipal employees. Mr. Brindley, however, credited the city clerk incumbent in 1920 and a local attorney destined to become judge of the municipal court a few years later with having contributed greatly to the final result.

On the basis of the facts thus recited, John M. Pfiffner, whose treatise, "The City-Manager Plan in Iowa," is the standard account of this form

of municipal government in the state up to 1928,<sup>1</sup> summarized the events leading up to the inauguration of the new system in these words: "Adoption of the city manager plan in Ames was not the result of popular indignation aroused by official corruption. It was entirely the voluntary act of the council, and the plan itself has never been an issue in municipal elections since the date of its inauguration." The final clause was as true in 1938 as it was a decade earlier. By 1938 nineteen years had passed since the enactment of the original manager ordinance, and there had never been anything in the nature of a drive either for the extension of the plan over the whole range of municipal activity or for its repeal. The people of the community had been only vaguely aware of the changes effected in 1919-20, and most of them remained uninformed about their legal character. It is doubtful if more than a dozen people in the community—outside its officialdom—realized that legally the council could have abolished the plan without warning and at a single meeting at any time during these two decades merely by repealing the ordinances on which it rested.

Such was the nature and the extent of the not-so-great change. The change marked two steps in the direction of unification of municipal powers in the council and of distinction between political and administrative functions—but only two. Whether the new arrangement would prove adequate to the needs of the growing community and whether additional steps would be taken in the future were questions to be determined largely by the caliber of the man chosen to serve as first manager and the willingness of the rest of the personnel to see the plan succeed.

### *Ahead with Hopkins*

Ordinance No. 319 which established the manager plan was rather poorly drawn. From having been a combined city engineer and superintendent of the light and water departments,<sup>2</sup> Hopkins became, in the language of the city clerk, manager of the engineering department and finally city manager of engineering. But he was far from clear about the precise nature of his rights and duties. He knew, of course, that he had inherited full authority and responsibility for the offices of city engineer, superintendent of electricity and water, and street commissioner, and that he had, in addition, become in a vague way the council's chief

<sup>1</sup> This study was printed in the *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, October, 1928, and January, 1929.

<sup>2</sup> This was the way in which the city clerk had him listed; meanwhile, as we have related above, he regarded himself as director of utilities.

administrative officer. Yet nowhere in the ordinance was there a plain and simple enumeration of his powers and prerogatives. Indeed, apart from the sections assigning to his office the four functions just named, the provisions written in the most explicit terms were those defining the position and delimiting the activities of the city clerk. In all, the instrument was so loosely drawn that, had it not been for the cooperative attitude shown by both the officers and the employees, the scheme might have collapsed before it had had a fair opportunity to prove its merits.

As it was, events moved smoothly and the new order got safely under way. The tradition of a city government free from politics stood the community in good stead. The man who was mayor when the manager ordinance was passed had four years in which to get the system into good working order; he was reelected in 1922 for a second term. The faithful clerk and the solicitor who had contributed so much to the thinking of the aldermen in all stages of their action remained steadily at their posts and cooperated loyally with the manager.<sup>1</sup> Only one of the six men on the council which enacted the managerial ordinance returned to that body for the following term beginning in March of 1922, but all five new councilmen supported the plan.

The manager, Mr. Hopkins, had become thoroughly conversant with the problems of the engineering, the light, the water, and the street departments during the year that had elapsed between his appointment as director of utilities and his selection as manager of engineering. Since he had already demonstrated his ability to handle these functions efficiently, his task consisted primarily of two parts. The first was to effect heightened economy in the operation of the departments under his control and to draw up for each long-range plans based on the expected growth of the city. The second was to make the entire personnel of the government management-conscious and to assist generally in the introduction of superior business procedures.

He achieved notable success in both fields. Since the council had been particularly eager to have the light and power plant put on a solid foundation, Mr. Hopkins concentrated on that department first. One of his earliest acts was the installation of an improved record system which enabled him to analyze costs more thoroughly than ever before. Another early move was to project the curves of population and plant capacity several years farther than they had previously been computed

<sup>1</sup> The clerk retired in 1934 after nearly forty consecutive years in the municipal service; the solicitor resigned in 1928 when he was elected judge of the newly created municipal court, a position which he still held in 1938.

and to anticipate increases in demand far enough in advance so that the danger of failure of output might be reduced to a minimum.

Major plant improvements were made on four different occasions during the seven years of Mr. Hopkins' tenure. In 1922 two 315-horse power boilers, feedwater heaters, and a 205-foot stack were added to the equipment. Three years later the department constructed a new primary feeder line to the Fourth Ward, the college section of the city, separated by three-quarters of a mile from the older parts of the community. In 1926 a 750-kilowatt turbo-generator and condenser were installed at the plant and, one year later, just before Mr. Hopkins' resignation, the purchase of a new coal and ash conveyor was completed. All these improvements were paid for out of earnings. Meanwhile the rates to consumers were revised on three occasions, upward in 1922 and downward in 1924 and 1926 to a point below the pre-war schedule. Popular appreciation of this progress found expression in greatly increased consumption; gross switchboard output rose rapidly. From a low of 1,500,000 kilowatt-hours in 1919 it jumped in eight years to approximately 4,300,000 kilowatt-hours.

Mr. Hopkins' record in the other fields specifically entrusted to him (engineering, streets, and water supply) was not so spectacular as that which he achieved at the electric plant, but it was highly creditable. The quality of work was enhanced while costs were lowered, and it gradually came to be known throughout the state that Ames had an extraordinarily capable manager. Stimulated by his suggestions, the council decided in 1924 to zone the community. When the zoning commission had completed its work, the manager was named the zoning enforcement officer. Buttressed by profits from the power plant, the council arranged in 1925 to purchase for the city the choice wooded tract, nineteen acres in size, later known as Brookside Park.

Inevitably, Mr. Hopkins' methods and achievements imbued the whole government with new vitality and confidence. Success gave him prestige, and prestige gave him influence even beyond the formal range of his authority. Not only in the departments under his official supervision but everywhere throughout the government, the officers and the employees of the city were put on their mettle and were made management-conscious to an extent remarkable in contrast to that of the previous decade.

In 1927 the managership of Mason City, Iowa (which had just adopted the plan), was offered to Mr. Hopkins at a salary considerably in excess of that which he was receiving in Ames. Willing to match the

money but unable to match the challenge offered by the larger city (its population at that time was approximately 23,000), the council reluctantly accepted his resignation. Yet another circumstance attendant upon his leave-taking attested the fullness of the success he had achieved as the city's first manager. When he suggested to the council that the provisions of Ordinance 319 did not adequately describe the activities for which he had been carrying responsibility, they instructed him to outline to the solicitor the provisions of a new ordinance, which they approved and passed immediately upon his retirement. The city had gone ahead a long way under Mr. Hopkins' management. After a smooth transition to its second manager, it was destined to continue its progress.

### *"Ames of Ames"*

In selecting John H. Ames as the city's second manager, the council again chose an engineer who had for some years been a resident of the community. His first position following graduation from Iowa State College in 1911 had been one as drainage engineer for Story County, but he resigned from that after one year to join the staff of the Iowa Highway Commission. Here he served successively as assistant highway engineer (one year), office engineer (three years), and bridge engineer (eleven years), the position which he occupied when the city of Ames made him its offer. From the standpoint of insuring a continuance of the brand of management Mr. Hopkins had furnished, the appointment was an admirable one. The two men not only had similar backgrounds in training and experience but resembled each other in many personal characteristics. Mr. Hopkins had made an enviable record; Mr. Ames not only wanted to carry on but had precisely the technical ability and the philosophic outlook that enabled him to do so.

What remains to be told of the experience of the community under the city manager plan—and it is the body of the story—revolves naturally around this man, "Ames of Ames." It may conveniently be presented in three parts: the relation of the manager to the mayor and the council, the role of the manager as administrator-in-chief of the municipal corporation, and the relation of the manager to the public.

### *The Manager and the Council*

Such had been the slow and steady accretion to the administrative scope of the manager from 1920 to 1927 that, as indicated above, the council punctuated the shift from Mr. Hopkins to Mr. Ames by drafting a new

statement of the powers and the duties of the office. Section 4 of the ordinance not only enumerated most of them but also, by implication, delineated the relations between the political and the administrative branches of the government. It is interesting as the embodiment of the specifications which Mr. Hopkins proposed to aid his successor. It read as follows:

1. He shall manage and have full control of the Electric Light and Power plant, its lines, poles and distribution system.
2. He shall manage and control the Water Works system.
3. He shall have charge of the streets, avenues, alleys and sidewalks of the City, and of their care, repair and maintenance.
4. He shall prepare, or cause to be prepared, all plans, specifications and plats necessary for the public improvements, see that all contracts in reference thereto are properly performed, and perform all other duties ordinarily attended to by a City Engineer.
5. He shall have charge of the making and preservation of all surveys, maps, plans, drawings, specifications and estimates for public improvements; the cleaning, sprinkling, and lighting of the streets, alleys and public places; the collection and disposal of waste and garbage, and the preservation of the tools, appliances and personal property of the City, under his jurisdiction.
6. He shall have charge of the sewers, drains and disposal plant.
7. He shall have charge of the cemetery, with the exception of the sale of lots therein, and of the burial records, which are in the hands of the City Clerk.
8. He shall have the charge of the buildings and real estate of the City, and be the custodian thereof, with the exception of the library and hospital grounds and the parks under the jurisdiction of the Park Board.
9. He shall have full charge and control of the fire department and shall appoint and employ the members thereof, subject to any rules of the Civil Service which may be in effect.
10. He shall have such control and supervision of the police department as the Mayor may at any time delegate.
11. He shall have power and authority to employ such assistants as he may deem necessary and to fix the compensation to be paid such employees.
12. He shall have power to discharge summarily and without cause any officer, appointee or employee, which he has authority to appoint or employ.
13. He shall have power to purchase and contract for fuel and supplies for the public utilities, and for all other material and supplies necessary for the performance of the duties herein set forth.
14. He shall, from time to time, recommend to the Council such measures as he may deem necessary for the better government of the City.



15. He shall be the enforcing officer under the zoning ordinance, of the fire limits ordinance and of any building code or ordinance that may be adopted.
16. He shall enforce the obligations of privately owned utilities which are enforceable by the City.
17. He shall attend all meetings of the Council.
18. He shall perform such other and further duties as may at any time be designated by resolution, or by other ordinances.

Among the "other and further" duties assigned to the manager, only three were of much importance. In another section of the ordinance of 1927 he was charged with preparing and submitting an annual budget covering the needs and the plans of departments under his control. (This he did in cooperation with the auditor-and-clerk.) Aside from variations in the extent of his authority over the police force, the only other significant changes in the manager's jurisdiction were made in 1938 when he was directed to supervise the work of the central purchasing office and, in addition, was authorized to appoint and to supervise a municipal milk sanitarian.

Table 1 shows the organization of local government in Ames as of January, 1939. From it one may discern at a glance what the governmental structure of the community was like as the end of the second decade of the city manager government approached.

The Ames council depended heavily upon the manager for guidance in policy formulation, and the contribution he made by a careful assemblage and organization of factual information pertinent to the numerous problems that confronted the city was a valuable one. Once or twice in the early years of Mr. Ames' service a member asked him for advice on a purely political question; by and large, however, he was not embarrassed by being asked for other than technical opinions or scientific information. His technical suggestions were customarily followed. Rarely did the council rely for advice on administrative officials other than the manager. The city solicitor and the city clerk were, of course, available on call, but an observer did not get the impression that aldermen went to them for other than simple points of fact.

The manager kept council members informed on administrative problems by a combination of methods: in preparation for each meeting, whether regular or special, he compiled a report touching every matter that in his judgment would be of interest to them; he kept an elaborate set of books and records which he showed whenever requested; sometimes on his own initiative and sometimes upon their invitation he drew up special reports on single topics.

TABLE I. ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AMES, JANUARY, 1939

*Elected Officials*

MAYOR. At large, for two-year term.

COUNCILMEN (6). One from each of four wards, two at large for two-year terms.

ASSESSOR. Two-year term.

TREASURER. Two-year term.

JUDGE, MUNICIPAL COURT. Four-year term.

CLERK, MUNICIPAL COURT. Four-year term.

PARK BOARD. Three at large for six-year terms.

BOARD OF EDUCATION. Five at large for three-year terms.<sup>a</sup>

*Appointed by Council*

CLERK AND AUDITOR.

ATTORNEY.

CITY MANAGER.

*Appointed by Mayor and Confirmed by Council*

CITY PLAN COMMISSION (7).

HOSPITAL BOARD (6).

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (3).

LIBRARY BOARD (9).

ZONING ADJUSTMENT BOARD (5).

PLUMBING EXAMINERS (3).<sup>b</sup>

RECREATION COMMISSION (9).

POLICE CHIEF.

*Appointed by City Manager*

FIRE CHIEF.

SUPERINTENDENT, LIGHT AND POWER PLANT.

SUPERINTENDENT, WATER WORKS.

STREET FOREMAN.

SUPERINTENDENT, CEMETERY.

PURCHASING AGENT.

MILK SANITARIAN.

All other employees in departments under manager.

---

<sup>a</sup> Separate election.

<sup>b</sup> Examinations for plumbers' licenses.

One consideration which induced the mayor and the council to lean so much on the manager was the fact that his analyses of community interests were usually projected far into the future. Patently, one of Mr. Ames' most worth-while achievements was to get the members of the council to extend the time-range of their speculations and deliberations

regarding the needs of the city. To one whose observation extended back to the pre-manager period, the contrast was remarkable. This comparison was drawn by a former mayor:

Before 1920 the problems of the city were generally handled on a temporary basis. We were always waiting for someone to take time to make a complete and long run study of an issue, as for example the question of how best to operate the generating plants. But that time was never taken until after the office of city manager was created. The situation today is quite the reverse of what it was prior to adoption of the manager system.

There was an increasing insistence that politics was politics and that administration was administration and that the twain should not meet except in a fashion calculated to preserve the prerogative of each. Councilmen knew that they had the field of political leadership to themselves, and they realized that the manager desired only to do the very best job of nonpolitical administration of which he was capable. They were fair about allowing him to run his departments without interference. Mr. Ames reported that in eleven years there were not more than one or two instances of even the faintest trace of councilmanic interference. Moreover, the council, on the whole, assumed willingly public responsibility for the manager's administrative acts. Individual members of the council had hidden behind the manager several times in the past, but for several years prior to 1939 there were no difficulties of that kind whatever. Since the manager plan itself was the expression of councilmanic action, there was nothing in it legally to protect the manager from interference from a council that might wish to encroach on his administrative functions. The manager's only protection was the tradition of good sportsmanship. Fortunately, it grew stronger with the years.

### *The Manager as Administrator-in-Chief*

High staff morale is indispensable to effective administration, and it animated the local public service generally. When Mr. Ames took command in 1927, he retained in municipal employment every person either qualified to handle the position he then held or able to fill acceptably some other necessary role in the work of the city. There was no purge calculated to arouse feelings of animosity or general insecurity. The first manager recruited and organized a staff on the basis of merit. The second and incumbent manager took full advantage of the situation and proceeded upon inherited foundations to build an even better staff for the discharge of municipal services.

The quality of the government and the long tenure characteristic of the staff established the manager as a good judge of men. His department heads showed a thorough capacity for their work, so that he was able to delegate to them an unusual amount of responsibility. Not only did he not insist upon passing on detail, but he had an admirable way of insisting that he not be bothered with details. He stated that the assistant manager "really runs the city." The remark did credit to both men: to the manager for success in delegating responsibility for routine administration and to the assistant for his ability to relieve the manager of concern over the normal run of business. Department heads went to the manager for consultation mainly on matters of salary adjustment for employees under their direction, on questions of major expenditures for equipment, and on the need for labor or special assistance not provided for in the budget.

Though his authority never extended over the whole range of municipal administration, the manager definitely came to be recognized as the administrator-in-chief of the city. As Table 1 reveals, there were several fields of action, such as police protection, accounting, and public health, over which the manager had little or no jurisdiction; yet this lack of full authority did not save him from criticism from the general public when something went amiss in these departments. He symbolized the city at work, and in their minds the people of the community held him accountable for everything that happened. Those who realized that his administrative powers were limited were comparatively few.

A theorist in public administration might say that the structural organization of the government of Ames was defective because it departed from principle in several particulars. To begin with, there were several local public functions, notably education, which were not integrated under the municipal corporation; and some functions although geared to the city proper were not integrated under the manager. Yet congenial personal relationships made up for logical deficiencies. As the manager said, "We are like a little family. We may conduct some of our business a bit illogically but we understand each other well enough so that we manage to get things done quite as well as if we followed orthodox theory at every point." The number of department heads reporting directly to the manager was reasonably small, about six, and the functions of each were well defined.

Personnel management represents by common agreement one of the crucial sectors of any administrator's job, but it did not prove to be a difficult problem for Ames. The first manager had something of a task

in building up a staff competent to direct the work of the various departments under his jurisdiction. His successor, the incumbent, had only to retain the men in office at the time of his appointment and, as occasion warranted, to find competent successors. There were so few changes made in the leading staff positions that the tenure of department heads during the city manager period demonstrated that the city had established a pattern of career service. The manager surrounded himself with capable subordinates by following two guides: the retention of good men already serving when he assumed office and the appointment of competent successors to fill vacancies later created. Statistical data were not available to document the point, but it was agreed in Ames that the municipality's record of tenure was better under the manager plan than it had been prior to the adoption of this form in 1920. In January, 1939, the average length of service of department heads as such was slightly more than twelve years.

Of the seventy regular employees of the city of Ames only the members of the police and fire department were under civil service regulations. Examinations of candidates for positions in these two departments were handled by a civil service commission, consisting of three members, which convened whenever there was a vacancy to be filled. The commission fulfilled its function in a satisfactory manner. Otherwise, except for employees in branches of the municipal government not under his jurisdiction, the manager's control over personnel was complete. He made all appointments and might legally remove any employee whenever, in his judgment, such action would be for the good of the service. Salary schedules and wage scales appeared to be fair and reasonable. It was the policy of the manager to pay employees under his jurisdiction salaries or wages equal to those of persons doing similar work in the most progressive cities in the state. On the municipally owned utilities it was his policy to pay salaries strictly comparable to those paid under private enterprise.

Turnover was at a minimum. There was never a period even under the old mayor-council system when city employees did not enjoy some security of tenure, but in 1939 they were practically on a career basis. The best tenure law imaginable could hardly give municipal employees in Ames greater security than they enjoyed—without benefit of law save for policemen and firemen—under the city manager plan. Of sixty-six employees on the regular pay roll of the city in June, 1938, including six employees with less than two years of service, the average length of service was 12.1 years. The city kept its employees on the pay roll as long as

their work was satisfactory, retiring them only when they reached an age beyond which they could no longer render efficient service. It had a pension and a retirement plan for policemen and firemen but not for other classes of employees.

As a result of the city's personnel practices, service with the city had in 1939 a creditable prestige in the community. Municipal employees were devoted to the city because the city demonstrated consistently over a long period that it would treat its employees fairly if the employees did their part. Without any doubt the years of the city manager system deepened and crystallized the idea that, if a government employee did his work well and stayed out of politics, he deserved a chance to work out a career in the public service.

To turn from personnel to finance is to discover an area in which the powers and the prerogatives of the manager were limited. The auditor and clerk was nominally the chief financial officer of the city, a fact traceable to the dominant position which that official had come to occupy in the period before 1920 and also to the circumstance that the same person held the office continuously from 1901 to 1934.<sup>1</sup> He maintained the central accounts and supervised current financial transactions. All bills due the city were paid in his office, and all obligations of the city were paid from his office. The annual budget of the municipality was worked out jointly by the manager and the clerk, the former assuming responsibility for all departments directly under his control, the latter for his own office and for other branches of the government under the mayor and council. Since the departments under the manager were those which required the larger sums, the manager was the principal budgeting officer, but both officials sponsored the document before the council. It covered every activity of local government within the community except education and consisted of about a dozen separate authorizations, each pertaining to a distinct fund. There was a lump sum appropriated, therefore, for each major service or activity, and the financial items were in every instance supported by plans for work to be accomplished with the money appropriated.

Under the city manager system, as generally before, the city lived within its budget. It was never necessary to make a deficiency appropriation at the end of the fiscal year. The municipal utilities were operated so efficiently that their surplus earnings were always more than sufficient to

<sup>1</sup> Because of some addition to his duties in the decade of the 1920's this official was legally known in 1938 not as clerk but as auditor and clerk. For convenience, however, he is often referred to here simply as clerk.

take care of whatever expenditures exceeded the appropriations. The bills incurred by the city of Ames were always promptly paid, and cash discounts were always secured. The idea of issuing tax-anticipation notes for current financing would be rank heresy in the community. There were never any outstanding warrants against the city for which there were no funds in the treasury. The financial status of the city of Ames was as solid as the proverbial Rock of Gibraltar. On March 31, 1938, its general obligation bonds outstanding totaled only \$38,000. There were, in addition, bonds in the amount of \$25,750 scheduled to be retired by the municipal industries and \$97,000 of special assessment bonds for paving, curbs, and gutters. The total debt of the corporation at that date, therefore, was only \$160,750.

Planning was something of a religion with both managers of the city. Mr. Hopkins (in 1939 appropriately director of the state planning board) had been able to say when he resigned in 1927 that, if plans then projected for the utilities were adhered to, they would safeguard the financial integrity of the community for all time to come. Mr. Ames showed a similar resolution to take a long view in anticipating the needs of the community. Plans for the electric plant and the water works included some developments extending twenty years into the future. Cemetery administration was being placed on the basis of perpetual care. Research on the problems of the city was a continuous process in the manager's office. A city planning commission was created in 1930, but, in comparison with the genuine accomplishments of the manager in his limited field, it began to get under way only several years later.

Aside from these procedures in personnel, finance, and planning, there were several other techniques of management worthy of mention. The manager made himself accessible to his staff. The door to his office was open to employees of the city at all times, and they exhibited a wholesome freedom about going to see him. Taking advantage of the small size of the whole municipal plant, the manager made almost daily tours of inspection of all activities. During an average day he had dozens of informal individual conferences with the key men among the city's seventy-odd employees. More significant, especially for the light and water plants, he worked out so elaborate a system of hourly, daily, weekly, and monthly reports that, even if he had stayed in his office, he would have known in considerable detail precisely how things were going. Another important feature of his work was the development of cost and performance records for the municipal utilities. Building on inherited foundations, Mr. Ames so perfected the record-keeping in these fields

that there was little, if anything, left to be desired. Allowance was made for every factor in the situation so that he was able to compute unit costs with a high degree of precision. Data for the light plant, for instance, were available showing the cost in cents per kilowatt of electricity produced, the number of pounds of coal required per kilowatt produced, and the cost in cents per gallon of water evaporated. Cross-use of equipment between departments afforded many economies. Finally, all purchasing was centralized in one person working under the manager.

### *The Manager and the Public*

The dominant consideration in the manager's relations with the public seemed to be the assumption that good work was its own best advertisement. His policy was apparently to do his work as competently as he could and to let its quality speak for itself. Agreement on this policy by the council, the mayor, and the clerk explained in large measure why the city had never in its history printed a good annual report. The manager prepared rather elaborate reports on the utilities every few years. These reports were mimeographed in numbers sufficient to enable all citizens strongly interested in the business affairs of the municipality to have one. Except in 1938 when because of the election the clerk prepared a thirty-page mimeographed report, he presented an annual report consisting of a single broadside of financial statistics.<sup>1</sup>

Yet the manager was by no means indifferent to the problem of interpreting the role of the city to the public and of building good will toward it. He made on the average two speeches a month within the city, and during a year he delivered as many as a dozen outside. He enjoyed cordial relations with the editor of the one local daily. In covering the city hall, the news reporter of the *Tribune* invariably drew more on the manager for information than upon the mayor or the clerk. "Open house" was staged occasionally at the water works and at the light plant to elicit the good will of the citizens. Every possible cooperation was extended to the teachers of high-school citizenship classes whenever they came to the study of municipal government. No citizen having business at the city hall ever had any difficulty in getting a chance to "talk it over with the manager."

With an even temper and a fine sense of humor, Mr. Ames got along with people easily and well. He belonged to the Rotary Club, the Masonic

<sup>1</sup> As a contribution to the celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the community, the city prepared in 1939 a rather elaborate and attractive booklet entitled, "Your City Government," in which was incorporated the *Annual Report for 1938-39*.



Lodge, the Country Club, and the Congregational Church. He was, moreover, energetic in his profession apart from immediate responsibilities at the city hall, being an active committee member and officer of professional societies, such as the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Association of State Highway Officials, the International City Managers' Association, the Iowa-Minnesota City Managers' Association, the Iowa Engineering Society, the American Public Works Association, and the League of Iowa Municipalities. During 1939 he was elected vice-president of the International City Managers' Association.

The manager arranged to have written complaints relayed immediately to the staff member within whose jurisdiction they fell. Complaints made over the telephone were received and filed by the switchboard operator, called to the attention of the manager, and referred by him to the proper party for action. For peculiarly unreasonable complaints the manager served as receiver himself. Sometimes the caller could be appeased or mollified by an explanation of the legal and financial limitations under which the city operated; if not, the manager used his discretion and complied with the request or not, whichever he thought best.

Cooperation by the city with other governmental entities was not whole-souled but some definite gestures were made in that direction. The city gave the board of education a special 15 per cent discount on all electricity used by the schools. The municipality and the school board did not engage in cooperative purchasing, but on request the city's purchasing agent supplied the superintendent of schools with information on the quality and the price of goods. The city's recreational commission and the school district's department of physical education co-operated effectively in administering a recreational program.

### *Significant Role of the Council*

No explanation of the long record of good government in Ames would be complete without emphasis on the importance of the roles played by the mayor and the council. The generally high quality of these men and their devotion to the welfare of the community explained as much as anything else the caliber of its politics and administration. For the munificent sum of one dollar a council meeting attended<sup>1</sup> and for the prestige that came from winning an electoral campaign every two years, the councilmen faithfully and intelligently promoted the public interest for as long as anyone living could remember.

Examination of the changing composition of the council from 1900 to

<sup>1</sup> The salary of the mayor was fixed at \$570 a year.

1938 did not disclose any startling shifts following the adoption of the manager plan in 1920. The council always included downtown business and professional men and professors on the staff of Iowa State College. In 1938 the professors held two councilmanic chairs and the mayoralty, and a high staff member of the Iowa Highway Commission sat in another councilmanic seat. If there was any change in the caliber of the council after the adoption of the manager ordinance, it was probably for the better.

The council met regularly on the first and third Monday evenings of every month. Its sessions began at eight and lasted until anywhere from ten to twelve-thirty o'clock. There were also special meetings particularly in the spring of the year when budget matters and public works projects for the building season were under consideration. There were six standing committees: finance and ordinance, electric light, sewers, streets and alleys, fire and water, cemetery and buildings. Most of the work of the members was done, however, not through committees but collectively with the elected mayor guiding their deliberations. Normally, after the council's stand on an issue was definitely settled, the mayor represented the policies of the city. When the council had no definite position, he usually helped the members reach a consensus. The position of mayor enjoyed as much prestige in 1938 as at any time during a generation, if not indeed more prestige.

The members of the council understood the theory of the manager plan thoroughly. They appreciated the fact that they were expected to take the initiative in the formulation of policy, and they assumed full responsibility in this field. There might have been times when they were influenced rather strongly by organized interest groups, yet the ten councils elected after 1920 had a large capacity for independent judgment. They were anxious to get information and were willing to take advice, but they left no doubt about who made the big decisions. They refrained conscientiously from interfering in the relations between the manager and the employees and officials under his supervision, and they defended him courageously against criticism arising from the administration of their policies. When it appeared, for example, in the campaign of 1938 that an opposition faction was trying to fasten the political mistakes of the regime then in power on the manager, there was a creditable disposition on the part of the men on the council to take the blame themselves and to defend the manager.

So long as the people of the community keep on electing mayors and councils of the caliber typical of the twenty years prior to 1938, the danger

of any relapse to mediocre government will be, if not nil, then at least negligible.

*"Made in Ames" and Still Indigenous*

The aim of city government, it has been said, is "not to satisfy the experts but to satisfy the people." That statement epitomizes the philosophy of Ames. When Mayor Graves and his council decided in 1919 that it would be desirable to combine the engineering, the electricity, and the water departments and to put them under a single director, they gave birth to an idea generated out of their own experience. Though not altogether unmindful of the experiments in integrated management in which other cities were engaged, they entertained no thought of re-fashioning their government upon a model fabricated far from home. What they did—and what the mayors and councils of Ames always tried to do—was to find a way to improve a concrete situation that confronted them. They were never concerned to achieve a logical organization such as an expert might devise for a city in Utopia.

Committed to making improvements only when and where they were really needed, Ames changed its ways so gradually that many of its new departures were practically indiscernible for several years after their inception. Ames prided itself upon having invented its own system of government, and it was justified in its pride. For despite the lack of a nice conformity by the government of Ames to any standard model, it worked and it produced good results. The police force took its instructions on traffic regulation from the manager and its orders on other services from the mayor, and it managed to serve both masters satisfactorily. No one knew precisely where the responsibilities of the manager and those of the clerk in the field of finance were divided, yet financial management proceeded smoothly.

In 1919 the idea of consolidating several local public services under a single manager accountable to the city council arose indigenously out of the political soil of the community. It received only a partial and limited application but contrived, nevertheless, to prove its validity and worth. Its reward came in the form of a series of extensions which continued and which promised to be projected into the future. The city manager plan had assurance of continued growth in the experience that constantly produced a wider understanding of its efficiency and a deeper appreciation of its democracy.

DAYTON, OHIO

*Landrum R. Bolling*

## CONTENTS

I. Introduction . . . . .	259
II. The Coming of City Manager Government . . . . .	265
III. The New Order . . . . .	273
IV. A Period of Uncertainty . . . . .	282
V. The Years of Stability . . . . .	286
VI. Organization . . . . .	297
VII. Administrative Practice and Problems . . . . .	304
VIII. Summary and Appraisal . . . . .	317



### IMPORTANT DATES IN DAYTON'S GOVERNMENT

Incorporation .....	1805
City Manager Government.....	1914

---

Henry M. Waite, Manager.....	1914-1918
James E. Barlow, Manager.....	1918-1920
William C. Barber, Manager.....	1920
Fred O. Eichelberger, Manager.....	1921—



*Field Work: Summer, 1938*  
*Report Written: February, 1939*

# City Manager Government in Dayton

---

## I. INTRODUCTION

IN THE LATE months of 1795 certain men traveled northward from Cincinnati to look for land and a site on which to build a new city. Only a short sixty miles away they found what seemed a suitable location. In a broad flat basin surrounded by low-lying hills three rivers and a sizeable creek came together. Near at hand were timber and deep rich soil and up the rivers and over the hills more fine valleys and plains stretched into the distance. Soon this surrounding area was to begin filling up with settlers from the East, for already more and more of them were crossing the Alleghenies to find new homes in the Northwest Territory. Here was, undoubtedly, the logical place for a trading center and these backwoods town planners recognized it as such. The following spring they laid out streets and lots, built homes, and, to honor one of their leaders, named the town Dayton. In the year 1805 the community was incorporated, two years after Ohio had become a state.

One hundred and forty-three years after the arrival of those first settlers one is still struck by the fact that where Dayton is there a city should be. Since 1888 the shifting center of population for the United States has hardly ever been more than a hundred miles away. Important streams of traffic, by highway, railroad, and air, cross through Dayton. Raw materials and markets are within easy reach. And to these geographic advantages have been added considerable local inventiveness and business enterprise.

Out of the bicycle shop of the mechanically-minded Wright brothers, Orville and Wilbur, came the flying machine to make Dayton famous. In another local workshop Charles F. Kettering developed the self-starter and the small home electric plant, and in 1938 almost half Dayton's wage-earners were employed in making these and associated products. But even before the day of Mr. Kettering and the Wrights other Daytonians had begun the manufacture of cash registers, computing scales, and railway cars, and a major portion of the economic

life of the community centered then, as in 1938, around the National Cash Register Company. As long ago as the 1870's Dayton was spoken of as a "place of great industrial activity and one of the most important of the interior cities of the United States."<sup>1</sup> Long continuing and specialized industrial activity made possible for many years a steady growth and an increasing prosperity.

In 1938 Dayton's industrial activity was concentrated chiefly in the production of machinery and mechanical equipment. Within these fields there was considerable diversity, but there was a feeling, expressed here and there in the literature of the Chamber of Commerce, that for a better-balanced local economy Dayton should be manufacturing such nondurable goods as shoes, clothing, and furniture. A list of the chief commodities produced in Dayton includes the following: accounting machines, auto accessories, cash registers, electric refrigerators, fare recorders, fire extinguishers, government stamped envelopes, lifting jacks, paper and paper mill machinery, precision tools and dies, pumps, rubber goods, computing scales, taximeters, and printed matter. In 1937 there were 437 factories in Dayton, 50,963 wage-earners, and an annual pay roll of \$94,570,000.

Until the end of the World War almost all Dayton's industrial enterprises were owned and managed by local people. The giant Barney and Smith car works belonged to two Dayton families. The National Cash Register Company, swiftly burgeoning into nearly a world monopoly, was the property of the Pattersons. Delco products became familiar to every automobile driver and to many a rural home-owner in the days when the Dayton Electric Laboratories Company was a locally owned and managed concern. But national trends toward economic centralization brought significant changes. Mr. Kettering and his associate, Colonel Deeds, transferred their Delco holdings to General Motors, a firm which, some reproachful old timers believed, took Dayton over as its own special province. The Barney and Smith car works, with the post-war decline of the railroads, found itself finally forced into bankruptcy. Even the National Cash Register Company, which under the late Patterson brothers was as self-sufficiently independent a firm as might be found, placed itself under the tutelage of New York bankers. In general, Dayton tended increasingly to merge itself and its industries into the general business structure of the land. In many important respects its problems in 1938 were representative of the problems of any other industrial community in this machine-age America.

<sup>1</sup>"Dayton, Ohio," *The New American Cyclopaedia* (1872), vol. vi.

In population Dayton was slowly rising toward the quarter-million class, but the rate of increase after 1930 was much less than during any previous decade. The proportion of foreign born in Dayton's estimated population of 215,000 in 1938 was fairly close to the national average. The percentage of native-born whites was somewhat higher than for the nation at large, but Dayton, too, had its foreign and Negro sections. Of the foreign-born group more than a third were German, and of the 41,772 Dayton residents listed in the 1930 census as being of foreign white stock, 19,026, or almost one-half, were of German origin. To a considerable extent the group kept its racial identity. It maintained two local native-language newspapers and exerted considerable influence upon the community as a whole.

Other major racial groups, not nearly so large or so distinct as the Germans, were the Hungarian, British, Russian, Polish, and Italian. In the period after the war the foreign-born population in Dayton declined both actually and relatively. According to the census of 1920 the number of foreign born was 13,165, or 8.5 per cent of the total population. By 1930 this number had fallen to 12,094, or barely 6 per cent.

With the falling off of immigration from overseas came the new migration of Negroes and poor whites from the South. First noticeable during the World War, this trend became increasingly pronounced in the decade which followed, and, although checked by the depression of the early 1930's, was continuing in 1938. No statistical studies are available on which to base any exact appraisal of the extent of this migration, but various long-time residents of Dayton vouch for its existence and the reality of its concomitant problems. Some suggestion of its extent may be found in the census figures for 1910, 1920, and 1930. Analysis of the 1930 census figures reveals that of the 65,764 residents of Dayton who were not born in Ohio but in other parts of the country 45 per cent came from the southern states, chiefly Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Virginia, and Alabama. While Dayton's white population increased by 28.1 per cent between 1920 and 1930, its Negro population grew 89.2 per cent within the same period. Meanwhile, the Negro population for the nation as a whole had expanded only 13.6 per cent.

These population shifts had marked effects on the general social and political life of the community. During periods of relative labor scarcity the influx of cheap nonunion labor was welcomed, for Dayton's business men then thought of their community as an ever expanding industrial metropolis. But in 1938 the most pointed evidence of the presence of these new groups was their high incidence on relief rolls.



In politics Dayton, from 1890 on, bestowed its favor in about equal measure upon the two major political parties. In swinging from one to the other in national elections it tended to parallel the national trend. Even James M. Cox, a local man, as the Democratic candidate for president in 1920 was not able to win a majority of the votes cast in Dayton at that overwhelmingly Republican election. Yet, in keeping with prevailing Democratic sentiment at other times, Dayton gave Woodrow Wilson a plurality in 1912 and a majority in 1916 and gave Franklin D. Roosevelt impressive majorities in 1932 and 1936.

One of the most interesting phases of Dayton's political history was the rise and fall of the Socialist party, which had a natural base in the social-democratic philosophy of the more class-conscious German immigrants. In the election of 1912 the Socialists polled more votes for Debs in Dayton than were cast for Theodore Roosevelt and their total was only slightly smaller than that of the Taft Republicans. Their activities in municipal affairs were for a while so successful that they and many of their opponents felt that it could be only a matter of time until Socialists would control the Dayton government. However, the coming of the World War produced in Dayton, as elsewhere in America, a violent anti-Socialist reaction. The prosperity of the 1920's further weakened the party, and the popularity of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal among workingmen all but wiped it out of existence. What little political rebelliousness there was in Dayton in 1938 found feeble expression through the Ku Klux Klan, the Townsend Club, and the Workers' Alliance, a union of the unemployed.

Evidences of underprivilege and special privilege, of course, might easily be found in Dayton, but those most likely to complain maintained an attitude of quiet resignation. The unemployed, who with their families numbered between 40,000 and 50,000 in June, 1938, existed after a fashion on their payments from the WPA or local direct relief. Few of them joined the Workers' Alliance, and in general their relations with the relief authorities were peaceful. Whether it be true or not that Dayton's unemployed were indifferent to their lot in life, and some of their would-be leaders said that they were, they appear to have been not overly impressed with the ways of salvation offered them by self-help cooperatives, militant unionism, or the Communist party.

So far as superficial evidences of culture and civic responsibility are concerned, Dayton deserves to rank high among cities of its size. Its library facilities are excellent and much used. Its three daily newspapers are locally owned and intelligently edited. The million-dollar Dayton Art

Institute is one of the local show-places in which the community takes greatest pride. There are two institutions of higher learning: the University of Dayton with about 1,200 students and Bonebrake Theological Seminary (United Brethren). The wealthy people of the community have long taken an active interest in initiating and supporting various cultural activities and have donated much of the city's park lands, the space for the municipal airport, and, at times, equipment for government services of various kinds.

After the war there was an increasing exodus of Dayton's upper-class families into the countryside beyond the corporate limits. This escape from the city, of course, tended to weaken the sense of civic responsibility of families which had previously shown considerable leadership in dealing with the community's problems. Or, like those who moved to a wooded ridge just south of the city limits, they created for themselves new civic responsibilities by setting up a separately incorporated community. This particular development, Oakwood, was in 1938 a city of approximately 8,000, with its own city manager government, its own school system, and freedom from the relief problem. Except for the greater costliness of Oakwood's housing, there was nothing to distinguish it from the part of Dayton which lay just beyond their joint boundary line, yet Oakwood citizens steadfastly refused to let their fine homes be annexed.

Within the poorer sections of Dayton proper there are many indecently bad houses. Mostly they are single dwellings, flimsy little clapboard shacks huddled together in dreary rows. Such houses do not predominate but they appear to be much more numerous than the fine homes on the edge of town. By far the greater portion of the people of Dayton live in comfortable but unpretentious single-family houses. Multiple housing, whether expensive apartments or cheap tenements, never gained much favor in Dayton. Surveys in 1910, 1920, and 1930 revealed that in the percentage of homes owned by their occupants Dayton was within the upper quarter of the list for American cities of comparable size. In 1930, 47.4 per cent of Dayton's houses were occupant-owned.<sup>1</sup>

Correlated with this high incidence of home ownership there long was a shortage of local capital for industrial and trade purposes. In one of its publications for 1929 the Chamber of Commerce remarked that the capital created in Dayton was in only small measure available for commercial credit. "Dayton's bank deposits," it pointed out, "are low compared with other cities, but Dayton's Building and Loan Association

<sup>1</sup> U. S. Census, 1930, v. ii.

assets per capita are \$860, which is probably not equaled by any city in the world. Truly liquid capital is scarce in Dayton.”<sup>1</sup> And in 1938 a large share of local savings was still invested in building and loan associations.

The publicity pamphlets about Dayton contained recurring accounts of the community's peaceful industrial relations. Dayton was in general an open-shop town. The labor unions were cooperative and conservative. What union strength there was, was largely concentrated in the building trades. Strikes were rare, short, and generally unsuccessful. But Dayton did not escape completely the rise of industrial unionism during the years prior to 1938. Several C.I.O. unions were organized in Dayton factories, chiefly in the plants of General Motors. They did not, however, have in Dayton the spectacular achievements which accompanied their organizing campaigns in some other cities. Still, their mere existence caused the local businessmen considerable fright and raised the A.F. of L. unions to a state of even greater respectability than they had occupied before.

The reason Dayton's wage-earners were peaceful and contented, it is sometimes said, was that Dayton's industrialists were model employers. To the extent that this is true, chief credit should perhaps go to the late John H. Patterson, who set an example in employee welfare work which many employers followed but scarcely ever equaled. Health clinics, a library, a continuation school, free movies, lectures, concerts, a company country club—these advantages and others were lavished on the employees of the National Cash Register Company. That tradition continued and in part explains why Dayton remained an open-shop town.

In addition to Dayton's favorable geographic location, its high percentage of home owners, and its peaceful labor conditions, civic boosters talk proudly of good government. “Hasn't Dayton had city manager government for twenty-five years? And isn't that the best kind of city government there is?” Such inferential questions seem to be representative of the attitude of Dayton's average citizens toward their government.

To relate the principal happenings of those twenty-five years of city manager government in Dayton and to appraise the effect of the city manager plan in its political and administrative aspects are the purposes of this study.

<sup>1</sup> Dayton Chamber of Commerce, *Facts About Dayton* (Dayton, 1929), p. 34.

## II. THE COMING OF CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT

THERE WERE in 1938 some older citizens in Dayton who remembered the city government which preceded the manager form as not an unusually bad one. There were even a few unconverted persons who insisted that the 1938 administration was no better than that of the pre-manager days. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1913—following the complete breakdown of the government during the disastrous flood of the preceding spring—a large majority of the citizens of Dayton had come to hold such a low opinion of the form, the policies, and the personnel of their municipal government that they decided to discard all three.

The reason generally given for Dayton's revolutionary change in government is that the citizens became aroused in a determination to "end government by deficit" and to establish efficient, nonpolitical, business administration of municipal affairs. Such indeed were the slogans of the charter campaign, but they hardly present a realistic explanation of the reasons why the campaign was undertaken and why it succeeded so notably. The ordinary citizens were generally indifferent to matters of administrative efficiency and finance so long as essential services continued and they were inclined to tolerate a certain amount of petty graft and political manipulation so long as there were no evidences of direct stealing from the public treasury. By these none too exacting standards the old city government of Dayton was, perhaps, passing fair, whether under the control of Democrats, Republicans, or a combination of both.

The government organization of Dayton was then much the same as that in other Ohio cities under the state municipal code. The elective officials were the mayor, the auditor, the treasurer, the solicitor, the judge, and the clerk of the police court, as well as the members of the city council. The mayor, as the chief administrative officer, appointed and controlled the director of public service, the director of public safety, and the city sealer. He also appointed, but did not necessarily control, the board of health, the park commission, and the sinking fund trustees. With the county prosecutor and the county auditor he was a member of the budget commission, which determined annually the tax income of the city. His salary was \$5,000 a year; his term of office two years.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dayton Bureau of Municipal Research, *Shall We Change Our City Government?* (Dayton, 1913), pp. 5-6.

The council consisted of fifteen members, elected every two years, one from each of the twelve wards and three from the city at large. Their duties were to initiate and pass all legislation, including the semi-annual appropriation ordinances, and to concur in the appointments of the mayor. Moreover, in practice they exercised the right to review almost every act of the mayor, and, through a feeble civil service commission which they appointed, the councilmen also had an important hand in the selection of personnel for the entire city government.

In general the people who filled the chief offices in the city administration were active political partisans. Whether elected or appointed, they owed their positions to the favor of one of the two major party machines. There was the customary solicitation of campaign funds from city employees, and occasionally firms which had done business with the city were "given an opportunity to contribute" to the party in power. City purchases were handled in such an informal fashion by each department that there could be no guarantee that full value was being received from these expenditures. In financial management the city officials were far from skillful. Prior to 1914 six successive years ended with deficits in operating expenses. On occasion long-term bonds were issued to pay for salaries, current bills, street lighting, street repairs, and cleaning sewers.

A small group of individuals became disturbed over these evidences of bad administration, and some of them pointed out that the city government did not offer the people as many tangible services as it should. Slowly there developed a feeling that the city should have some system for collecting rubbish, a health department able to cope with epidemics, a larger park area than the existing thirty-five acres, and at least a few playgrounds and that these services could be provided through a more efficient use of existing revenues. There was, however, no long-seething citizen revolt such as frequently presages a change in government, and until after the flood the only serious advocates of major reforms were a few businessmen. One of their number, John H. Patterson, as early as March, 1896, in speaking at the Dayton centennial celebration, had suggested the general objectives for a program of municipal reform:<sup>1</sup>

A city is a great business enterprise whose stockholders are the people. . . . Our municipal affairs would be placed upon a strict business basis and directed, not by partisans, either Republican or Democratic, but by men who are skilled in business management and social science; who would treat our people's money as a trust fund, to be expended wisely and economically, without waste, and

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Chester E. Rightor, *City Manager in Dayton*, p. 2.

for the benefit of all the citizens. Good men would take an interest in municipal government, and we should have more statesmen and fewer politicians.

Little by little that conception of municipal government as a "business enterprise" to be conducted on a "strict business basis" by men skilled in "business management" gained popularity in Dayton, particularly among businessmen. They felt themselves akin to the businessmen who reformed the governments in Dallas, Texas, and Des Moines, Iowa, where the commission form of government had been instituted, and in Staunton, Virginia, and Sumter, South Carolina, where the administration of city affairs had been turned over to appointed managers. Municipal reform was in the air. And in September, 1912, the state of Ohio added to its constitution a home rule amendment, thus providing a way of escape from the old municipal code which had imposed a rigid pattern of government upon the cities of Ohio. In the vital area of local finance, however, the state retained firm control: "Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes." (Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.) This declaration merely emphasized an already existing provision of the constitution:

The General Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities . . . by general laws; and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power. (Art XIV, Sec. 6.)

Statutes passed in accordance with these sections of the constitution, some students of Ohio government believe, have been no less serious a detriment to progressive and responsible municipal government than was the old federal form of organization. (Their effect upon the Dayton government will appear from time to time in the ensuing discussion.) But in 1912 the reformers' chief concern was to change the *form* of local government. It is small wonder then that they accepted as a sure beginning of a new era the charter section of the home rule amendment:

The legislative authority of any city . . . may . . . by vote of its members, and upon petition of ten per centum of the electors shall forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question, "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" . . . The ballot containing such question shall bear no party designation and provision shall be made thereon for the election from the municipality at large of fifteen electors who shall constitute a commission to frame a charter; provided that a majority of the electors voting on such a question shall have voted in the affirmative. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 8.)

In addition to this invitation for cities to revise their governments if they wished, the state government prepared suggested outlines for three types of municipal charters: commission, city manager, and the old federal form.

Immediately after the passage of the home rule amendment, the president of the Dayton Chamber of Commerce appointed a committee of five of the most prominent business leaders of the community to consider plans for initiating a charter campaign. Simultaneously with the setting up of this committee, its chairman, John H. Patterson, organized the Bureau of Municipal Research, which he personally financed. This new organization plunged forthwith into an aggressive campaign of public education, ferreting out instances of poor administration (none too difficult a task) and exposing them to the public gaze. With the help of one of the local newspapers the bureau made an investigation of commission government, which was then becoming increasingly popular in the South and West, and gained a large hearing in Dayton for its enthusiastic reports.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Chamber of Commerce began to suspect that its open sponsorship of a new charter might seem an evil omen to many of the ordinary working-class voters. Accordingly, it ceased its official participation, and the original committee of five was expanded to fifteen, then twenty, and finally became the Citizens' Committee of One Hundred, which in turn grew into a sort of reform-movement caucus of two hundred. Thus was it possible to pay tribute to democracy and to improve the chances of success at one and the same time. Open meetings of the committee were usually well attended, and there was free discussion from the floor. But always at the center of attention were the original leaders and their ideas; ideas which from the beginning had centered around a proposal for some sort of chief executive who would be an appointed administrative expert. Eventually the entire group of two hundred recorded its approval of the proposal for a city manager to be appointed by a small commission elected at large. Through balloting by mail the caucus selected fifteen of its members pledged to this plan as candidates for the charter commission.

With every indication that the voters would endorse the general proposition of a new charter, the Socialist and Democratic parties each

<sup>1</sup>The leaders of the movement took their task seriously and devoted considerable time to reading the current literature on municipal administration. Henry Bruere's *The New City* (Appleton, 1912) was carefully studied as well as reports on the *Bürgermeister* government of German cities and the new manager government of Sumter, South Carolina.

entered a slate of candidates. But the Republicans, many of whom had been absorbed into the Citizens' Committee, made no nominations.

The city manager advocates had certain natural advantages from the beginning. They had money, as much as would be needed to finance a thoroughgoing campaign. Their leaders were men of great vigor and resourcefulness, and they looked upon their cause as a crusade against political evils and for progressive social reforms. They condemned the existing regime for an inadequate police force, for dirty streets, for faulty public works, for its meager program of public welfare. They charged that there had been "shady" municipal contracts and that only those with political influence could enter the public service. Such evils, they insisted, would disappear with the change to city manager government.

The Democrats and the Socialists, while their proposals differed in details, agreed on the desirability of retaining the ward system and the general structure of the old so-called federal form of government. Both used similar campaign tactics. They denounced the city manager plan as a scheme of the business interests to gain perpetual control of the government. The manager would be an irresponsible autocrat. With a small council elected at large only rich men could afford to run for office. The whole business, they said, was an effort to destroy democracy. And then, two months before the election, came the flood.

Heavy rains in the latter part of March, 1913, raised the water level in Dayton's three rivers higher and higher along their banks, and, when a reservoir up one of the streams broke through its retaining wall, a full-sized flood soon spread itself over the flat, low, central section of the city. Thousands of people were marooned in their homes and places of business, about four hundred people lost their lives, and about \$100,000,000 worth of property was destroyed. Water stood eight feet deep along Main Street. The ordinary life of the community was paralyzed, and the city government was unable to meet the emergency. The mayor was one of those rescued at home.

Almost immediately the governor of Ohio declared martial law in Dayton, but before the militia could arrive John H. Patterson had taken charge of relief activities. He turned his cash register factory—located on safe high ground—into a giant refugee station with dormitories, hospital, and dining rooms. With a surprising display of dexterity, his men and machines began turning out boats in mass lots. The governor gave him a commission as colonel in charge of citizen relief.

Out of the crisis period came new stories about Mr. Patterson's organizing genius, his civic vision, his generosity. One of his contem-



poraries described Mr. Patterson as "a man of benevolent and autocratic impulses." There remain about him a great many anecdotes which tend to confirm that characterization and which also indicate the nature of his interests. One morning, so one story goes, as he was being driven from his home to the factory, Mr. Patterson decided that something should be done to improve the appearance of a shabby neighborhood through which he passed every day. By the time he reached his office he had the answer. Summoning a group of his workmen, he outlined his plan; soon they were going from house to house asking the occupants if they would permit their houses to be painted—at Mr. Patterson's expense.

On another occasion, not long before the advent of city manager government, Mr. Patterson became disgusted with the unsanitary and dilapidated condition of the city market house and what seemed to him an inexcusable delay in having repairs made. After giving the official in charge an emphatic and public tongue-lashing he dispatched a crew of repair men on his own pay roll to the market house and had things set right in short order. Grateful shoppers and shopkeepers held a celebration in Mr. Patterson's honor when the work was finished.

One of his chief civic interests was a federation of improvement associations, which grew out of an organization he created to improve the neighborhood adjacent to his factory. When the city manager movement got under way, it was natural that many who had been active in these neighborhood improvement organizations should follow Mr. Patterson's leadership in another kind of clean-up campaign. In 1938 John H. Patterson was remembered by many who took part in the charter election as "the man who put it over."

With reports of these philanthropies the newspapers carried accounts of petty bickering between municipal officials and the militia and of a squabble in the city council over whether a Democrat or a Republican should fill a vacancy on the health board. The Citizens' Committee and the *Dayton Journal* were quick to point the moral implicit in this contrast. In the weeks which followed John H. Patterson became more and more a public hero, and the city manager campaign, linked with his name, gained momentum.

How much effect the various circumstances connected with the flood had upon the outcome of the charter election it is impossible to judge. Several of the more prominent citizens who had previously been undecided announced publicly that the flood had convinced them that the old government could not function in a time of crisis and would not be equal to the task of reconstruction which lay ahead; hence they proposed

to support the manager campaign. Probably a large number of other citizens reached similar conclusions. But the members of the Citizens' Committee took no chances. They obtained the services of Lucius E. Wilson of the American City Bureau for intensive organization work. They secured full-page newspaper advertisements. They held hundreds of neighborhood meetings. And perhaps most important, they created a political organization as elaborate as any party machine—ward and precinct officers, block captains, and poll watchers. Written pledges signed before election day gave promise of an impressive victory.

By a majority of approximately two to one, and with a large majority of the electorate voting, the election authorized the drafting of a charter, and all fifteen candidates of the Citizens' Committee were elected to the charter commission. John H. Patterson, as was expected, received by far the largest number of votes and was made chairman of the commission. The other members were: E. C. Harley, wholesale grocer; F. H. Rike, department store owner; John F. McGee, merchant; J. B. Zohnder, furniture superintendent; O. B. Kneisly, dentist; Fred Cappel, furniture merchant; A. I. Mendenhall, union printer; W. A. Sparks, workingman; L. W. James, lawyer; E. E. Burkhart, lawyer; C. E. Bice, lumber dealer; E. T. Banks, Negro representative; Leopold Rauh, representative of business organizations.

This group was quickly divided into subcommittees to prepare various parts of the charter. The proposed sections, most of which had been prepared by the Bureau of Municipal Research, were then discussed in open meetings and approved by the whole committee. The final draft was completed within six weeks after the election. Six more weeks of intensive education on the merits of the proposed charter by the Citizens' Committee resulted in another sweeping two-to-one victory for the reformers. Dayton was now committed to a strange new form of government, untried except in a few small towns. Overnight Dayton gained national prominence as the first "real" city to adopt city manager government.

Throughout the campaign the advocates of the new charter were confused about the correct name for the form of government they were proposing. Much of the time they referred to it as commission government. (Even in 1938 there were Dayton citizens who assured the inquiring visitor that their city had the commission form of government.) The more precise called it the commission-manager government, as it was still known in 1938. Whatever the confusion over nomenclature, there was not much room for question about the organization of the new

government. The charter was both explicit and detailed, and the lines of responsibility were clear and distinct.

The legislative powers of the government were vested in a council<sup>1</sup> of five, elected from the city at large for periods of four years each. Councilmanic terms were staggered so that every two years there were either three or two places to be filled. The person who received the largest number of votes at the time three councilmen were elected automatically became mayor. He presided at council meetings, acted as ceremonial head of the city, and received a salary of eighteen hundred dollars. His colleagues received salaries of twelve hundred dollars.

The manager whom the council appointed was, according to the charter, "the administrative head of the . . . government." He was to be chosen "without regard to his political beliefs and . . . [might or might not] be a resident of . . . Dayton when appointed." He held office for an indeterminate period and might at any time be discharged by vote of the council. He was also, like the councilmen, subject to recall at a special election which should be held whenever a recall petition, signed by 25 per cent of the registered voters, was submitted to the clerk of the council.<sup>2</sup>

The chief duties of the manager, as prescribed in the charter, were to execute the municipal laws and ordinances; to appoint all department heads and their subordinates upon a basis of merit and fitness and, for those in the classified service, in accordance with the procedure of the civil service commission; to exercise control over all administrative departments and divisions, and to keep the council fully informed on the conduct of the government and to recommend to it whatever measures he might consider desirable.

The administrative organization of the government, as outlined by the charter, consisted of five departments: law, public service, public welfare, public safety, and finance. Provision was also made for a city purchasing agent, originally under the director of finance but later directly responsible to the city manager, and for a civil service board appointed by, and responsible to, the council.

This, briefly described, was the blueprint of the government to which the citizens of Dayton committed themselves on August 12, 1913. The vote was 13,217 to 6,122, out of an estimated voting population of 30,000.

<sup>1</sup> For the sake of uniformity with other studies in this series the word "council" is used in place of "commission," the term used in the charter.

<sup>2</sup> Up to 1939 the recall had never been used. The 25-per-cent petition requirement made it seem likely that, as charged by the Socialists originally, it was intended only as a harmless gesture.

A month later came the primary election to choose by nonpartisan ballot the ten candidates to be entered in the final election in November. Again the Socialists and Democrats entered their candidates, with a slate picked by the Citizens' Committee, but they were both so overwhelmingly outvoted in the primary that they allowed the charter group candidates to win the final election without a contest.

The first councilmen, said some, were men who "could not have been induced to hold public office under the old conditions, but they did consent to serve under the new regime."<sup>1</sup> This description might not have been quite accurate or altogether to their credit. However, it represented the views of those who managed the charter campaign. One of the aims of the movement had been to purge the city government of politicians and to inveigle the good men of the community to enter the public service. With the first election under the charter over and won the Citizens' Committee could well feel that this objective had been achieved. The new councilmen were responsible and able, four of them businessmen and the fifth a safely conservative printer on the Republican newspaper. There was still some muttering from the Socialists and from the Democratic machine against what they called the "domination of the business interests," but the victorious reformers paid no attention. They had won fairly and decisively and with full confidence in themselves and the future they turned to the task of building the new order in municipal affairs.

### III. THE NEW ORDER

THE FIRST and chief duty of the new council—even before it took office—was to select a city manager. There was no effort to limit the selection to men with previous governmental experience or to residents of Dayton. The council and its supporters were anxious that the new government should get its start under the leadership of some outstanding administrator, no matter where he might be found or however large a salary he should require. With this consideration in mind the position of city manager was first offered to a few of the most prominent local businessmen, but each of them declined. Then, quite sincerely but with full recognition of the publicity value of the move, the council cabled an offer of the position and a salary of \$25,000 to

<sup>1</sup>Arch Mandel and Wilbur M. Cotton, "Dayton's Sixteen Years of City Manager Government," *National Municipal Review* (1930), XIX, 504.

General George W. Goethals, who, still chief engineer of the newly finished Panama Canal, was one of the world figures of the day. General Goethals also refused, but all America learned that Dayton, Ohio, was hunting for an independent nonpartisan expert to manage its municipal affairs. By January 1, 1914, when the council began its official duties, a manager had been secured. He was Henry M. Waite, city engineer of Cincinnati; his salary, \$12,500, or, as the outraged Socialists put it, an unheard of "forty dollars a day."

Mr. Waite's previous experience in public office had been quite meager. He had been for two years, 1912-14, in Cincinnati's reform administration, which was headed by his friend Mayor Henry T. Hunt. Aside from that almost all the time since his graduation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Mr. Waite had spent in work for private corporations. At various times he had directed large-scale projects for railroad and mining concerns. His engineering reputation of being able to get things done impressed the council.

If his earlier experience was a helpful qualification, his personality was, in many ways, an even greater asset. He was keen, poised, completely sure of himself. He was "equally at home in the drawing rooms of Dayton's elite, in the fire stations with the 'boys,' or swapping a word with the street gangs at work."<sup>1</sup> He could be patient and gracious or blunt and profane. Forty-four years old at the time he was appointed, Mr. Waite was unusually alert, vigorous, and hard working.

When he accepted the position of manager, Mr. Waite was assured that, aside from the laying down of general policies by the council, he and he alone was to have the responsibility and the authority for managing the city administration. No one was to interfere with his work. People who worked closely with Mr. Waite have said that no other arrangement would have been acceptable to him. He welcomed suggestions from any interested citizen or group, and he consulted frequently with the council, but dictation he would not tolerate from anyone.<sup>2</sup>

Undoubtedly in Dayton during the first four years, the city manager was the outstanding figure in the government. This was so for two reasons: first, because in the charter campaigns almost the entire stress was laid upon the "city manager;" secondly, it happened that the manager during this period was a strong personality and a natural leader. This does not mean that the manager dictated the policies;

<sup>1</sup> Mandel and Cotton, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 513.

it merely means that he stood out more prominently before the public than did the council.

Instead of resenting Mr. Waite's overshadowing role in the government, the councilmen seemed to welcome it. Just such an arrangement, they said, had been planned in the charter. And for a time they went too far in deferring to the manager.<sup>1</sup>

There appeared the danger of its [the council's] being merely a rubber-stamping body, to put the mark of approval upon every official act of the manager it had appointed. There was the expressed tendency upon the part of a commissioner to pass legislative prerogatives to the manager. In even so important a matter as consideration of the annual budget a commissioner was once heard to remark, "Let the manager worry about that; that's his job."

But if this excessive lack of assertiveness on the part of the council was not altogether desirable, it was at least a welcome change from the days when the old council considered that its bounden duty was to interfere regularly with the work of the mayor and all the departments. Now administrative responsibility was fixed in the hands of the manager. Perhaps the first evidence of this new separation of the administrative functions from the legislative process was in the matter of appointments. The manager alone had the power of appointment and chose his subordinates on the basis of merit without even a confirming vote of approval from the council. To head the department of law he selected a prominent Dayton attorney. A local public accountant was made director of finance. And a minister who had been active in the community's social agencies was named director of public welfare. The position of safety director Mr. Waite left vacant for the first year and a half, assuming himself direct charge of the police and fire divisions. James E. Barlow, an engineer who had been associated with Mr. Waite in the Cincinnati government was made director of public service. With him came another Cincinnati engineer to become superintendent of streets.

The rank and file of city employees, carried over from the days of political appointments, were assured that if they did their work properly they would not be replaced. Almost all of them eventually proved themselves capable of meeting the new and more exacting standards. In time they developed toward the manager and the new form of government a loyalty which, because of greater security of tenure if nothing else, seemed to be even stronger than that which had previously bound job-

<sup>1</sup> Rightor, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

holders to their political machine. Moreover, as Rightor observed: "By reason of his compelling personality which pervaded the organization the manager was able to get the men in his organization to work with him."<sup>1</sup>

One of the not inconsiderable advantages of the change in governmental form was the opportunity it provided, explicitly or implicitly, for improving the routine methods of internal administration. The new civil service commission and its examiner were given detailed instructions in the charter for handling the recruiting, promotion, and discharge of employees in order to secure and maintain a personnel of highest competence. With municipal officers who believed in a merit system it was a simple matter to break away from the old system of personal and political favoritism. The charter also created a system of centralized purchasing and laid down regulations designed to guarantee to the city government full value for its expenditures. But it was the resourcefulness and honesty of the manager, the purchasing agent, and the other officials concerned which made it possible for the council to announce in its first annual report: "Through a standardization of all supplies and materials, and by combining purchases of the various departments and taking advantage of the market conditions, there has been effected a saving of \$33,000 this year over prices paid last year, without sacrificing quality."<sup>2</sup> A central garage was established to repair all the city's motor vehicles. Under Mr. Waite the first inventory of Dayton's city property was made. A new and centralized bookkeeping system was introduced. Staff meetings of the department heads and the manager were held each week. These changes and numerous others tended to develop throughout the entire staff an increasing feeling of responsibility for the successful accomplishment of the city's work.

The task which confronted the manager and his staff was a compelling and difficult one. The people of Dayton had directly and by implication been promised that all that was bad about the old government would be improved and all the good things that previously had been lacking would be supplied forthwith. They had become momentarily conscious of the workings of their city government, their hopes had been raised, and they expected results.

The accomplishments of the first six months of city manager government were summarized in a special report which the manager prepared and distributed throughout the city. Even the most stubborn opponents

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> *First Annual Report of the City Commission*, January 1, 1915, p. 4.

of the change knew that important improvements in tangible public services had been started. The collection of rubbish and ashes, which was discontinued altogether during 1913 and had been only sporadic before that, was resumed on a regular schedule for the entire city. The garbage removal service became more efficient and more dependable than it had ever been before.

A public welfare program such as few citizens had previously imagined was put in operation. Playgrounds were provided in all sections of the city and the total number was doubled. A full-time health officer was obtained. The number of meat and dairy inspectors was increased. A staff of city nurses was established and two private health organizations, the Visiting Nurses' Association and the Tuberculosis Society, were persuaded to transfer supervision of their staffs to the city health division. Five district physicians were employed and strict enforcement of sanitary regulations was secured. Five milk stations were established and many baby clinics were held. The resulting decline of the death rate among infants was enthusiastically proclaimed.<sup>1</sup>

The water works was overhauled and the pressure increased so that residents of the outlying districts or sections of the town could be assured a steady flow of water. Streets and sewers and bridges, long in need of attention, were repaired. And a great number of perennial citizen complaints on other matters were handled with dispatch by similar improvements.

In addition to improving the existing services, Mr. Waite and his staff undertook year by year to expand the scope of government functions as well. A free bureau of legal aid, one of the first in America, was established to provide counsel for people of small means who had been legally wronged and to correct the conditions out of which such injustices arose. The government helped to organize the Civic Music League which arranged outdoor concerts, programs of community singing, and winter series of concerts by famous artists. The manager took an active part in encouraging the growth of sport activities and amateur baseball and soft ball leagues were organized. With the help of the already functioning Playgrounds and Gardens Association, the manager persuaded real estate owners to permit their vacant lots to be used for community gardens. The city government did the plowing without charge for each family that applied. By 1917, 2,160 vacant lots and

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Report*, 1915, p. 26. The Bureau of Municipal Research prepared full-page advertisements which were published by each newspaper under the heading, "What the City Officials Are Doing for the Babies of Dayton."



2,900 back yards were producing vegetables,<sup>1</sup> and there was a large co-operative garden for the children. Ten garden inspectors employed by the city visited the gardens every two weeks, giving advice and grading the results.

Thus the new government attempted to bring its services more within the daily purview of the ordinary citizens than ever before, but at the same time it did not neglect the larger, more complicated and less personal aspects of operating a city. It was necessary to plan and build a comprehensive system of storm sewers. New sources of water supply had to be found to meet the increasing demands of a growing population. An outside expert was employed to recommend methods of dealing with the problems of traffic congestion. Three new bridges were built. A building code was drafted. A newly created civic center plan board was set to work planning a civic center. There was work and more work to be done, and every task completed or got under way represented another triumph for city manager government.

That the people were in favor of this program of physical expansion and improvement was shown in a special election held in 1915 at which the voters approved a series of bond issues for \$1,053,000 by well over the two-thirds majority required under state law. In this first test of the popular support of the new regime the city administration did effective work in presenting an easily understandable account of just why the money was needed and how it would be distributed among specific projects. Graphic publicity folders were distributed, and the manager made numerous speeches explaining and supporting these proposed expenditures.

In general the task of selling the new government to the citizens fell upon Mr. Waite. He was forever being called upon to speak before groups of one sort and another, and he almost never declined an invitation. For the year 1915 he gave an average of three speeches a week and was frequently asked to appear on ceremonial occasions. Newspaper reporters were given free access to the current mail which passed through the various city offices and were allowed to report whatever seemed worth a story. Annual printed reports (an additional mid-year one was issued the first year) also helped to present the case for the city government. To publicize the achievements of the first year, a municipal exhibit was arranged in 1915 in cooperation with the Bureau of Municipal Research to present by charts, graphs, and models an explana-

<sup>1</sup> Rightor, *op. cit.*, p. 87. The demands of the war time may have influenced the growth in the number of vegetable plots.

tion of the varied activities of the city government. Almost nothing of this sort had ever been done before.

Despite all these efforts at building citizen good will, popular support did not keep pace with the ambitious undertakings of the administration. Discussing the question of public relations in one of the annual meetings of the City Managers' Association, Mr. Waite said, "At first we had very poor publicity. Personally I am a very poor man on that because I have had no experience in it. I was trained in railroad work where we were taught to shun the newspapermen rather than to approach them."<sup>1</sup> The results of this deficiency Mr. Waite fully admitted in another connection:<sup>2</sup>

In Dayton our program for increased activities was so great that it was all-absorbing. Suddenly we found we were far ahead of the majority of the people of the community. . . . All new activities were stopped until what we had done could be explained to the community.

Mr. Waite may have been none too skilled at deliberate organization of publicity, but he instinctively did things which attracted attention: initiating a share-the-work program of public works to provide jobs during a period of unemployment, sending out firemen in the evenings to flush the streets in the business section, turning in fire alarms in the middle of the night to see how quickly the appropriate company would respond, corralling the city's bums in a municipal lodging house and requiring a half-day's work of each man for his keep. In addition to his speeches before local groups he gave numerous out-of-town addresses on Dayton and its new government during his first two years there. He felt it part of his duty to encourage and to participate directly in the activities of various civic organizations—garden clubs, music clubs, sports associations. With the maintenance and construction crews kept busy on long-delayed public works, the activities of the city administration and its leader were always in the public view.

"Everyone who is handling governmental questions must remember that it is simply a game of keeping the public interested in what you are doing,"<sup>3</sup> so Colonel Waite, then recently returned from war service abroad and no longer connected with municipal government, told the 1920 convention of city managers. But this was no new conviction arrived at from the sober reflection of retirement. He had said the same

<sup>1</sup> *Third Yearbook*, City Managers' Association (1916), p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Henry M. Waite, "The Legislative Body in City Manager Government," *National Municipal Review*, XII, 66.

<sup>3</sup> *Seventh Yearbook*, p. 188.

sort of thing three years before when he was still in the midst of his work in Dayton:<sup>1</sup>

You know and I know that the public itself is not so much interested in financial savings . . . as they are in some absolute results that they can see and feel and hear. Keep your community interested and alive to the fact that your government is giving them things they never had before. There is no end to the amount of propaganda that you must distribute to your people to make your efforts a success.

But no amount of propaganda from the city manager's office could overcome the suspicion with which a large section of the population looked upon the members of the first council. They were indelibly branded as representatives of the business interests. That this opinion extended beyond the Socialists or the grumbling politicians who had been superseded was early apparent to at least one impartial observer. "The businessmen," said Richard S. Childs, "had things too wholly their own way and elected a hand-picked ticket."<sup>2</sup> From the standpoint of their relation to the manager there is no doubt that the councilmen served admirably; they gave him a free hand in administrative matters. With their active support there were provided social services which previous councils, supposedly more representative of the common people, scarcely considered. Still their strength in administration was itself a weakness politically. They were accused of abdicating their responsibilities in favor of the manager. Overshadowing all else, were the indisputable facts that the Citizens' Committee which had brought about their election was guided and supported by local big businessmen and that four out of the five councilmen themselves were businessmen. Of such stuff are political campaign issues made, and just such issues were all that was needed for a comeback by the political forces which had been so completely routed in 1913.

At the election of 1915, with two councilmen to be chosen, the Citizens' Committee again had a hard struggle against the Democratic party machine which was still openly hostile to city manager government. One of the Citizens' Committee candidates was barely reelected; the other was decisively beaten. But contrary to the fears of the charter group, the addition of a Democratic politician to the council did not bring disaster. He was an able man, he did not attempt to interfere with the manager, and his personal popularity added public prestige to the council. The charter had survived its first major test.

<sup>1</sup> *Fourth Yearbook*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>2</sup> Leonard D. White, *The City Manager* (Chicago, 1927), p. 74.

By 1917, however, more violent political storms were brewing. The cost of living had risen higher and higher. Some people were beginning to talk about the extravagance of the city government. The Socialists were gaining support for their drive for municipally owned utilities. And underneath the surface was still a latent hostility to the "businessmen's" government. Thus, with three members of the council to be elected this time, there was a real possibility that control of the city government would pass into the hands of people who were hostile to the charter.

The primary campaign was a three-sided race between candidates of the Citizens' Committee, the Democrats, and the Socialists. Some of the charter group at first favored making a deal with the Democrats, but it was decided that the three original councilmen whose terms were expiring should run again and that the campaign should be based on the record of the past four years. So with newspaper advertisements, circulars, and speeches illustrated with stereopticon slides the Citizens' Committee undertook to justify the achievements of its period in office. It was "the most extensive publicity campaign ever undertaken in the city,"<sup>1</sup> and cost \$23,000. But even so, these high pressure methods were not enough. The three Socialist candidates topped the field, averaging about three thousand more votes than the average number received by the charter group candidates, who were fourth, fifth, and sixth, and averaging more than twice the number received by the leading Democrat. The Citizens' Committee candidates had been renominated, but with the Socialists polling three times their normal vote the primary election was anything but a public endorsement of the record of manager government. The charter group felt fairly sure of falling heir to a majority of the Democratic votes at the final election, but still they were hardly inclined to dispute the Socialists' claim of ultimate victory as they studied the primary totals:

Socialists .....	29,162
Citizens' Committee .....	20,545
Democrats .....	10,164

In essence the primary campaign had been a struggle between two symbols, "The People" versus the "Business Interests"—the Socialists had seen to that—and "The People" had won. The same sort of battle in the final election might have been assumed to end with the same result, but by a stroke of luck the Citizens' Committee was able to

<sup>1</sup> Rightor, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

change the contending symbols well before the November election.<sup>1</sup>

It happened that after the August election one of the local Socialist leaders wrote an article in the *New York Call*, the Socialist newspaper, in which he stated that the Socialists' success in Dayton was due to their anti-war attitude. This article was taken by the Citizens' Committee as its basis for the final campaign. The issue was made solely one of Americanism.

With the popular hatred for Germany the charter group stood to gain more votes by campaigning for a militant foreign policy for the nation than it had previously got by running on its municipal record. By identifying itself with the revered symbol "Americanism" and linking its opposition to the hated symbol "Un-Americanism," the charter organization showed that it could manipulate mass opinion no less effectively than the Socialists. In the campaign which followed the Socialist blunder the Citizens' Committee went to ridiculous extremes in jingoistic propaganda.<sup>2</sup> For the tedious house-to-house soliciting it enlisted the support of the Republican and Democratic machines. And on all its various campaign efforts it spent approximately \$27,000.

The result was a victory for all the charter group candidates. The Socialists gained 8,659 votes over their August total and polled 43 per cent of the votes, but they failed to elect a single councilman. The charter had been upheld, said the Citizens' Committee, but impartial observers knew that neither the August primary nor the November final election had indicated what the people of Dayton really thought of city manager government. Before there was another opportunity to test public opinion, Mr. Waite, who was the city government as much as any one person could be, had left Dayton. On January 1, 1918, he resigned to enter the engineering service of the United States Army in France.

#### IV. A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY

AS SUCCESSOR TO Mr. Waite the council promptly selected James E. Barlow, director of public service, whom Mr. Waite had brought with him from the Cincinnati government. Like his predecessor, Mr. Barlow was an engineer and a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was thirty-eight years old at the time of his appointment. His salary was fixed at seventy-five hundred dollars, a reduction of five thousand dollars from what Mr. Waite had received. Upon him

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> White, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

had rested most of the direct responsibility for the numerous public works which had been undertaken in the previous four years, and he had a record of having done his work well. But the tasks which lay before Mr. Barlow in March, 1918, were in many ways more difficult than those which had confronted Mr. Waite a year earlier.

During the year 1917 city expenditures had exceeded revenues by \$81,241. The prices of everything the city had to buy were exceedingly high and were still rising. The population was increasing rapidly because of an influx of workers for the munitions factory and other industries. The problems of law enforcement were becoming more acute. And the budget for 1918 had not been prepared.

As soon as the new manager had compiled the estimates of revenue and expense for the year, he presented them to the council at a public hearing. Then, for the first time under city manager government, the council went over the budget item by item, cutting here and adding there and increasing the proposed expenditures by about \$34,000. On the basis of these early figures it was estimated that there would be an operating deficit of \$147,215 for the year. But twice during 1918 the manager reduced expenditures below the estimates, and the year ended with a deficit of only \$32,654!

Merely to say that the budget of Dayton's government was unbalanced in 1917, 1918, and again in 1919 does not indicate the nature or the seriousness of the city's financial difficulties. The rising cost of equipment and supplies and the need for expanding certain municipal services with the rapid growth of population were, of course, factors which tended to cause financial unbalance. Moreover, with the extraordinary rise of wages and salaries in private industry the city was compelled to increase the pay of many of its employees in order to keep them from resigning. And under the strict regulation of local taxing agencies it was practically impossible to obtain any additional sources of revenue. By state law it was required that the total property taxes in any local governmental subdivision should not exceed  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the assessed valuation. With special levies for schools, roads, and the flood control work of the Miami Conservancy District that limit had been reached in 1918. There was no opportunity to increase taxes for the city's ordinary operating expenses.

Public improvements, such as street and bridge repairs and sewer extensions, were likewise restricted. The funds which had been provided by the bond election of 1915 had been exhausted by 1918, and much more work remained to be done. Yet even if it had been possible to

bring about the passage of another bond issue by the necessary two-thirds majority vote, the manager reported, it would have been a meaningless gesture. The taxes needed to liquidate any additional bonds could not have been levied under the state one-and-a-half-mill restriction. Then, further increasing the financial difficulties of the cities, came prohibition, and, as the saloons closed, badly needed license revenues disappeared.

In the face of this situation there were not many things the city manager could do, but he took two significant steps: he secured public approval for a reclassification of Dayton property with the hope of thus increasing revenues; and he called into conference representatives of the other cities of Ohio, most of which were even harder pressed than Dayton, to prepare recommendations for a program of financial reform which was submitted to the state legislature. But no major changes in local financing were produced. The legislature merely passed a law to permit municipalities to issue deficiency bonds with the pious hope that they could be retired from ordinary revenues and a relatively negligible inheritance tax.

The citizens' personal financial problems also helped to harass the city government. The high cost of living was one of the burning issues of the day. The administration was, of course, unable to cut prices, but it made particularly rigorous efforts to compel the use of fair weights and measures. Scales, weights, yardsticks, measuring baskets, barrels, and crates were condemned in large quantities, volunteer women inspectors greatly aiding the regular city staff in this work. The question of house rents was also of acute importance and a rent adjustment board was created by the council. The chairman of the board was the director of public welfare, and the secretary was the attorney who headed the bureau of legal aid; the other members were laymen. The attorney-secretary received all rent complaints and attempted to work out an adjustment. The disputes which he failed to settle were referred to the board. Meanwhile the public became indignant over the traction company's petition for permission to increase its fares, and the city manager and the council began studies to show that the increases could not be justified. But in the end, after strikes had been called by the employees of all the six Dayton street car companies, the council approved a substantial increase in fares. In Dayton, as elsewhere, the period was one of change, uncertainty, unrest.

Such critical times obviously demanded leadership no less dynamic and captivating than that which Henry M. Waite had provided during

the period of organization. But neither the members of the council nor the city manager, Mr. Barlow, were able to capture popular imagination, and the business leaders of the community, particularly John H. Patterson, never gave Mr. Barlow the enthusiastic support which had been accorded his predecessor. Moreover, in dealing with the councilmen Mr. Barlow lacked the skill which had characterized Mr. Waite's relationship to the same men. After an unpleasant controversy near the close of 1920 Mr. Barlow resigned, as of January 1, 1921.

Still loyal to the principles of city manager government, the council searched widely for a new chief administrator and selected William C. Barber of Joliet, Illinois. Mr. Barber was a banker and had a favorable record as the mayor of Joliet. As a banker, reasoned the council, he should be well qualified to untangle the city's financial snarls, and, as a man who had been elected to public office through a political campaign, he ought to have developed a capacity for maintaining good public relations. So with high hopes of having found a man able to carry on in the tradition of Henry M. Waite, the council employed Mr. Barber at a salary of twelve thousand dollars a year.

The written accounts of Mr. Barber's term as city manager are meager. Those who worked with him seemed to have only a rather general recollection of the period, and Mr. Barber was dead when this study was made. What evidence there was tended to indicate that, while he was honest, sincere, and hard working, he did not measure up to either of his predecessors in administrative capacity. In dealing with the council and the public he was apparently not gifted.

After he had been in office about six months a street car strike was called as the result of a threatened wage cut. The city manager and the council immediately attempted to mediate. As the strike dragged on the council became exasperated with Mr. Barber's handling of the situation. This matter, added to certain earlier but minor difficulties in his relations with the council, brought a quick end to his career as Dayton's city manager. On August 1, 1921, six months after he had taken office, Mr. Barber resigned.

The period of 1918-21 was a hectic and troubled time. Forces which no administrator, however astute or personally charming, could have mastered swept over Dayton, leaving in their wake, among other things, unbalanced budgets, industrial disputes, and an undercurrent of citizen discontent with the local government. Men of more magnetic personalities than those of Mr. Barlow and Mr. Barber could probably have humored the population more successfully, but time alone could



remove many of the basic difficulties. Meanwhile, the popularity of city manager government as such was slipping again in Dayton.

The old enemies of the charter raised anew the demand that the system be changed. Many friends of the system came to believe that the manager should be a home-town man, one who would understand local conditions and the local people. There was no outstanding local favorite son for the position nor were the political parties making any special effort, so far as one could see, to jockey themselves into power again. Popular sentiment seemed spontaneously to crystallize into a demand that Dayton's next city manager should be a Dayton man.

The choice fell, as it had three years earlier, upon the director of public service, who, unlike Mr. Barlow, was a long-time Dayton resident and a product of the local schools. As Fred O. Eichelberger, the new manager, assumed his duties on August 1, 1921, no one, certainly not Mr. Eichelberger or the councilmen, had any idea of how long he would last. The council hoped that his selection would prove a popular gesture and would help the charter supporters to win at the approaching election, but they were not at all certain. They surely would never have believed that seventeen years later the same charter and the same manager would still be guiding the governmental affairs of Dayton.

## V. THE YEARS OF STABILITY

IN ALL THE columns of newspaper reports on the attitudes of various Dayton citizens in 1913 toward the proposal to institute city manager government no mention was made of the opinion of Fred O. Eichelberger. Since he was an inconspicuous employee of the existing government, the papers could scarcely have bothered to interview him, and, if they had, he could not have been expected to profess support for the change. He was at that time thirty years old, married, and a father. Since entering the employ of the city on January 1, 1906, he had progressed slowly and steadily from transit man to first assistant engineer. Having had only a high school education and the engineering experience gained from working in the office of a local consulting engineer and a year with a crew of California railroad surveyors, Mr. Eichelberger could well have been proud of his achievement.

Mr. Eichelberger continued in the engineering office of the department of public service after Mr. Waite became city manager and in May, 1915, he was appointed city engineer, a position he held for five

years. When the director of public service resigned in April, 1920, Mr. Eichelberger was promoted to fill the vacancy. A little over a year later he became city manager, just at the time when the political current was changing. The original stalwarts in the charter movement were passing from the scene. The Citizens' Committee was losing its cohesiveness and in time vanished almost completely. Men active in political parties were again coming to the fore in municipal affairs. The businessmen, encouraged by the "return to normalcy," were devoting themselves more seriously to money-making than ever before.

A few months after Mr. Eichelberger began his duties, three new councilmen were elected. They were men with definite ideas about their prerogatives and about the relationship which should exist between the council and the manager. Chief among their interests was a desire to have a hand in making appointments and removals. Their influence in these matters was not exerted in an offensive manner, but in the popular view of things the council was tending increasingly to participate, or, as some put it, to interfere in the administration of city affairs.

Actually the shift in relationship between the council and the city manager was not so serious as it seemed on the surface, and it was not without advantage to the government as a whole. It tended in time to make the people who had been disturbed about what seemed to them the autocratic powers of the manager feel that through their elected representatives they had a measure of control over the government which they lacked under less assertive councilmen. As independent or partisan candidates came during the 1920's to replace councilmen "hand-picked" by the business group, the sense of popular control grew. Moreover, to the extent that the members of the council, particularly those who served as mayor, were popular leaders of the community, they conveniently complemented the manager, who was by nature quiet and retiring.

The last major attack on the charter came in 1922 when amendments were proposed providing for the election of a mayor and a council from among candidates of the political parties, with the councilmen chosen by wards. In response to a petition signed by more than 10 per cent of the electorate, these suggested amendments were submitted to a vote of the people, the result of which was 17,000 for, and 26,000 against, them. Among those who helped to uphold the manager plan this time were the Socialists, who in previous years had attacked it so bitterly but who now felt that government by a local city manager was preferable to the rule of party bosses.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mandel and Cotton, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

With this official test of the government out of the way Mr. Eichelberger persuaded the council a few months later to appoint a city charter advisory board of twenty-five "to receive suggestions and determine what the desires of the people might be with respect to any amendments to the charter as well as to make a study of the charter and determine wherein it would be well to amend it with advantage to the general welfare of the people."<sup>1</sup> The chief suggestions again were about changes in the council: proportional representation rather than election at large and an increase in the number of councilmen. It was also urged that an attempt be made through charter amendment to secure a greater degree of home rule in matters of finance. After a number of open meetings and several months of intermittent deliberation the board reported that it found "no convincing evidence of any demand for a change in the charter." It stated that it did not believe the people were yet ready for proportional representation and that the other suggestions were "either inconsequential or impossible of adoption." The report was accepted. In 1931 a similar board was appointed, and it too recommended that no change be made in the charter.

Political ferment of one kind or another, however, continued from year to year, and at almost every election there was at least one winning councilman, as well as some of the losers, grimly determined to set things right at city hall, which frequently meant, among other things, discharging the city manager. But such revolts, as a rule, were short-lived. Year after year Mr. Eichelberger showed an amazing capacity to take his enemies into camp. He did not sweep away opposition by means of an overpowering personality; he was a mild-mannered, rather shy individual. But he possessed a seemingly inexhaustible store of patience, tact, and persuasiveness. His associates credited him with having an extraordinary memory for facts. Since his memory encompassed the whole history of Dayton's city manager government and several years before, and since it encompassed the work of a rank and file employee, as well as that of an administrator, he had a formidable advantage over any amateur on the council who presumed to dictate how the affairs of the city should be run. Yet from time to time individual councilmen and occasionally the council as a whole gave the manager suggestions which outside observers considered to be unwarranted dictation and interference with purely administrative affairs. Nevertheless, Mr. Eichelberger did not fight back angrily, for fundamentally he had an interpretation of his position and of his relation to

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Report*, 1923, p. 5.

the council which, as someone put it, enabled him to "bend without breaking," to compromise without losing face.

TABLE 1. DAYTON CITY COUNCILMEN UNDER CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT, 1914-38

Member	Years in Office	Political Affiliation	Occupation
George M. Shroyer	8	Dem.	Automobile agent; sporting goods store owner.
John R. Flotron	6	Rep.	Lumber business.
John A. McGee	1	Dem.	Insurance and real estate broker.
R. I. Mendenhall	8	Rep.	Printer.
J. M. Switzer	8	Rep.	N.C.R. executive, manufacturer.
H. A. Hiddesen <sup>a</sup>	14	Dem.	Contractor.
Lorin Wright	8	Rep.	Toy factory owner (Brother of Orville and Wilbur Wright).
Frank B. Hale <sup>a</sup>	4	Dem.	Grocery chain owner and operator.
O. B. Kneisly <sup>a</sup>	4	Rep.	Dentist (framer of charter).
D. L. Stanze <sup>a</sup>	8	Rep.	Officer in pump mfg. co.
Allen C. McDonald	8	Rep.	Attorney.
Charles H. Paul	4	Rep.	Consulting engineer.
George W. Bisha	8	Dem.	Banker.
Harry N. Ballman <sup>a</sup>	4	Dem.	Grocer; head of R.G.A.
Karl F. Kroemer	2	Dem.	Insurance business.
Charles A. Bracher <sup>a</sup>	4	Rep.	Accountant.
John E. Breidenbach <sup>a</sup>	8	Former Socialist, later Rep.	Labor leader; president, Central Labor Body.
Charles J. Brennan	6	Rep.	Attorney.
Frank M. Krebs	5	Dem.	Owner, Super-Service station.
Frank H. Ireland	4	Rep.	Manager, G. M. plant.
Arthur C. Stock	4	Dem.	Contractor.
John F. Ahlers	1	Rep.	N.C.R. executive.

<sup>a</sup> Not sponsored by the Citizens' Committee.

Mr. Eichelberger never forgot that he was the employee of the council, that he served at their pleasure. He was easily amenable to suggestions so long as they did not conflict seriously with his own judgment and ideas of propriety, and, when they did, he almost never objected in a manner apt to give offense. The mildness of his protests at such times seemed at first glance to indicate to the outside observer a basic lack of strength and sureness. Some of those who knew him well said that he allowed the council to run over him. Whatever validity such judgments might have—and common enough they were in Dayton—they should not be accepted uncritically. In the first place, they usually came from people whose personality patterns were wholly different from Mr. Eichelberger's, people who, having called upon the Divinity to bear

them witness, asserted that, if they were in the city manager's place, they would certainly *be* city manager! Moreover, these judgments failed to take into account that for every time he capitulated to an opposing opinion there were innumerable other occasions of no less definite conflict when, according to the testimony of his associates, he won out by unassuming persistence and a superior knowledge of the facts. These judgments did not indicate truly the way in which he surrendered when he was overruled. Further, there was implicit in them the untenable assumptions of managerial infallibility and council corruption.

It was Mr. Eichelberger's expressed belief that his responsibility was to propose policies, to administer them, and to oppose unwise proposals but that the right to make the final decision in each instance rested with the council whenever it wished to assert that right. He felt that he always made a sincere effort to decide an issue on the basis of its merits and to defend his decision but that, when the councilmen overruled him, whatever their motives, it was no concern of his; his own record was clear. He did not feel impelled to enter into angry debate or to threaten to resign. Besides, such behavior would probably only make matters worse. To some of the city's discouraged reformers, who long dreamed of non-partisan government, this attitude represented defenseless compromising. Perhaps to most citizens it merely epitomized the normal workings of government.

From common report it seemed that among the most frequent differences of opinion between the manager and the council were decisions regarding personnel and purchasing. Not ordinarily, but at times, the councilmen objected to proposed appointments or promotions over which the manager was supposed to have complete authority and insisted on favoring other candidates who, they contended, were equally well qualified. Now and then they rejected arbitrarily the manager's purchase recommendations, as they had a legal right to do under the charter provision empowering them to approve all expenditures for more than five hundred dollars. In making numerous other decisions there was an understandable tendency on the part of the councilmen to favor the special interest groups of which they were a part. One councilman in office in 1938, for instance, was commonly accepted to be the representative of the large industrialists, while another was with equal definiteness the representative of organized labor. So, with the manager trying to administer municipal affairs impartially on the basis of his conception of the best interest of the whole community and with some councilmen having quite definite biases in one direction or another,

there were numerous opportunities for discord. As a result, the manager had had to compromise many times.

Yet in all his years as city manager—seventeen at the time of this study—Mr. Eichelberger remained universally trusted and respected, and his administration escaped any sort of scandal. This record is an indication of his competence and a justification of his interpretation of city manager government. In addition, this record seems to mean that over a period of twenty-five years beginning in 1914 there had been a net improvement in the political morality of the community, and that the occasional concessions to expediency which Dayton's city manager was required to make in 1938 were quite insignificant compared with those which were considered as a matter of course under the old mayor-council government. If the rigorous righteousness and political insensitivity of the first manager-government council were far in advance of the temper of the people and were made tolerable largely by the histrionic ability of Henry Waite, they nevertheless helped to establish a tradition of businesslike administration which survived a succession of more politically minded councilmen and less colorful managers. Moreover, the technical gains of the first few years—businesslike budget and accounting procedure, civil service, and centralized purchasing—were not only preserved uninterruptedly but their functioning was improved.

No longer did the councilmen leave everything to the manager, and undoubtedly they sometimes interfered in matters which, according to the charter, should be outside their influence. But on the whole no serious harm came from having a flexible dividing line of authority. Indeed, this flexibility was one of the strengths of the Dayton government. The manager was a major factor in the formulation of policy, and the council, always sensitive to public opinion, helped to soften the impersonal harshness of administration. Mr. Eichelberger said that, judging from what other city managers told him of stormy and continuous wrangling with their councils, he was convinced that by comparison his own experience was one of nearly perfect calm. In 1938 both he and the council seemed satisfied with their relationship to each other. Under that relationship there had continued from year to year a sound but unspectacular administration which Dayton citizens might well speak of proudly as good government.

No small part of the success of Dayton's government after 1921 was owing to the extensive public improvements which were carried out. Engineer that he was, Mr. Eichelberger was particularly sensitive to the pressing need for certain physical improvements at the time he be-

came manager. A few months before, a side of one of the city's bridges collapsed. Several other bridges, it was found, had insecure piers and needed strengthening. There was a serious need for additional sources of water supply, more storm sewers, street repairs, and enlargement of the sewage disposal system, which was then overflowing into the water sources at various places inside the city. In short, as Mr. Eichelberger explained, "there was everything to be done."

The first major project started under Mr. Eichelberger's direction was the enlargement of the water works. More than five hundred acres of land were acquired and wells were sunk into a hundred-foot-deep layer of water-bearing gravel, giving Dayton a source of water supply calculated to be adequate for the needs of the city for several generations to come. Parts of the same undertaking were the electrification of the pumping stations, the construction of reservoirs, and the laying of new conduits, all of which extended over a period of several years and cost more than \$3,000,000.

Another division of the city's activities which underwent complete revamping was the sewage disposal system at a cost of about \$3,000,000. A modern sewage treatment plant was constructed in the open country south of the city, a pumping station was built, and a great many new sewers were laid. The need for this improvement had been recognized for a long time before Mr. Eichelberger became manager, but it was delayed largely because of the difficulty of obtaining funds. Although this primary disposal plant was estimated to be adequate for a population up to 260,000, a secondary treatment plant was being added in 1938 with the help of the WPA, thus making possible the removal of dissolved as well as of suspended solids before releasing the water into the Miami River. With its equipment and offices housed in attractive buildings and the whole place well landscaped, this part of the city's physical plant was looked upon with great pride both by the manager and by the men who worked there.

The collapse of a second Dayton bridge after Mr. Eichelberger had taken over the city manager's office induced the voters to approve a bond issue of \$1,800,000 for bridge replacement. Seven were constructed by the city, and the county was persuaded to erect an eighth according to plans drawn by city engineers.

A project which was relatively inexpensive but which Mr. Eichelberger considered one of his neatest achievements was the building of a railroad siding into the city's street repair yards and water works. It cost only about \$20,000 and, according to the manager's estimate, saved

that amount within the first year. The city was thereby able to purchase many of its supplies in carload lots and much expensive trucking was eliminated. It was a simple little enterprise, but apparently no one had given it much thought before.

One of the Eichelberger undertakings most pleasing to Dayton's esthetic sensibilities was the abandonment of the unsightly old Miami and Erie Canal. It had been much used in the 1830's, 1840's, and later, but for many years it had been quite useless. Yet it was only after "a long, hard, and uphill fight"<sup>1</sup> that the manager and the council were able in 1925 to bring about the enactment of state legislation providing for its elimination.

By far the most expensive and ambitious project which Dayton's city manager government had undertaken up to 1939 was a program of grade-crossing elimination. With their community located for the most part on flat land and served by four main railroads, the people of Dayton were particularly sensitive to the hazards and the inconvenience of continually dodging trains or waiting for them to pass at crossings. In 1925 the city plan board submitted a report on the subject which served as a basis for the manager's negotiations with railroad officials. These conferences and the drafting of plans continued for about four years. By the end of 1926 the voters of Dayton had approved an \$8,000,000 bond issue to finance the city's portion of the expense, and in 1929 the work of grade separation was begun.

In the annual civic reports issued after about 1922 there was a continuing account of the improvement and expansion of the city's public services and its physical plant: the paving of unimproved streets, the building of new comfort stations, the construction of new playgrounds, the establishment of a school for underprivileged boys, the expansion of the public health service, the acquisition of large tracts of park lands, the installation of a new police and fire alarm signal system, the building of a municipal airport. The list could be extended indefinitely. There were naturally many more such enterprises during the prosperous 1920's than in the depression-ridden years which followed. But with the aid of PWA, WPA, and other federal agencies the stream of public works continued.

A revaluation of property in 1924 helped to ease the city's financial stress and during the years of general business prosperity the voters were much more inclined to approve bond issues and increased tax levies than ever before or after. Yet at least part of the numerous

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Report*, 1925, p. 7.



physical improvements were provided by means of careful management of the resources already available. One such instance was Madden Park, an eighteen-hole golf course and adjoining picnic grounds, located on land which had been part of the same farm on which the sewage disposal plant was located. In acquiring property needed for the sewage works, it would have been necessary to pay heavy severance and nuisance damages had the entire farm not been purchased. But by acquiring the entire property and by using workhouse labor and salvaged materials an attractive public golf course and club house were provided at very little additional cost. Dayton's engineer-manager was proud of that sort of achievement.

In finances the city's successes and failures under Mr. Eichelberger tended to follow the pattern of general economic conditions. For the year 1921, during only the latter half of which he was in office, there was an operating deficit of more than \$200,000. In the years of business prosperity which followed, the city's sources of revenue increased steadily and tax collections were good. Operating surpluses remained at the end of each year until 1931, when the city began to feel the pinch of the depression as tax collections fell further and further short of anticipations. Municipal services were curtailed and general wage and salary reductions were made necessary, but still operating deficits could not be avoided. As almost all other cities were in the same plight, the state legislature passed measures enabling the cities to issue scrip and deficiency bonds against future collection of delinquent taxes. With improved business conditions in 1936 and 1937 it was possible once more for the city, after making substantial payments on its depression debts, to begin building up a surplus. But in 1938 the municipal government was struggling with the financial problems of the 1937-38 business recession.<sup>1</sup>

In general, Mr. Eichelberger piled up a record of good solid achievement at the head of Dayton's government in the seventeen years covered by this study, and did his work almost completely without the use of dramatic effects. The people learned to have faith in his competence in the early 1920's as he successfully carried through one public improvement after another. For several years before 1938 it almost seemed that most of them ceased bothering to watch him and his administration at all. Governmental affairs, at least on the surface, moved along smoothly, and

<sup>1</sup>The year 1938 ended with a deficit of almost \$300,000, caused by the exhaustion of state funds for direct relief and the lack of local means for raising the extra money required. The general operating fund carried forward into 1939 a surplus of \$89,648.

not even the election of councilmen aroused much interest. An editorial in the *Dayton News* at the time of the 1937 campaign said:<sup>1</sup>

It seems hardly human for the government of such a city as Dayton to proceed year after year with such quiet efficiency that no more stir than now appears surrounds the election of its governing board. There is a danger in taking government as much for granted as we do in Dayton. In the watchfulness of the people lies the safety of the state. And yet it is an occasion for proper pride when a community's affairs move on year after year in this unsensational, satisfactory way.

For this public satisfaction, which approached indifference, there was more than one explanation. There is a natural tendency for the ordinary citizen to ignore the management of communal affairs so long as he has no direct complaint to make, a fact interestingly illustrated by the lack of public interest in the meetings of the Dayton council. Almost the only ones who attended these weekly open sessions were those who had a protest or a petition to present or were immediately concerned with the outcome of a proposed action by the council. And, as soon as the matters in which they were immediately interested were disposed of, one individual or group after another walked out of the meeting. The meetings for a while were held in the evening with the hope that more people would attend, but, that hope having proved a vain one, morning sessions were resumed. One of the few exceptions to this general lack of interest in the deliberations of the council was a period, soon after the election of one councilman, during which crowds filled the meeting hall each week to hear the new official's explosive speeches about the conduct of municipal affairs. But in time he too became a peaceful supporter of the administration, and when his forensic exhibitions ceased, the show-loving audiences disappeared. In Dayton it seemed to be almost axiomatic that the more smoothly government functioned the more apathetic the citizens became.

Moreover, Mr. Eichelberger was not a person given to doing his work in spectacular ways. His relations with the press were easy and cordial. He was readily accessible to anyone who came to his office. He made speeches now and then before civic groups and over the radio. Yet he lacked a knack for doing and saying things which attracted general notice. He did not have the actively propagandistic support from the business leaders of the community which characterized the relationship of that group to the city manager between 1914 and 1919. Realizing that they had produced the then recent change in the form of govern-

<sup>1</sup> *Dayton News*, July 13, 1937.

ment, those leaders felt a real responsibility for keeping the public informed of what the government was doing. Faced with the opposition of the Democratic and Socialist party organizations, the Citizens' Committee was acutely conscious of the necessity of protecting its creation against corruption or destruction and hence used, although sporadically, all the publicity devices at its command.

In 1938 all organized opposition to Dayton's city manager government seemed to have disappeared. The local Socialist party was hardly more than a collection of memories and faded press clippings. At election time both the Democratic and Republican machines helped get out the vote for the persons considered as candidates of the Citizens' Committee. The committee was in 1938 more ghost than reality. The campaigns were usually run with the incumbent councilmen as a ticket, ostensibly supported by the nebulous Citizens' Committee against the field of independent candidates. It is small wonder then that the 1938 civic leaders of the community did not feel any particular obligation to explain and to defend the work of the government. Actually, of course, they were not for the most part the same people who had been active in the charter movement itself. Many of the early leaders, like John H. Patterson, had died. Others had retired from any direct participation in business or government. More than a few of the new leaders were, at least in the eyes of some life-long residents of Dayton, merely transient overseers for the absentee owners of certain local industries. They did not have the same interest in, or the background for, helping to maintain a general civic consciousness that Dayton's business giants of the passing generation had.

Various Dayton citizens, interviewed at random, gave an impression of their general faith in the municipal government and its manager and of their lack of specific interest in its operation. In 1938 Dayton was finishing twenty-five years under the city manager plan. The people were proud that their city was the first place, outside of a few small towns, to adopt the manager plan. Having said, as some did, that "it's proved to be the best form of government that's yet been tried," they wondered what more one could ask. There were a few, however, who had a vague suspicion that everything was not just as it should be and that improvements could be made here and there, although just exactly where, except sometimes generally "in finances," they seemed not quite sure. But such nameless fears had not developed into any organized opposition. For the most part the people of Dayton accepted their government with complacent matter-of-factness and were grateful that

during the seventeen years of Mr. Eichelberger's leadership it had caused them little bother.

## VI. ORGANIZATION

IN SOME PAMPHLETS published at the time of the charter campaign it was said that the type of government being proposed was based upon the principles of business organization which had been tried and had proved successful. The chief among those principles was that the operation of an enterprise should be divided between a policy determining board of directors chosen by the stockholders and a manager selected by the directors who would have authority over all the departments. It was further stated that John H. Patterson, who was commonly considered to be Dayton's most successful business executive, as well as a public hero, had found that an organization worked best in units of five—five directors, five departments. It was therefore decided that the new government should have a council of five which should choose the city manager who in turn should have under his direction five administrative departments. Thus, in broad outline, it remained, although a sixth department was later added.

Contrasted to the structure of the pre-1914 government, the most significant organizational change involved in the adoption of city manager government was the concentration of all administrative responsibility in a single chief executive. All departments and bureaus were placed under the city manager. Under the previous system some departments were headed by men elected by, and responsible only to, the voters themselves, other department heads were subordinates of the mayor, and still others reported both to the council and to the mayor. Moreover, through committees set up to supervise certain administrative activities, and frequently through party control over the mayor, there was continual interference by the council and by individual councilmen in the day-to-day work of administration. This confusion meant inevitably that it was difficult in many situations to fix definite responsibility upon any single person or group. In large measure the real achievement of city manager government in Dayton was bringing order out of this chaos.

### *The Legislative Process*

The dividing line between policy formation and policy execution is perhaps never an absolute one. In Dayton's city manager government

it was always rather flexible. The charter itself stated that the manager should "recommend to the commission for adoption such measures as he may deem necessary or expedient." (Sec. 48.) Because of his day-to-day and direct responsibility for the operation of the government the manager was naturally in position to initiate a great many policies officially adopted by the council. In 1938, as when Henry Waite was manager, the council looked to the manager for leadership in almost every sphere of its activities.

TABLE 2. ORGANIZATION OF DAYTON'S CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT, 1938  
*Elected by Vote of the People*

COUNCILMEN (5)  
MUNICIPAL JUDGE

*Responsible to the Council*

CITY MANAGER  
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION  
CITY PLAN BOARD  
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS

*Responsible to the City Manager*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
CITY PURCHASING AGENT  
DIRECTOR OF LAW  
DIRECTOR OF FINANCE  
DIRECTOR OF SERVICE AND BUILDINGS  
    Division of Engineering  
    Division of Streets  
    Division of Building Inspection  
    Division of Markets and Public Property  
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
    Division of Fire  
    Division of Police  
    Division of Telegraphs and Signals  
    Bureau of Policewomen  
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WELFARE  
    Division of Correction  
    Division of Health  
    Division of Public Assistance (Relief)  
    Division of Parks and Playgrounds  
    Bureau of Legal Aid  
    State-City Employment Service  
DIRECTOR OF WATER  
    Division of Water  
    Division of Sewer Maintenance  
    Division of Sewage Treatment

TABLE 3. ORGANIZATION OF THE DAYTON GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO 1914

*Elected by Vote of the People*

COUNCILMEN (15)

MAYOR

AUDITOR

TREASURER

SOLICITOR

MUNICIPAL JUDGE

POLICE COURT CLERK

*Responsible to the Council*

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEES

*Responsible to the Mayor*

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY

CITY SEALER

*Responsible to the Council and the Mayor*

BOARD OF HEALTH

PARK COMMISSION

SINKING FUND TRUSTEES

By far the greater number of measures adopted by the council, a glance at the minutes revealed, granted approval to the manager's proposals for street, alley, and sidewalk improvement ordinances, traffic regulations, and other routine matters. The daily complaints of the citizens, whether or not they involved policy changes, for the most part went directly to the city manager's office, and even the formal petitions addressed to the council were usually referred to the manager for study and recommendation. As in every organization, a great many municipal policies of one sort or another were necessarily determined by the manager and his staff in the course of carrying out their regular duties. Still the final authority for establishing new policies or modifying or repealing old ones rested with the elected representatives of the people.

The regular sessions of the council were held each Wednesday morning in the public meeting room at the city hall. Special meetings were held whenever called by the mayor, two members of the council, or the manager. They might or might not be open to the public, but reporters were always present. Only on rare occasions did the councilmen and the manager feel strongly that the matters to be decided upon were of such a nature that they should be allowed to deliberate in strictly executive

session. Sometimes, usually after a lengthy delay in facing the issue, they held unannounced meetings.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately preceding the weekly open meeting the councilmen gathered in the office of the manager to go over the agenda and to discuss it and other matters informally among themselves and with the manager and whatever department heads might be concerned. In these meetings the actual decisions were made and the interplay of personalities and interests might be most readily observed. Newspaper reporters were always present at these informal meetings and from time to time asked questions. The atmosphere was one of good-natured camaraderie. The casual visitor, however, was apt to receive the impression that informality was at times carried to unfortunate extremes. It was not uncommon for several conversations to be going on simultaneously and for votes to be taken without everyone's being fully aware of just what he was being called upon to decide.

The decisions reached in the preliminary conferences were almost always followed in the open meetings, a fact which prompted some citizens to protest that "everything is cut and dried in secret," and that the public sessions were merely for the sake of formality. Whether or not there was anything necessarily sinister about this practice, it was not always followed. Interested citizens, salesmen, out-of-town people who might be affected by a proposed measure—all were given opportunity to express their views in the council's sessions. And hearing face-to-face the same arguments which they had dismissed behind closed doors, the councilmen sometimes changed their minds. The council, the manager, and the citizens themselves all played a part in the legislative process.

### *The Administrative Departments*

Closely assisting whenever called upon and cautioning whenever he saw a legal obstacle, the director of the law department, with his aides, was perhaps more directly related to the council than the head of any of the other administrative units. A large portion of the department's work was drafting ordinances and resolutions in proper legal form and preparing advisory opinions for the council. Of the four staff attorneys, one was city prosecutor in the municipal court. Protecting the city against lawsuits, prosecuting its claims, and telling the other departments what

<sup>1</sup> A councilman several years ago promised a local newspaper during the election campaign that if he were elected he would see that reporters were allowed to be present at every meeting of any kind that the council might hold. He was elected, and the tradition that he established lived on to plague the government subsequently as it did in his day.

they could and could not legally do, constituted other important phases of the legal staff's work. Consisting of only five members, this was the smallest of the six departments.

The department of finance with ten employees was in some ways the dominant unit of the Dayton government. In it were centralized all the accounting activities for the entire administration. It received and disbursed funds and it had charge of issuing licenses and permits. Originally the purchasing agent was under the department of finance, but in 1938 he was directly responsible to the city manager. The director of finance, who also had the title of chief accountant, was a member of the board of sinking fund trustees with the manager and the five councilmen. Because of the financial ups and downs of the government resulting from price fluctuations, the depression, and the restrictions of state law, the director was in a position of much greater responsibility than one might attribute to a person whose chief functions were to keep the books and to act as the custodian of public funds. In large measure he determined fiscal policy, and in times of stress he acted as public spokesman for the city in matters of finance.<sup>1</sup> The prominence of this office for several years before 1938 was undoubtedly partly because of the dominant personality of the incumbent director, E. E. Hagerman, a person of great energy with a forceful manner of expressing himself. He was in 1938 president of the League of Ohio Municipalities and spent much of his time lobbying at the state legislature for measures favorable to the cities of the state, particularly those designed to provide funds for direct relief. There were indications that the finance department tended to exercise a disproportionately large influence over Dayton's government, but, with the city bound by rigid state restrictions and an old and complicated system of taxation, finances were a matter of disproportionate concern.

The department of service and buildings began in 1914 as the department of public service. Along the way it lost some of its original functions, added others, and changed its name, but it was still chiefly concerned with the engineering, construction, and maintenance work of the city. Within the department there were the four divisions of engineering, streets, building inspection, and markets and public property.

The department of public safety consisted of the divisions of fire,

<sup>1</sup> The author was impressed during the weeks spent in Dayton with the frequency of newspaper interviews with Mr. Hagerman on the handling of the relief crisis. Newspaper clippings for several years revealed that it was a common practice for him to act as the chief spokesman for the government on finance.



police, telegraphs and signals, and the bureau of policewomen. The division of telegraphs and signals had charge of all installation and maintenance work connected with the traffic lights, the fire alarm system, the electric warning signs at street intersections and safety zones, the public address system in the fire stations, and the police radio station. The bureau of policewomen, which was actually more concerned with a program of social welfare among wayward girls than with detecting and punishing women criminals, was for many years immediately under the director of safety but in 1938 was supervised by the chief of police.

Of all the departments in the Dayton city government the department of welfare exercised the most varied functions and had the most complex organization. Besides the two bureaus of legal aid and state-city employment service, both of which reported to the director of welfare, there were four major divisions. The division of correction operated the municipal workhouse and farm. The division of health kept the vital statistics for the community, supervised the nursing service with its twenty-nine visiting nurses, operated a venereal disease clinic, and directed the bureau of food inspection and sanitation and the laboratory bureau. The division of public assistance had charge of direct relief in Dayton and was set up under the department of public welfare in May, 1937, when, in accordance with state legislation, the Montgomery County relief administration transferred all relief cases within the corporate limits to the city. The division of parks and playgrounds had the responsibility for maintaining the buildings, grounds, and equipment of the various parks, playgrounds, and boulevards. Functionally considered a part of this division, although administratively not responsible to its head, was the bureau of recreation. During 1937 this bureau conducted a program of supervised recreation in twenty-six municipal playgrounds.

The department of water was the newest of the six major units of the city's administration. It was made a separate department in January, 1927. Prior to that time the water works had been operated under the department of public service. According to the arrangement in 1938 there were under the department of water the divisions of water, sewer maintenance, and sewage treatment.

The six department heads and the purchasing agent were the only administrative officers who reported directly to the city manager. The manager also appointed the warm-air-heating contractors' license board and the plumbers' license board, but they performed their tasks through the division of building inspection. An executive secretary handled much

of the administrative routine connected with the city manager's office and was in effect an assistant city manager.

In addition to the manager there were several boards and commissions appointed by, and responsible to, the council. Those which were permanent parts of the city government were the city plan board with nine members, the zoning board of appeals with five members, and the civil service commission of three. The city plan board selected a secretary-engineer as its executive officer, who served in the same capacity for the zoning board. The civil service commission chose its own executive officer, who had charge of preparing and conducting the civil service examinations for all positions in the classified service and of submitting to the city manager eligible lists from which appointments were made. He also kept the efficiency rating records and conducted promotion examinations.

From time to time the council appointed citizen advisory boards to consider and make recommendations on such problems as traffic control, recreation, charter reform, and the naming of streets.

The contrast between the type of organization which was in effect in the government of Dayton after 1914 and that before the city plan was adopted is striking. The legal department, no longer headed by an elected official, took its place as a staff agency within the regular framework of the administration. Administration by committee, which had once governed the operation of the parks and the health service, was no more. The grouping of similar and related functions within the departments was established and was maintained. Both in the organization of departments under the manager and in the breakdown of departments into divisions and bureaus, the administration, whether deliberately or by chance, was successful in preserving a reasonable span of control. But, overshadowing these secondary changes, there was established through the city manager a unity of control and a definiteness of responsibility which had never existed under the old form of government.

## VII. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS

THE PUBLIC is generally concerned only with the services of government and their cost. So long as the services are considered adequate and the burden of supporting them is not felt to be too onerous by those who pay taxes, the administration is ordinarily believed to be satisfactory. When the public becomes dissatisfied with its government, it seems to have an almost automatic impulse to change its personnel or its form of organization and sometimes both. Yet such changes may not necessarily have any effect whatever on the basic difficulties arising from faulty administrative practice, which through competent and dispassionate analysis could be corrected.

Centralized purchasing by means of competitive bidding and a merit system of recruiting personnel are administrative practices which, charter prohibitions aside, could be adopted by any form of government, although the lack of them in the Dayton government prior to 1914 was repeatedly pointed to by the charter reform group as evidence of the need for the city manager plan. Likewise, an adequate system of accounting with proper budgetary control, which the old system did not have, could have been established without a change in the charter. Yet it is doubtful if such needed improvements in administrative methods would have been introduced so early in Dayton had there not been the exciting campaign which concentrated public attention on the proposal to write a new charter. To be sure, the city manager charter explicitly provided for certain administrative reforms, notably in personnel, purchasing, and accounting, but they were not essential to the new plan of organization itself. The extent to which they were successfully applied depended largely upon establishing a new tradition of municipal management and securing honest and resourceful leaders.

### *Personnel*

The task of securing for the public service the best qualified persons available and stimulating them to perform their duties to the best of their ability is never simple, even with the best of intentions. At the time of the charter campaign in Dayton it was widely charged and was generally believed that the intentions of the local officials about personnel were not always to recruit the best qualified persons. The civil service commission had been ineffective. Political patronage was the accepted rule, but in employment, as in everything else, responsibility was so diffused

that no one could be held accountable. With the installation of city manager government in Dayton there began a new system of personnel administration designed to guarantee free and open competition for appointments on a basis of merit and fitness and to fix definitely the final appointing power in one person, the manager.

To direct the personnel activities of the government, the charter provided for the appointment of three citizens to a civil service board for terms of six years each. This board, subject to the approval of the city council, prepared and enforced rules and regulations on employment and selected the chief examiner, who was "the employment officer of all city employees coming under the classified service."<sup>1</sup>

The unclassified service, aside from the elected officials and the city manager, included the heads of departments and divisions and their immediate assistants, the secretaries and the assistants of the manager, the clerk of the council, and the members of appointive boards. The classified service included all other positions and was divided into three classes: competitive, noncompetitive or professional, and labor. The examinations for the competitive class were prepared by the chief examiner after consultation with the head of the department concerned and frequently after a comparative study of similar examinations held in other cities. For some positions, notably those of policemen and firemen, oral examinations were given by the board sitting as a body after the written examination had been taken. The oral examination, designed to evaluate personality, alertness, appearance, and similar qualities of the candidates, could never count more than 30 points toward anyone's possible score of 100, and the board never knew the grades from the written examination until after it had made its ratings from the orals. The passing mark was 70, and all who passed were certified on an eligible list. War veterans who received passing marks automatically had 20 per cent added to their grades.

There were restrictions on eligibility to take the civil service examinations in Dayton. Legal residence within the corporate limits was a prerequisite, unless, in rare instances, it was waived by the civil service board. Age requirements varied with the position and with the general economic conditions of the community. In times of business prosperity, when applicants for city positions were relatively few, the upper limit might be raised. On the other hand, in times of depression the upper limits might also be raised to give older men with heavy family responsibilities an opportunity to qualify for appointment. The common lower

<sup>1</sup>Dayton, Charter, Sec. 97.

limit was twenty-one years, the upper limit sometimes as high as fifty-five. An applicant might be excluded from an examination on the grounds of undesirable character. For the fire and police divisions rather exacting physical standards had to be met before a person was allowed to participate in the written and oral examinations.

After all the examinations were taken and the eligible list, consisting of the names of all who received passing grades, was prepared and turned over to the city manager, there remained the task of making the final selections, over which the civil service board had no control. Almost always the manager passed the list of eligibles on to the heads of the departments and the divisions concerned. The division head made his selection, usually on the basis of additional interviews and inquiry, and sent his recommendation to the department head and on to the manager, who officially made the appointment. The person chosen did not have to be the person at the head of the eligible list, but he had to be on the list.

The chief examiner in office in 1938 and others who observed the government closely reported that the council had not interfered in any way with the work of the civil service board. Yet twenty-five years after the beginning of Dayton's reformation which was to end favoritism in employment, one still heard charges that there was sometimes politics in making appointments. It was, of course, difficult to secure documentation to support or to refute such accusations. Yet certain observations are perhaps worth recording in this connection.

So long as there are more persons eligible for appointment than there are positions to be filled, there will be disappointed aspirants to positions in the public service, and at times some who have been thus disappointed and their friends will accuse the administration of playing politics. Some citizens in Dayton undoubtedly took this attitude. Furthermore, there was confusion in the minds of many disinterested people when they heard that in filling a certain vacancy the person at the head of the list had been passed over and that one of the lower ranking candidates had been chosen. Many individuals believed sincerely, even if naively, that appointments should be made automatically in the strict order of placement on the eligible list.

The more serious and less public charge against the government's employment system was that members of the council interfered in making selections from the eligible registers. By and large, the manager was free to choose the persons he considered best qualified and almost always followed the recommendation of the division head. Occasionally

a councilman urged the directors in some departments to recommend for appointment persons he wanted to favor or at times made his request directly to the city manager. Sometimes, though rarely, persons were appointed who the division heads thought were less well qualified than the ones they had recommended. Interested observers outside the government considered such appointments politically inspired.

About the active participation of the council in hiring and discharging employees in the unclassified service there was more unmistakable evidence. The experiences of Mr. Eichelberger with the council during his first year as city manager and later indicate that at times he had to give in to the wishes of the councilmen in hiring and discharging chief members of his staff. In 1937 there was an instance of this sort which was thus described in the *Dayton Herald*:<sup>1</sup>

The appointment of S. E. Yendes, inspector of detectives, as safety director (an office that has been vacant for the last five years) occasions no surprise. It was apparent last week, when the city commission instructed the city manager to proceed with the appointment, that Mr. Yendes was the unanimous choice of the five commissioners. The city manager yesterday merely named the man whom he well knew he was expected to select. Whether the making of municipal appointments in this manner is desirable is at least a debatable matter.

The editorial went on to point out, however, that the man selected had had a good record in his previous position and wished him well.

In choosing members of the unclassified service there was an understandable tendency to give preference to local residents, but there continued the practice, begun under Henry Waite, of bringing in outsiders when properly qualified people could not be found in Dayton. In 1929 a new fire alarm system was installed by an out-of-town firm. The man in charge of the work, a New Englander, so impressed the city officials that he was employed as head of the division of telegraph and signals, thus replacing a lifelong resident, who had been none too well qualified for his place. In 1937 a member of the staff of the National Recreation Association in New York was employed as head of the bureau of recreation.

Regardless of the methods of recruitment followed and of the extent to which there was council interference, it is perhaps most important to ask whether the persons employed by the city government were well

<sup>1</sup> Editorial page, *Dayton Herald*, June 17, 1937. The preceding safety director had been removed ostensibly as an economy measure, although it was commonly believed in Dayton that this was merely a pretext for dismissing a man who had lost favor with the council.

qualified for their work. The answer is undoubtedly, yes. The division heads seemed to be proud of the people under their supervision. Perhaps the most frequent citizen complaint was that sometimes the persons who, on the basis of formal arithmetical ratings, appeared to be best qualified were not appointed.

Salary classifications were ordinarily determined by the city manager with the assistance of the heads of divisions and departments and were supposed to be on the basis of equal pay for equal work. The first attempt at standardization was begun in 1915. At that time it was declared to be the policy that "all positions having similar duties in the city government should have the same rate of compensation," but it was pointed out then that "unsatisfactory and unequal conditions exist in numerous instances."<sup>1</sup> The civil service board made a careful study of salary scales established by other municipalities and of those in effect in Dayton industries for comparable work. The resulting recommendations, embodied in a formal report to the city council and the manager,<sup>2</sup> were accepted and put into effect. During the war period various salary and wage increases were grudgingly granted in a not always successful attempt to keep municipal employees from deserting to private business, and were by no means uniform throughout the service. In 1920 the civil service board warned: "In order to preserve harmony and for the best interests of the city . . . a reclassification should be made as soon as conditions warrant."<sup>3</sup> No action was taken, however, until 1925 and 1926, after the civil service board in cooperation with the Dayton Research Association had conducted an inquiry to determine where readjustments were needed.

When the material for this report was being collected in Dayton, agitation for another reclassification was started by the Dayton local of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, which was composed entirely of skilled and unskilled outside workmen in the municipal service. Unlike the other classifications, however, the one proposed by the employees' union would be conducted by some out-of-town agency—a national consulting service was suggested—would make work analyses of all positions in the city government, would systematize promotions and salary increases, and would attempt to establish uniform wage and salary rates for comparable work throughout the service. This proposal called for a more comprehensive study of classifica-

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Report*, 1915, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Annual Report*, 1916, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Annual Report*, 1920, p. 3.

tion than had ever been made before in the Dayton government. The manager objected to it chiefly on the grounds of expense, knowing full well that equalization of rates would mean raising the lower ones rather than reducing the higher ones and knowing also that the necessary funds were not easily available. The variations in wage rates for common labor—there were seven different rates—and for helpers and miscellaneous skilled workmen were, in Mr. Eichelberger's opinion, justified by variations in the work to be done and in the experience and performance of the men. He admitted, however, that in some instances one man might receive more than others for the same sort of work simply because he happened to be hired at a time when industrial wages were up and applicants for municipal jobs were scarce. Such differentials provided obvious causes for grumbling, particularly since in 1938 there was a general employees' union. It may well be that the manager was correct in saying that the great number of pay-rate variations could be defended, but the employees naturally lacked this fine sense of discrimination. What they desired was a systematic method of classification as a substitute for the existing rule-of-thumb procedure.

Employee training has gained increasing favor with personnel directors in recent years and has been extensively undertaken in many private and public agencies. In the Dayton government, however, there was little in the way of an organized training program. The police and fire divisions had for a long time had a period of compulsory training for their recruits, and each year a few patrolmen attended the short courses for policemen which were conducted at Ohio State University. The usual Red Cross courses in first aid were given periodically. The recreation bureau also had a systematic training program. The supervisors were brought together in a week's playground institute at the beginning of the summer season and again in the fall. The head of the bureau provided some training in individual conferences with the supervisors throughout the week and held a meeting with all of them each Saturday morning. For the most part, however, the city employees learned their tasks from their colleagues and from their immediate supervisors.

Employee organizations were accepted by the administration with tolerance, and in the form of fraternal orders they had existed in the fire and police divisions for many years. The first association of the trade-union variety to gain a foothold in the Dayton government, however, was the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the local branch of which was organized in February, 1936. Its members were careful to point out that their union was an American



Federation of Labor affiliate and had no connection with the Congress of Industrial Organizations; nevertheless, the administration did not look upon it with complete approbation. The manager set aside one afternoon a month to confer with its leaders, but in the beginning he was inclined to consider them trouble-makers. In 1938 the union claimed over 250 members out of more than 1,000 municipal employees, but up to that time no office workers had joined.

So far as could be observed in visiting the various departments and in talking with employees in all ranks there appeared to be satisfactory morale throughout most of the organization. The employees in general had faith in the government of which they were a part, and they had respect for the people with and under whom they worked. The new union, according to its president, was constantly on the alert, however, to discover complaints and to take them up with the management in order to maintain among incumbent and prospective members an interest in union activities. It was this vigilance which once caused the manager to complain that whereas previously there had been just about perfect morale among city employees, a "union agitator" was constantly trying to stir up strife. Yet in 1938 negotiations were carried on with a business agent from the union's national office in a spirit of mutual confidence and good will.

Among the common devices to maintain good morale many were tried at one time or another and later allowed to lapse into disuse. Under Mr. Waite athletic teams were encouraged among employees and tournaments were held, but interest apparently waned. A staff magazine was published for a few years in the early 1920's and then in time disappeared. For many years there was an annual picnic of all city employees and their families, but when local businessmen who had previously provided the necessary funds withdrew their support, annual picnics were abandoned. Monthly dinners for the bureau, division, and department heads were once considered an established institution, but eventually they too were given up. There was perhaps more than a little reason to believe that just such enterprises as these were needed, if for no other reason than to counteract what Mr. Eichelberger considered "strife."

In stimulating employees to do good work the possibility of promotion, the promise of security, and the fear of dismissal operated effectively. Appointments might be considered permanent only after six months of satisfactory probationary service. Dismissal for cause might be made at any time, but the person discharged was entitled to a written statement of the reasons for his dismissal. He might appeal to the civil service board,

which, after a hearing, was empowered to make the final decision. Efficiency ratings were made by their superiors for all persons in the classified service and were filed each month with the civil service board. From these ratings, on occasion, lists were prepared of the persons eligible to take promotion examinations, which were conducted in the same manner as those for appointments. The results were reported to the city manager, who had authority to make the final choice.<sup>1</sup>

The firemen and the policemen had for several years had pension systems, supported by special taxes. It was only in 1938, however, that a pension system for all city employees became effective. Funds were contributed both by employees and by the government. Retirement was optional after thirty-six years of continuous service or at the age of sixty after a minimum period of five years' employment. Beginning in 1942, retirement would be compulsory for all over seventy. Drawn up by the state and established in all Ohio cities, the retirement plan had yet to be tried out, but those who were affected seemed hopeful and pleased.

### *Public Relations*

The extent to which the public was kept interested in the activities of government naturally varied somewhat with the personalities of the men in office. As has already been pointed out, the first city manager in Dayton had an innate capacity for doing things which attracted attention and was fully aware of the importance of maintaining citizen interest. Because the form of government was new and had been adopted after a campaign of spectacular publicity, the people had more than an ordinary concern about its functioning. Moreover, a vigorous opposition during the formative years stimulated the administration and its supporters to give more attention to publicity than they would otherwise have given. As the government gradually established itself in the confidence of the people and as the organized opposition disappeared, the need for this sort of defensive publicity declined. The Dayton Bureau of Municipal Research, which was an early ardent supporter of the plan, was subsequently closed for a while and, known as the Dayton Research Association, was not very active in 1938.

Within the administration in 1938 there was little conscious effort to keep the public informed about governmental activities. The budget, more than a half page of fine print, was published once a year in the

<sup>1</sup> After this was written, a new policy in regard to promotional examinations was put into effect. Beginning in February, 1939, promotions were made in strict order of standing on the eligible list.

Dayton newspapers. Annual reports, attractively printed and illustrated, were distributed throughout the city, although usually not until about six months after the close of the calendar and fiscal year. Now and again talks describing the city government were presented over the local radio stations and before adult education groups, and occasionally city officials were invited to speak before civic organizations. The incumbent mayor, who was serving his second four-year term, was considered a good speaker and was frequently asked to appear at public functions.

The relations between the administration and the local press were quite cordial. Reporters were allowed to go about the city offices with almost as much freedom as members of the staff and were given ready access to the material they needed. The three newspapers in turn were anxious and willing to give the government whatever special publicity it might desire.

The day-to-day relations between the manager and the public were characterized by quiet consideration. The manager was sensitive to complaints, always took pains to hear them, and was scrupulous in his efforts to remove or to explain away the causes which produced them. Thus, what he lacked in warmth of personality he tended to compensate for by extreme conscientiousness.

Thus far there had been only the scantiest attempt to provide the people of Dayton with the continuous information essential to an understanding of the government and its problems. At the time of bond elections special efforts were made through speeches and pamphlets to arouse public interest in specific enterprises. The annual reports were so much taken up with presenting trivial data and they covered, perhaps necessarily, so wide a range of topics in a superficial manner that they were certain to receive only casual reading. The financial reports were, to the uninitiated, meaningless tables of the city's dozen different funds rather than a summary of the cost of services. Yet inadequate though these reports might be, they contained much civic information and were prepared regularly after the beginning of manager government, whereas before that time the city almost never issued a public report of any sort.

### *Finance*

No part of the record of the administration which preceded 1914 was more roundly condemned by the charter group than its repeated failures to keep expenditures within revenues; "government by deficit" it was opprobriously labeled. The establishment of a scientific budget and a new charter prohibition against making financial commitments unless

the director of finance could certify that the money was available in the appropriate funds were two measures reckoned to be substantial safeguards against an unbalanced budget after 1914.

In the first annual report published by the manager and the council prominent mention was made of the government's completion of the year without issuing any bonds or borrowing money for operating expenses, although the additional services provided had cost almost four times as much as the increase in revenues. The years 1915 and 1916 also ended with surpluses in the city treasury; but in 1917, with the upward rush of wartime prices, deficits began once more, and the municipal budget was not balanced again until 1922. Protesting that the policy of issuing deficiency bonds was unsound finance, the administration was nonetheless grateful for legislative permission to resort to that practice during this period of financial stress. Business prosperity, with the attendant prompt payment of taxes, and a property revaluation in 1924 gave Dayton a period of unprecedented financial success between 1922 and 1930. By the end of 1930, however, tax delinquencies had become so common that it was necessary to reduce wages, salaries, and all other expenses wherever possible; but despite this retrenchment deficits followed one after another. Again the state legislature had to provide emergency methods of relief, and it authorized the use of municipal scrip and the issuing of bonds against delinquent tax collections. Revenues and expenditures nearly balanced in 1935, and in 1936 and 1937 substantial surpluses were created. The 1938 business recession, however, greatly reduced tax collections, and the city manager predicted that for 1938 income would again fall short of expense. Thus, from this summary of the experiences of Dayton's first twenty-four years under the manager plan, it may be seen just how far wrong the enthusiastic charter reformers were in their fond hopes and claims that a change in the form of government would abolish deficits. Economic conditions plus state tax limitations continued to nullify fiscal policy and charter provisions.

Restrictive state finance laws were no less difficult to overcome. The requirement that bond issues and tax levies must be approved by a two-thirds majority vote meant, of course, that a minority of those who voted could prevent improvements and new services or even the proper maintenance of existing functions which a majority of the people desired.

Another state regulation to which the municipal officers objected was that new valuations of property were made only at the pleasure of the county commissioners. There was also the state-prescribed system

whereby the tax rate was fixed each year by the county budget commission; and in 1938 the city administration had no direct representative on this commission as it had had under the old form of government under a formula established by state law. Aside from certain assessments outside the limitation, primarily for debt retirement, the total property tax rate was limited to ten mills on each dollar of assessed valuation and was divided between the city public school system, the county government, and the city, according to a rigid ratio fixed by the state. As the limitation had been fifteen mills prior to 1934, a sales tax law was enacted to offset the loss of property tax revenues resulting from the reduction. The distribution of these sales tax revenues among the units of local government was left to the discretion of the county budget commission. There was continual grumbling by the city officials in Dayton, as well as elsewhere in Ohio, about the lack of home rule in finances,<sup>1</sup> but only sporadic and poorly organized attempts to change the law had been made. The city government prior to 1914 struggled along under the same handicap. The change to city manager government did not cure this basic and troublesome difficulty.

The charter provided that a continuous audit should be made by an independent accountant employed by the council. This provision was faithfully observed for about fifteen years. It was discontinued on the assumption that the audits made by the state examiners were sufficient. The careless bookkeeping which existed under the old form of government had long ago been changed, and the accounts were kept in 1938 so that the exact financial position of the city was readily determined at the close of each day.

Another financial improvement which came with the new charter was a businesslike system of purchasing. It was promptly hailed as one of the fine achievements of the new administration and it continued to maintain a good record. On all purchases of over five hundred dollars it was the practice to advertise for bids for two weeks. In emergencies, however, purchases might be made on the approval of the council without advertising. For smaller purchases the purchasing agent merely asked informally, by letter or telephone, for bids from a few firms which he knew from experience were most apt to submit acceptable bids. To as great an extent as possible the purchasing agent tried to determine the need for certain major supplies and materials over a period of a year in advance and to let contracts for delivery when and as needed. After bids

<sup>1</sup> The one exception was Cincinnati, which obtained local control of finances by special legislative enactment.

were assembled, the manager made his selection, and transactions for purchases of less than five hundred dollars were completed immediately; the approval of the council was required for purchases over that amount. Ordinarily the recommendation of the manager was accepted, but if the low bidder was an out-of-town concern and there was a local firm whose bid was only slightly higher, the local firm was likely to be favored. There seemed to be no evidence of the improper handling of purchases, although frequently dealers heard of prospective contracts and went to members of the council to solicit their favor before the taking of bids was announced. Periodic tests were made of materials in order to determine whether they met the precise specifications.

### *Coordination*

Even a casual visit through the offices of the Dayton government was likely to give one the impression that the routine of operation was so firmly established and that the employees were so accustomed to their tasks after many years that the whole organization moved along without any conscious effort from anyone to direct or coordinate its activities. There seemed on the surface to be no hurry or excitement or display of authority, just quiet steady plodding. That characterization was in many respects justified by careful study.

The city manager in office in 1938, as the chief coordinator of the government, knew the functioning of the Dayton administration with a thoroughness seldom achieved by the head of a municipal government. Having spent most of his adult life in the municipal service and seventeen years as city manager, Mr. Eichelberger had had opportunity to develop an intimate acquaintance with every division and bureau. From long and close association he knew the capacities and the peculiarities of his staff. His assistant and two of the directors had been city employees for thirty years. Of the other directors, one was first employed in 1914, one in 1915, another in 1922, and the sixth in 1924. Similar long records of service were common in all subdivisions.

There was a minimum of formality in Mr. Eichelberger's relations with the staff. Except for the daily divisional reports in the safety department and the annual summary statements from which the city's annual report was prepared, there were few written accounts of the administration's activities. The manager simply followed the practice of going around to see for himself what work was being done and of visiting the various offices in the city hall. The directors went to his office repeatedly throughout the day with their individual problems. Staff

meetings he considered a waste of time, and he had held hardly any since 1928. Undoubtedly Mr. Eichelberger's long experience and his exceptional memory, along with the stability of policies and personnel throughout the administration, made it possible for him to dispense with such traditional coordinating devices as reports and staff meetings without impairing his own effectiveness.

On the lower administrative levels there were many examples of spontaneous cooperation among divisions. The division of building inspection and the fire prevention bureau worked together closely. The division of telegraphs and signals, although essentially devoted to work with the police and fire divisions, gave help on electric wiring wherever needed within the organization. The division of parks provided much equipment for the playgrounds out of materials salvaged from other departments. Here again most of the coordination was informal, although there were the usual interdepartmental book charges when services and materials were exchanged.

### *Planning*

Beginning with the installation of city manager government there was considerable interest in planning future physical improvements. A city plan board, appointed in 1914, spent several years in drawing up proposals for a civic center and assisting in the preparation of zoning ordinances. In 1924 a new and larger board was established and was given an adequate full-time personnel. Almost the first task undertaken by the new board was a study of the problem of grade-crossing elimination, and on the basis of its recommendations a program of railway elevation was carried into effect. In 1926 a comprehensive city plan was drawn up with the aid of the Technical Advisory Corporation of New York. With the zoning board of appeals, which grew out of its activities, the city plan board continued with its task of trying to direct the orderly growth of the community. After the federal government offered financial assistance for municipal works, there was some criticism in the community that the city was caught without adequate plans and that consequently Dayton did not receive its share of grants and loans from the WPA and PWA. The administration replied that the public would not supply the funds with which to provide the city's share of the cost of the improvements which had already been planned.

Used in another sense, planning within the general operations of the city was largely related to budget-making and depended to a considerable extent upon the ability of the finance director and the manager to

predict economic conditions and hence revenues. Periodic revisions of the budget each year made it possible to plan activities so that they came within reasonable range of the financial possibilities.

Used in its widest sense, planning could mean facing the broad general problems of the community, predicting probable changes, proposing solutions. With such planning talk the air was filled in the days of Messrs. Patterson and Waite, but not in 1938. It was generally agreed that the Dayton government employed competent clerks, bought supplies honestly, kept the streets clean, and extinguished fires promptly. It did its routine work not badly, but there was an undercurrent of feeling in Dayton that this efficient municipal housekeeping was hardly enough. Some people felt that in a large industrial community such as Dayton the government should assume the local leadership in trying to find ways to put decent houses in place of its slums, in providing work for the unemployed, in studying and making proposals on various other public issues of the day. The hope for ready-made solutions from Washington and the absence of effective home rule were obvious deterrents to bold action. Yet equally significant handicaps were a smug pride in past achievements and a lack both of imaginative leadership and of informed public opinion.

## VIII. SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL

IN REPORTING THE results of city manager government in Dayton, notably in the many pamphlets and articles by members of the Dayton Bureau of Municipal Research, it was usual to present a long list of the municipal accomplishments beginning on January 1, 1914, when the first manager assumed his duties. It is an impressive list: a new building code put into effect, countless miles of streets and sidewalks paved, a free bureau of legal aid established, a thousand acres of parks and playgrounds acquired, a garbage reduction plant built, the water works modernized and enlarged, a sewage disposal plant constructed, a comprehensive city plan adopted, many grade crossings eliminated by elevating the railroad tracks, the public health service vastly extended, a modern system of budget-making and accounting adopted, centralized purchasing established. These and innumerable lesser events were repeatedly described as evidences of what the city manager plan of government had done for Dayton, achievements, moreover, which were realized honestly and efficiently.



It is, of course, hardly worth while to argue about the amount of credit that rightly belongs to the city manager form of government as such for the various tangible achievements of the Dayton municipal administration during the past quarter-century. A large portion of the public works, however, would necessarily have been built, and many of the extensions in public services and the improvements in administrative practice would have come in time, regardless of the form of government. What can be said with certainty is that the administration which functioned under the city manager system performed its work well. Only an exhaustive analysis of the experiences of other cities during the same period could indicate—and perhaps then only tentatively—to what extent Dayton had more or less satisfactory government than that under other types of organization. No one can say what might have been the experiences of Dayton had not the existing charter gone into effect. But such speculations as these are useful if only because they help to hold advocacy within reasonable bounds.

Under city manager government the debt of the city of Dayton increased and the tax rate rose, but for these new expenditures, actual and promised, the community received a notable extension of services and an expansion of physical facilities. The public on the whole seemed satisfied with the bargain made for it by its officials. The credit of the city government remained good through the depression, and the Moody rating of its bonds, although not as high as that of Cincinnati, was comparable to that of the best Ohio cities.<sup>1</sup>

In matters of administrative organization the city manager system undoubtedly provided significant improvements over the form of government which had previously existed in Dayton. Unity of control was provided. Authority commensurate with responsibility was more nearly achieved. And the dividing line between policy formation and policy execution, flexible enough for easy relations, was far more firmly established than it ever was in the confused times prior to 1914.

Just as important as the administrative reforms explicitly provided for in the charter was the change in governmental tradition which followed the break away from the old system. The change in form of government constituted a psychological turning point, after which improvements theretofore impossible could easily be attained. The charter campaign and the exciting period of reorganization produced a popular desire to atone for old political sins which, only a short time before, had been quite consistent with the prevailing political mores. Thus the

<sup>1</sup> Dayton Research Association, *Facts About Debt*, April, 1937.

change in form of government served as the political equivalent of a religious revival meeting. The community, repudiating the sinfulness of politics and the politicians, put its faith in the businessmen councilmen who in turn were intrusted with the task of selecting an independent expert as city manager. The councilmen and the manager were then expected to rule over the people according to the law as set forth in the charter and according to the principles of sound business administration. This feeling of community expiation in Dayton during the early period of city manager government derived a considerable part of its strength from the public reaction to the disastrous flood of 1913. Everyone talked about the necessity of working together, not just to repair the damage but to build a bigger, finer, more prosperous community than the most extravagant civic boosters had ever dreamed of before. The Miami Conservancy District, consisting of the eight counties which had been affected by the flood, was created to build a chain of flood control dams. The wealthy families gave large sums of money for civic improvements and it became generally popular to talk of personal sacrifice for the common good. The emotional drive which made possible the success of the charter campaign continued long enough to create public support for the establishment of new administrative methods.

It was firmly believed by the founders of Dayton's new system of government that under it more capable men would be elected to the new council than had ever served on the old one. By aggressive campaigning for a hand-picked ticket the Citizens' Committee was able to name the entire council at the first election, and by abolishing the ward system of elections and by establishing nonpartisan ballots it was hoped that the political party leaders had been forever banished from municipal affairs. It was a foolish hope. The businessmen did not always maintain their early enthusiasm for direct political participation, and the groups which felt they were not adequately represented provided votes for candidates who promised to uphold the interest of "The People" against the big business group. The Citizens' Committee was only a nebulous affair for several years before 1938. The successful candidates for election to the council were usually men sponsored by the Citizens' Committee and indorsed by both the Republican and Democratic party organizations. Most of those who were elected after 1920 were more actively identified with their political parties than were the first councilmen and, as politicians are traditionally supposed to be, were more sensitive to the need for pleasing the public and for compromising conflicting interests. The later councils, it was recognized in Dayton, created a better balance

in the government between political representation and administrative independence than did the first ones.

The cycle of political emotions through which the people of Dayton passed was interestingly related to the personalities of the managers who served them, particularly the first one, Henry M. Waite, and the incumbent, Fred O. Eichelberger. Mr. Waite was a sort of evangelist for municipal reform and a hardheaded and competent administrator. Vigorous, colorful, enthusiastic, he carried the community and the council along with him in one spectacular enterprise after another. He filled the place of renovator, organizer, public leader almost to perfection. Moreover, he had the obvious advantage of serving at a time when city manager government itself was something new and exciting. After the organization period was over, a letdown was inevitable, but it was made even more severe by the financial crisis of the World War period. After two short-term managers and with returning prosperity the public attitude was receptive to a man of Mr. Eichelberger's character—unassuming, eager to work inconspicuously under the direction of the council, yet thoroughly capable of managing municipal affairs and of making public improvements without too much fuss and bother. Obviously the real test of city manager government is to be found, not in the four exciting reform years of Henry Waite's administration, but in the long and sometimes painful years of boom and depression, expansion and retrenchment, under Fred Eichelberger. That the government weathered one financial crisis after another and in the face of general public disinterest gave good and honest service is tribute both to the form of Dayton's government and to the man who ran it.

There was not, however, a perfect correlation between what the public wanted and needed and what the administration provided. Despite the breakdown in business control of the council, there continued a smoldering resentment against what was called the unrepresentative nature of the government. Enlarging the council, with or without the introduction of proportional representation, would very likely be a popular move, although it was repeatedly rejected by the council and its official committees.

There was evident need for a more conscious attempt to keep the public informed about the activities of its government, yet there was obviously no set formula to be prescribed. A full realization of this need by the city officials might stimulate more imaginative efforts in this direction. It would be worth while to consider the possibility of issuing special reports to the public on specific activities and problems. And for the

sake of popular understanding, the annual reports should be organized more in terms of functions of government rather than of miscellaneous bureau activities. Finances should likewise be reported in a more graphic fashion, with breakdowns by functions of government rather than by a summary of fund accounts.

Within the administration there was little awareness of the dangers of complacency which are inherent in long continuity of routine. Such aids to building morale as holding general staff meetings and organizing occasional recreational activities should be used. By developing a greater sense of employee participation in the general administration greater initiative and responsibility could be encouraged.

The adoption of the city manager system of government did not, of course, help to give the city greater control of its taxation problems, although, given a certain amount of revenue, there was much greater budgetary control than existed prior to 1914. To have completely responsible local government, the city should have power, within the limits of whatever tax sources were assigned to it by the state, to raise its own revenues and to issue bonds by simple majority vote. Under the existing arrangement the city officials could always say—and with justification—that the failure of the government to meet its obligations or to provide needed improvements was either because of state and county taxation restrictions or because of the obstinacy of willful minorities at the time of bond elections. Only strongly organized efforts in cooperation with the other cities of Ohio could produce the necessary changes in state laws. The Dayton government was exceptionally active in the campaign to secure modification of state restrictions on local finance, but facing the necessity of dealing with a legislature dominated by a hostile combination of farmers and large industrialists, the cause of the cities was hard to win.

One aspect of the Dayton government during the early days of city manager administration which gave great promise for the future was the tendency of the municipal government to assume leadership in a wide variety of community activities. But since that leadership was so largely provided by a manager of forceful personality, it diminished when he left and the excitement of the first years of government reform were over. In 1938 with a large portion of the population on relief and with concomitant problems demanding the most thoughtful consideration that the community and its leaders could provide the government of Dayton was making scant attempts locally to find solutions for its basic social and economic problems. So long as the city must carry the burden of direct

relief and so long as city sources of revenue are rigidly limited by state law, it is obvious that the local officials must devote much of their attention to attempts to secure financial aid from the state and federal governments. While this attention was given with great persistence, the responsibility of the municipal administration should extend beyond mere mendicancy.

It may not be true, as one prominent Dayton citizen was certain, that "someday the city of Dayton is going to wake up and find that the revolution has come, simply because the people and the government didn't know or bother to find ways of dealing with the troubles here at home." But it does seem that the attitude of constant "waiting to see what the state legislature or Congress is going to do" is an unhealthy sign. Just such symptoms of local government decline can, of course, be found everywhere and to a large extent are the inevitable developments of the times, but it is to be regretted that Dayton, which started out so confidently in 1914 to point the way for other cities to follow, could not in 1938 show more of that same local resourcefulness. However well the federal government may succeed in controlling the economic processes and social problems of the nation, there will probably be increasing need for local experiments in social control. Dayton, with a quarter-century of experience under a type of administration which on the whole functioned quite effectively, should be in a position to attempt to find solutions to some of its local problems and to provide other test results for the nation to observe.

In general Dayton's record up to 1939 was good. The city manager system worked. But there was no justification for indifferent complacency, toward which there was a decided tendency in the community at large. The perplexities of the times were providing new tests for Dayton's form of government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Largely as a result of the forced closing of the public schools in November, 1938, the Montgomery County Public Advisory Committee was formed to make a comprehensive survey of all the taxing and spending units of the county, including the city government, the city school system, and the county government. The present report is presented as a historical review of local government in Dayton to 1938, and does not purport to deal with the forces leading to the setting up of the Advisory Committee, with its survey, or with the results of the survey.

LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA

*A. George Miller*

## CONTENTS

I.	The City . . . . .	325
II.	Mayor-Council and Commission Governments, 1881-1921 . . . . .	326
III.	Adoption of the City Manager Plan . . . . .	329
IV.	City Manager Government, 1921-34 . . . . .	334
V.	City Manager Government, 1934-38 . . . . .	341
VI.	Administrative Achievements . . . . .	347
VII.	Public Relations . . . . .	366
VIII.	Conclusion . . . . .	370



### IMPORTANT DATES IN LONG BEACH'S GOVERNMENT

Incorporation .....	1897
Mayor-Council Government.....	1908
Commission Plan.....	1914
City Manager Plan .....	1921

---

Charles E. Hewes, Manager.....	1921
Charles H. Windham, Manager.....	1922
Charles S. Henderson, Manager....	1926
H. S. Callahan, Manager.....	1927
George L. Buck, Manager.....	1929
C. C. Lewis, Manager.....	1930
E. S. Dobbin, Manager.....	1932
James Bonner, Manager.....	1933
Randall M. Dorton, Manager.....	1934



*Field Work: Summer, 1938*  
*Report Written: Spring, 1939*

# City Manager Government in Long Beach

---

## I. THE CITY

LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA, long famous as a haven for retired mid-westerners, grew into a fair-sized city almost overnight. From 1910 to 1920 its population more than tripled, and from 1920 to 1930 it more than doubled, increasing in the latter period from 55,593 to 142,032. The estimated population in 1938 was 175,000.

The census reports of 1930 confirmed the general impression that Long Beach was a city to which the elderly came to spend their last years in leisure. According to these reports over 9 per cent of the population was over sixty-five years of age, and in nearly one-fifth of the families there was no member gainfully employed. The percentage of illiteracy was much lower than the state or national average (the rate being only .05 per cent) and was found largely among the 2 per cent of the population which was made up of Negroes, Mexicans, Filipinos, Chinese, and Japanese. The native-born whites represented 88.7 per cent of the population, compared with 74.5 for the state of California.

Chamber of Commerce literature states that Long Beach is a city without tenements or slums, and this appears to be substantially true. While there are certain areas in which the housing of low-income workers could be improved, there are no real slums or large blighted areas. The median sale price of homes in Long Beach was in 1930 \$7,230, and the median rental was \$37.36, figures which are much higher than those for the state as a whole or for the other four California cities of over 100,000 population.

The presence in the community of large numbers of aged retired people accounts to a considerable extent for the lack of interest in city affairs. These older citizens have led their active life in other cities and are perhaps more familiar with political affairs "back home" than in Long Beach. Their major interest appears to be in social organizations, of which there is a plethora. They provide for reunion celebrations of all who have come from a particular state, county, or city. The Iowa



State Society in Long Beach is the largest of such groups in all California. These clubs and societies, with the exception of the Townsend Clubs, are not interested in politics and have seldom taken any part in local political campaigns.

Though a large part of the population is made up of retired people, about 40 per cent of the population is gainfully employed. Long Beach has very little heavy industry, but the oil fields, the Ford Motor Company assembly plant, the huge harbor terminal, and the retail and service businesses furnish employment for many. The United States Navy has a base at the Los Angeles-Long Beach harbor, and the Navy pay roll represents an immense stabilizing force in the volume of retail business.

Local government is carried on by the county, the city, and the school district, no two of which are coterminous. The school district has charge of all public educational institutions, does its own purchasing, recruits its own personnel (certificated and otherwise), and is related to the city administration only to the extent that the city pays the salaries of the members of the board of education. The effect of the county government is not very apparent within the city, and there is some feeling in favor of complete separation from the county. The county acts as a tax-collecting agent for several special jurisdictions that overlap the city, such as flood-control and water districts.

## II. MAYOR-COUNCIL AND COMMISSION GOVERNMENTS, 1881 TO 1921

LONG BEACH WAS founded in 1881 under the name of Willmore City, after W. E. Willmore, a young Englishman who had visions of a metropolis arising from what was then a sheep ranch. Mr. Willmore obtained an option to purchase four thousand acres of land from Jotham Bixby at twenty-five dollars an acre and zoned the tract into a central residential section and a district on the outskirts devoted to small farming acreages. The residential area included the business district of the city as it was in 1938. Lack of adequate transportation facilities hindered the sale of the lots, and in 1883 Mr. Willmore had to relinquish his contract.

But the development had already attracted a few settlers, who in 1884 changed the name of the town to Long Beach. In 1888 the residents voted to incorporate the town as a city of the sixth class to be governed

by a board of trustees. According to the census of 1890, Long Beach had a population of 564.

One burning issue, destined to divide the community for many years to come, had already appeared. The original owner of the sheep ranch had inserted a clause in the deed to Mr. Willmore prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages. Mr. Willmore, however, had included this provision in only some of the contracts for the sale of lots, and thus opened the way for the wet-dry controversy, which became so heated by 1896 that the citizens voted to disincorporate the city. For over a year municipal functions were carried on by voluntary subscriptions from private citizens, since there was no regularly constituted city government. The situation eventually became intolerable, and the city was reincorporated in 1897, again as a city of the sixth class governed by a board of trustees.<sup>1</sup>

The state constitution was amended in 1902 to provide for a greater degree of home rule for incorporated areas, but Long Beach did not adopt a new charter until October of 1906. An earlier attempt in 1904 failed when the proposed charter was defeated. The new charter, which provided for a mayor-council form of government, was adopted at an election held in February, 1907, and went into effect on January 6, 1908, after being approved by the state legislature. One of the members of the first council, H. S. Callahan, later served as city manager from July 5, 1927, to December 7, 1928.

The liquor question many times divided the voters of Long Beach into two political parties. National parties in Long Beach did not decide municipal campaigns; in fact, the national parties seldom endorsed candidates or propositions on the ballot. Local issues were generally settled by the extent to which they attracted the church vote, the dry vote, the wet vote, the Navy vote, or the support of other local groups.

The mayor-council government did not seem able to provide a successful or harmonious administration. The constant strife between the mayor and the council and the ever present liquor question aroused public opinion to such a pitch that it was felt that any change would be an improvement. A board of freeholders was elected April 20, 1914, and drew up a charter embodying the commission plan of government. The liquor controversy was the principal issue in the campaign for the adoption of the new charter. The wets opposed the commission charter

<sup>1</sup> The earlier incorporation and disincorporation are usually disregarded, and 1897 is given as the date of incorporation. The seal of the city bears the inscription "Incorporated 1897," and the increment map in the office of the city engineer starts with December 1, 1897.

because it tightened the enforcement of liquor laws, and the most extreme dries were against it because they thought it was not strict enough. The charter won by a narrow margin in the election held on October 15, 1914, and went into effect shortly thereafter. The vote was light: 1,651 in favor of the charter and 1,605 opposed, out of 15,357 eligible voters.

The commission was composed of five men elected for a term of four years at an annual salary of \$2,500 each. The members of the commission were individually heads of the departments of public finance and accounting, public affairs, public property, public works, and public safety. One of the commissioners was selected by his colleagues to act as mayor. The title did not imply, nor did the charter prescribe, any additional authority or duties for the mayor except those of presiding over the meetings of the commission.

A clause in the commission charter contained the germ of the city manager plan. Upon petition of 51 per cent of the voters the commission was required to appoint a city manager; upon petition of 25 per cent of the voters the manager proposal was to be submitted to the people at the polls. The clause did not provide for a new city manager charter but proposed to set up the office of manager within the existing structure. These provisions concerning the manager form of government seemed harmless enough. It would be quite difficult to obtain signatures of 25 per cent of the voters, and it would be virtually impossible to get the signatures of 51 per cent. If public opinion was strongly in favor of the manager form of government, it would be easier to force an election for a board of freeholders to draw up a manager charter. However, the manager clause occasioned a great deal of verbal pyrotechnics. During the 1914 campaign the Reverend Mullen, identified as a minister of the gospel from a Bible institute in Los Angeles, characterized the manager form of government as a "lager beer effervescence of imperialism" imported from militaristic Europe.<sup>1</sup> Others defended it nearly as violently. Both daily papers supported the commission charter, with the *Long Beach Press* doing the more active campaigning.

<sup>1</sup> *Long Beach Daily Telegram*, October 14, 1914.

### III. ADOPTION OF THE CITY MANAGER PLAN

THE COMMISSION PLAN seemed to be satisfactory for a few years, but only until the continued growth of the city and municipal functions demonstrated the inherent weaknesses of the system. Popularly elected amateur administrators were found to be incapable of meeting the problems presented by a rapidly growing city. During the decade from 1910 to 1920 the population tripled, placing a tremendous strain on the physical facilities which had been adequate for the city ten years before. Although deliberate mismanagement was rare, none of the departments was administered by trained technicians. The duties and the responsibilities of the positions were simply too great for most of the men who were elected. Elections were generally decided upon the ability of a candidate to ingratiate himself with the electorate rather than upon his technical training for the job or upon his ability as an administrator.

There was no coordination of departmental functions, and the commissioners were incessantly at odds with one another over the details of operation. Charges by the press of inefficiency and of lack of coordination were common at this time. Department heads hired their own employees and did their own purchasing, except for a small amount of purchasing delegated to the commissioner of public finance and accounting. The city had a poor reputation among the vendors of the city because of the difficulty in obtaining payment for goods or services.

There was a definite feeling among the more progressive and far-sighted citizens that the city had actually commenced to decline under this form of government despite population increases. It was felt that the future would have to be planned with greater care if the work of government were to keep pace with the physical growth. Little progress had been made in improving the harbor, no notable expansion of services had taken place, and no territory had been added to the city.

#### *Campaign for the Plan*

The insertion of the city manager provision in the commission charter indicated that there had been some desire for this form of government as early as 1914. It was not, however, until about 1920 that the demand reached considerable proportions. Sentiment was nearly equally divided

between returning to the mayor-council form of government and adopting a city manager charter. The newspapers and the civic organizations agreed about discontinuing the commission form, but they did not agree on a substitute.

A board of freeholders was elected to draw up a new charter and framed one embodying many principles of city manager government. Paul B. Wilcox had been an unsuccessful candidate for the board of freeholders. Because of his recent university training in municipal government Mr. Wilcox was invited to act as a technical adviser to the members of the board. All except two members of the board eventually favored the city manager form of government, and an effort was made to have all its features incorporated in the new charter. A number of compromises became necessary before the charter could get the support of the board. Two compromise provisions—the recall of the manager and the easy means of recalling the council—ultimately militated against the success of the plan to a considerable degree. The system of electing councilmen was also a compromise: nomination by districts and election at large were the result of an attempt to conciliate the advocates of these two systems of representation.

Most of the support for the manager form of government came from the Long Beach *Daily Telegram* and from the business and professional people of the city. The Chamber of Commerce did not officially take the responsibility, but its individual members backed the plan and employed Mr. Wilcox to act as campaign manager to work for the adoption of the proposed charter.

The Long Beach *Press* opposed the city manager form of government. While it, too, rejected the commission plan, it advocated a return to the mayor-council form as being more efficient than the commission and more democratic than the city manager type. One argument used by the *Press* was that the city manager plan, especially if a nonresident manager were appointed, would result in a weak executive, because the manager would have to appoint local subordinates and would have to rely on the advice of the council in making appointments. This dependence, it was asserted, would weaken his authority and would also place much of the responsibility for administrative proficiency on the members of the council. This argument was a weak one to use in opposing the manager plan in Long Beach, where most of the opposition arose from a fear of one-man rule.

The Long Beach *Daily Telegram* supported the movement for the city manager plan through its editorial columns, feature stories, and

special columns, particularly the columns edited by Harold Williams ("Hit and Miss") and by Paul B. Wilcox ("Municipal Government"). Mr. Williams' column had been a daily feature for many years. Mr. Wilcox wrote his column as an educational program to acquaint the citizens of Long Beach with the theory and the advantages of city manager government. The column began on March 29, 1921, and ran until the election was held on April 14, 1921.

The *Telegram* argued that the manager would not be a dictator but would correspond to the general manager of a corporation or to the business manager who took the load of administrative detail off the members of the school board. Editorials cited the San Diego government as an example of the improvement to be expected from manager government. San Diego was reported to be accomplishing great savings and to be getting more efficient government, but the example was hardly a fair one, since the city manager in San Diego was called the manager of operations and was actually little more than a director of public works.<sup>1</sup>

The *Press* contended that no specific savings had been indicated by the proponents of the manager plan and challenged them to get down to cases and to quit arguing generalities and theories. The Anti-Managerial League violently attacked the proposed charter on the ground that it would lead to one-man rule. Most news stories carried by the *Press* were those of meetings held to oppose the city manager charter. The *Telegram* carried the reports of the favorable meetings. The small weekly papers were noncommittal on the proposed charter, evidently preferring to let the two large dailies do the fighting.

### *The Election*

A special election was held on April 14, 1921, for the purpose of voting on several propositions which were none too clear to the citizens. On the ballot was a proposal to adopt the new city manager charter which had just been drawn, eight amendments to the commission charter, and two alternative boundary-line proposals. The proposal to return to the mayor-council form of government was presented as Amendment No. 1 to the commission charter.

Out of 24,258 registered voters, only 5,761 cast ballots. The city manager charter was adopted by a vote of 3,047 to 2,377. A number of amend-

<sup>1</sup> Later, the International City Managers' Association withdrew San Diego from the list of cities recognized as a city manager city, and San Diego was not placed back on the list until 1931, when it adopted a new charter incorporating the city manager form.

ments to the commission charter were approved at this election but were nullified by the adoption of the new charter. Amendment No. 1 lost by seven votes.

Approximately one-eighth of the registered voters voted for the new charter, and over three-quarters of the registered voters expressed no preference. It was apparent that a large proportion of the people either did not understand the principles underlying city manager government, were not in sympathy with them, or were confused by the numerous contradictory proposals on the ballot.

On the day following the election the *Press* carried a news item in which three prominent local citizens without special qualifications for the position were mentioned as possible managers. This attitude typified certain eras in the history of manager government in Long Beach. It was only against strong local prejudice that two of the councils were able to appoint trained administrators from beyond the city limits. The general difficulty seemed to be that the public was not convinced of the wisdom of employing an expert administrator.

The agitation for the city manager charter had originated with the businessmen of the city. It was largely through their efforts that the board of freeholders was elected, the charter was adopted, and the first council was elected. It is a story of a group of businessmen, their thrifty sensibilities outraged by the sight of continued waste and mismanagement, taking charge of a campaign to put the city on a business basis. The opposition of entrenched jobholders was the chief obstacle to be overcome. Most people could see that the commission plan was not giving full value for the tax dollar. In the struggle between the advocates of the mayor-council and the city manager forms, it was the influence and prestige of the business and professional leaders that finally gained the narrow margin of victory for the city manager plan.

The first council was elected by the business interests and was composed of a group of men more or less sincerely committed to the principle of professional management. This election took place before the effects of the educational campaigns had worn off. Subsequent councils departed farther and farther from the principles of manager government.

### *The Charter*

The city manager charter of 1921 provided for a council of seven, nominated by districts and elected at large. When Greater Long Beach was annexed to the city in 1923, the size of the council was increased to nine to provide representatives from two new councilmanic districts.

One member of the council was elected by its members to serve as mayor of the city. All councilmen were elected at the same time for three-year terms, and occasionally the entire membership changed at one municipal election. While this plan might insure the reflection of the popular will at election time, it prevented assurance of continuity of legislative planning. The councilmanic salary was ten dollars a meeting, not to exceed fifty dollars a month.

Three officers with important administrative duties were also elected for three-year terms. They were the city attorney, the city prosecutor, and the auditor. The auditor had charge of all accounting functions, and the independence of this office was a serious obstacle to the manager in controlling administrative affairs.

The greatest single weakness in the entire charter, and perhaps the primary reason for the early failure of manager government in Long Beach, was the provision for the recall of the city manager. Thus, from the very beginning of the plan the office of the city manager was made a political one. One reason for this unusual provision was the fear that the city manager plan would be undemocratic and that a local dictator would arise. Two members of the board of freeholders favored the mayor-council form of government, and several others were only mildly favorable to the city manager form.

Not only was the manager made subject to popular recall, but the process was made ridiculously easy. A petition signed by electors totalling 10 per cent of the ballots cast at the last municipal general election could force a special recall election. The average election brought out less than 40 per cent of the registered voters, so that 3 or 4 per cent of the registered voters were able to force an election. Recall provisions for councilmen were identical with those pertaining to the manager. The only provision that kept recalls from being a weekly occurrence was a clause in the charter that required such petitions to be signed at the office of the city clerk. This provision was unusual, and the reasons advanced for it were that the clerk's office would be able to ascertain whether or not petitioners were registered voters at the time of signing and that citizens who really cared to initiate a recall should have enough interest to go to the city hall to sign the petition.

There was no provision to disqualify a member of the council from accepting or applying for the position of city manager. Many charters have such a provision in an attempt to make the office of manager a professional rather than a political one. The lack of such a provision in the Long Beach charter resulted in the appointment of two managers who



resigned from the council to accept the position. This practice placed the appointment definitely on a political basis.

The charter provided for a department of finance and a department of public safety, each containing several subdivisions. If these departments had been operated as the freeholders intended, there would be about seven fewer administrative heads reporting directly to the manager. However, no provision was made in the charter for the position of director or superintendent in either department, so the head of each subdivision reported directly to the manager.

The water department, the harbor department, and the civil service board were all managed by commissions. The civil service board was appointed by the council, and the other two boards were appointed by the manager with the confirmation of the council. All appointments of the manager had to be confirmed by the council, except for the members of the public library book committee. Thus, the charter failed to give the manager complete freedom in choosing his subordinates.

#### IV. CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT, 1921-34

THE FIRST COUNCIL elected under the new charter was made up of businessmen who looked for an experienced manager. They selected Charles E. Hewes, a trained engineer and an experienced administrator, who had been manager of two California cities (Alhambra, 1914-17, and Alameda, 1917-21). He resigned from his position in Alameda to accept the position in Long Beach.

Mr. Hewes encountered opposition from the start, for one of his first official acts was the consolidation of several offices and departments, which eliminated several well-paid jobs. He placed the building, sewer, plumbing, and electrical departments and the functions formerly performed by the city engineer under the office of the director of public works. These departments had all existed separately until Mr. Hewes attempted to integrate and to coordinate their activities.

This consolidation may have been sound administration, but it proved to be poor politics. In the opinion of several informed citizens, Mr. Hewes possessed ideals of municipal government that were a little too advanced for the majority of the local citizens. He was firm in his opinions and set out to give Long Beach the best sort of administration that it was possible for him to accomplish. The best administration, how-

ever, was not exactly what Long Beach wanted, despite the recent adoption of the city manager charter.

In the face of the powerful opposition which his administration aroused, Mr. Hewes remained in office until removed by a recall election on November 29, 1922. Various opinions were given concerning the immediate reason for the recall proceedings. One reason was that Mr. Hewes, acting upon the directions of the council, had employed Charles H. Cheney, a zoning consultant, whose survey of the city resulted in the enactment of a zoning ordinance. This ordinance was a good thing for the future development of the city because it came at a time of feverish expansion during the early days of the oil boom. It was very unpopular at the time because of the limitations that it placed upon land use. Numerous speculators who had visions of de luxe apartment hotels arising from their lots found that their property was limited to one-family or two-family dwellings.

Another reason for the recall of Mr. Hewes was the lease of the city oil lands to the Jergins Trust Company. Although the city was to receive oil royalties to the amount of 40 per cent, some people thought that it should have had more. As a matter of fact, several years later, the rate was cut considerably. Whatever the exact reasons for the recall, Mr. Hewes, while later conceded to have been scrupulously honest in all his dealings and an excellent administrator, found too little time to mix with people and had ideas of administration that were too "orthodox," in the opinion of many citizens. The city was not yet ready for so much efficiency or for the strict distinction between policy-forming and administrative functions that the manager tried to maintain. The citizens did not distinguish between problems of administration and matters of policy when they recalled him.

After the recall of Mr. Hewes the city council made a fortunate choice in appointing Charles H. Windham, another engineer, to be the second city manager. Mr. Windham took the oath of office on December 11, 1922, just seventeen months after Mr. Hewes had taken office. He was a local man at the time of his appointment but no novice in local politics. He had served two terms as mayor of Long Beach from 1908 to 1912. He had been a member of the Los Angeles County civil service commission from 1916 to 1922. While serving as mayor he led the movement to purchase the city water lands in order to assure the city an independent water supply. A few years later these water lands were discovered to be in the oil belt and contributed greatly to the support of the city government from that time on.

During his term of office Mr. Windham operated more like a strong mayor than a manager. He expanded the city services by acquiring the gasworks as a municipal utility in 1924. In 1923 the city purchased four hundred acres for Recreation Park, thus adding a beautiful recreation area in the eastern part of the city.<sup>1</sup> Much progress was made toward public acquisition of the beach areas. Mr. Windham's greatest achievement, however, was the development of Long Beach harbor. The harbor project was his greatest interest, and the results of his efforts were of lasting benefit to the residents of Long Beach.

Charles Windham had had some experience in public administration by virtue of his two terms as mayor, although the problems of Long Beach were considerably more complex in 1922 than they had been from 1908 to 1912. He had also had executive experience in the engineering profession. His tact and diplomacy enabled him to be a strong leader in the formulation of public policy. To help keep the political situation harmonious, the manager continually advocated long-term projects, such as the plans for harbor development. Day-to-day issues of a controversial nature were played down as much as possible. But Mr. Windham could not keep himself entirely apart from controversies. He had been a prominent local leader for many years and could not divest himself of this leadership when he assumed the office of manager. He could not hold himself aloof from political issues because he was the outstanding political figure. In many ways his administration was much more like that of a popularly elected mayor in a well-integrated mayor-council organization than that of a professional city manager. His suavity and his personal popularity enabled him to stay in office for over three years without a serious threat of removal.

In January, 1926, Mr. Windham received an attractive offer to develop a harbor in Florida. By this time the harbor in Long Beach was progressing satisfactorily, and Mr. Windham felt that he could leave its completion to others. He tendered his resignation on January 19, 1926, to be effective March 1, or as soon before that time as a successor could be appointed. He never held office in Long Beach after 1926, but upon completion of the engineering project in Florida he returned to Long Beach to live and as a private citizen once more became influential in local affairs. Some people who were in a position to judge credited Mr. Windham with doing nearly all the long-range planning for Long Beach for over a period of twenty years, either in his official capacity or as a private citizen.

<sup>1</sup> An option to purchase had been taken by the Hewes administration.

When Mr. Windham resigned, the brief period of political peace in Long Beach came to an end. From 1926 until 1934 a manager resigned or was removed on an average once in every eighteen months.

During the three years under the political and administrative leadership of Mr. Windham, the people of Long Beach almost completely lost sight of the principles of city manager government which had been explained to them at the time of the adoption of the charter. Mr. Windham made a great contribution to the city, but the character of his administration again focused attention on leadership of the strong-mayor type. Because the charter provided that the manager could be recalled and because this provision had actually been invoked in the recall of Mr. Hewes, the voters thought of the manager as an indirectly elected official whom they could remove at will. Many thought Mr. Windham's administration presaged a return to mayor-council government.

### *Attempts to Change Charter*

At the time the council accepted Mr. Windham's resignation, it instructed the city attorney to institute proceedings for calling an election to choose another board of freeholders. It was expected that a new board of freeholders would frame a charter based on the mayor-council form of government. The city manager charter had not won by a very great margin in 1921, and many people who had been offended by the Hewes administration were counted upon to support a movement to return to the mayor-council form. But the change contemplated by the council did not occur, for all except two members of the board of freeholders elected in 1926 favored the managerial form. A new manager charter increasing the powers of the manager was drawn and submitted to the voters, but it was defeated.

While the squabble over the charter was going on, the council looked about for a successor to Mr. Windham. There was some talk at first of asking Mr. Koiner, manager of Pasadena, to apply for the position, but this was as close as the council came to looking for an experienced manager or for a nonresident. Four men under consideration were the park superintendent, a member of the council, a former president of the Chamber of Commerce, and the chief clerk in the manager's office. From this time until 1934 there was usually some councilman who wanted the position of city manager.

On January 26, 1926, Charles S. Henderson, a businessman, was appointed city manager. He had lived in Long Beach for seven years and had been on the police, fire, and pension commission for the two years

preceding his appointment. He was a former president of the Chamber of Commerce, was well informed on local problems, and had the backing of the business organizations. He realized the serious situation into which he was going, as did the daily papers, which pleaded editorially that the new manager be given a fair trial.

Mr. Henderson followed a manager who had been popular and whose administration had been spending a considerable amount of money. The time for retrenchment and economy was at hand, and an economy administration did not prove popular with those who had been the ones to benefit from generous governmental spending. Economy was the keynote of the entire Henderson administration, and most of the efforts of the city manager were in the direction of bringing about savings throughout the service. Mr. Henderson stated that he would resign if a change took place in the council at the election in June, 1927. Several changes took place, and his resignation was handed in on July 1, 1927.

#### *A New Manager Every Eighteen Months*

The council elected in 1927 was composed of a well-organized majority of eight members and a single member in opposition. H. S. Callahan, one of the majority, had been elected in 1924 and reelected in 1927. He had also been on the council in 1908 when the mayor-council government was in operation. While on the council, Mr. Callahan had opposed Mr. Henderson and was one of the leaders in overthrowing his administration. With the wholehearted support of his colleagues on the council Mr. Callahan resigned from that body to become city manager. Mr. Henderson's resignation and Mr. Callahan's appointment indicate the political nature of the manager's office during this period.

It became apparent as soon as Mr. Callahan took office on July 5, 1927, that he was determined to run the office in his own way. A consistent opponent of the manager plan during his years in the council, Mr. Callahan suddenly refused to become a figurehead or a rubber stamp for his friends in the council who had placed him in the position of manager. What seemed on the surface to be a conversion to the principles of city manager government was, in the opinion of many observers, a plain case of political opportunism. It is entirely possible that Mr. Callahan relished the idea of being the chief administrator so much that he felt independent and decided not to "play ball" after all. Naturally this change alienated the support of his erstwhile political friends. It was not long before internal friction and outside pressure

broke up the machine which the council had created. To add to the internal troubles of the council recall proceedings were started against four members, two of whom resigned under pressure. Their places were filled by appointment. The other two tried to fight the recall, but they lost by a three-to-one margin. A charge alleged was that they had formed the Long Beach Insurance Agency for the purpose of profiting as councilmen from the bonding of certain contractors who were working on city projects.

On December 15, 1928, Mr. Callahan resigned under fire. He had been an important issue during the recall campaign in June and July of that year, although there was actually no petition circulated to recall him. Considering his early alliance with the council, it was a foregone conclusion that he must be the object of any attack upon that group. After two new men were elected, the pressure for Mr. Callahan's resignation grew, and his support became weaker. He finally capitulated on December 15, 1928.

As a successor to Mr. Callahan, the council appointed George L. Buck, who had been chief clerk under Mr. Windham and assistant manager under Mr. Henderson and Mr. Callahan. He seemed well qualified for the position in terms of education and training, for in addition to his seven years of service in the office of the manager he had had academic training in political science and economics at Oberlin College and the University of Michigan. Mr. Buck took office on January 18, 1929, and remained until June, 1930, when an election resulted in six changes in the council. He was later manager of San Diego for a short time.

With Mr. Buck's appointment there began an era of council domination of the office of the city manager. The council had tried to dominate Mr. Callahan, but his dogged insistence upon running his own office had thwarted their efforts. Mr. Callahan was influenced and hindered but was hardly dominated; there can be little question that Mr. Buck was dominated by the council.

### *Manager Not Permitted to Manage*

Mr. Buck and the managers who followed him were managers in name only; they were not permitted to manage. It cannot be said that the fault lay entirely with the council, although the council meddled continually in the details of administration. The managers were politically inexperienced local men with local political ties, and public opinion did not demand that the council respect the rights granted the manager in the charter.

The political reversal in 1930 swept six members of the council and Mr. Buck out of office. Although not a candidate for the position, C. C. Lewis was the unanimous choice of the new members and assumed the office of city manager on July 7, 1930. Mr. Lewis was a successful jeweler who had lived in the city for about twelve years. He had served on the council from 1925 to 1927, being appointed to fill out an unexpired term. Mr. Lewis was a popular manager, although under considerable council domination, and might have remained in office a great deal longer had not his health failed and forced him to give up the work. He never returned to public office.

Colonel E. S. Dobbin, a retired army officer, resigned from the council to accept the position of city manager left vacant by the resignation of Mr. Lewis. He took office on April 19, 1932. This was the second time in Long Beach that an elected councilman had resigned his position to become city manager. Colonel Dobbin had been elected on the ticket that broke up the domination of the previous council in 1930 and could not reasonably expect to last any longer than his colleagues on the council. Five changes took place in the council as a result of the elections in 1933, so Colonel Dobbin was forced to resign and James Bonner, a local oil man, was appointed on July 8, 1933.

Up to this time the first manager, Mr. Hewes, had been the only manager who had made an effort to improve administrative procedure. The second manager, Mr. Windham, had been thoroughly preoccupied with the expansion of services and public works. Managers who followed him served short terms, most of them had had no responsible public administrative experience, and none of them effected any important improvements in administration. With the exception of Mr. Hewes, none of the managers had had previous managerial experience. There was, besides, a distinct lack of sympathy with the principles of manager government on the part of all except Mr. Hewes. Administration was utterly neglected by several of the managers, who devoted most of their time to rebuilding political fences. There was also evidence that many department and division heads in these years were political appointees who made no contribution to administration.

During Mr. Bonner's administration, Leigh Hume was appointed city accountant to act as a budget control officer, and with the approval and the support of the manager he attempted to improve a bad budgetary situation. The city, up until the low point of the depression, had always had plenty of money to spend, and the tax rate was low enough so there were no serious complaints about excessive costs of

government. Appropriations generally exceeded estimated revenues, and these appropriations were over-expended. At the end of each fiscal year the gas department reserves would be tapped for sufficient funds to close the books without showing a deficit. Thus, the gas department reserves and the revenues from the city-owned oil lands held down the tax rate despite the lack of financial control.

The attempted improvements involved the introduction of an accrual system of accounting and administrative control over expenditures. Although there had been some slight agitation for budgetary control in 1931, no one had done anything about it until Mr. Bonner made the attempt.

The council election in 1933 returned four men to office and elected five new members. These two groups were almost continually in opposition to each other. In the spring of 1934 recall petitions were circulated against the five new councilmen who formed the majority. As soon as it became apparent that the petitions would attract sufficient signatures to require a recall election, the majority group retaliated by starting petitions against the minority four. Eventually all petitions received enough names and were checked and cleared by the city clerk. The date for the election was set for July 10, 1934, and a vicious campaign was carried on. The result of the election was the removal of all nine members of the council from office, although the sentiment was not so strong against the minority group as it was against the five newer members. The majority members were recalled by margins ranging from two to one to more than four to one. The minority members were recalled by relatively small margins.

## V. CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT, 1934-38

THE CONSTANT BICKERING among the members of the council and the frequent recall elections finally exhausted the patience of the citizens. A thorough housecleaning at the city hall was demanded. The city manager form of government was literally on trial for its life, for another recall election would probably have provoked a change to mayor-council government. Never had there been so much turmoil in city government as in the years after 1921. This disturbance occurred under a form of government that had been highly recommended as one which would place the city on a business basis and would bring order out of the chaos created by the commission form of government. While the provi-



sions for the recall of the manager and the council, the three elective officials, the councilmanic approval of the manager's appointments, and other charter requirements had sadly crippled the principles of manager government throughout the years, there was little public recognition of the large part these factors had played in the succession of failures.

After the recall of the entire council in 1934 a group of the younger business and professional men formed the Charter Enforcement Party. They knew that the bad charter was an obstacle to good city manager government, but they pledged themselves to elect a new council that would run the government according to the recognized principles of the city manager plan.

To the criticism that thirteen years was a sufficient trial for any form of government the members of the executive committee of the Charter Enforcement Party answered that, with the exception of the first council, which hired Mr. Hewes, there had never been a council that was sufficiently in sympathy with the ideals of city manager government to hire an experienced executive and to allow him to manage. Many people had felt that a change to the manager form of government in 1921 would be a cure-all for the political ills from which the city had suffered for many years. Yet the same type of councilmen continued to be elected year after year, while the citizens waited for some sort of miracle from the form of their government. A vast majority of these councilmen were not in sympathy with the city manager form of government.

From a field of over 130 candidates in the nine districts the Charter Enforcement Party endorsed nine men—one from each district—after a careful investigation of the leading candidates. Other organizations, such as the Citizens' Recall Committee, the Church Alliance, the Democratic party, the Managerial Government Group, and organized labor, also endorsed candidates in those districts where they were strong; not all groups had complete slates.

When the election returns were in, it was found that the efforts of the Charter Enforcement Party had made the best showing. Of the nine councilmen elected the Charter Enforcement Party had endorsed eight, the Church Alliance had endorsed four, the Managerial Government Group five, the Citizens' Recall Committee four, the Democratic party two, and Labor one. Some of the successful candidates were endorsed by three or more independent organizations, showing that they were not purely partisan candidates.

The Long Beach *Press-Telegram* and the Long Beach *Sun*, both of which favored the managerial form of government and the candidates

who were elected, expressed their pleasure at the caliber of men who were seated on the council. The *Press-Telegram*, through its editorial columns, congratulated the Charter Enforcement Party upon heading up the formerly ineffectual sentiment in favor of the city manager form of government.

The new council went into office pledged to support the principles of manager government, to get as good a manager as possible and to allow him to have full charge of administrative affairs. The extent to which they were successful in the eyes of the majority of the citizens is indicated by the overwhelming vote of confidence which they received at another recall election in 1935 and by the manner in which all nine were returned to the council in the regular elections held in 1936.

Mr. Bonner offered to resign when the new council was elected, but he was asked to remain in office until the new group had an opportunity to consider more thoroughly the qualifications of the many applicants for the position. The council then did a thing that no previous council had done. It called upon the League of California Municipalities to furnish a list of city managers who might be open to an offer and who were well qualified in a professional sense. One or two of the members opposed the appointment of any out-of-town man, but the majority overruled them and insisted upon appointing the best man they could get regardless of his residence.

#### *Out-of-Town Manager Selected*

The council interviewed Randall M. Dorton on September 13, 1934, and was favorably impressed by his personality, training, and experience. He had been manager of Pittsburg, California, from 1919 to 1925 and manager of Monterey, California, since 1925. His appointment, effective October 1, 1934, was unanimous. Two weeks later, a petition signed by over a thousand registered voters was presented to the council protesting the appointment of an out-of-town man as city manager. But the council refused to be intimidated by this show of resentment and indicated that it intended to back its new manager to the limit.

The political "outs" had not given up, however, and recall proceedings were started again within less than a year. All nine members were named in the petition, and sufficient signatures were obtained, many of them at a cost of a dollar each and free transportation to the city hall, to require a recall election. The petition was filed on March 11, 1935, and the date of the election was set for June 7, 1935.

The charter provided that recall petitions must be signed by 10 per

cent of the number of electors voting at the last general municipal election. Since it was only upon rare occasions that 40 per cent of the registered voters cast their ballots, this clause enabled less than 4 per cent of the electors to embarrass public officials with recalls and put the city to the expense of special elections almost at will. Political malcontents could generally induce this fraction of the voters to sign recall petitions, even though it had to be done at the city hall. The members of the council, determined to put a stop to the "spite" recalls, drafted a charter amendment which raised the percentage of required signatures from 10 to 25.<sup>1</sup> By raising the percentage it was hoped that petty matters and personal grudges would not result in recalls and that this remedy would be reserved for instances that really warranted such action. The recall against the council was extremely unpopular in nearly all publications throughout the city. The *Long Beach Press-Telegram*, *Long Beach Sun*, *Star-Progress*, *Progressive Review*, and the *Long Beach Argus* all carried editorials, political advertisements, and news stories ridiculing the recall and asking the people to support the incumbents. The Citizens' Committee Against the Recall, representing thirty-five social, business, and fraternal organizations and claiming to represent a total membership of several thousand persons, was the most active, other than the Charter Enforcement Party, in supporting the council.

Soon after the original petition was filed, charges of misrepresentation were hurled at those who had started it. By June 5 thirteen signers had repudiated it on these and similar grounds, and one had been disqualified. On June 3 Mrs. Rose V. Aubrey filed an affidavit that she had never signed the petition nor authorized anyone to sign for her, maintaining that the signature purported to be hers was a forgery.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to determine who really were behind this recall movement, since they did not identify themselves after they saw how unpopular the movement had turned out to be. The ones who signed the original petition, according to their statements to the newspapers, did not bear any animosity toward the members of the council, nor did they desire their recall.

The *Press-Telegram* and the *Long Beach Sun* urged the citizens to adopt the charter amendment which would increase the number of signatures needed for recall. The neighborhood weekly papers quite generally opposed the amendment, although most of them were op-

<sup>1</sup> The percentage of signatures required to force an election for recall of the manager was also raised at this time from 10 to 25 per cent.

<sup>2</sup> *Long Beach Press-Telegram*, June 3, 1935, p. B-1.

posed to the current recall. They felt that this particular occasion constituted a misuse of the recall, but they did not want to give up the right of easy recall.

### *Recall Made More Difficult*

The election was held June 7, 1935, and all members of the council were retained in office. In 136 of the 137 precincts the incumbents received majorities with margins averaging greater than three to one. The charter amendment was adopted by a vote of 16,391 to 11,241.

The council, thus approved by the voters in such convincing fashion, had to face the same attacks the following year when the regular elections occurred. The incumbents were endorsed by the Charter Enforcement Party and by the United Citizens' Committee; some of them were also included in the list of candidates endorsed by the Townsend Club. The people who usually organized political cliques were either in favor of the incumbents or felt it was useless to oppose them because there were only these three organizations that endorsed slates of candidates. There was no lack of competition, but nearly all the opposition candidates were running independently. The United Citizens' Committee represented an amalgamation of some of the groups that had been active in 1934 and defended the council in 1935, such as the Church Alliance and the Citizens' Committee Against the Recall.

The election was held on June 2, 1936, and all nine members were returned to office. Two of them encountered stiff opposition from Townsend candidates but managed to win by small majorities. The others won by margins of from two to one to four to one. Three of these men had the backing of the Townsend Club, as well as that of the Charter Enforcement Party and the United Citizens' Committee.

### *Financial Powers of Manager Increased*

After the elections in 1936 the political scene was relatively peaceful. There was no concerted opposition to the incumbent administration, and the voters approved a charter amendment on May 4, 1937, that increased the financial powers of the manager. Certain functions were transferred from the elective auditor to the department of finance, with divisions of city assessor, city tax collector, city treasurer, city purchasing agent, and city accountant under the supervision and the control of the city manager. The elected auditor had formerly been included in the department of finance and had been the chief accounting officer of the city.

In the opinions of a number of prominent professional men and busi-

ness leaders, the city manager form of government was in 1938 no longer a campaign issue in municipal elections. One of the few persons who held the opposite view was the city auditor. This elected official was strongly opposed to the manager form of government and stated that another year or two would see a return to the mayor-council form. This opinion was not shared by leading business and professional people, and the editors of the two leading newspapers said that their publications would support the city manager form of government if it should ever again become a campaign issue. The elected city attorney, while he did not approve of the city manager government as it generally operates, said that there was no doubt in his mind of its relative permanence in Long Beach. He would be in favor of a manager charter that would increase the powers and the salary of the manager, would remove all residence restrictions for officials of the rank of division head and higher, would provide civil service with the "open back door," and would provide a thorough cost-accounting system.

The statement was often made that Long Beach had really had manager government only after 1934. This contention may be supported to a great extent by a comparison of the ways in which the plan was administered from 1921 to 1934 and from 1934 to 1938. Because much of the administrative improvement can be credited directly to the council and the manager in office in 1938, comparisons of the administration before with that after the appointment of Randall M. Dorton as manager are justified.<sup>1</sup>

In bringing about these improvements the members of the council played their part. Most of them were well informed about the principles of city manager government when they ran for office. None of them had ever been on the council before or had held any other public office. While this inexperience might have had certain disadvantages, it also meant that they came into office with no political affiliations and with no debts to pay. They arrived at a definite understanding with the new manager about the limits of authority for each, and both the manager and the councilmen kept their bargain, which was one of the main reasons for the harmony at the city hall in 1938.

Of the nine members of the council in office in 1938 none had less than a complete high-school education, and five had university training. Three were retired: an oil man, a businessman, and a physician. One member represented organized labor, and he was elected mayor by his

<sup>1</sup> After the writing of this report, Mr. Dorton resigned in July, 1939, as of September 1, 1939, and was succeeded by J. W. Charleville.

colleagues for the first term, July, 1934, to July, 1936. The others were a druggist, a funeral director, an automobile sales manager (mayor in 1938), a young civil engineer in the gasoline business, and the manager of an estate. The average age of the members was fifty or possibly less. None of them depended to a great extent upon a councilman's salary for a livelihood. None was an outstanding local leader prior to his election to the council. That may account, partly, for the cooperation that existed in their relations with each other and with the city manager. Only Carl Fletcher, the labor leader of the city, had a strong personal following. The others did not have large followings, although the council as a unit was well thought of and received sound support.

## VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ACHIEVEMENTS

WHILE THE manager plan did not live up to the high expectations of its earlier supporters, it resulted in a definite improvement in administration, especially within the years after 1934, during which the council chose to give the manager complete charge of administrative affairs. The first council that hired Mr. Hewes and the council in office after 1934, were the only councils that recognized and respected the difference between administration and the determination of policy.

For twelve years, from 1922 to 1934, the council effectively tied the hands of the manager. Strong managers were able to direct administration; weak managers sometimes literally became the errand boys of the council. Mr. Hewes had the backing of the council; Mr. Windham was able, because of his political strength, to take a lead in matters of policy; Mr. Callahan tried, against a hostile majority on the council, to preserve the integrity of his office but had to admit defeat and resign. Succeeding managers for one reason or another were dominated by the council and were not allowed to function as actual administrative heads of the municipal government. The manager in office in 1938 for the first time in many years had a free hand in administration.

The accomplishment of these five years was in large measure the work of Randall M. Dorton, who was manager of Long Beach after October 1, 1934.

Mr. Dorton received his B.A. degree from the University of California and had very nearly completed his work for an M.A. in political science

when the United States entered the World War. He enlisted and before the war ended rose from the rank of second lieutenant to that of captain in the Ninety-First Division. For nearly a year after the war he served as executive secretary of the War Camp Community Service for Oakland, Berkeley, and Alameda.

From November 1, 1919, until 1925 he held the position of city manager of Pittsburg, California. During this time he also engaged in graduate study at the University of California and received his M.A. in 1925. His thesis, "City Manager Government in the State of California," was an analysis of several city manager charters in the state, with comments and criticisms of the organization and the operation of the municipal governments that had resulted.

Mr. Dorton accepted the position of city manager of Monterey, California, and took office on June 1, 1925. He had a fine record there and remained until September 30, 1934, a period of over nine years. He resigned from this position to become manager of Long Beach, a post which up to 1939 he had held for over four years—the longest tenure of any manager of this city and more than twice as long as any except that of Mr. Windham.

Mr. Dorton was forty-seven years old in 1938 and had been a professional city manager for over nineteen years. He was a member of the International City Managers' Association. He did not enter the field of management by accident but he had determined upon a career in public administration as early as his junior year at the university, and his subsequent education was taken with this end in view. With the exception of twenty-six months in the army he was always a civil official.

Mr. Dorton had a good professional reputation among the people of the city, and he was well liked by those who knew him. Businessmen in Long Beach credited him with exceptional executive ability, especially in matters involving finance. He was a coordinator and an administrator, not an operator. He surrounded himself with capable and well-qualified technicians and gave them the responsibility for operations. He managed to keep free of many details of administration by encouraging and trusting his subordinates to make their own decisions on departmental matters.

### *Organization*

The change from the commission plan of government did away with the five main departments, leaving many smaller divisions to be supervised directly by the manager. Important alterations in the organization

TABLE 1. ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LONG BEACH, 1938

*Elected*

COUNCILMEN (9). Select one of their number to be mayor;  
three-year term.

CITY ATTORNEY. Three-year term.

AUDITOR. Three-year term.

CITY PROSECUTOR. Three-year term.

POLICE JUDGE. Three-year term.

*Appointed by the Council*

CITY MANAGER.

CITY CLERK.

CIVIL SERVICE BOARD.

AVIATION COMMISSION.

*Appointed by the Mayor*

PARK AND HIGHWAY COMMISSION.

POLICE AND FIRE COMMISSION.<sup>1</sup>

*Appointed by the Manager (subject to approval  
by the Council)*

ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER.

LIBRARIAN.

UTILITIES INSPECTOR.

SUPERINTENDENT OF GAS DEPARTMENT.

BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS.

BOARD OF HARBOR COMMISSIONERS.

RECREATION COMMISSION.<sup>2</sup>

CITY ACCOUNTANT.

CITY TREASURER.

PURCHASING AGENT.

PLANNING COMMISSION.

TAX COLLECTOR.

POLICE CHIEF.

FIRE CHIEF.

SUPERINTENDENT OF THE AUDITORIUM AND

CONVENTION BUREAU.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND ENGINEERING.

GREENS COMMITTEE.

HEALTH OFFICER.

SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.

<sup>1</sup> Appointments approved by the council.

<sup>2</sup> Appointed jointly by the manager and the board of education, elected from a district not coterminous with the city boundaries.



were made in the manager charter after it was adopted, and the incumbent manager and council did some switching around until in 1938 seventeen separate departments and divisions were controlled by the manager; seven offices, boards, or commissions were directly under the mayor and council; and four offices were managed by independently elected heads. The arrangement of the parts of the city government outlined in Table 1 shows the officer or body in charge of the divisions.

### *Reorganization*

When Mr. Dorton took office, he found that there were some grave defects in the organization of the city's forces and set about effecting improvements which were possible under the law. Most of the defects had been pointed out in a survey made in 1931 by Griffenhagen and Associates, a firm of municipal consultants. Mr. Dorton found that the offices of director of public service and city engineer, which were dealing with similar work, existed separately, both with large staffs of employees. He combined them and placed one competent man in charge. The manager estimated that the saving to the city in salaries and office expenses was about \$100,000 annually and that the new department operated more effectively than had the two competing departments. The director of the department in office in 1938 had had a wide experience in municipal engineering over a period of thirty years.

The city never had a central garage before 1934. All equipment, except for some repairs on fire department equipment, was in 1938 maintained at the central garage, which developed gradually after 1934. It was a division in the public service department.

The financial situation was the most difficult one to deal with. The charter originally provided for a city auditor, who had full charge of all accounts for the city and was referred to as the "general accountant of the city of Long Beach." In addition, there was a city accountant who had the duties of installing systems and of auditing all departments except the city auditor's. Since the city auditor was an elected official and the city accountant was appointed by the manager, the organization was extremely unsatisfactory. The mix-up was aggravated by the opposition of the auditor to the city manager plan of government. This combination made it extremely difficult for any manager to obtain the information that was needed for day-to-day financial control. Mr. Dorton found it necessary to have a supplementary set of records kept in the office of the city accountant so that he could get information and statements when he wanted them. These records were on budgetary accounts

and were kept on an accrual basis; the auditor kept only cash accounts. There was a certain amount of duplication here, but it was tolerated for the sake of bringing about financial control.

At the election on May 4, 1937, the charter was amended by the adoption of an entirely new article setting up the department of finance. According to the new article the city accountant was to be the chief accounting officer for the city; the city auditor was to conduct the pre-audit and an annual post-audit of all departments. After the change in duties was effected, the manager and the department heads had no trouble in obtaining needed information on financial matters.

### *Examples of Good Administration*

The police department reported such items as glass or dead animals in the street, street lights broken or not functioning, building without permits, paving breaks, and unhealthful conditions. The latter item was also reported by inspectors from the fire prevention bureau, when particularly bad instances came to their attention. Reports from the police department were telephoned to the proper departments during the daytime. When the reports originated on the night patrols, special mimeographed forms were filled out and were routed to the proper department head for his attention the first thing in the morning. According to the survey made by Griffenhagen and Associates in 1931 the public service department had three full-time men policing the city for building-permit violations, so that cooperation between the police department and the public service department was a comparatively new development.

The central garage was closely allied with the equipment pool. When Mr. Dorton came to Long Beach, the city operated 387 pieces of automotive and power equipment, of which a number of pieces were over twenty years old, more than one-fifth were over ten years old, and more than four-fifths had seen at least five years of service. Since each department had to finance its own equipment, replacements were made only when the equipment became junk rather than when the equipment became inefficient and uneconomical to operate. By 1938 all the older pieces had been replaced with efficient modern units, and progress was being made toward the early retirement of many more. Each department got its trucks, automobiles, and other equipment from the central pool. This pool was financed by a revolving fund, that is, charges were made on the using departments to replace the money expended for operating and maintenance costs. In this way the fund was continuously

replaced. Rentals for automobiles and other equipment were scaled at a rate that would build up a replacement fund rather rapidly. The rental rate would be much lower after a few years when the machinery was brought up to date; in 1938 it covered costs of operation and maintenance plus an extra contribution toward the replacement program. Such a thing as an equipment pool had never been attempted under the commission form of government and did not receive serious consideration under the city manager form of government until 1934.

The fire prevention bureau collaborated with the building inspector in the preparation of building and electrical codes for the city. The fire prevention bureau did not make preliminary inspections of new buildings but sent a representative with the building inspector for the final inspection. The fire prevention bureau, however, maintained especially close supervision over remodeling work. The chief stated that the fire department was more interested in occupancy than in construction; for this reason the department paid particular attention to permits to alter business property for new types of business. The building department enforced the codes and took the necessary legal steps when there were violations. The fire department acted in an advisory capacity. There was no evidence to show that such cooperation had existed earlier than 1921.

The system of filing accident reports in the office of the coordinator of traffic safety, entirely separate from the police department, was made to complement that of the traffic bureau of the police department. The traffic bureau filed its reports alphabetically over many years; this practice gave a complete record of the local offenses of each violator. The office of the coordinator filed its copies by streets and intersections in order to supply data on locations and causes of accidents. This office was not concerned with the parties involved, as were the police; it wanted to know the location and the reason for each accident. A spot map showed the place of each accident, and the file gave the cause, the time of day, and all other pertinent information for each one.

Interoffice communications were formerly made on expensive bond paper, with each communication on a separate sheet. In 1938 the original message and all replies were on the same sheet or were clipped together in order to facilitate reference. Since long intervals of time frequently elapsed between sending the original communication and receiving the reply, this procedure saved much time that would otherwise be spent in searching files or in trying to remember the exact details of the original message. The new system was more economical, as well, since

many departments used large sheets of inexpensive paper for this purpose.

### *Coordination*

Evidences of effective coordination in 1938 were much more numerous than those to the contrary. Only slight progress was made in the first ten years of manager government, and most of the coordination dated from the time of the incumbent administration and was instituted by Mr. Dorton and his department heads. The following pages contain some examples of coordination and some instances of the lack of it.

Employees were transferred among the divisions of the department of public service to handle peak loads. This was intradepartmental coordination, but it was in a large department performing a number of functions and presenting some rather complex problems in coordination. There was some transfer of personnel within this department under the commission plan, but there was a greater degree of coordination in 1938 than at any other time after the adoption of the manager plan.

The manager tried to use staff conferences to bring department heads together to discuss problems affecting a number of departments, but he found that most department heads were specialized in their knowledge and interests and did not like to spend time listening to problems that did not immediately concern them. Since conferences with the staff did not seem to produce the desired results, the manager scheduled regular conferences with the individual heads, their frequency depending upon the volume of work handled by the particular departments. When two or more departments were concerned with a specific problem, the manager brought the directors together to determine procedures and to coordinate their activities. This technique was used in preparing the annual report, in settling problems involved in paving new streets, and in starting a safety campaign in the use of city-owned equipment. The general staff conference was not successful, but modifications were used to advantage when problems existed which concerned a few departments.

Materials and equipment were carefully salvaged when the original using department finished with them. The largest single item was worn-out or over-aged fire hose, which was used in the street, sewer, and park divisions of the department of public service. The departments got hose by requisitioning it through the office of the purchasing agent. Typewriters were another salvage item. When machines became too worn for efficient operation in a department where a large amount of

typing was done, they were sent to lifeguard stations, fire stations, or some other office where the machine was not used constantly and did not reduce appreciably the efficiency of the office. An equipment committee of five members passed upon all requisitions for equipment. The manager named as standing appointments the purchasing agent, the budget deputy, and the inventory clerk; two members were changed from time to time. One of these two members was a representative of the requisitioning department and the other was a technical man—an auto shop foreman, a typewriter repairman, or some other, depending on the nature of the purchase contemplated. This committee in no way interfered with routine purchases of supplies or materials but had always to approve the purchase of equipment. The committee saved the city large sums of money through transfers of equipment and utilization of available substitutes. There was no evidence of an attempt to salvage equipment prior to 1921, and certainly the committee on equipment was an innovation.

There were a few evidences of the lack of coordination. The manager plan failed to provide the solution to some rather important problems.

One serious absence of coordination was seen in the inelasticity of personnel. With the exception of intradepartmental coordination in the public service department, there was no plan for shifting personnel about to meet peak requirements. As a result part-time and temporary help was frequently hired. The civil service board established extremely rigid rules on classification that tended to handicap the manager and other administrative officers in attempting to transfer personnel. An employee had to work 75 per cent of the time within his classification. This rule made it difficult to transfer employees, even if only for temporary work. The classifications were being revised and broadened in 1938, and the revision would probably result in greater flexibility. To 1939, however, civil service, in the matter of interchange of personnel, was more of a hindrance than a help to the management.

Quite a large number of paving cuts were apparent. Some of these might be explained by the rapid growth of the city and the numerous annexations that overtaxed the earlier subsurface equipment. The city engineer said that in 1938 before new paving was laid the matter of subsurface equipment received careful consideration. Indications were that such procedure had not always been followed.

The assessment of property was made so late in the year that the tax bills did not go out until after the beginning of the fiscal year. It would be necessary to set the assessment period and the payment dates earlier

in the year in order to eliminate the lapse of nearly five months between the beginning of the fiscal year and the first tax payments. Most of this lag was because the delinquent date for taxes was in December. Prior to November collections were light.

### *Personnel*

The central personnel agency was the creation of the city manager charter. Before 1921 most department heads hired their own employees, both under the commission plan and the forms which preceded it. The police and fire departments had been under some kind of civil service rules since 1907. Employees in the health department and in the city clerk's office were placed in the classified service in 1915 by a provision of the commission charter. It was not until the adoption of the city manager charter, however, that employees in all departments were placed under civil service. The civil service commission of the city of Los Angeles prepared and conducted the first examinations in 1907 for Long Beach. In 1938 the city gave its own examinations without cooperating with other governments. Civil service regulations did not apply to department or division heads, deputies, and assistants of elected officers nor to the deputies or assistants of the city manager.

The charter provided for a civil service board, appointed by the council, which selected its own secretary or chief examiner. The board was completely insulated from any influence the manager might wish to use, but a fairly cooperative attitude prevailed on both sides. There had not been this attitude early in the life of the agency, when the board concerned itself primarily with protecting the employees in their jobs.

From 1921 to 1931 all classification was done by the heads of the departments. The central personnel agency examined applicants, prepared eligible lists, and certified employees to the departments, but the departments were free to accept these employees and reclassify them to fill other positions. This was often done to enable some favored employee to hold his job or to receive a larger salary. The charter was amended in 1931 to provide for classification by the civil service board, subject to the confirmation of the council, of all positions in the classified service. This amendment was the authority for the classification study being made in 1938.

Although a formalized merit plan was supposed to go into effect in 1921, nothing was done, and the positions in the city service were being classified for the first time in 1938. Positions gradually accumulated until in 1934 there were 360 classifications in a service that numbered about

1,600 employees. The system was entirely too inflexible, and transfers were practically impossible. Many of these classifications had never been legally established. Even while the 1938 survey was still going on, the number of classifications was nearly halved.

Residence requirements were strict and were rigidly enforced. Local residence was seldom waived, although certain positions requiring special skills were filled by appointment of nonresidents, but only after the bulletins were posted locally and it was found that there were no local persons qualified for the position. Employees had to be residents for a year prior to their appointments and had to remain in residence for the duration of their employment.

Before 1934 members of the council were quite active in securing preferences for friends and constituents, although there was not nearly the diligence in this direction that there had been during the days of the commission plan. There seemed to be rather general agreement that council members in 1938 had little if any influence upon appointments. The incumbent members made no attempts to influence appointments, if one excepts a few casual inquiries about the time when certain of their constituents would get to the top of the common labor list. No pressure was exerted. There were instances where the councilmen themselves even bore the brunt of the complaints of constituents rather than pass them on to the city manager or to the secretary of the civil service board. In the past the political philosophy of the citizens of Long Beach included the inalienable right to blame the manager for everything, whether matters of administration or of policy.

Employees served a probationary period of six months under a requirement of the charter, a testing period during which each was rated monthly on a Probst scale. During this time adjustments might be made if the employee was inadequately equipped for the work.

An attempt was made to recover the time and the expense that went into training employees during the probationary period. Persons who passed competitive examinations for positions and then failed to measure up to the standards during the probationary period were allowed to accept demotions to a lower level of the same general type of work before permanent status was attained. In this manner the city salvaged some of the investment made in training a new employee.

Permanent status did not follow automatically upon the completion of six months of probation. At the end of the fifth month the office of the civil service board notified the head of the department that the probationary period for the employee was nearly completed. The notice contained

a request for a statement from the department head regarding the advisability of extending permanent status to the employee. Thus, no employee slipped unobserved into a permanent position; on the contrary, a definite, positive step had to be taken both by the personnel officer and by the department head in evaluating the candidate's five efficiency ratings and in passing judgment upon his fitness as a permanent part of the municipal organization.

The city of Long Beach used the Probst system of ratings to measure the ability of each employee to satisfy the requirements of his job. Whenever possible, an attempt was made to have the employee appraised by three supervisory officers who had knowledge of his attitude and ability.

A new system of personnel records was being installed at the time of this survey. The change was to be effective July 1, 1938, but was considerably delayed because of the mass of clerical work that was involved in transferring the old records onto the new cards. Since the Probst service rating forms were used, the personnel record cards were so designed that material could be taken directly from the rating sheets to the permanent cards. More information was available from the new cards than from the old ones. There was nothing to show that there were any such records prior to 1921. Such items as "vacation" and "leave of absence," which were formerly given in totals, were broken down into their component parts in order to facilitate the appraisal of the employee's record. It was possible in 1938 to ascertain the number of days sick with pay, sick without pay, leave of absence, vacation, accident with compensation, and accident without compensation.

The only objection to the Probst ratings came from the fire department. The men were definitely opposed to them; they favored the graphic scale on which the officer making the rating might check "excellent" or "poor" (or anywhere between) on each of a number of characteristics. Much of the objection to the Probst system seemed to be to the manner in which the ratings were made rather than to any of the principles of the Probst ratings.

The procedure for paying employees was completely changed between 1933 and 1938. When Mr. Dorton took office, he found that many employees were coming to the office of the auditor for their checks. This was soon stopped because it involved too much loss of working time, especially for the public service employees who might be working in some outlying district on pay day. After this method was discontinued, the auditor or one of her deputies would deliver the checks in person to each employee. This little personal touch was also expensive since it



took up the time of the office staff and involved a car allowance for the auditor. The distribution of checks by the auditor's office was stopped definitely by the charter amendment of 1937. Under the plan in operation in 1938 pay rolls were made up in the departments, approved by the civil service board and the manager's office, and pre-audited by the auditor. Warrants were prepared by the city accountant, audited by the auditor, and then sent to the treasurer. The warrants went from the treasurer to the department heads; from there they were distributed through the regular channels to division heads or timekeepers and so to the individual employees. The checks were distributed just as rapidly as before, and regular means of interdepartmental communication were utilized instead of making special trips for the purpose. The same amount of checking and pre-auditing was done when the other methods were used.

### *In-Service Training*

The police department took the lead in establishing an in-service training program between 1936 and 1938. The department of public service also had training programs; three were in operation during the summer and fall of 1938, one for foremen, one for truck drivers, and one for gas-plant operators. The foreman and truck-driver courses were held for the manual labor group. The course for gas-plant operators was given to more highly skilled groups. It was in the police department, however, that really professional training was going on. Lieutenant Peterson was sent to Washington to take the course offered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice. After his return he conducted classes for the rest of the department personnel. The courses were offered on a voluntary basis and the employees attended on their own time. Even under these circumstances about three-quarters of the uniformed personnel were attending classes regularly. All the men questioned were enthusiastic about the program and seemed to feel that they were benefiting greatly as a result of the work. Several of them commented favorably that the work was optional. Earlier programs were usually compulsory and, therefore, distinctly unpopular. Six groups met weekly to keep the classes reasonably small and to reach all the men during their time off.

They had lecture courses on fingerprinting, preservation of evidence, taking testimony, developing and presenting evidence in court, and criminal investigation—all supplemented with laboratory problems approximating actual cases. This work was not offered exclusively to active

personnel of the department; it was also open to men on the eligible lists for patrolmen, thus constituting a form of pre-entry training as well as in-service training.

A new salary plan was approved by the council but in 1938 had not yet been put into effect. The committee that worked on it was composed of the secretary of the civil service board, the city accountant, and the assistant city manager. According to the plan the salary limits would be set for each classification with five levels of pay for each. Employees would be assigned to the proper level within their classification on the basis of the numerical average of the past four Probst service ratings plus one point for each year of seniority not exceeding six. This system recognized the principle of seniority but still did not allow it to dominate other considerations, such as efficiency and improvement. The new salary plan would be the first attempt to pay salaries to employees within each class according to the work done. Policemen and firemen would not be affected as their salaries were set by an initiative ordinance.

The retirement provisions in Long Beach were poor. The retirement plan applied only to personnel in the police and fire departments and was not on an actuarial basis. It was adopted as a result of a campaign by the policemen and firemen of the city, in which the deciding factors were appeals to sentiment rather than to knowledge of the fundamentals of insurance. There was an actuarial deficit in the pension fund amounting to several hundred thousands of dollars in 1938. For the fiscal year 1936-37, the disbursements from the fund exceeded the receipts by nearly 30 per cent, and, in addition, the system was not caring for all those who were eligible for pensions. There were many men in both departments who had long since passed the retirement age but who did not retire because the pensions were inadequate. The council chose to pass the matter of the retirement fund over until the time for the 1939-40 budget; the fund would be practically exhausted by that time. In the meantime, a committee of seven members was active in studying the situation and was expected to have some recommendations to make before the 1939-40 budget was prepared. An actuarially sound plan could have been submitted to the voters in 1936, but it was withheld because it would have raised the tax rate fourteen cents. The new administration was just beginning to get the city's affairs straightened up at that time, and it was felt that there was not sufficient time in which to present the new retirement plan to the voters properly. It is extremely probable that a new pension proposal, released only a short time before the election, would have aroused considerable opposition to the administration.

There were several employee organizations, none of them very active or representing a large number of employees. There was one group of about fifty members affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. There was no C.I.O. affiliate. The City Employees' Association, the most important from the standpoint of numbers, operated a credit union. There were also small groups of employees in the fire, police, water, gas, and sanitation departments. These organizations formerly functioned as mutual benefit societies but became largely social in character after group insurance became available.

Dismissals might be summary or with notice and a hearing. Summary dismissals for the good of the service were made by the manager with the consent of two-thirds of the council; dismissals of this type constituted less than half of the total. Nearly all regular dismissals resulted in an appeal to the civil service board for a hearing, but there were few instances in which the decision of the department head was reversed. Dismissals were sustained in about four-fifths of the cases, according to the secretary of the civil service board.

Employee morale was good, and the prestige of city employment was higher than ever before. As recently as 1935 one department head advised a young man to accept a position with a local dairy instead of one with the city. He told the young man that the recommendation of the dairy operator would be worth more than one from the city when it came to looking for another job. However, within the two years before 1938 private employers asked the secretary of the civil service board for names from the eligible lists for clerical and other office positions, saying that the caliber of the persons on the city lists was higher than that of those who came from the employment agencies. This reversal showed the shift in public opinion. The indications were that city employment was becoming attractive to better-educated and better-trained people or that standards of selection were improved. During several years prior to 1938 graduates of the local junior colleges were appointed in both the police and fire departments as well as to other positions throughout the city service. Two law school graduates were in 1938 in the police department. Both chiefs said that these young college and junior college men made better employees, learned their duties more quickly, were better at meeting the public, and showed a more professional interest in their work than the average recruit. They said that the best age for entrance seemed to be about twenty-five years.

The most pressing personnel problems in Long Beach were the classification plan, the retirement plan, and the achievement of greater

flexibility in transferring employees. While there were defects in the organization and the administration of personnel, much improvement had taken place since the adoption of manager government and, more especially, since 1934. Employee morale was good, the prestige of city employment had improved immensely, in-service training was gaining a foothold, and some progressive work was being done on compensation schedules.

### *Finance*

The commission charter in theory centralized financial matters in the office of the commissioner of public finance and accounting. There was apparently considerable actual decentralization because individual departments did most of their own purchasing and accounting. The commissioners were not always experienced in financial administration and deficits were not uncommon. Financial irresponsibility on the part of department heads became so pronounced that many business places refused to deal with the city because of the difficulty of collecting their accounts. Part of this trouble was owing to lack of systematic record-keeping, and more of it was owing to inability to fix responsibility on any one officer.

The city manager charter attempted to centralize the financial administration and to correct some of the weaknesses of the commission government. A department of finance was set up to include the divisions of assessor, accountant, tax collector, auditor, treasurer, and purchasing agent. Through oversight or intent there was no provision made for a head of this department. This administrative department included one elective officer, the city auditor, who conducted the pre-audit of all pay rolls and expenditures, had the responsibility of keeping all the city accounts, and was completely independent of the manager and the council. The provision making the auditor the actual accountant for the city may have been another compromise to satisfy the people who feared excessive concentration of power in the hands of the manager. Whatever the intent, it effectively isolated the accounting from the manager's direction for over fifteen years, owing in some measure to personal friction between the auditor and the successive managers.

When Mr. Dorton came to Long Beach, he inherited a rather discouraging financial problem left over from the Bonner administration. Mr. Bonner had not remained in office long enough to carry out the reforms that he planned. Mr. Dorton found that revenues had been overestimated and that appropriations were being overexpended. In his attempt

to close the year without a deficit Mr. Dorton had to take some drastic steps. A reduction of 10 per cent was made in all salaries, some car allowances were discontinued entirely, vacant positions were left unfilled, a 10 per cent surcharge was added to the regular rates charged by the municipally operated gas department, and a regime of strictest economy was inaugurated. The result was a slight surplus at the end of the year, even though it had been found necessary to replace a few of the most antiquated pieces of city equipment.

One of the first changes made by Mr. Dorton was to replace the old system of car allowances and mileage fees for privately owned cars with a central equipment pool where city cars could be rented by departments. The manager estimated a saving of approximately \$30,000 a year as a result of this change. Employees still had the use of city cars when they were transacting city business and had need of cars, but excessive mileage and padded expense accounts were practically eliminated under the newer system. Every department rented equipment from the central pool, and cars were not taken home by employees, as in former years.

A number of reasons may be given for the lax budgetary control exercised by the earlier managers. Managers often had had no experience in financial planning and control and did not have well-trained subordinates to whom they could delegate this work. The charter provision which assigned the accounting function to an elective officer over whom the manager had no control limited the possibility of the manager's having any definite influence in developing more useful reports or in getting necessary information. Since the political scene was in almost perpetual turmoil, managers had no assurance that they would remain in office long enough to carry out any proposed reforms. The few attempts to make improvements were nullified by the placement of the accounting function beyond the reach of the manager. Revenues in excess of estimates (especially oil royalties) were spent without authority, and several funds had deficits of many thousands of dollars. That no effort was made to conceal these conditions would seem to imply a disregard for accounting principles and a lack of proper budgetary control rather than a deliberate misapplication of funds.

The accounting system under the commission plan was on a strictly cash basis; even as recently as 1934 the city auditor kept the accounts on a basis of revenue collected and warrants issued. The accounts in 1938 were kept in the office of the city accountant and were double entry and on an accrual basis. The changes recommended by Mr. Bonner and Mr. Hume went into effect July 1, 1934, but it was difficult to make much

progress so long as the auditor continued to keep the accounts. Mr. Dorton retained Mr. Hume as city accountant and left the revised system in operation. The auditor continued to keep the city accounts, but the accountant kept a supplementary set of budgetary accounts so that the manager and the department heads could get the information necessary for sound financial control and planning. The charter amendment of 1937 settled the controversy between the auditor and the administration by placing all the accounting in the office of the city accountant.

The city auditor thereafter conducted an annual post-audit of all departments and pre-audited all pay rolls, claims, or other payments by the city. The pre-audit was primarily a check on the legality of the expenditure and the occasion for allocating the expenditure to the proper budgetary accounts. The records of encumbrances were kept in the office of the city accountant. The accountant checked the availability of funds for the expenditure before the requisition went to the auditor.

Long Beach was one of the few cities in Los Angeles County that did its own assessing and collecting of taxes. Practically all others contracted with the county for this work. The assessed valuations assigned by the county were about one-third less than the city assessor's figures. Because of this difference city officials said that the city could not maintain the 1938 level of services within the one-dollar general-purpose limit if the county valuations were used. The residents of Long Beach, in general, did not favor any move that would result in greater dependence upon the county; on the contrary, there was a growing feeling in favor of withdrawing from it entirely and of setting up a consolidated city-county government.

For a short time the offices of city treasurer and of city tax collector were consolidated in an attempt at greater coordination. This union was of rather short duration, however, largely because the two offices remained on different floors in the city hall. There was a certain amount of interchange of personnel while the consolidation was in effect, but the differences in location nullified most of the gains. It was also felt that revision of the tax ordinances and new problems in tax delinquencies would require the full time of a department head. The method of recording delinquencies was modernized, and machines were used in this department. Because of these various considerations the consolidation was reconsidered, and the two offices functioned as separate divisions again.

The manager plan had not yet solved the problem of financing the city during the period between the beginning of the fiscal year and the time

when taxes were collected. Long Beach had a dry period of over four months during which it was necessary to register warrants for purchases and pay rolls. Many solutions were proposed, but none was entirely satisfactory. The manager was interested in the ten-payment plan in use in Stockton, California, which was reported to be solving a similar situation quite satisfactorily. In the meantime, a fund was being built up which would help finance the city during this dry period.

The city manager charter created a centralized purchasing agency. This was a tremendous step forward from the haphazard and irresponsible purchasing under the commission plan. Savings were immediately apparent, even though the office of the purchasing agent was not functioning at maximum efficiency. The survey by Griffenhagen and Associates in 1931 showed that this office was doing hand-to-mouth buying with no effort at standardization. The procedure for collecting accounts with the city was still burdened with red tape, and the survey recommended that some simplification be tried. Some effort was being made in 1938 at standardizing and bulking orders, but the purchasing agent felt that the office would be able to do a better job if it had a larger revolving fund with which to work. Much of the red tape was eliminated by changing the procedures for passing upon claims, although the system was still somewhat clumsy.

In contrast to one simple record kept by the commissioners (if and when they remembered to use it), the purchasing office in 1938 was equipped with an extensive system of records. No materials were bought by the purchasing agent until a requisition was received from the requesting department. Each requisition started a chain of records for keeping proper track of the request, fixing responsibility, and expediting the purchase. Purchase orders, receiving tickets, return orders, requisitions, and other forms were used, whereas no systematic plan had been followed by the commission government. This procedure accounts in part for better fiscal control in 1938, for no purchases were made until the city accountant certified that money was available and until the city auditor certified that the obligation might be legally incurred.

Like the central garage and equipment pool the purchasing office was financed by a revolving fund. The department had a fund of \$22,000 with which it bought materials and supplies for the storeroom or for immediate use. When departments requisitioned articles from the purchasing office, they were charged the actual cost of the article plus 12 per cent for handling and administration. The purchasing agent claimed that costs to the departments were considerably below the market price

despite the apparently high service charge. The purchasing agent tried for a number of years to get an additional \$20,000 for the fund, feeling that the high costs to the departments might be reduced if a larger fund were available for more efficient purchasing.

The water department and the harbor department advertised their own bids on items peculiar to their particular work. All other purchases went through the office of the purchasing agent or, if they involved amounts in excess of eight hundred dollars, were advertised by the council. The city schools did their own buying, since there was practically no dealing between the board of education and the city government.

The manager had almost daily conferences with the city accountant and received informal reports on fund balances, the condition of the monthly allotments, collections, and other information which former managers found it almost impossible to obtain. The city accountant got daily reports from the treasurer on the condition of cash balances and from the tax collector on the amount and the rate of collections; these statements were reconciled with his own accounts. Since the accountant had more frequent conferences with the manager than the treasurer and tax collector, he included their reports with his own to keep the manager up to date. Formal statements came once a month from each fiscal division under the manager's control.

The manager maintained a budget control record in his office which, while it was prepared from the accountant's reports, was entirely different in appearance and was readily interpreted by the layman. Instead of the usual type of record this was a graphic one composed of a movable red bar and a scale divided into hundredths, the whole forming a bar chart for each appropriation. These pages were mounted in an overlapping fashion in a large folder in such a manner that the chart and the name of each fund were immediately available for reference. This series of bar charts showed at a glance the condition of all appropriations in terms of the percentage expended and encumbered. Monthly totals were written into spaces which were provided, as well as being shown on the chart. This record was easy to use and had a great deal of important data condensed and readily at hand for reference. Allotments were made on a monthly basis and could be indicated on the chart so that the relationship between allotments and encumbrances could be shown at any time. Usually allotments were made in twelve equal amounts, except for some work that was seasonal in nature. The plan was not inflexible, however, since the manager allowed the accountant to permit overexpenditure of monthly allotments when there seemed to be good reason for so



doing. Favorable price situations or real emergencies were sufficient cause for allowing overexpenditures.

Much personal friction existed between the office of the manager and that of the auditor, because the auditor was opposed to the manager form of government and was also indignant about the successful attempt in 1937 to remove the accounting work from her office. The auditor admitted responsibility to no one except to the people of the city; she had held this office for about twenty years. Perhaps the friction was a little greater during the incumbent administration because Mr. Dorton was not a resident of Long Beach at the time of his appointment. What appeared to be wishful thinking led her to the conclusion that the mayor-council form of government would be restored within the next two or three years. No similar expressions of opinion were encountered from others.

## VII. PUBLIC RELATIONS

THE NUMEROUS CITY managers of Long Beach maintained cordial relations with the press. The manager in office in 1938 received fine cooperation from reporters and seemed to get favorable consideration in the location and space allotted to stories and illustrations about the city's business. Reporters did not receive prepared releases, nor were they limited in their sources of information. Department heads frequently gave interviews on the operation of their departments, as did the heads of the various boards and commissions. It was understood that the information must be received from someone in a position of responsibility who had the authority to make public statements and had intimate knowledge of all the facts. These stories were in the nature of reports; they never concerned controversial matters. The daily papers were both favorable to the incumbent administration and reported information fairly and without any obvious distortion. On the other hand, the administration could not expect to have its mistakes glossed over, since the editors of both papers were willing to conduct a campaign of constructive criticism whenever it seemed necessary.

The opposition expressed itself through two or three small weekly papers, usually the *Enterpriser*, the *Bel-Na-Mos*, and the *Long Beach Independent*. Much of their opposition to the administration seemed to be inspired by the favorable attitude on the part of the *Press-Telegram* and the *Sun*. It was often difficult to tell how much of the opposition

was directed against the administration and how much was aimed indirectly at the large papers by attacking the thing that they favored.

The city had, as yet, done very little in the matter of radio releases. True, a certain amount of city hall news found its way into the regular news releases originating from local stations, but there was no attempt on the part of the administration to edit and release its own news broadcasts. Both local radio stations indicated that they would cooperate with the manager whenever he decided to make this move. A room at the city hall was available and was partially equipped. The manager wanted to use this means of publicity but was rather cautious about undertaking it in 1938. Someone would have to edit and release these news items, and neither the manager nor the assistant manager had enough time for this additional work. There were other administrative heads who might be able to do the work, but the manager felt that a better over-all picture of city hall business would result if the final work were done in his office, which was the center of all administration.

During his first year in office Mr. Dorton maintained a rather strenuous schedule of speaking engagements. Most of these talks explained the theory of city manager government. It is probable that these talks were not requested so much for the purpose of getting information on the form of government as they were to sound out the ideas of the new manager. All groups wanted to meet the new man, so he accepted as many invitations as possible in order to do a thorough job of selling the administration to the public. He made about one hundred such appearances during his first year in office. Groups to which he talked included service clubs, social groups, parent-teacher associations, and professional and fraternal groups. These invitation talks were about the only type of what might be called promotional work that Mr. Dorton undertook during the first year.

The manager was compelled by pressure of official duties and human limitations to curtail his public speaking work after the first year. He was a good speaker and was still greatly in demand by service and civic organizations. To some it might seem that the mayor, as political head of the city, should do most of the public relations work. The mayor, however, was primarily a business man and only a part-time public official. He drew an allowance for official entertaining, but otherwise he received only his salary as a member of the council: a maximum of fifty dollars a month. Under the circumstances he felt justified in leaving most of the interpretation of the administration to the city manager.

Most of the manager's speaking was done on three subjects: a general

topic, the city manager form of government; the financial condition of the city; and significant progress in administration, which he wished to emphasize. In 1938 most talks were confined to the two latter subjects; the first one was the major topic of the first year. The manager never made public comments on issues that had not been thoroughly settled in meetings with the council. In this way the council members and the manager arrived at a distinct understanding before any announcements were made.

Department heads enjoyed the same freedom in addressing clubs and other groups as they did in the matter of newspaper stories. They were encouraged to accept invitations to speak on the work of their own departments and to show their relation to the operation of the whole municipal organization. Department heads regularly addressed forums held at the public library. Here interested citizens might learn about the operations of the several departments and about the government as a whole in its relation to the citizens and other governmental units.

The manager tried to stimulate citizen interest in local government through a short educational institute designed to acquaint the citizens with the many activities of their municipal organization. Qualified persons explained the relations between the departments of the city government and the operations of the individual departments. The instruction was similar to that given at the forums. This program did not enjoy the success that the manager anticipated. There was, however, no immediate probability of discontinuing it.

Prior to the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, the annual report was prepared by the city auditor. The report was a summary of the financial operations for the year but with little information which would be interesting or intelligible to the average citizen. With the exception of a few pages devoted to pictures of the auditor and a few other officials, the report was almost entirely filled with financial data and statistics. The citizens, if they read the report, could tell how much they had paid but little about how much they had received in terms of services. The 1938 report gave a brief summary of the activities of each department and of many of their subdivisions. The financial reports were not so full as they were before, but no essential material was omitted. The manager received many favorable comments from bond buyers on the form of the financial sections of the annual reports.

Mr. Dorton's first two annual reports were published too late to be recognized in Clarence Ridley's annual appraisal in the *National Municipal Review*. The one for the year ending June 30, 1938, was to

be released much earlier, possibly by the first of September. The reports were about sixty-five pages in length, six by nine inches in size, attractively illustrated, and contained well-written statements of municipal activities accompanied by simple statistics, many in graphic form.

One of the most successful public relations activities in recent years was the work of the office of the coordinator of traffic safety. The coordinator was appointed by the manager and was aided by a large advisory commission made up of public-spirited citizens who volunteered their time and services. The undertaking started in the summer of 1935 when about fifty business and social leaders decided to do something besides talk about the appalling frequency of traffic accidents and fatalities. The coordinator was an experienced educator, had studied law and safety engineering, and had conducted traffic schools in the city of Los Angeles for some time before coming to Long Beach. The city manager was extremely proud of the record of this office in reducing the fatalities and the ratio of accidents to injuries and accidents to fatalities. Intensive educational programs were carried on through the schools, fleet operators, city employees, clubs, and other organizations. A speakers' bureau was organized at Polytechnic High School with about one hundred students who were prepared to give interesting and educational five-minute talks on a variety of subjects about safety. These talks were delivered before parent-teacher associations, luncheon groups, service clubs, and any others who gave them time. The coordinator was continually on the lookout for places or meetings where he might be able to arrange for one of his speakers to give a short talk. Most groups would make time for a short talk by a student when they might not for an adult who might take up a half hour of their time.

In order to get the greatest possible results the coordinator was careful to study the accident records and to do the prevention work where it was most needed. For instance, he did not lay as great stress as one might expect on the theme, "Save our children." The emphasis, in speaking before the older groups was, "Watch out for yourselves." Evidence showed that it was not the children of Long Beach who were being maimed and killed in auto-pedestrian accidents, but elderly people. The children were better able to take care of themselves on the city streets than their elders, probably as a result of safety programs originating in the schools. Thus, if the children exercised a reasonable degree of caution on the street, the emphasis might properly be shifted to the older group of the population who had had comparatively little safety education about themselves as pedestrians.

The fire prevention bureau could be used more than it had been for educational work. This bureau did a great deal of valuable work in cooperation with the building inspection services and in the preparation of codes. The bureau was well manned but did not do nearly so much publicity work as the office of the coordinator of traffic safety. There may have been two reasons for this: there was a vast difference in the popular appeal of the two programs, and the fire prevention bureau had been an efficient organization long before the traffic safety program got started. The bureau did not feel, therefore, that it needed to do as much crusading as the newer organization. The accident report was much more of a sore spot to civic leaders than was the report of fire losses up to 1938. The fire prevention bureau was doing a good job, but many citizens were unacquainted with its work.

## VIII. CONCLUSION

LONG BEACH city manager government, operating under a charter which was a compromise, did not always fulfill the hopes that were entertained for this form of government. The early supporters of the manager plan expected the city manager to be a business manager and to operate the city on a business basis. The first council was a business man's council and appointed an experienced professional administrator. Subsequent shifts in popular sentiment changed the composition of the council and the concept of the duties and the responsibilities of the manager. There followed a succession of strong and weak managers, each maintaining a different relationship with the city council. One manager dominated the council to the extent of dictating policies. Evidently, there had been no crystallized public sentiment about the type of relationship that should exist between the manager and the council. The inclusion of the recall provision for the city manager made him a political officer responsible to the people. The amended recall provision made the manager less vulnerable to the direct political pressure of citizen groups.

Even with this background of political instability, up to 1939 at least, the incumbent council had remained in office for four years, weathering two elections and keeping the same manager in office. Councilmanic interference in matters of administration was, surprisingly enough, practically nonexistent after 1934. There were two good reasons for this self-restraint. In the first place, the manager had a solid backing of the in-

fluent business and professional people of the city. These men formed the backbone of the Charter Enforcement Party which lent its support to this council on three different occasions. Other organized citizens' groups which supported the council insisted that the manager be allowed to handle the administrative part of the city government. The second reason for the position that the council took arose from the fact that the councilmen took office as a reform party and got a good deal of favorable publicity by the appointment of the incumbent manager. They built up excellent reputations among the supporters of manager government and would hesitate to risk losing these reputations by meddling with administrative processes which operated so well. Furthermore all the members of the council were convinced of the benefits that city manager government would yield if it were allowed to function as intended.

Administration fluctuated from a strong centralized administration to that of a decentralized, council-operated scheme under some of the weaker local managers. In 1938 all administration was under the city manager with the exception of one or two independent boards.

Departmental activities were much better coordinated under the manager form of government than under the commission plan. Not only were the activities of single departments administered by qualified professional technicians, but all municipal functions were supervised and coordinated by one trained responsible head. Administration of all departments by a professional chief executive never occurred during the operation of the commission plan when there were five separate department heads with equal authority, responsible to no one except to the voters on election day.

Yet it took Long Beach thirteen years to realize the benefits which city manager government could bring to it, for the increased efficiency observed in this survey in 1938 had been brought about almost entirely by the council elected in 1934 and their appointee, Mr. Dorton, as manager.



WINNETKA, ILLINOIS

*David G. Monroe*

*and*

*Harry O'Neal Wilson*



## CONTENTS

I. Introduction . . . . .	375
II. The Legal Setting . . . . .	378
III. The Winnetka System . . . . .	387
IV. The Village Council . . . . .	397
V. The Manager . . . . .	404
VI. Administrative Organization . . . . .	413
VII. Financial Organization . . . . .	417
VIII. Personnel Management . . . . .	421
IX. Coordination. . . . .	426
X. Conclusion . . . . .	433



### IMPORTANT DATES IN WINNETKA'S GOVERNMENT

Village Named .....	1858
Village Charter Enacted .....	1869
Manager Plan Established .....	1915

---

Robert L. Fitzgerald, Manager .....	1915
Herbert L. Woolhiser, Manager .....	1917



*Field Work: 1938*  
*Report Written: 1939*

# City Manager Government in Winnetka

---

## I. INTRODUCTION

THE VILLAGE of Winnetka will impress any casual visitor as the ideal of suburban simplicity in community life. Yet the observer who looks behind this facade of contentment and simplicity finds that the political structure which maintains this appearance is astoundingly intricate. Winnetka is a community of paradoxes.

It is a wealthy suburb of Chicago, an integral part of metropolitan Chicago. It lies within a county notorious for its mismanagement, inefficiency, political corruption, and boss control. Yet Winnetka itself has a well-managed, efficient, honest, and democratically controlled government.

Again, its village government operates under the laws of Illinois which permit the manager plan only in "cities of 5,000 or less." But Winnetka in 1938 had grown to have 13,000 citizens who still enjoyed a firmly established manager plan which had operated with clocklike precision since 1915 when the population was about 4,300. The village is noted for its cultured, enlightened, and civic-minded citizens, yet the council held many closed sessions.

Largely Republican in national politics, Winnetkans pride themselves on their nonpartisan local elections. Ultraconservative in economic and political outlook on national problems, they boast of their municipally owned and operated water and electric light plant. They point with pride to the progressive innovations and experiments carried on in their public schools. This famous section of Chicago's Metropolitan Gold Coast is truly aristocratic and upper crust in tradition and background, but it is characterized by an amazing spirit of social consciousness and a feeling of community unity which embraces all classes. Winnetka is, indeed, an interesting and unusual village.

Winnetka is situated in New Trier Township in the northeast corner of Cook County on the western shore of Lake Michigan. It is about eighteen miles north of downtown Chicago. With Evanston, Glencoe, Wilmette, Highland Park, and the neighboring towns on the lake it

shares the distinction of forming a part of Chicago's most impressive and pleasing suburban section. This distinction, perhaps, belongs especially to Winnetka, for, by and large, it has been able to withstand the comparatively rapid degree of commercialization which has overtaken Evanston and Wilmette.

For nearly three miles its eastern boundary stretches along the lake shore. Smooth sandy beaches attract the eye of the stranger. Its shaded streets, natural wooded areas, and parks form a background for the magnificent estates which overlook the lake. When in 1858 Mr. Charles Peck recorded the plat for what was to become the village, he chose appropriately the name Winnetka, an Indian term for "Beautiful Land." In 1938 over 64 per cent of all the territory in the village was restricted for residential use only, and nearly 30 per cent of that area consisted of homes located on one-half acre or more of land.

To the average Chicagoan the name Winnetka connotes money, social power, culture, and prestige, for Winnetka has always been a wealthy village. It began as a wealthy village when many Chicago business and professional people established their summer homes there. A considerable portion of the population is composed of persons who possess better-than-average accumulations of wealth and receive better-than-average yearly incomes. Over 75 per cent of all Winnetka families owned their own homes in 1930, and estimates of the average yearly income per family varied from forty-five hundred to eight thousand dollars.

There are no industries and no manufacturing in Winnetka. While there is considerable local business activity, it is retail in character and provides adequately for the usual household necessities. Retail business was sufficient to warrant the establishment of a Chamber of Commerce in 1923 which was still operating in 1938, at the time of this survey.

The local merchants were energetic, for Winnetkans as a group demanded Service with a capital S, and they got Service not only from their businessmen but also from their government. Many Winnetkans insisted on doing business only with the proprietor of a shop, the president of a bank, or the manager of the village. The result was that every organization in town kept on its toes and made every effort to render the services expected and demanded.

The village of Winnetka is world renowned for its grade school system dedicated to progressive education. When in 1919 the board appointed Carlton Washburne superintendent of the Winnetka schools, it took a forward step in the development of education in the village. The Winnetka system, largely owing to the efforts of Mr. Washburne, was

distinctive primarily because of its unusual treatment of the special interests and aptitudes of the child as a whole. In emphasizing this phase of modern education, Winnetka worked out techniques of progressive school administration which were constantly revised to keep pace with the most recent developments in educational methods. The ultimate emphasis in Winnetka, however, was always the "complete individual and social development of the child."<sup>1</sup> The majority of residents of the village were justly proud of the achievements of their superintendent of schools and of his able corps of administrators and teachers. Many Winnetkans, however, objected to the way the schools were run. The average Winnetkan's opinion of the school system apparently depended upon the success of his children in school and upon his reaction to the personality of the superintendent. Some citizens felt that the number of families who left the village because of antagonisms caused by the methods used in the schools just about equaled the number of families that were attracted to Winnetka because of the reputation of the school system.

Although the village was incorporated in 1869, no official census figures are available for Winnetka prior to 1880. In 1924 an old inhabitant, since dead, estimated that about 250 persons lived in Winnetka in 1875. According to the United States Census for 1880 there were 584 persons then living in the village. By 1900 the population had increased to 1,833. Although the population increased steadily, it was not until after 1900 that the real development of the village took place. The census indicates that the population nearly doubled in each of the three decades after 1900. The population in 1938 was estimated at nearly 13,000. The rate of growth from 1930 to 1938 was considerably slower. Economic conditions after the depression prevented further suburban migration. Moreover, Winnetkans did not want a large and growing village. Their overwhelming desire to keep Winnetka a relatively small residential community was a bulwark against a continued rapid increase in population.

From the beginning of the settlement of the North Shore area the population of Winnetka was more or less homogeneous. Most early white settlers were of British extraction. Thereafter the composition of the population did not change greatly. A general picture of the composition of the population may be obtained from the following census figures.

<sup>1</sup> Carlton Washburne, "The Aims of the Winnetka Public Schools," *Your Child and Your School* (Winnetka Parent-Teacher Association), p. 21.

Origin	1920		1930	
	Number	Per Cent.	Number	Per Cent.
Native white .....	5,314	79.4	9,885	81.3
Foreign-born white .....	1,304	19.5	2,012	16.5
Negro .....	74	1.1	256	2.1
Other .....	2	0.0	13	.1
TOTAL	6,694	100.0	12,166	100.0

The population was predominantly Protestant, although the Catholics maintained two churches. There were a few Jewish families in the village.

There was little indication of social cleavage resulting from differences in national origin or differences in religion, although some foreign-born groups confined their social and religious activities largely within their own circle. But Community House and the Congregational Church were significant factors in uniting the social life of the minority elements with that of the community as a whole. The principal social divisions in Winnetka were based primarily on economic groupings. Some local merchants and tradesmen felt that the commuters made a distinction between the "washed" and the "unwashed." With some justification they felt that their interests as an economic and social group were not fully recognized by the dominant elements in the community and that differences in income tended to make differences in social status. By and large, however, there was a greater amount of sincere concern for the welfare of one's neighbors and a greater awareness of common problems in Winnetka than one would expect in a community conscious of wealth and privilege.

## II. THE LEGAL SETTING

EFFECTIVE MANAGER government probably depends more upon the political temper of the community than upon the kind of charter under which the manager plan operates. There is no better illustration of this hypothesis than the village of Winnetka. Here as elsewhere the fundamental problem was the adequacy of the powers granted, for no local government can be successful unless it possesses sufficient power to carry on the services expected and demanded by its citizens. The structure of the local government and the distribution of its powers over its component parts are also highly important; but if the authority

itself is reasonably adequate, structural defects can be compensated for locally by increasing the vigor and the effectiveness of civic vigilance and interest. Perhaps Winnetka's special achievement was not the maintenance of manager government, but rather the development of extralegal devices to coordinate the administrative activities of the agencies of local government in the community.

The legal background of Winnetka's government affords an excellent opportunity to the student of the law of municipal corporations. For here one can see clearly how the political ingenuity of a community can compensate for a complex and inadequate legal structure. Manager government functioned well under a structure which appeared to be ill adapted to successful administration.

Winnetka's charter had its origin in the desire for better schools. Because a number of prominent citizens wanted better school facilities, they held meetings during the winter of 1868-69. From these meetings developed the feeling that better schools were possible only through the organization of a village government. Consequently, a bill for a village charter was drawn up by a committee and forwarded to the state legislature for approval. With its enactment in March, 1869, the document became the charter of Winnetka.

Though Winnetka nominally operated under the special charter, that act of the legislature was not the chief source of the powers of the village. Rather Winnetka derived its powers as a municipal corporation from two other more important sources: acts of the legislature applicable to special charter villages only and acts granting powers to cities and villages under general law. A close study of the special charter indicates that most, if not all, the grants of power were duplicated in the Cities and Villages Act,<sup>1</sup> from which all Illinois municipalities derived their powers. Not even the most skillful lawyer could state definitely the effect of these statutes upon the affairs of Winnetka.

Since Winnetka did not depend upon its special charter as the foundation of its general corporate powers and since the charter contained restrictions on the powers of the village, the question might well be asked why the charter was retained. The explanation was not hard to find. In the first place many Winnetkans believed that the charter afforded them a special legal safeguard which municipalities organized under the Cities and Villages Act did not possess and that, therefore, they were better able to preserve the manager form of government.

<sup>1</sup> *Illinois, Rev. Stats.* (Cahill, 1935), chap. 24, part I.

Winnetkans, including the village attorney, the village manager, and the chairman of the law committee of the council, believed that the legal basis of village manager government rested squarely upon the following brief section in the special charter: "The Council shall have power by resolution or ordinance to appoint other officers or agents to perform special duties and fix the compensation therefor." (Art. III, sec. 2.) Actually this provision of the Winnetka Charter was not materially different from a similar section in the general law.

Furthermore, one section of the special charter prohibited the sale of liquor within the boundaries of the village. Thus, Winnetka possessed a mandatory prohibition law which municipalities organized under general law did not have. There was evidence that this provision strongly influenced the controlling elements in the village to insist on the retention of the special charter. Third, Winnetka could exercise all powers conferred on villages under general law, making it unnecessary to surrender the charter in order to obtain more power.

Fourth, village government *worked* under this legal set-up. The citizens of Winnetka found that their government was able to supply the services they needed and desired without a fundamental change in the charter. Finally, tradition was an important factor in Winnetka. Many Winnetkans greatly cherished the charter as a landmark in the growth and development of the village, and though its provisions were not fully understood even by many lawyers of the village, there was a certain amount of distinction and dignity derived from the retention of an historical special charter of government in a state where practically all other municipalities were brought under the blanket provisions of general law.

### *Inadequacy of Winnetka's Powers*

The Cities and Villages Act can neither be considered a "fundamental document for the government of a metropolitan city,"<sup>1</sup> nor with Winnetka's special charter can it be regarded as a genuinely adequate legal base for the government of a residential suburban community. Though Winnetka did not face nearly so many or so varied municipal problems as the great metropolis to the south, nevertheless the vagaries, the inconsistencies, and the shortcomings of its fundamental law had a profound effect upon the government of the village. The legal and administrative relationships of Winnetka were shaped and were colored by conditions arising directly or indirectly from imperfections in these basic laws.

<sup>1</sup> Lepawsky, *Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago* (1935), p. 117.

Many activities not provided for in the law of incorporation or in the laws extending Winnetka's powers were developed through extralegal means. A kind of customary law evolved to plug up the gaps in the statutory law. Thus, the story of Winnetka is that of the achievement of good government despite many legal handicaps.

Powers and functions of local government were spread over a bewildering multitude and assortment of taxing authorities, thus limiting the scope of the legal powers of the village government. In 1933 there were reported to be 1,642 separate taxing units for the area included in metropolitan Chicago,<sup>1</sup> most of which was coterminous with Cook County. This situation resulted partly from the combination of the county form of government found in the southern colonies and the New England township form. A more important cause was the creation of many *ad hoc* bodies designed either to accomplish special governmental functions or to evade the constitutional debt limits.

It was in this multiplicity of local units that the government of Winnetka operated.<sup>2</sup> Winnetka was one of the five villages in New Trier Township. There were three other units of local government which shared the general territory of Winnetka with the village government: the board of park commissioners of the Winnetka park district; the board of education, and the board of directors of the public library. The park district and the board of education had tax jurisdiction within the boundaries of the village; the library board controlled the expenditure of appropriations for library purposes. The oldest and best known of the three was the board of education, composed of outstanding residents of the community, many of whom stood high in their respective vocations. As a group they allowed the superintendent a free hand in running the schools. The result was that the school system, like the village administration, was largely a reflection of the personality of its chief administrative officer, Carlton Washburne. Both the superintendent of schools and the village manager enjoyed a wide range of discretion and were permitted a great deal of freedom for experimentation. Both were relatively free from legislative control, both achieved a high measure of efficiency, and both developed new and significant techniques of administration.

<sup>1</sup> Merriam, Parratt, and Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (1933), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> In 1938 the following governmental bodies levied taxes within some part of the area of the village of Winnetka: the state of Illinois, Cook County, a forest preserve district, a sanitary district, a mosquito abatement district, New Trier Township, New Trier High School, Winnetka Public Schools, Winnetka Park District, and the Village of Winnetka.



Organized in 1904, the Winnetka park district provided park and recreational facilities for the village. For this purpose the board maintained a total of twenty-three publicly owned park areas in addition to areas maintained by the board although privately owned. While the park board was undoubtedly rendering efficient service to Winnetka, no special advantage was evident from its independent set-up. The powers of the board should have been exercised by the village council. In reality, a large measure of integrated control was achieved, though not provided by law. Thus, on the basis of a more or less formal agreement, the village water and electric department installed for the park board a sprinkling system, tennis court cables, and the flooding and lighting system of the skating rink at Skokie playfield. When the Skokie Valley Flood occurred in July, 1938, the park board cooperated with other units of government in the construction of dikes and in other emergency activities under the direction of the manager, Mr. Woolhiser, assisted by Mr. Anderson, superintendent of public works for the village.

In 1938 the Winnetka public library completed its fifty-second year as a public body created for the purpose of supplying library facilities for the village. By authority of an act passed in 1872, the board of six trustees was empowered to control the expenditures of all money collected to the credit of the library fund. While the library was administered separately from the village government, the village council had the authority to levy general taxes for its operation and maintenance. Its administration was closely tied in with that of the village government, for the library budget was submitted to the manager who presented it to the council in much the same fashion in which he presented departmental estimates. Thus, another integrating step was taken, though not provided by law.

The powers of the village were inadequate for the complete operation of a well-integrated system of local government. This inadequacy was illustrated in part by the complexity of the whole governmental set-up and by the number of units of government operating in the area. There were, in addition, special problems over which control by local governments was limited by state laws and court decisions. Four of these problems will be discussed briefly.

Winnetka was one of the first municipalities to take advantage of an act passed by the legislature in 1921 empowering cities and villages to enact zoning ordinances. The enabling legislation was passed at an opportune time for the village, for it permitted the council to carry out many ideals formulated in the plan for Winnetka. This plan was pre-

pared in 1921 for the Winnetka plan commission by Edward H. Bennett, a well-known consulting architect of Chicago.<sup>1</sup>

The Watchword for Winnetka [wrote Mr. Bennett] like that of the whole North Shore, might well be "Preservation." In a sense it is the keynote of this report. . . . The purpose should be to restore country conditions. . . . The importance of preserving this comparatively small area as a residential section, free from the noise, smoke and dust of industry, requires no argument. . . . If the village is to retain its country-like character rather than become suburban with closely built houses and apartments, the problem would seem to be to influence the distribution of new population in the best manner possible and to regulate its density under the new zoning law.

The ideal set forth in the plan was adhered to rigidly, for to the majority of the residents of the village any relaxation in the enforcement of the zoning ordinance would pave the way not only for undue expansion of local business but also for a substantial increase in population. Both these possibilities caused many Winnetkans grave concern. Moreover, in a village dedicated to the ideal of preservation, threats to the continuance of its "country-like character" become associated with the fear that its social and political institutions would likewise be put in danger. To residents of the North Shore villages, urbanization connoted Chicago—and to them Chicago meant bossism, political machinations, and partisan strife. The increasing number of persons who moved to Winnetka from Chicago after 1918 led many to fear the possibility of the introduction of Chicago politics into local affairs. Faced with an estimated turnover of 30 per cent in the population between 1928 and 1938, the influential citizens of the village clung more and more tenaciously to the ideals that were crystallized in the Winnetka plan.

Winnetka's zoning ordinance was passed on January 17, 1922. For purposes of classification it divided the village into five separate categories. Business establishments were strictly confined to the commercial and industrial districts which constituted only 1.4 per cent of the entire area of the village. No apartment or two-family houses were permitted in the two class A residential districts. Apartment houses "not to exceed two families" might be erected in the class B residential district. But the few multi-family apartment houses in the village were confined to the areas zoned for commercial use. They were in buildings that had store fronts.

In order to effectuate and properly to implement the desires of nearly

<sup>1</sup> Winnetka Plan Commission, *Plan of Winnetka* (1921), pp. 31-35.

all Winnetkans, the superintendent of public works as the administrative agent of the council tended toward an ever more rigid application of the zoning ordinance. But the power of the council in this direction was restricted in several instances as a result of decisions by the courts. Once when the village sought an injunction to restrain a property owner from using his property in a manner that did not conform to the use specified in the zoning ordinances, the court denied the petition. Winnetka and all other Illinois municipalities were deprived of an important tool of adjustment when the Illinois Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the discretion of the zoning board of appeals to grant variances.<sup>1</sup> As the result of this case and others, the council amended the ordinance in an attempt to patch up the legal loopholes created by the decisions.

The inability of the village to provide benefits to employees was a second problem. For some time the manager had desired to inaugurate a retirement system and a system of group insurance for municipal employees. After the legislature in 1927 made the adoption of a pension plan for the police and fire departments mandatory for municipalities over five thousand in population, the desire for a similar system for all other municipal employees increased. But until the legislature passed the enabling legislation the village council would be powerless to provide such a plan. Here is another example of the inadequacy of the powers of the village. Provision could be made neither for group insurance nor for pensions nor for any type of retirement system. The village employees were, of course, exempted from the provisions of the Federal Social Security Act of 1935. The situation was aggravated because annuity schemes and pension plans were permitted to all employees of Chicago.

Third, the county treasurer, who was *ex officio* county collector, was responsible for the collection of delinquent general taxes in the village. Delinquent accounts were turned over to the county by the township collector. No statement of the tax functions of Cook County and their effects on government units within the county would be complete without mention of the unfortunate tax situation which led in New Trier to the formation of the New Trier Township Committee.<sup>2</sup> As the result of considerable pressure, the Illinois Tax Commission in 1927 found it necessary to order a new quadrennial reassessment of real

<sup>1</sup> *Welton v. Hamilton* (1931) 342 Ill. 82.

<sup>2</sup> The New Trier Township Committee was an extralegal body formed to devise means of getting villages in whole or in part in the township "out of the red." See pp. 432-33 for a further account of the work of this committee.

estate throughout the state. Completed for most counties in less than six months, the reassessment took more than a year at a cost of more than a million dollars in Cook County. Thus, no tax bills were sent to Cook County property owners in 1928. Nearly all local taxing bodies—the village of Winnetka was an exception—were forced to issue tax-anticipation warrants. Because of the delay in collecting taxes, the financial difficulties caused by the panic and by the industrial depression, and the decline in the demand for tax-anticipation warrants, nearly all units of local government found themselves in difficult straits. Most significant, the county did not take effective steps to alleviate the difficulty. No attempt was made by the county to coordinate and to integrate the activity among local governments or between the county and the local governments.

Winnetka was handicapped in two important ways by the system of tax collections and by the insufficiency of village powers. First, considerable delay resulted in the transfer of funds from the county to the village. While the amount involved was never excessive and the administration of the village was never seriously injured by the delay, nevertheless, the delay was a source of annoyance and inconvenience. Second, Winnetka with other North Shore villages was subject to a practice of the county treasurer brought to light a few years prior to 1939. It was found by the New Trier Township Committee that the county treasurer had customarily withheld from the villages 10 to 15 per cent of the amount collected as a so-called "cushion," which was designed to protect the treasurer from claims arising from possible illegal collections.

Fourth, the paramount difficulty associated with the life of the village as a whole and the issue that gave the council most concern was the problem of grade crossings. The four-track main line of the Chicago and North Western Railroad and the practically parallel two-track electric line of the Chicago, North Shore, and Milwaukee Railroad ran through the whole length of the village. Some cities solved similar problems by elevating the railroads; others succeeded in getting track depression. In Winnetka there was neither depression nor elevation. The only protection for the citizens was furnished by watchmen at safety gates operated by hand.

Many deaths and injuries resulted from accidents at the nine crossings. From 1910 to 1921 forty-four persons were killed or seriously injured. For several years before 1939, the rate was lower, but scarcely a year passed without one fatality. An especially horrible accident which oc-

curred in October, 1937, aggravated the ever present fear of many residents.

Moreover, the situation was aesthetically unfortunate. The beauty of the land just off the lake was disfigured by unsightly tracks and numerous trains. There were no hills to break the noise and the roar. The village was cut in half by the tracks. "The elimination of grade crossings," wrote the plan commission in 1921, "is Winnetka's most serious and urgent problem."<sup>1</sup> It still was in 1938.<sup>2</sup>

From the standpoint of public policy it would be difficult, if not impossible to sustain the expediency of granting the village power over the railroads within its borders. Yet the council had to appeal to the Illinois Commerce Commission for relief in this matter of great local concern.

Winnetka's legal setting was complicated: the village powers were derived from many sources; the village government functioned as one of many independent units covering part of or all the same territory; and the village jurisdiction, with that of all other Illinois municipalities, was limited by state laws and by court decisions. Despite the labyrinth of legal intricacies, complicated relationships, and overlapping governments Winnetka's village manager government worked well. Largely because of extralegal cooperative devices and gentlemen's agreements, many overlapping functions were coordinated. Limitations imposed by state law and by court decisions could not be circumvented, but the village government adapted its actions to these limitations in such a way that the best possible results under the circumstances were obtained for Winnetka. The manager plan itself probably existed on a basis of general consent, since Illinois provided that form of government only for municipalities under five thousand population. The average citizen of Winnetka was proud of his government, proud of the record of the manager, proud of the caliber of the men on the council, and proud of the achievements of the village. It was not likely that the validity of Winnetka's manager government would be challenged in the courts.

<sup>1</sup> Winnetka Plan Commission, *Report*, 1921, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Grade separation was begun after this report was written.

### III. THE WINNETKA SYSTEM

THE WINNETKA SYSTEM was frequently mentioned in the village. The phrase was used as a synonym for the "spirit of Winnetka." It was that intangible community force comparable to individual integrity that made possible, among other things, the accomplishment of a smoothly functioning, efficient government despite legal complications and intricacies. The Winnetka System resulted from a tradition of citizen activity and articulation pervading all phases of community life. In 1938 this citizen alertness emanated primarily from two organizations, the Caucus and Community House, both of which had their origins in Winnetka's early history.

#### *The Town Meeting*

Before the village government, set up in 1869, was a year old extralegal weekly assemblies of citizens were a common occurrence. These popular assemblies (known from the outset as town meetings) were a directing influence in village affairs until the turn of the century.

Three citizens—Artemus Carter, Captain Larned, and the Reverend Quincy Dowd—were primarily responsible for the town meeting. Mr. Carter, the first village president, initiated these weekly gatherings of villagers as a means of discussing civic problems. Mr. Carter undoubtedly adopted the idea of the town meeting because of its employment in Leominster, Massachusetts, where he was born and reared. Similarity between parliamentary procedures used in the Winnetka town meeting and in the New England town meeting was the work of Captain Larned, a native of Providence, Rhode Island. Because of the efforts of the Reverend Mr. Dowd, pastor of the Congregational Church, the town meetings soon ceased to be a public discussion club, becoming instead a community institution which catered to the social, religious, and political life of the community. The solidarity thus accomplished made easier the promotion of a strong community spirit.

#### *Discontent with the Village Government*

During the first fifteen years the charter-town meeting government functioned smoothly, and the villagers were well satisfied with the plan. About 1885, however, a series of circumstances began which aroused in the villagers increasing distrust and dissatisfaction.

A utilities problem brought to a head the discontent with the village government. Most villagers still depended on their back-yard wells for

water, and there were only a few miles of gas mains. As early as 1885 various utility companies were bargaining for gas and water franchises. The village council favored granting a gas franchise to a private concern, a policy which many villagers opposed. Controversy between the council and the villagers was temporarily settled when the council voted to construct a village water works but was renewed in 1894 when the council voted to grant a forty-year franchise to a utility company. Signing of the franchise was delayed until after the spring election.

The decision about the gas company precipitated a popular revolt against the council. The leader of the revolt was Henry D. Lloyd, whose exposé of the Standard Oil Trust was then making history. He urged that since the voters had no legal power to veto a contract approved by the council, the trustees should be compelled to bow to the popular will by requiring every candidate for the council to sign a pledge guaranteeing to refer utility questions to the people. A motion was made in the town meeting to require candidates for the spring election to sign such an agreement. After the election the council referred the question to the people. The vote was 180 to 4 against granting the franchise.

The settlement of the gas issue was only one of two major results of the controversy of 1894. Out of the controversy was born the Winnetka System, part of which was a procedure of government by which the villagers agreed among themselves to retain a veto over actions of the council. The town meeting of 1895 appointed a committee to draw up a platform to which all candidates supported by the town meeting had to subscribe. This act established the principle which Winnetkans called their direct initiative.

### *Participation in Government by Individuals and Civic Agencies*

According to contemporary accounts the village government during the period 1880-95 had been none too active in providing for many important governmental functions. Many streets were mud holes. The street lighting system was poorly serviced. Public relief and charity were disregarded. As a result, many private citizens attempted to remedy these omissions, and several civic organizations were founded for the same purpose.

The most important civic organization was the Village Improvement Association, organized in 1895 to agitate for a new railroad station. As a result of agitation, a station was constructed. After this achievement the association began a drive for garbage incineration and street clean-

ing. The association organized its own garbage carriers and street cleaners; until 1908, when public scavengers were employed, the association was unofficially known as the "department of street cleaning and garbage disposal."

After 1900 several other improvement associations were founded. A Clean Village Club was organized in 1908 as a helpmate to the Village Improvement Association which was then staggering along under a reduced budget. The Clean Village Club was founded primarily for the purpose of campaigning for better control over waste deposited in vacant lots. Another organization, the North Shore Citizens' Association—formed to drive liquor traffic from Winnetka—hired a number of detectives, secured evidence on the more notorious "pigs," and finally brought about the conviction of several proprietors. With the liquor traffic brought under control the association made an investigation of the Skokie drainage problem. It drew up a plan of action whereby the dumping of waste into the Skokie basin by adjacent villages could be prevented. This plan formed the basis of the Chicago Sanitary District's action in constructing a sewage disposal plant on the near North Shore. A Public Discussions Club was formed as a means of obtaining community sentiment on village affairs.

### *The Revolt Against Ineffective Government*

Until 1915 the villagers were content to pinch-hit for the government. They did not attempt to adjust fundamental weakness in administrative organization which, to a large extent, had been responsible for the ineffectiveness of Winnetka's government prior to 1915. After 1915 the efforts of the citizens were directed almost entirely to remedying defects in administration and to developing extralegal organizations to make possible better government. Again it was a utility problem that precipitated revolt against ineffective government, a revolt which led to the adoption of the city manager plan.

When the water and light plant was completed in 1899, F. E. Herdman was made superintendent. A man of unquestioned integrity, held in high esteem by villagers for many years, he had served several terms as village president and was an acknowledged leader in the community. But after 1910 his prestige began to wane. As a prominent village official stated: "Authority went to his head. He tried to run the council in a tactless and overbearing manner. Dictatorial tactics plus bad judgment alienated many, and the handling of his employees caused a good many of them to hate him." After 1910 altercations with the council grew more



heated, and the breach between the council and Mr. Herdman widened.

Had the water and light plant been efficiently managed, the ousting of Mr. Herdman as superintendent might have been delayed for several years. But the plant had been allowed to fall into bad repair and showed a frequent deficit in its annual operating account. Often there were interruptions in the service, and every time the lights went out the council was deluged with complaints.

After two unsuccessful attempts to get Mr. Herdman to make improvements in the administration of the plant, the council in 1914 employed Robert L. Fitzgerald, a consultant from a well-known engineering firm, to make a thorough investigation of the water and light plant. His report was an indictment of Mr. Herdman's administrative practices. After careful consideration the council discharged Mr. Herdman.

Several months prior to Mr. Herdman's dismissal one of the trustees had suggested that someone ought to be appointed to battle with department heads over administrative details. When the council came to select a successor to Mr. Herdman, a trustee suggested appointing a person who not only could take charge of the water and light plant but could also serve as a business manager. Mr. Fitzgerald, the engineer, had made a favorable impression on the council and was offered the post of business manager in January, 1915. Shortly after his acceptance Mr. Fitzgerald stated in an interview:<sup>1</sup>

As I understand it, I am here to remove as much as possible of the burden of detail now resting upon the shoulders of the Board of Trustees, such as the investigation of complaints, petitions and other local problems which have formed an important part of the village administration and have hitherto been a heavy drain upon the time of busy business men who serve the public as trustees.

The shift to the manager plan was essentially a reorganization from within the government and was not the result of external forces. The press had little to say, and judging from the nonchalant accounts, the real significance of the change was not grasped. There were no sweeping headlines or vigorous editorials indicting Winnetka's administrative practices or lauding the change. Civic and social groups took no part. The manager plan was adopted without recourse to public vote and was prompted solely by the council in the interests of better government. To most residents the manager plan came as a simple solution of a disagreeable utilities situation. They did not conceive it as a reformation in village administration.

<sup>1</sup> *Messenger*, January 15, 1915.

The manager plan became a legal reality with the passage of a short resolution drawn up in 1915 defining the duties of the manager. Between 1915 and 1939 there was no amendment to the charter, nor was the plan reenforced by legislative act.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the office of manager could easily have been discarded if a majority of the council wanted to do so. But in the two years following the introduction of the manager plan a number of prominent citizens devised a means of anchoring manager government to Winnetka's future. Known as the Caucus, this device constituted Winnetka's most valuable contribution to municipal government.

### *The Caucus*

Although the community was little disturbed during the strife which wound up in the appointment of a village manager, repercussions were enormous. The annual election was scheduled in April, three months after the dismissal of Mr. Herdman. During the three months the atmosphere was charged with political controversy and personal antagonism. By February it was obvious that the election was to be a bitter contest waged between those who objected to Mr. Herdman's dismissal and those who backed the council in their quest for better government. But a number of leaders in the community felt that greater issues were at stake, that the future of Winnetka's government was in jeopardy.

In consequence, a number of citizens met to discuss ways and means of electing to the council men known to favor government in keeping with Winnetka's ideals, and the men later selected favored the retention of manager government. By March, 1915, more than a hundred leaders in the community had organized a Committee of One Hundred and Five, which nominated its own slate of candidates for the council and wrote a platform on which its candidates were to run. Calling itself the Citizens' Ticket, the committee organized an intensive campaign to advertise its candidates and the real issues involved. The support of many of Winnetka's leaders was a vital factor in the success of the Citizens' Ticket at the polls.

The leaders of the party were well aware that the victory of 1915 was not a permanent solution. It merely secured "good government" for one year. The leaders reasoned that "good government" could be insured if means could be found to select and to nominate candidates of assured integrity and experience on a platform in agreement with village

<sup>1</sup> It was formalized by an ordinance in 1932.

desires and needs. The Committee of One Hundred and Five, as a final act before disbanding late in 1915, therefore set in motion the political machinery which won every election between 1915 and 1938 by a wide margin—the Caucus.

The Caucus was one of those phantom-like organizations which defy exact definition. No ordinance or charter provision determined its organization, powers, duties, or limitations. There was no Caucus constitution. By-laws were almost unknown. To some Winnetkans the Caucus meant a self-perpetuating central committee; other Winnetkans vaguely spoke of the Caucus party, meaning those who voted for candidates nominated by a central committee. To a good many the Caucus meant the annual meeting of the villagers summoned to approve the work of a central committee.

Caucus organization was essentially the same in 1938 as in 1915 when the first Caucus committee was organized. The backbone of the Caucus movement was a succession of central committees, the first of which was appointed by the Committee of One Hundred and Five. Thereafter every central committee appointed its successor. In this way outsiders with political appetites were prevented from obtaining a foothold in the Caucus. The central committee, which held office for one year, performed four major functions: it nominated candidates; it drew up the annual platform of the Caucus; it advertised and conducted a campaign for its nominees; and it appointed its successor.

In carrying out these functions, the central committee, consisting of twenty-five members in 1938, worked through the following eight subcommittees: nominating, interviewing candidates, platform, publicity, caucus arrangements, petitions, vacancies, and finance. Membership on these committees ranged from two to twenty. Not infrequently a member of the central committee served on several subcommittees.

The nominating committee chose the central committee for the following year. In 1938 the nominating committee consisted of two members from each of Winnetka's ten precincts. The central committee itself comprised two members from each precinct plus five members selected at large. Actually therefore, the only difference in the personnel of the two committees was the five at-large members. In practice no member of a nominating committee was renominated, but usually about one-third of the central committee was reappointed.

Nominating committees used great care in selecting members of future central committees. When the Caucus was first organized, members of the central committee were selected without reference to village

representation; often an entire committee was composed of residents of one section of the village. Since this policy created a good deal of friction, geographic representation became a factor in making appointments after 1933. Usually a number of clubs and associations in the village were asked to submit names of well-qualified persons. Once a list of suggested candidates was compiled, committee members methodically investigated each candidate. Informal conversations over the coffee cup or during a round of golf with the prospect or with those acquainted with him were not unusual procedures. Weight was given to the prospect's professional standing and the regard in which he was held in the community. Nominating committees were not alone interested in securing persons of competence. They selected central committees which represented a good cross-section of Winnetka life: doctors, lawyers, merchants, business men and women, housewives.

The committee on interviewing candidates sought out persons of approved integrity and experience and nominated them for village offices. Much of the success of the manager plan can be attributed to this committee's excellent work. In 1938 the committee chose candidates not only for the village council but also for the library board, the park board, the board of education, police magistrates, and the village marshal. Appeal was made to all the social, business, and religious organizations for names of well-qualified persons to be submitted to the committee. It was not unusual for villagers to send in several hundred names, indicating again the interest of Winnetkans in their government.

The candidates committee was active throughout the year. When the village council required a special committee, the council asked the candidates committee for suggestions, a logical procedure since it was the business of that Caucus committee to know the abilities of Winnetkans available for public service. Thus, in 1932 an advisory board was organized in this way to report on the railroad problem in the village.

No one could successfully seek office in Winnetka. In fact, the best way to keep out of office was to run for office. The slightest political maneuvering ruined any chance of nomination by the Caucus. So firmly inbedded was this tradition that sectional or pressure interests seldom risked grooming a candidate for office, and candidates made no move to sell themselves to the community. Initiative in nominations resided wholly in the Caucus committee. This is the reason why a village candidate was seldom supported by other political organizations. His one act was to accept nomination. As a result, Winnetka's government was refreshingly immune from corrupting influences in mu-

nicipal government. In the words of a member of the candidates committee: "We discount parties and groups. We attempt to satisfy, so far as possible, various sections and interests but we always seek good candidates for public office in the interests of the village as a whole."

Successive platform committees ably performed the dual task of perpetuating the ideals of the Caucus founders and of keeping Caucus platforms abreast of the times. Every platform committee had to pledge the retention of the manager plan and the village ideal as expressed by the Committee of One Hundred and Five. Caucus platforms were kept up to date, because the platform committee asked community organizations to submit suggestions for improving the government and interviewed several hundred villagers yearly to obtain suggestions for village improvement.

The publicity and the finance committees were seldom important. They were active only when the Caucus faced real opposition. Only once, in 1933, was there any formidable opposition. In nineteen of the twenty-two years under manager government up to 1939 no opposition party appeared. The major task of the committee on caucus arrangements was the calling and the management of the annual meeting of the villagers. Notices were posted several weeks in advance, naming the date and the place of the meeting. The committee ordered the publication of the annual platform in the local newspaper and publicized the names of nominees by means of a circular.

The annual meeting always proceeded with clocklike precision. In 1938 it opened with a brief address on the history of the Caucus. A short talk on the problems and the needs of the village was given by the village president. Then followed a reading of the reports of the president of the board of education, the park board, and the library board. A report by the treasurer of the Caucus committee came next. A resolution was offered by the chair for a vote of confidence in the work of village officials. Three committees then reported. The chairman of the candidates committee read the list of nominees, which was referred to the meeting for vote. The report of the nominating committee was then passed and was followed by the report of the petitions committee which asked villagers to endorse the petitions of candidates approved by the Caucus committee.

What Winnetka thought of its Caucus government was demonstrated in no uncertain terms in 1933, when Caucus candidates were swept into office by an overwhelming majority—2,854 votes for Caucus candidates, 833 for the opposition. After the crushing defeat of the opposition in

1933, Caucus elections were uncontested at least through 1938 when this study was made.

### *Community House*

Winnetka's Community House was a playground for the village, a recreational center, and the hub of nearly all club activity. It was a brick and limestone building with more than forty rooms including a bowling alley, handball courts, library browsing rooms, studios for art classes, music study, and art exhibits, an assembly hall with a capacity of about six hundred, and club lounges and meeting rooms. But Community House was more than a building; it was a community institution. It was the guiding influence in shaping the social, recreational, and organizational destinies of the village. Furthermore, Community House played a role of almost equal importance in the political affairs of the community.

Community House Council was an important adviser to the village council in all matters affecting the life of the community. It was a source to which the president and trustees could invariably refer when in doubt about village opinion. It was both the sounding board and the coordinator of public opinion, articulating the views of villagers in advance of decisions by the council. It represented in every sense of the word a cross-section of the village. In 1938 the council comprised representatives of thirty-three leading organizations<sup>1</sup> and fourteen members elected at large. The council was self-perpetuating, but the nomination of a representative of an organization had to be approved by the organization. The council met three times a year and was an advisory body only. A board of governors elected annually by the Community House Council operated and managed the institution.

Community House was started in 1911 by the pastor of the Congregational Church, and for many years that church made up the annual deficits which ran as high as five thousand dollars. Nevertheless, Community House was nondenominational even then. But after the original

<sup>1</sup> League of Women Voters, Neighborhood Circles, Winnetka Women's Club, North Shore Art League, American Legion, Winnetka Rotary Club, Winnetka Lions Club, Indian Hill Improvement Association, Hubbard Woods Improvement Association, Parent-Teacher Association, Izaak Walton League, Chamber of Commerce, Winnetka Music Club, Children's Hours Committee, Girl Scouts, Winnetka Teacher's Council, Community Chest, Village Council, Winnetka Board of Education, Winnetka Park District, North Shore Country Day School, Winnetka Congregational Church, Christ Episcopal Church, First Evangelical Church, North Shore Congregation Israel (located in Glencoe), Sacred Heart Parish, Boy Scouts, Winnetka Drama Club, Winnetka Relief and Aid Society, Winnetka Business and Professional Women's Club, Junior Auxiliary of Winnetka Women's Club, Church of Christ, Scientist, Panthers.

building was destroyed by fire in 1933, Community House was re-organized and rebuilt as a nonprofit-sharing corporation directed by the community and in the interests of the community. To a large extent it was self-supporting, although the Community Chest made up the annual deficit.

How the Community House Council operated as a bulwark to the village council was demonstrated in the solution of the moving picture problem which faced the village council in 1936. A petition was received from the operator of a large chain of Chicago theaters for a permit to construct a moving picture theater in Winnetka. The village council, as a matter of course, referred the petition to the Community House Council, the chairman of which appointed a special committee to investigate and report on the petition. A circular letter was sent to each member of the Community House Council and to all other organizations not represented on the council. The circular requested each organization to take a vote on the petition and to summarize the views of organization members. Since about nine-tenths of the villagers belonged to one organization or another, such a summarization was a reliable index to village opinion. When returns were submitted by the various organizations, the special committee consolidated them, drew up a statement of conclusions, and forwarded it to the village council. As the report decisively indicated that villagers were opposed to granting the permit, the village council unhesitatingly turned down the petition.

In similar fashion the Community House Council settled the relief and charity issue. Until 1932 charity and relief were directed by the township government and a number of local agencies. How to centralize the collection of funds in one agency was the problem confronting the village. Again a committee was appointed by the Community House Council to investigate and to advise. The committee spent over a year making a comprehensive survey of the problem in other cities and villages. When a summary report of findings was completed by the committee, a second committee was called, comprising one representative from each of the seventy-three village organizations. Each representative was empowered to cast a vote for his organization. The committee approved the plan drawn by the investigating committee; and, as a result, Community Chest, Incorporated, came into existence.

Viewed in the broad perspective, the importance of the Community House Council lay in its ability to assemble viewpoints from every section of the village and from every interest. In consequence, the village

government was always able to obtain a reliable index to village opinion and could project policies which it knew to be in accord with village sentiment. Legally the board of directors of a \$250,000 corporation, Community House Council was in fact the chief advisory board to the village government.

#### IV. THE VILLAGE COUNCIL

POLICY WAS DETERMINED in Winnetka by the interaction of three important elements: the Caucus, the president and trustees of the village government, and the civic organizations represented on the Community House Council. Basic principles of government and fundamental issues of policy were formulated by the Caucus. These were expressed in the annual platform. Operating within this broad framework, the council made its own decisions on specific issues and methods of action not covered by the Caucus' program. In effect the council implemented the general propositions of the Caucus. While questions of major policy were invariably talked over informally with members of the Caucus as individuals, most issues were decided by the council alone.

The village council, or the board of trustees, was composed of six trustees and the president of the village. All the members after 1940 were to be elected for terms of two years, three being chosen one year and four the next so that their terms would overlap. The president, while a member of the board, was separately elected by the voters. None of the members of the council, including the president, received any compensation. Winnetkans were proud of this volunteer basis of service. The council was divided into nine committees of three members each. Each councilman, therefore, except the president who was on no committee, served on at least four committees.

Meetings of the council were held regularly once every two weeks and generally lasted about three hours. Special meetings were held occasionally. The usual procedure was for the council to meet in committee of the whole at 7:30 P.M. for half an hour and then to convene in formal public session for another half an hour or less. Following the public session, the board went into executive session which usually lasted until 10:30 or 11:00 P.M.

The purpose of the executive session and of the committee of the



whole was to permit unhindered discussion. In fact, most of the work of the council was done in closed session. The procedure was quite informal. The president and the trustees sat around a rather small table and discussed village affairs without any definite routine. Actually the whole proceeding was much like an informal meeting of the board of directors of any ordinary business corporation.

While nearly all the work of the board was done in closed session, the board members frequently invited persons desirous of having certain matters considered or actions taken to appear and to confer with them. The council invited these persons not only to the public sessions but also to the closed sessions which were held just before the formal meeting. Some members of the council admitted that the use of secret sessions might be justly censored, but all agreed that it was an effective method for speeding up work. As the manager put it, "It certainly does get things done."

In the public session the board adopted its official actions. Minutes of the proceedings were taken by the village clerk who was not present at the private meetings. These public sessions were, however, cut and dried and were only a formality. Action was taken with rapid clocklike precision, the actual decisions having been made previously in closed session. Partly because council meetings were dull and formal, and partly because of public apathy in Winnetka as in other American municipalities, villagers seldom attended council meetings.

Members of the council did not devote full time to their work, nor were the requirements of office burdensome. Four members, however, voluntarily gave a considerable amount of time to the work of the village. These four were the president, and the chairmen of the committees on public safety, health, and finance. The chairman of the committee on public safety regularly spent about one hour a week in conference with the manager and the chief of police. The chairman of the committee on health often conferred with the health officer and occasionally spent several hours on Saturday mornings in the health department. The chairman of the finance committee (who was invariably appointed village treasurer) devoted more than an hour a week to the signing of vouchers and to other duties connected with the custody of village funds. On the whole, however, the amount of time required was not excessive. Thus, men and women were able to serve who otherwise might not be able to afford the time. The reasonable amount of work required of council members was owing in considerable part to the manager who relieved the members of most of the details.

The council in office in 1938, which was typical, consisted of William B. Moulton, lawyer, president, and the following trustees: George W. Gordon, lawyer, Austin Jenner, banker and lawyer, John F. Manierre, lawyer, Francis E. Phelan, druggist, Herbert Sieck, engineer, Mrs. Isabelle Young, clubwoman. Mr. Moulton, a Harvard graduate, had been for many years a practicing lawyer in Chicago. During his twenty-two years of residence in Winnetka he served in many local and national organizations and had been a director of the Community Chest and of the Community House Council. Mr. Gordon, a graduate of Princeton and Harvard, was the senior partner of a well-known firm of Chicago lawyers. He had served on the Winnetka park board and he belonged to a number of clubs. Mr. Jenner, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, was an assistant vice-president of the First National Bank of Chicago. He was appointed treasurer of the village in April, 1938. Mr. Manierre, the youngest member of the council, was a college graduate and belonged to a number of organizations. He practiced law in Chicago. Mr. Phelan, the representative of the local businessmen, was a certified pharmacist. He was active in the American Legion, having served as district commander for the North Shore area, 1935-36. In 1937 he was head of a committee of the Chicago Retail Druggist Association. Mr. Sieck was secretary and treasurer of a chemical engineering firm—a position he had held for twenty-four years. He was a graduate of the Armour Institute of Technology and was a member of several chemical societies. Mrs. Young, a graduate of a finishing school in the East, was active in the Women's Republican Club. She was also regent of the local chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

None of the incumbent members of the council sought that office. As pointed out above, the office truly sought the man in Winnetka. Obviously, therefore, members did not take office for their own political advantage. Councilmen received no salary. There was no patronage to dispense, nor was the position of village trustee a political stepping stone to higher office. Why, then, did men and women of the caliber of the incumbent council run for that office? The answer was simple. The Caucus drafted them. As one member put it, "How could I refuse? One of the very men who asked me to serve was the same man I had called on when I was interviewing candidates for the Caucus!" Thus, the average councilman considered it both an honor and a duty to serve. It was an honor to be handpicked by the Caucus. It was a duty to live up to the responsibility presented. The prestige of the office itself meant little. Rather, the chance to be of service to the community played

some part in the willingness of councilmen to run. And nomination by the Caucus was tantamount to election.

Council members were elected at large on a nonpartisan ballot. No member felt that he represented any particular neighborhood interest, with one possible exception. The Caucus always selected a local businessman for the council. The local businessman felt that he definitely represented the small group of local merchants and tradesmen who collectively formed the only specialized interest group in the village, and his policies on the council were definitely colored by his relationship with his fellow tradesmen. He tended to favor policies which benefited the merchants, many of whom felt that they were discriminated against by the commuters on the council. The Chamber of Commerce and the local businessmen as a whole, however, were sincerely interested in the welfare of the entire community and were enthusiastically in favor of the Caucus and of the manager plan.

There was no petty politics in Winnetka. There was no spoils system. Outstanding persons served as members of the council both before and after the adoption of the manager plan. But the absence of petty politics and spoils and the presence of the manager plan were not the basic cause for the caliber of council members. Rather, the Caucus, following well-established tradition, was the vital influence in getting outstanding men and women to serve on the council. There was certainly little evidence to indicate that the caliber of council members changed after the adoption of the manager plan. Rather, there was a great deal of evidence to show that Winnetka had, with perhaps a few exceptions, always been served by councils composed of men and women of ability, integrity, and character.

### *The President and Public Leadership*

The office of village president was one of great importance in Winnetka. Legally, the president was the chief executive officer of the village. He was charged with the duty of enforcing all laws and ordinances. With the approval of the council he appointed the village manager. Moreover, with the board of trustees he appointed the non-elective officers who were outside the control of the manager: treasurer, attorney, collector, and engineer. In addition he presided at the meetings of the council.

Since the smoothness of operation of government in Winnetka depended largely upon gentlemen's agreements and upon extralegal devices, the relationship between community leaders and village officials

and administrators, largely determined by personalities, was of great importance. Contributing to the maintenance of working agreements between various parts of the government was continuity of leadership, and responsibility for political<sup>1</sup> leadership before the public was an important part of the president's job in Winnetka. Between 1919 and 1939 Winnetka had only three presidents. Mr. Moulton, the incumbent in 1938, had been in office since 1929, the longest term in the history of the village. Friendly, jovial, conscientious, even tempered, sincere, Mr. Moulton was an able president and contributed in no small way to the village *esprit* which made possible government by gentlemen's agreement.

Thus, while the president was vested with executive power by the charter and to some extent by general law, he relinquished three powers in the interest of better administration: First, he tacitly delegated the authority to appoint and to remove department heads as well as the implied power of supervision of the village administration to the manager. Second, the president did not exercise the power of veto of council ordinances. Though he was probably vested with this power by virtue of the President's Act of 1887, so far as can be determined no president ever exercised it. Third, the president delegated his powers in the enforcement of village ordinances in part to the manager, in part to the chief of police, and in part to the chairman of the committee on public safety of the council. After 1932, when direct administrative supervision of the police department was first put under the manager, determination of administrative policy about law enforcement emanated from a weekly meeting of these three officials, not from the president.

The president, in order to make manager government effective, voluntarily relinquished these legal powers. The need for self-restraint on the part of the president in administrative matters is manifest. Effective manager government, in the absence of legal sanctions, had to rest upon an efficacious gentlemen's agreement. The smoothness with which government worked in Winnetka, therefore, was a tribute, not to the nature and the form of the fundamental law organizing the village, but rather to the character and temperament of the president and of the manager.

Neither the village manager nor the trustees undertook to keep the public informed about the government or to maintain public support for council policies or to feel out the public view for policy formulation.

<sup>1</sup>The term "political" is used throughout this chapter in its broad meaning, not in a partisan sense.

Accordingly, the political activity that is part of an elective representative's responsibility devolved upon the president of the village. It was customary for the president of Winnetka to assume public leadership in the political life of the community. As the result of well-established custom, he acted in five more or less distinct capacities. The president served as public mediator. Winnetkans were proud that there was no partisan politics in their town. Of necessity, however, there was a good deal of political activity in another sense. Winnetkans were community conscious. Civic and social groups met to discuss problems of community welfare. Often alternative methods of action were proposed by different groups, and different policies were suggested. The reconciliation of different attitudes about proposed policy for the government of the village was one of the interesting activities of the president. Thus, when a resident of Indian Hill who had recently moved out from the South Side of Chicago created a good deal of agitation for representation on the council for his particular section of town, Mr. Moulton on invitation addressed a meeting of some of the members of the Indian Hill Improvement Association and succeeded in reconciling the ex-Chicagoan's theory of representative government with that held by most Winnetkans.

The president served as public educator. In this capacity he was often obliged to defend specific actions taken by the council. At times there was outspoken criticism of certain policies of the council, some justified and some quite unfounded. Local businessmen seldom saw eye to eye with other residents on the question of zoning specified sections of town. In 1938 the Indian Hill Improvement Association took exception to the zoning of Winnetka Avenue at Indian Hill Station. Many other citizens objected to the plan for rezoning Green Bay Road. In such instances the president often was invited to speak before the groups involved, and on these occasions he defended and elucidated the reasons for the council's action. Other members of the council rarely did this—the manager, never.

The president was public contact man. Practically all questions of policy which arose from group and individual discussions were taken directly to him. It was the prevailing opinion in Winnetka that one of his proper functions was to listen to opinions. But just as he exercised this function in matters involving the determination of policy, President Moulton in particular studiously refrained from meddling in affairs which involved problems of administration. For Mr. Moulton appreciated fully the distinction between policy and administration. There were many illustrations of this. Several newcomers to the community

on occasion sought presidential clemency for failure to receive discounts on their water and light bills paid after the fifteen days allowed. Others endeavored to have hapless altercations with the police department "remedied," but Mr. Moulton refused to intervene.

The president was ceremonial head of the village. In this capacity he represented the village at all public events and on all formal occasions. He symbolized the political life of Winnetka. Finally, the president was presiding officer of the council. He presided over the closed as well as the open sessions of the council and was a nonvoting member except in a tie. In this capacity the assumption of public leadership on the part of the president met its severest test. For, one might expect that a president who took public responsibility for the actions of the council and who stood out as the head of Winnetka's government might also wish to dominate and subdue the council in its meetings. Mr. Moulton not only refrained from dominating the council in their private and public meetings but actually served to bring out the fullest and most frank discussion of problems of municipal policy without directly participating in the debate.

Even though Mr. Moulton may have been the paragon of a presiding officer, he was nevertheless an important influence in forming policies. In speaking to a group he might suggest a course of action. His suggestion would be considered by members of his audience who in turn would report to other organizations to which they belonged. These organizations would then voice their opinions on the suggestion through the wide-open channel leading to the village council. There, quite likely, the impartial presiding officer would hear his own suggestion, perhaps slightly modified but nevertheless his, discussed and made the official policy of the village. The cycle would be completed when he again discussed his suggestion before a village group, but this time representing the opinion of the village council.

Correlative with the assumption of leadership by the president was the willingness of the council to remain in the background. In their official capacities council members traditionally took little part in community affairs, although as private citizens they often played an important part in the life of the village.

## V. THE MANAGER

ADMINISTRATION was centered in the village manager. His personality colored and shaped the development of administrative practices and techniques to such an extent that it is impossible to understand the village government without understanding the personality and the background of the manager.

Herbert LaDue Woolhiser was a shy, quiet, self-effacing man whose reluctance to appear in public was matched only by his vigor and efficiency as an administrator. He was born at South Wayne, Wisconsin, in 1886. He started as a public utility engineer, and at the age of twenty he was construction superintendent of the LaCrosse Water Power Company of Wisconsin (1906-08). After two years with that company he went to the University of Wisconsin in 1908, receiving a bachelor's degree in 1911 and an engineering degree (E.E.) in 1912. During the ensuing year he taught courses in the College of Engineering at the university and was also an electrical and mechanical engineer with the railroad commission of Wisconsin.

In 1914 Mr. Woolhiser became associated with a firm of construction engineers in Chicago. As consultant on engineering problems, he handled projects for many public utility companies, including the Bay State Street Railway Company of Boston, the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Baltimore, the Indianapolis Light and Heat Company, the Peoples Gas, Light, and Coke Company of Chicago. He resigned his position with the Chicago firm to become village manager of Winnetka beginning May 1, 1917. He served the village continuously after that date and was still in office when this study was made.

Mr. Woolhiser was a member of many professional societies, among which were the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, the Western Society of Engineers, and the American Water Works Association. In 1917 he joined the International City Managers' Association. He was vice-president of that body during 1923-24 and president in 1934-35. He was also connected with several organizations in the village. He was secretary of the Winnetka Rotary Club for five years. He had been director of finance for Community House since 1932. In addition he served as financial officer of the Congregational Church for many years. He was also a member of the Izaak Walton League, the Winnetka Tennis Club, and the Skokie Country Club.

Mr. Woolhiser wrote a number of articles on municipal administration and was a contributing editor of *Public Management*, the monthly

magazine of the International City Managers' Association. Though he had had no previous experience in direct public administration, Mr. Woolhiser saw in the city manager profession an opportunity not only for greater public service, but also a chance for continued contact with engineering and public utility problems for the solution of which he was qualified by training and experience. In an interview for an article Mr. Woolhiser outlined the five principles that served him as criteria for action in the position of manager. These principles, just as live in 1938 as in 1929, afford a thumbnail sketch of the manager's personality:<sup>1</sup>

(1) a city manager has no responsibility for the development of public opinion or for the promulgation or promotion of municipal projects of a general nature, particularly if controversial in character; (2) if he wants to be a reformer or a pioneer, other than in administrative matters, let him resign and go into politics; (3) this does not preclude his opportunity to achieve progress in municipal affairs by his contact with the Council, the members of which properly look to him for advice and information on the needs of the city; (4) if he can exercise a fair degree of patience and "bide his time," he can in this way often bring his dreams to fruition without building up group antagonisms that so often jeopardize the tenure of public officials and bring condemnation, often unjustified, on good government as exemplified in the council-manager plan; and (5) a city manager, for permanent success, must play no favorites, either in the council or in his organization, must develop a reputation for courtesy and fair play; and must not let a little authority "go to his head."

### *The Manager and the Council*

To a large extent the council relied upon the manager for information needed for the determination of policies, but the manager took no part in the public formulation of policy. Mr. Woolhiser was never a political leader. He had no formal contact with the Caucus. He made no political speeches. He confined his social life to nonpolitical organizations, and he shunned public life. But through his contact with members of the council in their fortnightly meetings, Mr. Woolhiser played an important part in the shaping of public policy. With the exception of the village attorney and the health officer, who attended all public meetings of the council, the manager was the only village administrative official who took part in council meetings.<sup>2</sup>

In the private meetings of the council the manager sat a little to one

<sup>1</sup> *Public Management* (October, 1929), XI, 619-620.

<sup>2</sup> The village attorney invariably attended the private meetings as well; the health officer attended occasionally, when health legislation was under discussion.



side of the president near the council table. In these meetings he rarely advanced his own opinion unless requested by one of the members. He definitely did not direct the meeting. Although he prepared the agenda for the council and though his opinion undoubtedly carried more weight than that of any other participant, the manager played a subsidiary role in the actual conduct of the meeting. In the public meetings the manager, though present, took little part in the proceedings. He sat near the council table just below the rostrum from which the president conducted the meeting.

Nevertheless, the council leaned heavily upon Mr. Woolhiser in deciding what action to take on specific issues. Council members sought his opinion and, according to his own estimate, they followed it about four times out of five. More important, the manager's reports to the council furnished the means for closest contact between policy and administration and served to illustrate the nature of this relationship in Winnetka. The manager prepared reports on all phases of the administration. With only a few exceptions even the reports of the various committees of the council were drafted by the manager. Moreover, from time to time he issued reports on special activities of the government. All these reports included a statement of the facts and possible alternative methods of action based on the facts presented. Usually, but not always, the manager's own proposals or recommendations were also included.

### *The Council and Administration*

The council left Mr. Woolhiser a free hand in the management of village affairs. For example, between 1935 and 1938 the manager made two important dismissals. Though one of these involved a "local boy," there was no objection by the council. In making these removals the manager had not consulted the council beforehand, even though he reported them afterwards. Nor did the council interfere with department heads or employees.

Appeals by employees over the head of the manager were unknown. In fact, most employees never saw the members of the council. When a celebration was held to honor the chief of police, William M. Peterson, for his twenty-five years of service, several councilmen were present to participate in the festivities with the employees of the village. Before the meeting was over, the manager, who was toastmaster, introduced the four trustees present to the audience. Many employees craned their necks, for to most of them council members were merely names.

The manager had a comparatively free hand in the preparation of the

budget and in the expenditure of village funds. The council was required by law to approve each expenditure, and it did so by quickly accepting a memorandum prepared by the manager on which all vouchers of the preceding fortnight were listed. No question was raised, for Mr. Woolhiser enjoyed the fullest confidence of the council. Furthermore, the manager had little difficulty in getting the council to accept changes or proposals for the administrative organization or plans for the improvements in the services rendered by the village. The extension of the light plant involving considerable expenditure, the introduction of two new waste disposal services, and the reorganization of the general office were only a few examples.

### *The Manager as Administrator*

The manager was an excellent planner. In 1923 at the request of the council Mr. Woolhiser introduced Winnetka's first five-year financial plan. Based on the experience of the village in past years and on current estimates of future needs, this plan outlined proposed income and outgo for each of three separate funds. When significant changes occurred during a five-year period, the plan was revised and recast in the light of new conditions.

Examples of the manager's foresight and planning ability were found in every department. Thus, in the public works department of greatest significance perhaps was the plan used for the proper maintenance of the sewer system. Sewers were cleaned and flushed regularly in order to prevent stoppage. A card index was kept for all the sewers, and the record of a periodic and diligent check-up on repairs was kept on the cards. Furthermore, the entire system was inspected once a year. The adoption of a new system of sidewalk repair was further evidence of efficient planning in this department. The manager's plan for the west side drainage project was a good instance of foresight in considering the needs of the village for many years to come. The severe floods early in July, 1938, threw this issue in bold relief, vividly portraying the significance of long-range planning. A further illustration of long-range planning was the realization that track depression might someday become a reality. This possibility was taken into account in making the detailed plans for sewers and watermains up to 1952.

As a result of careful planning for the water and light plant, including estimates for future consumption, the capacity of equipment on hand, and the number of replacements needed yearly, the management of the electric plant reached a high level of efficiency. Thus, with an average

load factor of 42.9 per cent for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1937, the distribution loss amounted to only 8.2 per cent. There was not a single general service interruption during that year. Moreover, the average duration of the circuit interruptions was only three minutes for the entire year and for the 1938 fiscal year only 2.8 minutes. Furthermore, construction undertaken by the water and electric department in laying a system of underground cables was planned with reference to certain possible changes in the life of the community as far ahead as 1950. The installation in 1938 of a new three-thousand-KW 80-per-cent P.F. Westinghouse turbogenerator with a four-thousand-square-foot Allis-Chalmers surface condenser and other improvements and extensions of the electric power plant were the result of a long-planned modernization of the plant.

Winnetka's manager was a good employer as well as a good planner. If the caliber of the staff which an administrator has built up is an index to the quality and effectiveness of administrative management in a municipality, Winnetka was most fortunate, for Mr. Woolhiser surrounded himself with a group of competent administrators. They were not of equal experience and ability, nor did they possess equal educational backgrounds. But in the technical duties required in the several departments each was a specialist and was clearly able to handle the specialized functions of his department. Moreover, several gave every evidence of being capable executives possessing the analytical and planning ability needed for efficient administrative supervision.

The reasons for the presence of competent department heads in Winnetka were not hard to find. The first was that Mr. Woolhiser brought in men from the outside. Without exception the department heads in office in 1938 were originally from places outside the village of Winnetka. The manager was able to guarantee his subordinates permanent tenure in exchange for work well done. He was aided by the absence of politics and of interference by meddlesome councilmen. Department heads had every reason to expect reasonable advances in pay in due course of time. The manager encouraged men to improve themselves by study and enrollment in special courses. Mr. Woolhiser did not tolerate sloppy work. He did not hesitate to get rid of inefficient, lazy, or intemperate employees. The manager recognized the distinctive personal differences of each of his assistants. Each knew that he could expect fair and impartial treatment from the manager. Mr. Woolhiser furnished an example to all his subordinates by his own ability and industry.

Most important, Mr. Woolhiser delegated authority well. While there were few problems arising within the organization which escaped his attention, many details, such as the temporary transfer of an employee from one department to another or the formulation and execution of a routine decision or the preparation of a plan for the improvement of work, were handled exclusively by the department head. Each department head, though held to strict account for the efficient performance of his department, was afforded that degree of autonomy necessary for a subordinate to feel free to exercise his independent judgment and to develop his own ability as an administrator. Finally, department heads were carefully selected and so skillfully picked that few were ever discharged.

With the exception of the police department there were no regular meetings of heads of departments with the manager. Department heads, however, consulted the manager freely about many matters. The policy of the manager contributed greatly to the development of the morale of the employees. Mr. Woolhiser was studiously careful to make all contact with employees through the department head concerned. All routine matters of business were naturally cleared through the department head. But even matters involving personal suggestions and complaints were handled in similar style. As stated in the draft for the *Personnel Manual*:

The Village Manager will welcome suggestions from department heads and employees for improving the personnel system. Such suggestions should be transmitted to the Village Manager by letter or memorandum or by a personal visit, with the approval of the department head; such suggestions will receive careful consideration and if changes appear to be necessary or desirable, they will be made. Any employee with a complaint or grievance may be assured of a fair hearing by the Village Manager, in cooperation with the department head.

It is difficult to say which of the techniques developed by the manager for the building up of morale and for the stimulation of performance was the most significant. His basic methods resulted from the homely virtues—sincerity in manner, personal interest in the employee, assurance of a square deal. Security of tenure and the demand for accurate work were important factors. Mr. Woolhiser was complimentary when a job was well done. When an employee or a department head performed a particular task in a creditable manner, Mr. Woolhiser either wrote a letter or personally commended the employee or the department head on the quality of his work. Then, too, a bonus was often given for outstanding accomplishments.

The smoothness with which the administrative relationships operated resulted largely from the personality of the manager. Tactful in manner yet forceful in action, unobtrusive in speech and appearance yet firm withal, Mr. Woolhiser possessed the happy and all too unusual faculty of inspiring the confidence and the loyalty of his fellow workers while at the same time allowing a large measure of autonomous action and a feeling of independence on their part. Not only were there no department heads, including the chief of police, who did not feel responsible to the manager, but many village officers nominally outside the control of the manager looked to him for guidance and advice. Moreover, many administrative officers of other units of government conferred with Mr. Woolhiser about common problems.

### *The Manager and Administrative Innovation*

Mr. Woolhiser was experimentally minded and was willing to try new administrative methods. He introduced centralized purchasing in 1922. In 1930 he created a new post: office manager and purchasing agent. In 1935 he reorganized the management of the water and electric plant. The function of distribution was separated from that of production, and a new distribution superintendent was appointed. In 1937 responsibility for the various processes involved in the production and distribution of electric power and the filtration and distribution of water was centered in C. R. Miller, who was promoted from distribution superintendent to superintendent of the water and electric department. On April 1, 1938, Mr. Woolhiser created the new position of personnel director, and he hoped to centralize all personnel management in this new office before the year was out.

An attempt to point out all the practices introduced by the manager in Winnetka would involve a discussion of the whole administrative organization and the way it worked. In a real sense the administration of Winnetka's government was the product of Mr. Woolhiser's efforts. He was the administration.

The following list is by no means exhaustive. It merely contains a few of the more significant administrative practices and procedures introduced by Mr. Woolhiser: current operating statement and balance sheet compiled every thirty days; ten-year accounting and statistical record; system of street signs improved; systematic sidewalk repair introduced; courtesy card system for traffic violation; thorough investigation of all complaints with view to improving administration; cooperative arrangements with other units of government in the neighborhood.

In general, however, Mr. Woolhiser's propensity toward experimentation was tempered by his rather conservative disposition. He was progressive but not inclined to make radical experiments. In the last analysis he placed greater emphasis on experience than on experiment.

### *The Manager and the Public*

No reports of the village government were issued before the introduction of the manager plan. The *First Annual Report* of the village of Winnetka was published in 1916 by Robert L. Fitzgerald, "business manager." From then on reports were issued annually. It is significant that these reports were entitled *Report of the Village Manager to the Village Council*. They were designed primarily for the council rather than for the public at large. About five hundred copies were printed each year, and a few persons interested in reading a statistical record of the administration received copies from the village hall. These reports averaged between twenty-five and thirty-five pages. They contained a summary of the work of the whole administration and were published usually in July or August.

In 1930 motion pictures were used "as a means of getting across to the citizens the story of their municipal government in an effective way."<sup>1</sup> Necessary equipment was purchased so that standard thirty-five-mm. films could be made by the village staff. The manager took all kinds of notes of the various phases of administrative activity. On completion the film was shown to a great many groups, associations, and organizations of citizens and in many schools. A typical comment, quoted by the manager as illustrative of the reception of the films, was, "I thought I knew Winnetka pretty well, but my knowledge and appreciation were immensely increased by today's pictures." Mr. Woolhiser thought that the use of films for municipal reporting was beneficial, for it made it possible to publicize the activities of the village while avoiding the appearance of propaganda. The films also formed a record of historical value. They were shown continuously after 1931. Many organizations outside the village borrowed them, and they were often shown in the Winnetka schools.

Mr. Woolhiser was cordial to the reporters for the *Winnetka Talk* and the *North Shore Times*, the two local weekly papers. From time to time he issued statements about the work of the village administration or about the condition of the village as a whole.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Woolhiser, "Motion Pictures as a Public Reporting Medium," *Public Management* (September, 1931), XIII, 289.

Few exhibits of the village government were held. The best and most complete exhibit was that prepared for the annual convention of the Illinois League of Women Voters held in Winnetka on May 9, 1938. Each department helped to prepare charts, graphs, and tables to illustrate the regular activities of all branches of the administration. These displays were placed in the council room of the village hall where the sessions of the convention were held. But there were no elaborate demonstrations planned to acquaint the residents of Winnetka with the services performed by the government. Aside from the activities of the president, the statements which Mr. Woolhiser gave to the press, and the annual reports, no definite effort was made to inform the citizens about the services and the activities of the government.

To Winnetkans the manager plan was synonymous with the manager, Mr. Woolhiser. Both symbolized good government. Nearly every service which the people received from their village government in 1938 originated after the inception of the manager plan. Although Mr. Fitzgerald, the first manager, took important steps in reorganizing and expanding the activities of the administration, his term of office was so short that few Winnetkans remembered him in 1938. Mr. Woolhiser enjoyed not only the loyalty and the support of every employee and department head but also the confidence and the support of the council and the community at large. This support was inspired in part by the manner and the quality of service rendered by the village government and in part by the sound financial condition of the village. Perhaps to an even greater extent the manager inspired confidence because his life as a private citizen was such that it was admired by members of this residential community.

Mr. Woolhiser did not play politics, and he deliberately shied away from publicity and public life. All these factors tend to explain his success and his long tenure. It is quite probable that the legal basis of the manager plan in Winnetka had not been challenged at least up to 1939 largely because Mr. Woolhiser did not try to dominate the political life of the community but kept in the background.

## VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

**D**ESPITE A HERITAGE of legal contradictions and complexities, Winetka achieved centralization of administration under the manager plan. But this integration required a reallocation of administrative responsibility. Duties vested in such elective officials as the marshal and the village clerk had to be transferred to, or placed under, the jurisdiction of the manager. The important duties of such appointive officials as the treasurer<sup>1</sup> and the collector required the same treatment. By one means or another administrative functions vested in a number of independent boards and commissions had to be brought under the supervision or the direction of the manager. The apparently impossible was accomplished.

The chief administrative official and business manager of the village was the village manager, charged with the management and the operation of the department of public works, the fire department, the police department, the health department, the water and electric department, and "such other administrative departments and offices as may be created." The manager had supervision over the accounting of the village government and, to a considerable degree, over the receipt and the disbursement of village funds. He was authorized to make all "necessary purchases of supplies and equipment for all departments" and might make expenditures of five hundred dollars or less without preliminary authorization by the council, subject to limitations imposed by the adoption of a budget or other special appropriation. He appointed and removed administrative officers and employees subject to the one provision that he submit to the council a statement showing the grounds for dismissal.<sup>2</sup>

Village officials appointed by, and subject to the jurisdiction of, the manager were: chief of police, fire marshal, superintendent of public works, health officer, water and light superintendent, police prosecutor, chief electrical inspector, and inspector of weights and measures.

The integration under the manager plan contrasted strongly with the administrative organization of preceding council governments. The fire marshal, the superintendent of public works, and the health officer had been responsible to the village president. Supervision over the police department resided in the council. Several boards and commissions carried

<sup>1</sup> Though appointed by the president, the treasurer was to be elected, according to the charter.

<sup>2</sup> For the powers and duties of the manager see *Municipal Code* (1932), secs. 17-26.



on administrative activity without reference to others. Coordination was difficult, if not impossible. Bookkeeping functions were scattered throughout a number of departments. Reports to the council were varied and conflicting. Councils were composed of businessmen who had little time to manage the village. They attempted with indifferent success to supervise administrative departments. Each department was self-contained, oblivious to others.

With the introduction of the manager plan a variety of techniques and devices had to be adopted in order to shift administration into the hands of the manager. The following table indicates the array of independent offices and establishments:

TABLE 1. ORGANIZATION OF WINNETKA GOVERNMENT, 1938

*Elected Officials*

PRESIDENT. Four-year term.  
 TRUSTEES (6). Two- and four-year terms.  
 VILLAGE CLERK. Two-year term.  
 LIBRARY TRUSTEES (6). Six-year terms.  
 POLICE MAGISTRATES (2). Four-year terms.  
 VILLAGE MARSHAL. One-year term.

*Appointed by the Village President, Approved by the Council*

MANAGER.  
 ATTORNEY.  
 TREASURER. Two-year term.  
 COLLECTOR. Two-year term.  
 PLAN COMMISSION (9). Three-year terms; village president, member of the park board, member of the zoning board of appeals, and six other members.  
 ZONING COMMISSION (5). Five citizens of the village appointed by the village president; five-year terms.  
 ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS (5). Same as the Zoning Commission; five-year terms.  
 POLICE PENSION BOARD (3). Two appointed by the village president, one police officer elected by the department; two-year terms.  
 ELECTRICAL COMMISSION (5). Chief Electrical Inspector, fire marshal, journeyman electrician, representative of the water and light plant, electric contractor; one-year term.

*Elected and Ex-Officio Boards*

FIRE PENSION BOARD (6). Village president ex officio, fire marshal, three firemen elected by fire department (two-year terms), one retired fireman elected in the same manner (two-year term).

*Boards with the Same Membership as the Council*

BOARD OF HEALTH.  
 BOARD OF LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS.

Among the elective offices which seriously interfered with proper integration of administration under the manager was the office of marshal. Given all the powers of a constable under the common law and state acts by the Charter of 1869, the marshal was, in fact, the chief of police of the village. Because these powers were thoroughly entrenched by the charter, no attempt was made to shift them to some other office by an ordinance provision. Rather, the shift was accomplished by having the Caucus nominate for the office of marshal the person appointed by the manager as chief of police. In this manner, the office of marshal became a name. To all intents and purposes the two offices were consolidated. Further integration of police functions was accomplished by regular weekly conferences between the chairman of the committee on public safety of the council, the manager, and the chief of police. In these conferences the three officials discussed the work, the problems, and the general policy of the police department.

Of the appointive officers the treasurer was the chief concern. As required by the charter, he had to "receive all moneys belonging to the village and keep accounts of receipts and expenditures." Such legal mandates would have barred the manager from any participation in treasury functions. While no changes in these provisions were made by ordinance, most of the duties of the treasurer were in fact turned over to the manager. This was done by gentlemen's agreement. For some years treasurers politely ignored the provisions of charter and ordinance. They turned over to the manager all bookkeeping and accounting functions connected with finance. In practice, the work of the treasurer was reduced to countersigning vouchers and safeguarding village money, although his legal liabilities were not decreased.

Through a number of integrating devices the important functions of the statutory office of the village collector—processes for the collection of special assessments and special taxes—were also adjusted to meet the requirements of managerial administration. Councils adopted the practice of appointing the village assistant cashier (an appointee of the manager) as collector. All accounts of the collector were, therefore, supervised by the manager. The collector's salary was fixed by the manager and in practice was no longer derived from collection fees as prescribed by statute. To comply with the law, the collector signed a debit memo in exchange for a warrant issued to her for the full amount of the fees.

A number of boards and commissions performed important roles in administration, and, therefore, the development of techniques to co-

ordinate their functions with the rest of the administration was necessary. For example, the board of health<sup>1</sup> not only made such rules and regulations as were necessary to preserve the public health but was required to "aid in the enforcement of such rules and regulations." To provide for the administration of health measures, however, the council created a department of health as an "administrative department of the village" headed by a public health officer appointed by and responsible to the manager.

Further evidence of integrating techniques was in the administration of the duties of the plan commission established by authority of state legislature. The plan commission had authority to "prepare and recommend to the council a comprehensive plan of public improvements looking to the present and future development of the village" and to "promote the realization of the official plan." In the administration of planning measures a good deal of the work was turned over to the superintendent of public works who was appointed secretary of the plan commission. This arrangement made possible a close relationship between the administration and the commission, allowed for the central handling of records, and provided for over-all coordination.

There were many instances of interlocking personnel used as a means of centralization. A few were these: the office of village treasurer was always filled by appointment of the chairman of the committee on finance of the council; the building inspector was secretary to the board of zoning appeals and acted as health inspector for the health department; and the health officer was secretary to the board of health.

Finally there were the techniques employed to adjust the administrative work of such independent boards as the fire and the police pension boards. One member of the fire pension board was the fire marshal who was appointed by the manager. Pension payments were cleared through the manager's office. The manager kept all records of the board and invested the funds of the board. After 1931 the manager attended all meetings of the board. There was a similar close relationship between the police pension board and the manager. The manager assisted in the administration of police pension funds and was the general adviser of the police pension board.

In brief, every means at the disposal of the council was employed to give the manager a free rein in administration. Departments were created whenever needed. Administrative functions vested in offices

<sup>1</sup> By ordinance, membership on the board of health and on the village council was identical.

beyond the control of the manager were, to a large extent, turned over to the manager. The manager was given blanket authority to appoint and remove employees. The manager had the necessary authority to manage. What the law did not provide, gentlemen's agreements did.

## VII. FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION

WINNETKA'S FINANCE organization was in general agreement with the principles of organization set forth in the Model Charter promulgated by the National Municipal League. Controlling, assessing, treasury, purchasing, and budget functions, if not legally vested in the manager, were in practice under his direction and supervision. These functions were all handled by the general office staff which occupied one wing of the village hall. In a village the size of Winnetka a small office staff could adequately take care of all these functions, and there was no need for creating a number of bureaus. Mr. Woolhiser's assistant, Harry Knight, was office manager, purchasing agent, and personnel director.

### *Budgeting*

The village budget was not an over-all document; that is, it did not include forecasts of receipts and expenditures for the park district board or for the school board. It included forecasts for the library board, however. Informality in budget consideration was the rule, not the exception. In preparing the budget the manager first received estimates from the department heads. Then conferences were arranged to iron out any problems. Budgets were prepared on a long-term basis wherever possible. The 1937 budget called for a five-year sidewalk construction program, about eight thousand dollars being included in the 1938 budget for that year's quota. Incomes and expenditures of the village utilities and other municipal properties were likewise planned on a five-year basis.

After some revision and upon tentative approval by the council the proposed budget was posted in the village hall. Copies were mailed to a number of organizations: the Women's Club, the Chamber of Commerce, the Community House Council, and the improvement associations. The organizations were invited to send representatives to confer with the council. Final approval of the budget was not given until after the conference with these representatives.

*Budgetary Control*

The manager was given complete control over expenditures within appropriations. An annual allocation was made to all departments at the time the budget was approved by the council. Allocations were never made by quarters or on a monthly basis or according to work plans submitted by the department. The Winnetka single-allocation system worked well because of Mr. Woolhiser's care in keeping in constant touch with expenditures. A monthly disbursement sheet was prepared, showing the amount appropriated for each activity and the expenditures to date. Although the disbursement sheet did not demonstrate whether an appropriation was being exhausted too rapidly according to a month-to-month schedule, it allowed an alert manager to obtain a clear view of the relation between appropriations and spending. The preparation of all vouchers in the general office aided in obtaining an over-all checking.

In general, the problem of budgetary control was not a complex one in Winnetka. Most financial activity was centered in the general office. Purchasing functions, the preparation of vouchers, the maintenance of books and accounts were all directly under Mr. Woolhiser.

Finance machinery was weak in one important aspect. The fiscal year ended March 31. Appropriations covered the period between April 1 and March 31. Unfortunately, the annual budget was not approved by the council until the latter part of May. During the period between the end of the budget year on March 31 and the establishment of the new budget around June the administration probably had no legal right to spend a cent. A taxpayer's suit, like the proverbial monkey wrench, might throw the whole administrative machinery out of gear. Up to the time this study was made Winnetka had escaped such an embarrassment. The budget, however, should be prepared and approved before the expiration of the fiscal period.

*Financial Condition of the Village*

Winnetka's government was a banker's paradise. Although the village had a bonding power in excess of \$450,000, its bonded debt was only \$12,000, and by the end of the 1938 fiscal year, the debt was to be wiped out. The village had a cash surplus of \$679,749.66 in banks and fixed assets totalling \$3,069,020.56. In brief, Winnetka was a four-million dollar concern with a negligible bonded debt of \$12,000 and the reputation of never having defaulted on an obligation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The grade separation project started after this report was written was partly financed by a \$950,000 serial-bond issue.

Deficits and surpluses in the water and electric light accounts indicate the kind of financial management given by manager government. In the fifteen years prior to the introduction of the manager plan, water department operations resulted in a net average annual deficit of \$8,489.82. The largest single annual surplus was only \$8,947.69. After 1915 under manager control surpluses increased despite the construction in 1922 of a new filtration plant at a cost in excess of \$200,000 paid out of water department surpluses.

### *Accounting and Control*

Winnetka's accounting system worked well but could be improved. It was essentially conservative in operation and worked in 1938 about as it had in 1915 when the system was installed. The system was chiefly weak in that it placed a greater burden on bookkeepers and clerks than was probably necessary. For example, the names of officers and employees were all written in longhand on the pay-roll sheets. At the end of the month the pay-roll sheets were closed, and a fresh inscription of names was made on new pay-roll sheets. The task of recopying 134 names each month was not titanic—merely unnecessary.

The double-entry system on a cash basis was employed in Winnetka. Accrual accounting would materially aid in classifying accounting practices and would make possible more accurate accounting by successive periods. But while the system was cumbersome and was wanting in many of the more modern accounting practices, it satisfied the three objectives of municipal accounting, namely: a basis for managing municipal affairs; information for determining the fidelity of persons administering funds; and information for persons interested in the financial conditions and operations of the village. Financial facts were easily ascertained; they were available and understandable.

Central financial controls were exercised. All invoices, obligations, and expenditures were carefully checked, and expenditures were never made until the appropriation allotment was checked. The manager's approval of all expenditures was mandatory. Within the limits established by the budget he had full authority over current spending.

One of the first innovations to be made in administration under manager government was the installation of a new accounting system. When Mr. Fitzgerald came into office, he found that bookkeeping and accounting functions were split up among the various departments, each keeping its own books. The superintendent of the water and light plant, Mr. Herdman, had kept no books; he merely jotted down

memoranda in a notebook kept in his pocket. In place of a decentralized and disorganized accounting system, central office accounting was established.

### *Purchasing*

All village purchasing was centralized in one office under the direct supervision of one man, the purchasing agent. Ultimate control over purchases, of course, resided in the manager. In practice all materials were purchased through requisition from department heads, although emergency orders costing two dollars or less could be signed by department heads. The total volume of emergency orders could not exceed fifty dollars a month.

Savings through central purchasing were considerable. More than a thousand dollars was saved each year through the consolidation of all gasoline and oil requirements and the placing of contracts for the total year's supply in advance. A saving of 15 per cent was effected by grouping lumber requirements of all departments and buying through a local source. The purchasing department made a study of office supplies and found that one source of supply would extend discounts resulting in savings of 10 per cent to 25 per cent provided that the volume of purchases ran in excess of twenty-four hundred dollars a year. As a result, cooperative buying with agencies outside the village government was inaugurated. The purchasing agent estimated that Winnetka's annual savings from taking cash discounts amounted to nearly three thousand dollars a year.

Much was accomplished in savings and services through emphasis on standardization. For example, for some years the village purchased three kinds of gasoline: one for fire trucks, another for passenger cars, and still another for trucks. The purchasing department convinced department heads that one kind of gas would suffice for both passenger cars and trucks. Larger purchases of one kind of gas resulted in further economy.

Every order was strictly competitive, and two or more bids were always received. When an order was closed, a summary statement of the various bids was prepared and posted on the village bulletin board in the village hall. By this means suppliers were advised which bid was accepted and why. Bulking was done wherever possible, although it was seldom found convenient to bulk orders because Winnetka had no central storage system.

There were many instances of salvage. Usually articles were traded

while a trade-in allowance could be obtained. Articles which had no trade-in value were used to the last and then were placed on the scrap heap. Bids for junk were sought from junk dealers and second-hand stores. Nothing went to waste.

Of stores control Mr. Knight remarked: "We charge everything in at the time of the purchase, as though it were consumed by the department. If an article is to be used within the current year, the item is charged to operations. Otherwise, it is charged to the proper account, which is then reduced through our depreciation account." Consequently, no stores-control techniques were adopted, and apparently none were needed. All in all, Winnetka had a smoothly functioning purchasing system.

### *Auditing*

Annual audits by public accountants were much improved after the adoption of the manager plan. Prior to the manager plan auditors directed too much attention to inventories and not enough to financial transactions. Apparently there had not been much to audit. The company which made the audit for 1914 pointed an accusing finger at the trouble: "Inefficiency is caused mainly by the complications of a poorly organized and inadequate system of accounting." Audits made after 1916 were all thorough and comprehensive.

The same firm audited the village books for a dozen years or more. The reports after 1928 rarely offered any constructive criticism of the accounting practices and procedures employed. Perhaps none were necessary; but perhaps another firm, with a different outlook on these practices, might suggest changes.

## VIII. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT in Winnetka was in the process of transition at the time of this survey. Though there were a few definite rules and understandings in effect before 1938, no definite procedure or organization for the management of personnel existed in Winnetka before that year. On March 29, 1938, Mr. Woolhiser prepared a preliminary draft for a personnel manual. This manual was designed to "cover existing procedure" and to "standardize personnel procedure" for "the entire Village organization." Personnel administration was re-organized and "new regulations, in accordance with the best accepted present practice of municipalities" were established.



Winnetka did not come under the Civil Service Act which set up the organization and prescribed the procedure for Illinois commissions. Yet an effective merit system had operated in the village for many years. During the first year of the manager plan, President Rummler said,

Believing that the Village employees and officers should have an indefinite tenure of office and reasonable certainty of permanent employment as long as they are capable, I have departed from the former practice of reappointing all important employees for one year terms and have let it be known that no one would be removed except for failure to satisfactorily fill his position. I hope that this policy may continue since it reduces the likelihood that changes in the personnel will be made for reasons other than the good of the service, and removes the incentive for offensive political partisanship on the part of Village employees.

Because of the lack of rigid legal requirements, greater flexibility in the administration of personnel was possible in Winnetka than in the municipalities that elected to adopt the Civil Service Act.

The organization for personnel administration was under the direct control of the manager. The manager determined all major personnel policies and approved all final action taken in accord with the regulations in the *Manual*: "In reaching decisions, he may at his discretion, consult with the Personnel Director, the department head concerned, or with others." The decision of the manager was final on all personnel matters.

A new position—personnel director—was created on April 1, 1938. The office manager served in that capacity. The personnel director was charged with the preparation and maintenance of a classification plan for all village positions; the preparation and maintenance of forms and records for the administration of the necessary personnel procedures; the conduct of examinations and tests for eligibility to positions, the establishment and the maintenance of eligible lists; the supervision of all probationary and temporary appointments; and the supervision of the preparation and certification of all pay rolls.

With the exception of the common labor group the manager made or approved all appointments to the village service. He, of course, appointed all department heads. The manager had power to remove all employees under his jurisdiction. Having the assistance of the personnel director, who in his capacity as office manager was directly under the manager, the manager was greatly aided in the management of personnel. With all authority flowing from one source there was no friction or bickering between the personnel director—who was really merely an assistant to the manager—and the department heads.

In the appointment of nonresidents the policy in Winnetka was somewhat unusual. Comparison with other cities and villages within the same population group as Winnetka indicated that more nonresidents were appointed to the village service in 1936 and 1937 than in any other municipality in its class in the entire country. During 1937 six nonresidents were appointed to the service in Winnetka. While this number was larger than usual for one year, there was never a definite policy prejudicial to nonresidents. After appointment employees were not required to live in the village, but residence outside the village had to be approved by the manager. If the manager felt that the duties of the position were incompatible with residence outside the village, such approval might be withheld.

All appointments were made for a test period of six months before becoming permanent. This probation supplemented the formal examinations that were to be given for all appointments after 1938. During the six-month period the department head was required to submit service ratings of each new employee to the manager once every two months. If the employee did not prove wholly satisfactory, the department head might release him at any time during the probationary period "on a written report to the village manager, setting forth the reasons for dismissal." At the end of the probationary period appointment became permanent if the department head so recommended to the manager. Permanent appointment was wholly contingent upon satisfactory service, and such appointment was not made if there was doubt about the employee's ability. After permanent appointment there were few discharges from the village service.

All appointments were entirely divorced from politics. The general policy of the manager was simply stated in the draft of the *Manual*: "There shall be no discrimination on account of political or religious opinion." There were 127 employees in the village administration in 1938. These employees were not under a classification system, nor were they hired under such a system. A classification plan was, however, in preparation in 1938.

### *Salaries*

Salary rates appeared to be fair and reasonable. The council determined the budget appropriation for salaries and wages and specifically approved the manager's recommendations on salaries of department heads. The manager fixed individual salaries and wages on the recommendation of department heads. In fixing the salaries the manager considered sub-

stantially equal pay for equal work and responsibility, salary scales of similar work in other local government agencies, the cost of living in Winnetka, and departmental difference in pension privileges, allowances for uniforms, and bonuses.

The manager reviewed the salary and wage scales for each employee at least once a year, though not at any specified time. A new employee was paid at the minimum of the approved salary range of the position to which he was appointed, except in unusual instances. Advancement in salary was based primarily on performance and attitude and secondarily on length of service.

### *Promotions*

The procedure for promotions was relatively simple. Up to 1938 the manager made all promotions, usually in consultation with the department head. Under the new organization the personnel director ascertained whether employees already within the department were qualified to fill the higher post. If he found that one or more persons were so qualified, he might recommend to the manager that a promotional examination be held and that it be opened or closed to outsiders. If the manager decided that a promotional examination was not necessary, the department head recommended the appointment of the employee within his department, who, in his judgment, was best qualified for the position. If the manager approved, the appointment was made. If the manager decided, however, that a promotional examination should be held, then the procedure was similar to that set up for applicants under the regular competitive examinations.

The superintendent of public works, Robert Anderson, was an employee who had come up through the ranks. He started as building inspector at \$240 a month and was promoted to superintendent of public works at \$375 a month. Lief Irgens, electric plant superintendent in 1938, started with the village in 1912 as a common laborer. He began at \$75 a month; in 1938 he received \$350 a month.

Although the manager was interested in inaugurating some kind of retirement system for all employees, no such general system was thought possible under the law in operation in 1938. The police and firemen had such a system to which the village contributed. Included in the *Manual* was this statement:

Until such time as a comprehensive retirement plan can legally be adopted for all village employees, such employees should give careful thought to the fact that continued employment with the village cannot

be expected after sixty-five years of age, depending on physical condition, and that their income should be so budgeted that a reasonable provision will be made for the welfare of themselves and dependents after reaching the time of retirement. Employees should also give attention to proper care of their personal health and safety during the working years in order that the date of retirement may be postponed as long as possible. The village will cooperate by maintaining safe and healthful working conditions and by paying as high wages and salaries as can be justified in each case.

The village, however, permitted employees to make arrangements for life, hospital, and other forms of group insurance and handled the accounting work required for deductions from pay rolls and the payment of premiums to the insurance company or to the underwriters of the risk.

The personnel records in 1938 were sketchy and did not contain much information that was usually found in the records of a good business organization. All the essential data were available, however, and expansion of the system of records was planned.

### *In-Service Training*

There was no definite in-service training program in 1938, but the manager was extremely favorable to such a program for all employees. Thus, every opportunity was afforded employees who wished to enroll in training courses for their work. In many instances leave with pay was granted for attendance, and on successful completion of the course the village reimbursed the employee for the cost of tuition or enrollment. The head of the department or some other person designated by him might act as director of training in that department, arranging for conferences and talks about the work of the department and serving as adviser about the directions and methods for additional training.

### *Unions*

There were no employee unions in Winnetka. The policy of the manager was clearly stated in the *Manual*:

No department head or other village employee shall affiliate or take an active part in any association of municipal employees or officials, whether local or otherwise, that has for its object the altering of conditions of municipal employment by bringing pressure on local or state legislative authorities, or by other means than through the procedure outlined in these regulations.

The manager and the department heads were absolutely free to remove any employee in the administration. A department head might

dismiss any employee in his department at any time on approval of the manager. Although there was no formal procedure to protect the employee, arbitrary removal was unknown. With the approval of the department head an employee might have a hearing before the manager, but no such hearing had been held up to 1938. Despite the inadequate provisions for the protection of the rights of the employee, the average length of service for all employees was twelve years, and the rate of turnover was low.

### *Morale*

Morale among municipal employees is an intangible factor, the results of which, strangely enough, are more apparent if it is absent than present. Employee morale in Winnetka's village government was excellent. Employees without exception respected the manager as an individual and as the leader of the village administration. They believed, and rightly, that he was sincerely interested in their welfare not only as a group but also as human beings.

The realization that advancement and promotion were the result of merit and hard work was widespread throughout the service. Great emphasis was placed by all on the job well done. Nearly every employee displayed a distinct feeling of pride in his connection with the village service. The aristocratic nature of the community, the organization and the functioning of the administration, the significance of the name Winnetka as well as the personal significance of the manager—all were factors which contributed toward the *esprit de corps*.

## IX. COORDINATION

EFFECTIVE COORDINATION is a sure indicator of an efficient and well-integrated administration. In fact, coordination is the heart of administration. It is the chief means by which the administrative machinery is directed to accomplish the purposes of government. One of the most important functions of an over-all chief executive is to coordinate administrative activities. He is responsible for seeing that all parts of the government work without duplication of effort and without clogging each other's machinery. He is responsible for seeing that parts of the government cooperate on projects requiring the activities of one or more divisions. His function is to direct the administrative machinery

so that it constantly runs smoothly and efficiently to serve the whole community according to the policy adopted by the elected governing body. In order to coordinate municipal functions the chief executive must keep well informed about all phases of administrative activity, and he must have over-all supervisory authority or influence over independent administrative bodies sufficient to secure their active cooperation with his suggestions.

Before the manager plan there was no real coordination of activities in Winnetka. The president as head of the village had neither the time nor the inclination to coordinate administrative activities. Under the manager plan, however, Winnetka achieved a high measure of effective coordination.

### *Techniques of Control as Aids in Coordination*

No elaborate techniques were devised by the manager to keep himself informed about the actual work of each department. The principal means used for coordination and control were informal individual conferences with department heads, interdepartmental memoranda, periodic operation reports, and personal inspection. Mr. Woolhiser found these methods both simple and adequate.

Individual conferences between the manager and each department head played an important part in the administration of the village. Interdepartmental memoranda constituted the chief formal means by which the manager coordinated and controlled work. These memoranda might originate either with the manager or with someone in a department. In either instance copies were made for all other department heads and officials possibly concerned. Each head had a book in which these memoranda were filed by date, and while the system appeared to work well, it could probably be improved by codifying or indexing the memoranda.

The manager received daily reports from the police department, monthly reports from public works and health, and periodic reports from the fire and the water and electric departments. Daily reports of the water and electric department were entered in a log in the general office, and the log was accessible to the manager. All complaints about garbage and ash collections were recorded and were used to check up on the public works department. Special reports were required whenever a specific job was assigned to a department head, such as a reconstruction job in the public works department or an assignment to the purchasing agent to investigate fire insurance rates. In addition, special financial

reports were made to the manager whenever major construction or replacement of equipment was under way.

Perhaps the most effective means used by the manager—the means which resulted in the greatest measure of actual control—was simply personal inspection. Though practically impossible for a larger organization, this means of control worked well in a comparatively small organization. As one department head put it, “Mr. Woolhiser never misses a slip-up!”

One of the most useful aids was the pamphlet which served as a kind of administrative code. Published in May, 1932, and revised in September, 1935, this pamphlet included all the administrative rules and regulations formulated in connection with the water service, the electric service, waste collection and disposal, and the regulations of the board of health. Each department had a definite system for the performance of its functions. The accounting manual standardized administrative procedure for accounts. Nearly all departments had typewritten or mimeographed sheets which served as manuals of instruction and which also served to standardize routines. Department heads assigned jobs in various ways. All issued general orders in one form or another and some issued special work orders on forms provided for that purpose.

The general office kept elaborate cost records on specific items, such as automobile expense and water distribution. The public works department had a set of records which indicated unit costs for paving, sidewalk replacement, curbing, and miles of streets swept; and the water and electric department kept performance records which contained an account of the specific unit of work performed. Except for these instances, however, cost and performance records for specific units were not developed to any considerable extent. In general, the records contained cost information in terms of the service as a whole. While it was difficult to make accurate comparison, it is safe to state that records in 1938 were vastly superior to those in existence before 1915. Before the manager plan was introduced, there were few records of any sort. Important statistics of the water and light plant were kept in a notebook which the superintendent carried around in his pocket. Health records were spotty, and a general accounting system was unknown. With scarcely an exception every management technique and service performed by the village was introduced after the establishment of the manager plan. These techniques of control and these methods of keeping informed were essential to the manager in coordinating the administrative activities of Winnetka's village government.

*Intragovernmental Coordination*

The village administration was well coordinated. Departments worked together in a most amicable and effective manner. This cooperation was clearly the result of the manager's efforts, for Mr. Woolhiser was adroit at keeping the mechanism of administration well oiled.

There were numerous examples of teamwork between departments. Equipment was constantly interchanged, with the cost billed to the department using the equipment. The greatest interchange of equipment occurred between the public works and the water and electric departments. The public works department lent not only trucks and similar equipment but also drivers. The water and electric department maintained the fire alarm signals for the fire department, and the traffic signals and "mushroom" lights for the police department. The laboratory at the water plant and some equipment were used by the milk inspectors of the health department.

Employees were quite frequently shifted from one department to another. When the village attorney requested that a count be made of the number of trains passing through Winnetka—information that was necessary for the preparation of a case before the Illinois Commerce Commission—Mr. Anderson borrowed men from the general office and from two other departments to assist in watching. The general office borrowed the electric department meter-readers to take care of the addressograph cards. In all these instances of interchange the borrowing department was billed for the employees' time for all amounts over one dollar.

Under the manager plan all village-owned automobiles and motor-driven equipment and many cars owned by village employees were serviced at a central place.<sup>1</sup> Each department was billed for its share in the cost of maintaining the yard in accordance with an elaborate cost record of automobile expense. Under the manager the superintendent of public works and the superintendent of the water and electric departments cooperated to keep down the number of paving cuts. Cuts

<sup>1</sup> The village supplied cars for employees whose work required the frequent and extensive use of a car. These automobiles could not be employed for personal use unless the manager specifically authorized such use and made arrangement for reimbursement of the village. The total cost of maintenance and operation, including license and insurance of those cars owned by employees, "principally department heads," was borne by the village. But an employee had to receive the manager's approval of the type and condition of the car he proposed to buy, had to reimburse the village for tire wear, and had to pay for any service or repairs made on "extended personal trips," had to pay for the cost of any repairs as the result of an accident while in personal use, and, in general, had to restrict the mileage for personal use to equal approximately that for official use.



were kept to a minimum by seeing that all underground work was in before the paving was laid. The manager instructed all departments to notify the public works department before making cuts.

An aid to the effective coordination of the work of the departments was the clear definition of areas of responsibility and lines of authority. Mr. Woolhiser set up administrative rules for each department delineating the appropriate sphere of action. More important, however, Mr. Woolhiser watched the borderline instances closely, for in such situations friction was most likely to develop.

### *Coordination of Services of Other Local Government Units*

Problems of coordination of general functions such as separate purchasing of similar equipment, separate administration of common personnel problems, and separate handling of analogous legal problems arose continuously in the operation of government in the whole area. Moreover, difficulties in connection with the coordination of special functions were always cropping up. The need for a joint policy on health administration was obvious. Similarly, coordination of the policing function required constant attention, especially since there was practically no cooperation from the sheriff of Cook County. The need for an adequate water supply of those villages which had no water plant and the necessity for fire protection in the unincorporated areas adjacent to Winnetka created perplexing problems of government. This situation was a serious difficulty for all concerned. If there were friction or working at cross-purposes between the governmental units in the area, not only would there be grave possibility of permanent danger to property, but also the effective protection of the lives of the citizens in the community would be made difficult.

The techniques developed in Winnetka and New Trier to meet these problems fell under four general heads: intergovernmental agreements, interlocking personnel, informal meetings "downtown," and special agencies for the coordination of specific functions.

One of the chief methods developed by Winnetka for the solution of the general problem of coordination of the activities of the various bodies operating in the area was a system of intergovernmental agreements. A large share of the credit for this development was due to Mr. Woolhiser for his unceasing efforts in working for the integration of the administrative functions of local units. To an even greater extent this method was made possible by the general spirit of cooperation and community interest in New Trier township.

The agreements to which Winnetka was a party included formal contracts and informal understandings. Among the services Winnetka furnished to other government units under definite contracts were water supply, fire protection, electricity, health, and registration of vital statistics. Services performed by the village for other units on the basis of informal understandings included the purchase of office and other supplies, the provision of police service, and motor equipment servicing. Municipalities in the vicinity freely exchanged information.

Illustrations of a trend toward agreements on a larger scale were afforded by several new developments. Dr. Orvis, the village health officer, and Drs. Gormley and McKenney of the New Trier high school organized cooperative tuberculin testing for all school children. Mr. Knight purchased activated carbon used in the water filtration process for Wilmette and Winnetka. Negotiations were under way for the inclusion of Evanston. Northwestern University was included in a Winnetka contract for grass seed, and Mr. Knight bought typewriters for the Northwestern Student Cooperative.

Not only did Winnetka furnish special services to other units of government and private individuals outside the limits of the village, but the village was also the recipient of certain special services and favors. The park board cared for the village's shrubs planted along the railroad tracks, and the Winnetka Garden Club aided in taking care of other village plants. Park board equipment was often borrowed by one of the line departments. There were some instances of the interchange of equipment with the school board. Men were freely shifted to meet varying work loads, especially between the park board and the village. Moreover, in emergencies, of course, like the floods in the Skokie Valley in 1938, equipment and men were effectively coordinated in one working unit. In all these transactions, however, strict accounting methods were followed, and each body or department was carefully billed for every major item involved.

The second important method which tended to meet the need for intergovernmental coordination was the practice of having one person serve in two capacities. Winnetka extended the practice of interlocking personnel not only to offices within the village administration itself but also to many outside. Thus, the village manager served as park superintendent for fifteen years; the head of the health department was the health officer for the township, Winnetka schools, Kenilworth, and Kenilworth schools; the village attorney was the attorney for the park board; the supervisor of the township acted as policewoman and juvenile

officer under the chief of police; and the township collector served as treasurer of the park board.

A considerable degree of integration among the policy determining bodies was achieved by another practice characteristic of New Trier. Influenced by the central opinion-forming organizations such as the Caucus, members of the governing boards of the several units of local government in New Trier often met at lunch in the Chicago Loop to talk over problems of common concern. Most members of these bodies were commuters. In this way united opinion among the policy-determining officials was achieved informally.

Special agencies were created for the solution of common problems, and in some ways this method was probably the most distinctive and significant development of intergovernmental coordination in New Trier. Two bodies deserve special mention. The North Shore Municipalities Milk Control Cooperative Service was started by Dr. Orvis, Winnetka's health officer, and Dr. A. J. Rissinger, the health officer of Lake Forest and Lake Bluff. In this service the administration of a laboratory and inspection service was in the hands of Dr. Orvis as head of the Winnetka health department. Winnetka contracted with the other villages that participated in the plan. The two inspectors employed by Dr. Orvis made periodic inspections of the farms and pasteurizing plants that furnished milk for consumption on the North Shore. These inspections were based on a system prepared by the United States Public Health Service. On the basis of a scale set up by the federal service "the percentage of compliance" for farmers inspected rose steadily from 68.42 in July, 1937, to 89.93 in February, 1938. When the Illinois inspector made his first inspection of the whole service in May, 1937, he found that the over-all rating of the North Shore municipalities was 96 per cent compliance. "The North Shore Municipalities," wrote Dr. A. C. Baxter, acting director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, in a letter to Dr. Orvis on June 27, 1938, "are to be commended for the co-operative work done and the improvement made in the quality and safety of the milk supply since the adoption of the milk program early in 1937. . . . Only through constant vigilance and effort can this [high rating be maintained]. . . ."

The New Trier Township Committee was another coordinating agency. The committee was organized in the fall of 1932 as a result of the difficult financial position in which many units of local government found themselves. A group of elected officials representing thirteen taxing bodies in New Trier formed this committee to find a way "out of the

ed." A program of publicity was undertaken, a firm of auditors was employed to make an accurate survey of tax delinquency, a tax specialist was engaged to aid in carrying on foreclosure proceedings under the Karda Act of April, 1933, and other steps were taken, the net result of which was the substantial improvement of the financial condition of all the bodies represented.

## X. CONCLUSION

IT MAY SEEM that this report has failed to criticize and point out the weaknesses in Winnetka's government, that it has assumed too eagerly and easily that Winnetka's government is nearly perfect. It has not been the purpose of this study, however, to measure specific administrative practices against abstract standards. It is more important to record that in terms of general objectives, the range of public service, and the measure of public satisfaction, manager government in Winnetka very closely approached the ideal. This impression was the nearly unanimous, collective judgment of the citizens of Winnetka.

Winnetka's story was that of capable personnel, enlightened public interest, extralegal coordination of effort, practically unified control, effective administrative organization. The results were long-range planning, expanding municipal services, lower tax rates, reduction of bonded debt, and consolidated, unanimous public confidence and support and pride.

Although the manager plan was one of the important instruments through which good government was achieved in Winnetka, it was not the sole reason for this accomplishment. It is entirely possible that equal results might have been achieved under some other form of organization because of the importance of the contributions of the Caucus, Community House, the village council, and the various civic groups to the political life of the community. Nevertheless, good government was achieved under the manager plan, and the residents of the community assumed a causal relation between the two. The manager, Mr. Wooliser, himself typified Winnetka government to Winnetkans. Careful, analytical, community-conscious, reluctant to appear in the limelight or to take part in the public life of the village, he inspired confidence not only in himself but also in the manager plan of government. If it can be assumed that only under the manager plan could Winnetka have ob-

tained the services of an executive of Mr. Woolhiser's caliber, then, perhaps, it would be justifiable to conclude that the manager plan was the primary reason for good government.

Winnetka's government was not, however, a precarious, one-man show. It would not collapse if Mr. Woolhiser should leave it, nor could he carry the burden alone. President Moulton, the political head of the village, and his predecessors played an important part in the formulation of public policy. Appropriately enough, they supplied the important political leadership.

The Caucus, an extralegal institution organized to maintain village government in keeping with Winnetka's ideals, mobilized the community solidly behind the cause of good government, assured continuity of policy, and insulated the formal village government from the petty political problems which might disrupt or distract it. So successful was the Caucus that partisan strife was eliminated in local elections. The village council, composed of outstanding residents of the community, articulated and implemented the fundamental policies for which the Caucus assumed responsibility to the community. Community House, a political influence as well as a social institution, helped build social cohesion and through its council proved of inestimable value as a sounding-board for public opinion.

The story of Winnetka, therefore, is the story of a community which achieved an excellent working relationship between political and administrative forces and which developed distinctive contributions both to the political and to the administrative aspects of its local government. Winnetka was burdened with a legal structure which yielded to none in complexity. It was a structure so intricate that the observer looking only at the legal aspects would inevitably conclude that it could not possibly be made to work. Yet the ingenuity of the community circumvented these legal handicaps by the development of a wide variety of extralegal devices and made the structure work as effectively as if its legal foundation were the most symmetrical and orderly charter that could be drafted.

"The manager plan, we believe, is the best thing that has yet been devised for the proper operation of a village like Winnetka," the secretary of one of the local improvement associations wrote, "and we believe that the Caucus form of government is as fine a form of government as there is for a village of our size." A banker remarked, "We have what you often hear about but seldom encounter—a municipal government run on a business basis. I am very sure that the village would not

countenance a change." The president of the Women's Club wrote, "We feel that the manager plan is more than satisfactory." A garage mechanic said, "Yes sir! I like the village government here because it works." Thus, when the pragmatic test is applied, only one conclusion is possible—Winnetka, the village of paradoxes, achieved the ultimate paradox: extraordinarily good government in the midst of a region abounding in extraordinarily poor and corrupt government.



# INDEX





# INDEX

- Abbott, Helen Probst, 18-19, 28  
Accounting, 82, 225, 249, 301, 304, 333,  
341, 361-62, 413, 415, 419  
Adler, Isaac, 21, 28, 31, 39  
Administrative committees, 71  
Advisory boards, 45, 63, 67, 112, 142, 219,  
221, 303, 393  
Aex, Paul B., 80  
Alameda County Mosquito Abatement Dis-  
trict, 104, 158  
Aldridge, George W., 12-15, 18, 30, 61, 97  
All Berkeley Club, 120  
Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, 21  
Ament, Edward N., 122, 126, 130  
American Federation of Labor, 310  
American Federation of State, County, and  
Municipal Employees, 308  
American Labor Party, Rochester, 49  
American Public Works Association, 254  
American Society of Civil Engineers, 254  
Ames  
accounting, 249  
budget, 246, 251  
council, 254  
committees, 238  
political leadership, 248, 255  
council-manager relations, 244-48, 255  
debt, 236, 252  
department heads, 249  
career service, 250  
tenure, 250  
descriptive background, 235  
finance, 251-52  
health, 249  
library, 236  
management aids, 247  
manager, 244  
administrative authority, 248-49, 251,  
256  
policy leadership, 247  
executive assistant, 249  
experience, 244  
public relations, 253  
manager plan  
by ordinance, 235  
never political issue, 241  
mayor, 238-39, 254, 256  
organization, 246  
park, 243  
performance records, 252  
personnel, 248, 249  
removal, 250  
salaries, 250-51  
tenure, 249-50  
planning, 252  
Ames—*continued*  
police, 249  
public utilities, 236, 243  
purchasing, 246, 253-54  
records, 242, 247  
report, 253  
Ames Commercial Club, 240  
Ames *Daily Tribune*, 240  
Ames, John H., 244, 247-48  
Anderson, Robert, 244  
Argetsinger, George, 43, 44  
Assessments, 43, 76, 86-89, 363  
Assistance to manager, executive, 138-39,  
153, 249  
Aubrey, Mrs. Rose V., 344  
Baker, Harold W., 15, 34, 39, 46, 47, 48,  
50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 66, 70, 95-96  
Banks, E. T., 271  
Barber, William C., 285  
Bareham, Harry J., 25, 28, 44  
Barker, Curtis W., 34  
Barlow, James E., 275, 282, 285  
Bartlett, Louis, 107, 112, 115  
Bartlow, Bert S., 180  
Baxter, A. C., 432  
Bennett, Edward H., 383  
Benninghofen, Paul, 202, 204  
Berg, Frank A., 131  
Berkeley  
advisory boards, 112, 142  
assistant to manager, executive, 138, 153  
budget, 106, 110, 128, 129, 148, 159,  
160  
budget control, 160-62  
citizen commissions, 106  
Citizens' Committee, 123  
Citizens' Committee of Sixteen, 143, 149  
Citizens' Committee of Thirty-six, 143,  
150  
City Planning Commission, 140, 142  
City Planning Committee, 111  
Civic Art Commission, 111  
commission government, 105, 106, 138,  
157, 170  
Commission of Public Charities, 142  
coordinating council, 111, 157  
coordination, 155-56  
council, 120-22, 128, 129-37, 170  
committees, 143  
public relations, 135  
council-manager relations, 127, 133, 167  
debt, 149  
department heads, 107, 111, 128, 139-  
41, 159, 161

- Berkeley—*continued*  
 Department of Equipment Maintenance,  
   156-57, 161  
 descriptive background, 101-5  
 elections, 142  
 emergency organization, 155  
 finance, 147, 149, 150  
 garbage disposal, 115, 149  
 health, 140  
 manager  
   administrative authority, 127-28, 129,  
     134, 170  
   budget control, 142  
   education, 133, 136  
   experience, 133, 136  
   political leadership, 125, 131, 170  
   public relations, 138, 144, 146  
 manager plan campaign, 112  
*Manual of Administrative Practice*, 146,  
   159, 164  
 mayor, 107, 126  
 newspapers, 107  
 organization, 108  
 Park Commission, 112  
 parks, 104  
 personnel, 111, 163-168  
   recruitment, 111, 158, 163, 164  
   salaries, 128, 165  
   superannuation, 167-68  
   tenure, 167  
   training, 151, 163, 165, 224-25  
 planning, 143  
 Playground Board, 111  
 police, 159-60  
 Police Department, 108, 150  
 public utilities, 104  
 Public Works Department, 152  
 purchasing, 111, 128, 152, 162-63  
 recreation, 140, 144  
 Recreation Commission, 142  
 reorganization, 152-55  
 reports, 108, 144  
   in motion pictures, 146  
 Traffic Safety Commission, 143  
 water supply, 104  
 zoning, 112  
 Berkeley City Club, 112, 113, 114  
 Berkeley City Manager Committee, 118-19  
 Berkeley Council Manager League, 124-26,  
   131, 141, 170  
*Berkeley Daily Gazette*, 102, 115, 118, 120,  
   122, 124, 126, 127, 137, 145  
 Berkeley General Hospital, 158  
 Berkeley Manufacturers' Association, 116  
 Berkeley Municipal League, 119, 120, 122-  
   23, 125-26, 130  
*Berkeley Municipal News*, 145  
 Berkeley Welfare Society, 116  
 Bice, C. E., 271  
 Bierman, August, 200  
 Bixby, Jotham, 326  
 Bock, Franklin W., 35  
 Bonner, James, 340, 343  
 Bostwick, Charles E., 15, 26  
 Briggs, James, 139  
 Briggs, Theodore, 44-45  
 Brindley, John E., 239-40  
 Broderick, Thomas, 50, 51, 53  
 Bruere, Henry, 268  
 Buck, George L., 339  
 Budget, 6, 29, 33, 44, 47, 62, 74, 80-82,  
   106, 110, 128-29, 148, 159-62, 246,  
   251, 265, 283, 313, 340, 365, 407,  
   417-18  
   control, 33, 44, 142, 160-62, 365, 418  
 Building code, 278  
 Bureau of Municipal Research  
   Dayton, 265, 268, 271, 277-78, 317  
   New York, 9, 10, 83  
   Rochester, 10-11, 17, 19, 21, 27, 32,  
     36, 52, 58, 65, 83-84, 87-88, 92  
 Burke, R. H., 198-99, 214-16, 231  
 Burkhart, E. E., 271  
 Bush, Roy F., 49  
 Caldecott, Thomas, 119, 122  
 Calhoun, J. C., 228  
 Callahan, H. S., 327, 338-39, 347  
 Cappel, Fred, 271  
 Cartwright, Louis, 34, 80  
 Central Trades and Labor Council, 21, 39  
 Chamber of Commerce  
   Ames, 235  
   Berkeley, 127  
   Dayton, 260, 268  
   Hamilton, 176, 183-84, 185, 192, 194,  
     196, 209  
   Oakland, 112  
   Winnetka, 417  
 Charleville, J. W., 346  
 Charter League, Hamilton, 192  
 Charts, organization, 73, 75, 77  
 Cheney, Charles H., 335  
 Chicago Sanitary District, 389  
 Childs, Richard S., 280  
 Cincinnati  
   finance, 314  
   mayor, 21, 274  
 Citizens' Committee of One Hundred  
   Dayton, 268, 270-71, 280, 287, 296,  
     319  
   Rochester, 19  
 Citizens' Economy League, Berkeley, 124  
 Citizens' Recall Committee, Long Beach,  
   342  
 Citizens' Republican Committee, Roches-  
   ter, 26, 27, 28  
 City-county consolidation, 363

- City Club, Rochester, 17, 19  
 City Government Plan Committee, 19-21, 28  
 City manager  
   administrative authority  
     Ames  
       accepted, 248  
       limited, 249, 251, 256  
     Berkeley  
       Edy's interpretation, 134  
       stated in charter, 127-29  
     Dayton  
       assured by council, 274-75  
       significant change, 297  
       stated in charter, 272  
     Long Beach  
       defined after 1934, 346-47  
       questioned, 330  
     Rochester  
       further integration, 72  
       weakened by politics, 74  
     Winnetka  
       delegated by president, 401  
       extra-legal devices, 413, 416-17  
 education, 31, 46, 70, 133, 136, 274, 282, 285-86, 343, 347, 404  
 experience, 31, 46, 70, 133, 136, 220, 244, 274, 282, 285-86, 335, 337-40, 343, 347, 404  
 personality, 274, 288, 410  
 policy determination, 247  
 political issue, 38, 41, 66  
 political leadership, 31, 69, 96, 125, 131, 170, 336  
 public relations, 138, 144, 146, 253, 279-80, 295, 311-12, 366-67  
 residence, 208, 285-86, 335, 343  
 tenure, 348  
 too conspicuous, 36  
 City Manager Committee, Rochester, 19  
 City Manager League, Rochester, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 47, 50, 53, 54, 57-58, 60, 64, 66  
 City manager plan campaign, 14, 16-25, 112, 265, 319, 329  
 City manager plan, local experience. *See* under individual cities  
 City manager plan theory, individual interpretation, Woolhiser, 405  
 City Managers' Association, 279  
 City planning, 37, 40, 52, 92, 143, 176, 183, 197, 252, 278, 316-17, 336, 382-83, 416  
 Civil Service Assembly, 224  
 Civil Service Commissions, 89-90, 223, 276, 303-4  
 Cleveland, Frederick, 10  
 Commission government, 105, 106, 122, 138, 157, 170, 268, 271, 328-29, 348, 362  
 Commission Government Association, 16  
 Committee of One Hundred and Five, Winnetka, 391-92  
 Complaint bureau, 68  
 Consultants, 180  
 Coordination, 74, 80, 155-56, 221-22, 315, 353, 414, 426-33  
   extra-legal devices 379, 381, 386, 400, 415-16, 430, 433-34  
 Cope, Ella Mae, 193, 195, 231  
 Cotton, Wilbur M., 273  
 Cottrell, W. F., 230  
 Council  
   Ames  
     political leadership, 248, 255  
     quality of members, 254-55  
   Berkeley  
     authority defined, 128  
     incumbents supported, 126  
     new members appointed, 170  
     procedure, 132-33  
     quality of, 120-22, 129-31  
   Dayton  
     indifferent, 295  
     procedure, 299-300  
     size, 266, 272, 288, 320  
     viewed with suspicion, 280  
   Hamilton  
     indifferent, 184  
     proportional representation, 199-202  
     size, 181  
   Long Beach  
     comparison of, 370  
     quality of, 346-47  
     recall provisions, 333  
     retained, 345  
     salaries, 333  
     size, 332  
   Rochester  
     decline of, 7  
     political control, 54-55, 58-59  
     salaries, 60  
     size, 29, 61  
     strong men elected, 30  
   Winnetka  
     procedure, 397-98  
     quality of, 399-400  
     size, 397  
 Council-manager relations, 127, 133, 167, 205, 244-48, 255, 275, 280, 285, 287-91, 307, 339, 346-47, 370, 406  
 Cox, James M., 262  
 Dabagh, Thomas S., 122  
 Dailey, Donald, 49, 50  
 Dayton  
   accounting, 301, 304  
   advisory boards, 303  
   board of health, 265

Dayton—*continued*

budget, 265, 283, 313  
 building code, 278  
 charter advisory board, 288  
 Citizens' Committee of One Hundred,  
     268, 270-71, 280, 287, 296, 319  
 city plan board, 303  
 Civic Music League, 277  
 civil service commission, 276, 303-4  
 coordination, 315  
 council, 266, 272, 280, 288, 295, 299-  
     300, 320  
 council-manager relations, 275, 280, 285,  
     287-91, 307  
 councilmen, 289  
 debt, 318  
 department heads, 275-76, 297, 302, 305  
 descriptive background, 259-64  
 elections, 280-82  
 finance, 283-84, 288, 293-94, 312-14,  
     321  
 flood, 269, 319  
 grade crossings, 293, 316  
 home rule, 267  
 housing, 263  
 independent boards, 265, 303  
 Ku Klux Klan, 262  
 labor unions, 264  
 legal aid, 302  
 manager, 272, 274, 282, 285  
     administrative authority, 272, 274-75,  
         297  
     education, 274, 282, 285-86  
     experience, 274, 282, 285-86  
     policy determination, 297  
     personality, 274, 288, 320  
     public relations, 279, 295, 311-12  
     residence, 285-86  
 manager plan, 296  
 manager plan campaign, 265, 319  
 market, 270  
 mayor, 269, 272  
     salary, 265  
 Miami and Erie Canal, abandoned, 293  
 newspapers, 300, 312  
 organization, 297, 299  
 park commission, 265  
 personnel, 275-76, 290, 304-7  
     in-service training, 309  
     merit system, 304-5  
     morale, 310  
     organizations, 309  
     patronage system, 304-6  
     residence, 305, 307  
     retirement, 311  
     salaries, 308  
 planning, 278, 316-17  
 policewomen, 302  
 public welfare, 277, 302

Dayton—*continued*

purchasing, 276, 290, 301, 304, 314  
 purchasing agent, 302, 314  
 recall, 272  
 recreation, 302  
 refuse disposal, 277  
 relief, 302, 321-22  
 reports, 275-76, 312-13  
 sewage disposal, 292  
 sinking fund, 265  
 Socialists, 262, 281, 287  
 Townsend Club, 262  
 water works, 292  
 Workers' Alliance, 262  
 Dayton Art Institute, 262-63  
 Dayton Electric Laboratories Company, 260  
 Dayton *Herald*, 307  
 Dayton *Journal*, 270  
 Dayton *News*, 295  
 Dayton Research Association, 192, 311, 318  
 Debt, 32, 41, 47, 149, 190-92, 228, 236,  
     252, 318, 418  
*Democrat and Chronicle*, Rochester, 20, 36,  
     52  
 Deneen, C. E., 183  
 Department heads, 6, 8, 34, 42, 47, 51, 71,  
     107, 111, 128, 139-41, 159, 161, 166,  
     220, 249-50, 275-76, 297, 302, 305,  
     340, 355, 363, 366, 390, 401, 406,  
     408-9, 422-23  
     career service, 250  
     residence, 208  
     tenure, 139-40, 250, 409  
 Dicker, Samuel, 52, 64  
 Dickson, Virgil, 111  
 Dobbin, E. S., 340  
 Dorton, Randall M., 343, 346-48, 351, 353,  
     357, 361-63, 366-68, 371  
 Driver, M. B., 119, 122  
  
 East Bay Municipal Utility District, 104  
 East Bay Regional Park District, 104  
 East Bay Water Company, 110  
 Eastman, George, 9, 10, 13, 17, 18, 19,  
     21, 24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36  
 Eastman Kodak Company, 48  
 Edgerton, Hiram H., 61, 70  
 Edy, John N., 133-41, 144, 146-48, 152,  
     159, 160, 164  
 Eichelberger, Fred O., 286-95, 307, 309-10,  
     315-16, 320  
 Eichelberger, John S., 139  
 Elections, 12, 36, 50, 51, 94, 122-23, 142,  
     177, 280-82, 331  
     nonpartisan, 26, 31, 39, 42, 48, 53-57,  
         95, 205, 207-8  
 Eliel, Paul, 112  
*Enterpriser*, 366

- Finance, 43-45, 71, 74, 78-9, 82, 94, 147,  
149-50, 251-52, 283-84, 288, 293-94,  
312-14, 321, 345, 350, 361, 418  
centralization of, 74, 78-9, 82, 94, 345,  
350-51, 361, 418
- Fire prevention, 32, 92, 228
- Fisher, Lester, 39
- Fisk, Chester C., 136
- Fitzgerald, Robert L., 390, 411-12, 419
- Fletcher, Carl, 347
- Flood, Dayton, 269, 319
- Forward Berkeley Committee, 127
- Foulkes, Louis S., 20, 28, 46
- Frechtling, Eleanor W., 209, 211
- Frechtling, Louis E., 230
- French, Burton L., 230
- French, Richard S., 131
- Gaines, Frank S., 126, 127, 131
- Gambling, 210-11, 214-15
- Gannett, Frank, 18, 51
- Garbage disposal, 115, 149
- Gardner, Edward J., 225
- Goethals, George W., 274
- Gordon, George W., 399
- Grade crossings, 293, 316, 385-6
- Graves, E. H., 238-39, 256
- Green, Clarence, 193
- Griffenhagen and Associates, 350-51, 364
- Hagerman, E. E., 301
- Haggerty, George, 139
- Hamilton
- accounting, 225
  - advisory boards, 219, 221
  - Charter Commission Committee, 192
  - Charter Commission, 195, 209-11
  - Citizens' Committee Favoring Sale of  
Electric Light Plant, 185, 193
  - city planning commission, 183
  - civil service commission, 223
  - Committee of One Hundred, 183
  - community chest, 183
  - consultants, 180
  - coordination, 221-22
  - council, 184, 201-2, 207
    - appoints independent boards, 179
    - committee of the whole, 213
    - size, 181
  - debt, 190-92, 228
  - department heads, 220
  - descriptive background, 173
  - elections, 177
  - fire department, 228
  - gambling, 210-11, 214-15
  - health, 178, 226
  - library, 177
- Hamilton—*continued*
- manager
    - experience, 220
    - policy determination, 215
    - residence, 208
  - manager plan, outgrowth of civic interest,  
197
  - mayor, 180, 201
    - political leadership, 215
  - organization, 182, 218-19
  - personnel, 223-26
    - in-service training, 224-25
    - merit system, 223-24
    - retirement, 226
    - salaries, 180, 225
    - tenure, 181, 208
  - planning, 176, 183, 197
  - police department, 227-28
  - prohibition, 210
  - proportional representation, 183, 194,  
198
  - public utilities, 184, 229
  - public welfare, 226-27
  - purchasing, 177, 222-23
  - records, 227
  - Socialists, 201
  - state control, 198, 222, 229
- Hamilton, Alexander, 173
- Hamilton Welfare Association, 183
- Harley, E. C., 271
- Hatton, A. R., 19, 21, 194
- Heads of departments. *See* Department  
heads
- Health, 140, 178, 226, 249
- Hegemann, Werner, 112
- Henderson, Charles S., 337-38, 339
- Herdman, F. E., 389-91, 419
- Herrick, Mrs. Benita, 131
- Hewes, Charles E., 334
- Heywood, Charles, 107, 112, 113, 115,  
117-18
- Higgins, Clarence, 34, 80
- Hodghead, Beverley, 107, 113
- Hoesterey, Julius, 17, 46, 49, 50, 63
- Holmes, E. Clarence, 119
- Home rule, 19, 21, 22, 23, 105, 190, 267
- Hopkins, P. F., 238-45
- Hotchkiss, James L., 14-15, 20, 26, 28
- Housing, 52, 263
- Hoyt, Mrs. Carrie, 119, 131
- Hume, Leigh, 340, 363
- Hunt, Henry T., 274
- Illinois
- Commerce Commission, 386, 429
  - Department of Public Health, 432
  - League of Women Voters, 412
- Independent boards, 8, 265, 303, 413, 415-  
16

- Initiative, 106  
 International City Managers' Association,  
   65, 137, 144, 254, 331, 348, 404-5  
 Iowa  
   Highway Commission, 235, 244, 255  
   State College, 235  
   Engineering Society, 254  
   Journal of History and Politics, 241  
   League of Municipalities, 239, 254  
 Irving, Samuel C., 107, 114
- Jacobstein, Meyer, 21, 23, 24, 28, 39  
 James, L. W., 271  
 Jenner, Austin, 399  
 Jennings, Rufus, 116  
 Jones, William C., 106, 113, 115  
 Junior Chamber of Commerce, 145
- Keeler, Charles, 117  
 Kelly, George B., 49  
 Kelly, Howard, 185, 205, 231  
 Kettering, Charles F., 259  
 Kneisly, O. B., 271  
 Kneubuhl, Emily, 20, 21, 26  
 Knight, Harry, 417, 431  
 Koehler, Harry J., 185, 193, 196, 198-99,  
   205-06, 209, 219, 224, 231
- Labor unions, 54, 193, 264, 342  
 Ladley, E. M., 224, 231  
 League of California Municipalities, 137,  
   343  
 League of Ohio Municipalities, 301  
 League of Women Voters, Berkeley, 131,  
   143, 145  
 Legal aid, 302  
 Lepawsky, Albert, 380  
 Lewis, C. C., 340  
 Libraries, 44, 74, 177, 236  
 Lloyd, Henry D., 388  
 Lochte, Arthur, 53  
 Lohman, Phillip H., 230  
 Long Beach  
   accounting, 333, 341, 361-62  
   assessments, 363  
   auditor, 333  
   budget, 340  
   budget control, 365  
   Charter Enforcement Party, 342-44, 371  
   Citizens' Committee Against the Recall,  
     344  
   Citizens' Recall Committee, 342  
   city-county consolidation, considered, 363  
   City Employees' Association, 360  
   commission government, 328-29, 348,  
     362  
   coordination, 353  
   coordinator of traffic safety, 369  
   Long Beach—*continued*  
     council, 346, 370  
       appointed civil service board, 324, 355  
       recall, 333, 341  
       retained, 345  
       salaries, 333  
       size, 332  
     council-manager relations, 339, 346-47,  
       370  
     department heads, 340, 355, 363, 366  
     descriptive background, 325-26  
     elections, 331  
     finance, 345, 350, 361  
     harbor, 336  
     labor unions, 342  
     manager  
       administrative authority, 330, 346-47  
       education, 343, 347  
       experience, 335, 337-40, 343, 347  
       political leadership, 336  
       public relations, 366-67  
       recall, 333, 339, 343, 370  
       residence, 335, 343  
       tenure, 348  
     manager plan, 331, 346  
     manager plan campaign, 329  
     Managerial Government Group, 342  
     newspapers, 328, 331, 342, 344-45  
     organization, 349-50  
     parks, 336  
     personnel, 354  
       employee organization, 360  
       in-service training, 358  
       merit system, 355  
       morale, 360  
       removal, 360  
       retirement, 359  
       salaries, 358-59, 362  
     planning, 336  
     public utilities, 336  
     purchasing, 329, 361, 364  
     radio releases, 367  
     recall, 330, 333, 339, 343, 370  
       amendment raised percentage, 344  
     reorganization, 334, 350  
     reports, 369  
     safety campaign, 369  
     United Citizens' Committee, 345  
   Long Beach *Argus*, 344  
   Long Beach *Daily Telegram*, 328, 330, 342  
   Long Beach *Independent*, 366  
   Long Beach *Press*, 330  
   Long Beach *Press-Telegram*, 344  
   Long Beach *Star-Progress*, 344  
   Long Beach *Sun*, 342, 344  
   Los Angeles County Civil Service Com-  
     mission, 335  
   Love, William F., 15, 23

- MacFarlin, Harold S. W., 50-53, 64, 67-68, 76  
 MacSweeney, Leo A., 15, 26, 45  
 McBain, Howard Lee, 21  
 McGee, John F., 271  
 Management aids, 158, 247, 427-28  
 Mandel, Arch, 192, 273  
 Manierre, John F., 399  
 Martin, Edward A., 126, 127, 131  
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 282  
 May, Samuel C., 119  
 Mayor, 7-8, 30, 42, 45, 50-52, 61-63, 66, 67, 70, 85, 94, 106, 107, 120, 121, 126-27, 130, 180-81, 201, 215, 238-39, 254, 256, 265, 269, 272  
 Mendenhall, A. I., 271  
 Millard, Walter J., 194, 196  
 Millikin, Mark, 183, 193, 195, 211, 214-15  
 Model Charter. *See* National Municipal League  
 Moody, Mrs. A. C., 119  
 Mork, Walter, 120, 131  
 Morrish, William, 117  
 Motion pictures. *See* Reports.  
 Motor vehicles, municipal, 429  
 Moulton, William B., 399, 401, 434  
 Municipal Finance Officers' Association, 141  
  
 National Cash Register Company, 260  
 National Municipal League, 113, 196, 417  
 Model Charter, 417  
 National Recreation Association, 307  
 New Trier Township Committee, 381, 384-85, 432  
 N. Y. S. Water Power and Control Commission, 48  
 Newspapers, 13, 20, 25, 107, 113, 124, 192, 300, 312, 328, 331, 345, 366, 390  
 Nichols, F. E., 120  
 Nier, George, 34, 36  
 Nolen, John, 143, 149  
 Nonpartisan League for Better Representation, Hamilton, 212  
 Non-Partisan League for the Preservation of Popular Government, Rochester, 25  
 North Shore Citizens' Association, 389  
 North Shore Municipal Milk Control Co-operative Service, 432  
 North Shore Times, 411  
 Northway, John, 184, 231  
  
 Oakwood, manager, 263  
 O'Neil, Martin B., 26, 70  
 Organization, 108, 182, 218-19, 297, 299, 349-50, 414  
 emergency, 155  
*See also* Charts, organization  
 Oviatt, Percival D., 42, 45, 63  
 Owen, Charles S., 41, 42, 43, 45, 62  
  
 Parce, Donald, 127  
 Parks, 44, 74, 93, 104, 243, 336, 382  
 Patterson, John H., 266, 268-70, 285, 296-97, 317  
 Paviour, Ernest A., 21, 44  
 Performance records, 252  
 Personnel, 11, 37, 40, 111, 163-68, 223-26, 248, 249, 275-76, 290, 304-7, 354, 421, 431  
 in-service training, 151, 163, 224-25, 309, 358, 425  
 merit system, 89, 223-24, 304-05, 355, 422  
 morale, 310, 360, 426  
 organizations, 309, 360  
 patronage system, 32-34, 47, 86, 91, 304-6  
 political activity, 35, 42, 422  
 recruitment, 111, 150-51, 158, 163-64  
 removal, 250, 360, 406, 425-26  
 residence, 305, 307, 423  
 retirement, 226, 251, 311, 359  
 salaries, 128, 165, 190, 225, 250-51, 306, 358-59, 362, 423  
 superannuation, 167-68  
 tenure, 167, 181, 208, 249-50  
 training. *See* Personnel, in-service training  
  
 Peterson, William M., 406  
 Pfiffner, John M., 240  
 Phelan, Francis E., 399  
 Pierce, C. L., 21  
 Planning. *See* City planning  
 Platt, Clarence, 21, 34  
 Police, 32, 38, 92, 159-60, 227-28, 249, 401, 406, 409, 413, 427, 430  
 Policewomen, 302, 431  
 Political machines, 9-14, 43, 54, 59, 84, 96  
 Poole, Arthur C., 42, 43, 44  
 Porter, William A., 131  
 Price, Russell P., 212, 219-20, 224, 228-29, 231  
 Primmer, B. F., 188, 189  
 Probst rating system, 356-57  
 Proportional representation, 17, 26, 55, 57, 95, 183, 194, 198, 200-1, 203-7, 212, 216, 320  
 Public Health League Nursing Association, 178, 226  
*Public Management*, 404  
 Public utilities, 104, 388  
 municipal ownership, 184, 229, 236, 243, 336  
 Public welfare, 43, 76, 226-27, 277, 302  
 Public works, 32, 33, 40  
 Purchasing, 6, 8, 29, 32, 41, 74, 83-86, 111, 128, 152, 162-63, 177, 222-23, 246, 253-54, 276, 290, 301, 304, 314, 329, 361, 364, 410, 420



- Radio, 68, 367  
 Raitt, Charles B., 35, 36  
 Rapp, Lester B., 51, 52, 64  
 Rauh, Leopold, 271  
 Recall, 48, 67, 106, 272, 330, 333, 339,  
   341, 343, 344, 370  
 Records, 163, 227, 242, 247, 428  
 Recreation, 35, 93, 140, 144, 302  
 Reed, Thomas H., 113, 114  
 Referendum, 106  
 Refuse disposal, 277  
 Relief, 302, 321-22  
 Reorganization, 152-55, 334, 350  
 Reports, 68, 108, 144, 146, 253, 275-76,  
   312-13, 369, 406, 411  
   via motion pictures, 68, 146, 411, 427  
 Rice, T. L., 239  
 Ridley, Clarence E., 144, 368  
 Rightor, Chester E., 266, 276  
 Rike, F. H., 271  
 Rippey, Harlan W., 16, 46, 49  
 Rissinger, A. J., 432  
 Rochester  
   accounting, 82  
   administrative committees, 71  
   advisory committee, 45, 63, 67  
   assessments, 43, 76, 86-89  
   Board of Estimate and Apportionment,  
     78  
   budget, 6, 29, 47, 62, 74, 80-82  
     control, 33  
     slashed, 44  
   charter, 7-11  
   charts, organization, 73, 75, 77  
   city hall, 52  
   civic education  
     by motion pictures, 68  
     by radio, 68  
   Civil Service Commission, 89-90  
   complaint bureau, 68  
   council, 6-7, 30, 54-55, 58  
     committees, 59  
     deadlocked, 39  
     overlapping terms, 55  
     recall, 67  
     salaries, 60  
     size, 61  
   debt, 32, 41, 47  
   department heads, 8, 51  
   Department of Assessment, 52  
   Department of Commerce, 52, 67, 68  
   Department of Finance, 71, 76, 78, 79,  
     85  
   descriptive background, 3-7  
   elections, 12, 36, 50, 51  
   finance, 43-45, 71, 74, 78, 79, 82, 94  
   Financial Advisory Board, 44  
   fire prevention, 32, 92  
   housing, 52  
   Rochester—*continued*  
     independent boards, 8  
     labor unions, 54  
     library, 44, 74  
     manager, 31, 43, 58, 62  
       administrative authority, 72, 76  
       education, 31, 46, 70  
       experience, 31, 46, 70  
       political issue, 38, 41, 66  
       political leadership, 31, 69, 96  
       too conspicuous, 36  
     manager plan, 9, 10  
       method of adoption, 22-23  
     manager plan campaign, 14, 16-25  
     mayor, 7, 8, 30, 42, 43, 45, 50, 51, 52,  
       61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 70, 85  
     parks, 44, 74, 93  
     personnel, 11, 37, 40  
       director abolished, 44  
       patronage system, 32-34, 86, 91  
       political activity, 35, 42  
     Personnel Office, 90  
     planning, 37, 40, 52, 92  
     police, 32, 38, 92  
       director abolished, 44  
     political machine, 9-14, 43, 54, 59, 84,  
       96  
     public works, 32, 33, 40  
     purchasing, 6, 8, 29, 32, 41, 74, 83-86  
     recall attempted, 48  
     recreation, 35, 93  
     report, 68  
     salaries, 35, 37, 40, 74, 88-89  
     survey, 9  
     water supply, 47, 66, 67  
     welfare, 43, 76  
   Rochester *Evening News*, 67  
   Rochester *Journal*, 18  
   Roosevelt, Franklin D., 262  
   Rowell, Chester, 119  
  
 San Diego, manager, 339  
 San Jose, manager, 113, 114  
 Sanderson, L. D., 117  
 Schmidt, George, 116, 118, 120  
 Schmidt, Louis B., 240  
 Seasingood, Murray, 193  
 Sewage disposal, 292  
 Sieck, Herbert, 399  
 Silverstein, Joseph, 45, 46, 50, 51  
 Sinclair, Earl J., 117, 136  
 Smith, Alfred E., 16  
 Smith, Culla J., 183  
 Snyder, LeRoy, 10, 17, 24, 41  
 Socialists, 201, 262  
 Sparks, W. A., 271  
 Squires, Harry J., 139  
 Stanton, Charles, 38, 45, 46, 49, 50, 63  
 State control, 190, 198, 222, 229, 267, 313

Stone, Emery, 127  
 Story, Stephen B., 27, 28, 32, 33, 36-42,  
 45, 47, 57, 62, 65, 66, 70, 85-87, 96  
 Stringham, Frank, 117, 119, 121, 130  
 Taft, Robert, 194  
 Taxpayers' Protective League, 123  
 Teaff, C. N., 220  
 Technical Advisory Corporation of New  
 York, 316  
 Telford, Fred, 164  
 Thompson, Hollis R., 116, 125, 136, 150,  
 159  
 Toerner, Joseph, 214  
 Udall, A. R., 126  
 United States Public Health Service, 432  
 VanZandt, Clarence D., 14, 23, 24, 26,  
 61, 70  
 Vaughn, F. K., 193-95, 211  
 Vollmer, August, 108, 111, 150  
 Voters' and Taxpayers' League, Berkeley,  
 125  
 Waite, Henry M., 274, 277-79, 282, 284-  
 86, 291, 298, 307, 317, 320  
 Washburne, Carlton, 381  
 Water supply, 47, 66, 67, 104, 292  
 Wayne, Anthony, 184  
 Welsh, J. Henry, 185, 200  
 Welsh, Leo, 185, 188, 207, 210, 212, 231  
 Wentworth, Frank, 120  
 Wheeler, Benjamin Ide, 113  
 White, Leonard, 280  
 Wilcox, Paul B., 330, 331  
 Williams, Harold, 331  
 Willmore City, 326  
 Willmore, W. E., 326  
 Wilson, J. Stitt, 107  
 Wilson, Joseph C., 14, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30,  
 36, 39, 62  
 Wilson, Lucius E., 271  
 Wilson, Woodrow, 114, 262  
 Windham, Charles H., 335-337, 339, 347-  
 48  
 Winnetka  
 accounting, 413, 415, 419  
 advisory board, 393  
 auditing, 421  
 budget, 407, 417  
 budget control, 418  
 caucus, 387, 391-95, 397, 399-400, 405,  
 415, 432, 434  
 charter, 379  
 Citizens' Ticket, 391  
 Clean Village Club, 389  
 Committee of One Hundred and Five,  
 391-92

Winnetka—*continued*

Community House, 387, 395-96, 417,  
 434  
 coordination, 414, 426-33  
 extra legal devices, 379, 381, 386, 400,  
 415-16, 430, 433-34  
 council, 393, 397-400, 406-7, 413  
 power restricted, 384  
 council-manager relations, 406  
 debt, 418  
 department heads, 390, 401, 406, 408-  
 9, 422-23  
 descriptive background, 375-78  
 exhibits, 412  
 finance, 418  
 grade crossings, 385-86  
 independent boards, 413, 415-16  
 library board, 381  
 manager, 406-8  
 administrative authority, 401, 413,  
 416-17  
 control of personnel, 422  
 education, 404  
 experience, 404  
 personality, 410  
 manager plan, 389-90, 394  
 approached ideal, 433  
 marshal, 415  
 motor vehicles, 429  
 newspapers, 390  
 organization, 414  
 park commission, 381  
 parks, 382  
 personnel, 421  
 in-service training, 425  
 interlocking, 431  
 merit system, 422,  
 morale, 426  
 political activity, 422  
 promotions, 424  
 removal, 406, 425-26  
 residence, 423  
 retirement, 226, 251, 311, 359, 384,  
 425-26  
 salaries, 423  
 personnel director, 410, 422  
 plan commission, 383  
 planning, 382-83, 416  
 police, 401, 406, 409, 413, 427, 430  
 policewoman, 431  
 president, 400-3, 427, 434  
 prohibition law, 380  
 Public Discussions Club, 389  
 public utilities, 388  
 purchasing, 410, 420  
 records, 428  
 reports, 406, 411  
 via motion pictures, 411, 427  
 tax delinquency, 433

*Winnetka—continued*

taxes, 381

Women's Club, 417

zoning, 382-83, 416

Winnetka Garden Club, 431

*Winnetka Talk*, 411

Woolhiser, H. L., 404-12, 418, 421, 428-30, 433-34

Woman's City Club, Hamilton, 192-93, 203, 209-10

Women, influence upon government, 17

Women's City Club, Rochester, 17-21, 28

Workers' Alliance, Berkeley, 124

Wright, Orville, 259

Wright, Wilbur, 259

Yendes, S. E., 307

Young, Isabelle, 399

Zohnder, J. B., 271

Zoning, 112, 382-83, 416



















